Posts about: "Airbus" [Posts: 64 Pages: 4]

Once again thanks M2dude and ChristiaanJ for such interesting answers. Whilst Concorde was not a commerical success it was certainly a technical "tour de force". Would it be too much of an exaggeration to say that Concorde provided the sound technical foundations on which Airbus have now so successfully built?
Am I right in saying that Concorde was the first fly by wire commerical plane?

Hi Nick, thanks again for your comments. As far as not being a commercial success, for the airline this side of the Channel it was a HUGE commercial success (but of course I accept that in manufacturing terms this was far from the case. The project suffered from very poor financial control). Concorde was the first commercial FBW aircraft as you rightly surmised.
A huge amount of Airbus work was 'burried' in the Concorde project; at Filton a large amount of Airbus components came through that were almost identical to those on Concorde. (witness the STRIKING similarity between the A300 main gear and that of Concorde). Apologies if this post is a little tardy, it's done from my IPhone).

No thanks needed.. I like plunging back into the history, especially when people are interested, and I have a sneaky suspicion that M2dude does too!
As M2dude says... to some extent, yes!

As an example in my particular field, you have to be an expert to distinguish the Concorde ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) and HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator) - the two big central instruments on the pilot's and copilot's panel - from those on the first Airbus, the A300, or the early A310s. Apart from a couple of lights and buttons, they were the same, and the innards were pretty well identical.

And a lot of the technology in the AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System, i.e., the autopilots, etc.) was also virtually indistinguishable (the circuitry was obviously different... an A300 did not do Mach2).

But even more than the technical foundations, Concorde also laid the foundations for an effective and successful international cooperation in aircraft design, development and production.
We learned a tremendous amount from Concorde... Airbus might still have happened without Concorde, but it certainly would have happened years later.

Yes, you're right.
The one difference with "modern" FBW commercial planes (such as the A320) is that Concorde still did have a mechanical back-up for when all else failed.
At the time, there was still a doubt about all these new-fangled elektriks replacing good old rods and cables, so when you look under the floor in a Concorde, the rods and cables are still there.
But apart from tests and training for emergencies, essentially they were never used.

Biggles78
Sorry Biggles78, I'd forgotten to answer your CofG query, so here we go: CofG was a really critical parameter on Concorde, being a delta, with no tailplane made it more so at take off speeds, and as we've previously said, was how we trimmed the aircraft for supersonic flight. CG was expressed as a percentage of the aerodynamic chord line. To get indication of CG you needed to know the mass of fuel in each tank; easy, from the FQI system. You needed to know the moment arm of each tank, (fixed of course). You then needed the zero fuel weight (ZFW) and zero fuel CG (ZFCG); these were manually input into the CG computers by the F/E, from load control data. The final parameter you needed was total fuel weight, again easy from the FQI system.
The 'normal' T/O CG was 53.5%, but in order to increase fuel weight (and hence range) an extra 'bump' was enabled to allow a max T/O CG of 54%. (CG was indicated on a linear gauge, with forward and aft limit 'bugs' either side of the needle. These bugs would move as a function of Mach and at the lower end of the speed range, A/C weight also). As the A/C accelerated, the limit bugs would move rearwards (with of course the rearward shifting centre of pressure) and so the fuel would be moved from the two front trim tanks 9 & 10 to the rear tank. 11. Once tank 11 reached it's preset limit (around 10 tonnes), the remainder of the 'front' fuel would automatically over-spill into tanks 5 & 7. (Once the fuel panel was set up, the whole process was controlled with a single switch). At Mach 2, the CG would be around 59%, the whole rearwards shift being in the order of 6'. As we said before, the 'final' CG could be tweaked to give us a 1/2 degree down elevon, for minimum drag.
I really hope this helps Biggles78.

Guys, back to the Airbus thing; My friend ChristiaanJ gave some really accurate insights, (he always does) but there is another legacy that carries on the this day; some of the audio warning tones were COPIED from Concorde into Airbus. (For example, the A/P disconnect audio is identical). I think this is great, and gives 'our' aircraft a lasting everyday legacy.

As far as the fly by wire goes, Concorde had a relatively simple analog system, with little or no envelope protection (Except at extreme angles if attack). As has been previously poted before, production series test aircraft 201, F-WTSB, pioneered the use of a sidestick within a new digital fly by wire Controlled Conviguration Vehicle sytem, with envelope protection and attitude rate feedback. (This evolved into the superb system known and loved by the Airbus community). It is a really bizaar twist of fate that the Concorde FBW system has more mechanical similarities to the system used in the B777 than Airbus. (Mechanically similar at the front end, with an electric backdrive system moving the column in A/P mode; Concorde being backdriven by a hydraulic relay jack).
As a final piece of irony; the Primary Flight Control Computers on the B777 are designed and built by GEC Marconi Avionics in Rochester Kent, now BAe Systems. This is the same plant where Elliot (becoming Marconi and finally GEC Marconi Avionics) developed and built the UK half of the AFCS computers. Isn't this aviation world strange?
Galaxy Flyer
Your inputs here are great, and I'm sure appreciated by all. (I assume from your name that you were a C5A pilot. While I was in the RAF on C-130's, our Lockheed rep' used to supply us all with company magazines, that were full of stuff on this new (it was then) giant of the sky. I fell in love with it there and then).
Anyway, back to Conc': The decel' positions were carefully worked out and adhered to; the aim was to be subsonic to within (I think) 50 nm of the east coast. I'll wait for one of my Concorde pilot friends to confirm that here, but i think I'm correct. I do have a fond memory of one flight out of JFK; we were temporarily 'held' by Boston ATC to Mach 1.6 (and at around FL440) because of an Air France Concorde heading for JFK. We saw this guy above us, at around FL580 on a near reciprical , doing Mach 2, screaming straight over the top of us. We were excited by this amazing spectacle, and so were the AF crew over the VHF ('you never boomed us, did we boom you?'). But the most excited person of all was this guy in Boston ATC. ('I've never seen anything like it guys, your two blips whistled over each other on my my screen like crazy').
Stliton
As far as the F/D noise levels were concerned, once the nose and visor were raised, it was as if someone had switched off the noise . The main source of noise up there was just the equipment cooling, and that was not bad either. It was, in my view, little noisier up than most subsonics. (But not the 744, where you are so far away from all the racket ).
Ozgrade3
You're making us blush here; thanks for your comments, I think we are just trying to share some of our experiences (and 'bit's we've picked up over the years).
From my perspective, I did write some stuff used by our pilots, AF even got a copy or two I think.

I feel like the fog is begining to clear and I am getting a slight understanding of how she flew. I was hung up with her flying at Mach speeds where as she was flown at an IAS (specific the the profile she was in). The Mach speed, especially when high, was a result of the temperature and not because she was f a s t ! The altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane. This is true of all aeroplanes but due to the extreme environment this was more true of Concorde?

The subsonics have issues with Coffin Corner (I think I read that one Airbus model had somehting like 7kts between the high and low end of the envelope when up high); did Concorde have this "problem"?

I remember reading the BA Concorde flew with 2 Captain Pilots (and of course the most important Flight Engineer) and when I was watching The Rise and Fall of the Concorde , I was looking for the 4 bars in the RHS. Didn't see one but on the Air France Concorde the RHS pilot had 3 stripes. Was this correct or are my "little grey cells" confused?(sorry can't type a Belgium accent )

I don't know why this popped into my head but what was her glide ratio if all the engines stopped? Maybe because I remember from my early training being told the a B707 had a better glide ratio than the PA28-140 I was learning in. Now that was an eye opener at the time.

Biggles78


...The altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane. This is true of all aeroplanes...

Sadly, it isn’t, as subsonic aircraft are allocated a specific cruising flight level and often - for example on the North Atlantic Track system - a specific cruising Mach number as well, and no deviation from that clearance is permitted without specific permission from ATC. Obviously everyone flight plans at the most economic heights and speeds for their aircraft type, but in busy airspace not everyone gets what they want!

Think of your flight plan as being Angelina Jolie, and your ATC clearance as being your wife. Your flight plan is what you’d really like to have, but your ATC clearance is what you’re going to have to live with!


... altitude flown was due to temperature and weight of the areoplane...this was more true of Concorde?...

Subsonic aircraft could equally benefit from using cruise-climb techniques (early long range aircraft crews knew all about cruise-climb techniques and used them when able) but with the large number of subsonic aircraft now using the world’s airways it is impractical for ATC to allow them to drift up and down at will, and so they are assigned specific cruising altitudes.

Few other aircraft got up to Concorde’s cruising levels, and so ATC were able to issue much more flexible clearances to her.

A typical Concorde ATC clearance would have allowed her to accelerate to M2.00 whilst operating within a "block" of altitude, rather than at a specific flight level. Typically this block clearance would have been to operate anywhere between FL450 up to FL600 without restriction.

So, unlike subsonic aircraft assigned a fixed cruising altitude such as FL350, Concorde could, and did, drift up or down, and was thus able to remain at the optimum altitude for the prevailing conditions throughout most of the flight.


... I remember reading the BA Concorde flew with 2 Captain Pilots (and of course the most important Flight Engineer)...

Concorde operated, as did all 3 crew aircraft in BA, with a standard crew of a Captain, F/O and F/E.

A small number of trips had two Captains on board (or two F/Es for that matter) when training or checking was going on, or an extra crew member was carried for PR purposes, but otherwise, the vast majority of occasions, just the standard crew was on board. Everyone preferred it that way, especially the F/O and F/E!


... The subsonics have issues with Coffin Corner (I think I read that one Airbus model had somehting like 7kts between the high and low end of the envelope when up high); did Concorde have this "problem"?...

Have a look at this picture of G-BOAE, cruising at her maximum certificated altitude of FL600, en-route to Barbados on 16 August 2003:





The available IAS speed range is shown on the ASI, and lies between the yellow and black Barbers Pole, currently indicating 440kts, and the white bug set to 300kts, the VLA ( L owest A uthorised speed) at this altitude.

The available Mach speed range is shown on the Mach meter, and lies between the yellow and black Barbers Pole, currently indicating M2.05, and the yellow bug which indicates the lowest Mach number allowed for the current aircraft CG position (the AFT limit) currently showing M1.35.

So, given that at her maximum altitude she had a speed range of 140kts IAS and a Mach range of M0.7, we can see that coffin corner was not a problem!


main_dog


...I too would like to ask what her idle thrust glide ratio was...

By my calculations, the figures quoted for a straight in approach, give an average glide ratio of around 20:1, however these were for a standard decel/descent, and on Concorde the early part of the decel/descent was not flown at idle power.

A considerable amount of power was left on initially, around 94% N2, for various reasons, and only below M1.0 were the throttles usually selected to idle.

I hadn’t noticed it until now but there does not appear to have been a chart giving glide distance at idle thrust!

However, since the speeds to be flown during the “4 Eng Flame Out” procedure were not too far from the normal decel/descent speeds, I’ll hazard a guess (and that is all it is) that the glide distance from FL600, with no thrust, would have been about 150nm, giving a glide ratio of around 15:1.

EXWOK , more than happy to take a hint........PLEASE! and welcome to this gem of a thread.

With the FBW, was there any feedback built into the yoke? The Airbus with it's "joystick" has, I believe, no feel unlike a Flight Sim force feedback one.
If there was a yoke movement on one side did the other side mirror the movement or like the Airbus did the sidestick play dead?

M2 , it appears the tailwheel was, so far, the only "fault" in an otherwise extreme machine. Were there any other items like the tailwheel that were unworthy to be in her?

Does anyone have a tech drawing of the "sliding seals" used in the hydraulics. I have trouble visualising something that could withstand the 4,000psi pressure. Why was such a high pressure used? After all the control surfaces couldn't have required that much input to effect an authority movement. I understand it was also a special fluid that was used. Was this because of the pressure it was under or the temperature extremes?

Biggles:

Yep, there was feedback. In this respect, the implementation of FBW had a rather different philosophy to FBW Airbus'.

Below 200kts it was basically a spring feedback, above that speed it was achieved throught the feel system, not entirely unlike conventional aircraft.

Of course, the feel was tempered also by the autostab system, which didn't feedback through the yoke, but did make control surface inputs. A basic analogy is to imagine a yaw damper, but on all three axes. (It was of course rather more sophisticated, especially in pitch).

During airtests we would fly portions of the supersonic accel without autostabs and it was then very obvious exactly how much input was being made - great care was needed to remain within sensible bank angles in the low supersonic regime.

Also - watch a video of the control surfaces in the latter stages of the approach and landing - all those rapid deflections are the autostabs overlaid on the pilot's inputs. One has to remember that the aircraft is effectively statically unstable in pitch at approach speeds, so a pilot up-elevator input would soon be followed by a countering autostab elevon-down to contain the tendency to keep pitching up, and vice-versa. Gusts affecting the IAS would also create an input.

All of which means the basic spring feel below 200kts is not as basic as it sounds.....and in normal signalling modes (ie FBW and autostab active) the amazing thing is that the aircraft handled beautifully through an 1100kt speed range.

If you look at a picture of the flightdeck you will see a row of 14 white switches full width of the fwd edge of the overhead panel. These were autostab pitch/roll/yaw, feel pitch/roll/yaw left and right systems and the two pitch trim switches (which played a big part in the low-speed protection).

If any of them dropped out you could be sure that the first thing the nearest pilot would do would be to try to re-engage them, as it made for a vastly more pleasant life.

Biggles78
The tailwheel design really was the one exception in poor design terms, but I'm sure that if the aircraft was doing what she should be doing right now, (you know routinely flying across the Atlantic and beyond, instead of languishing in museums), modifications would have finally put this particular malady to bed). In design terms, the rest of the aircraft was nothing short of a flying work of art, a masterpiece. Having said that though, personally I would rather that four rather than three hydraulic systems had been used. Originally there were four systems in the design, but the RED system was deleted, as it was felt to be superfluous. My own view is that this particular decision was total poppycock. Oh, and Green, Blue and Yellow hydraulic systems was something else that Airbus copied from Concorde.... although we ourselves pinched that idea off of the Comet ).
As far as the hydraulic expansion joints go, I will scour around and see if I can find a diagram for you. Try and picture two titanium (or stainless) tubes, on inside the other, with a sealed chamber being formed at the join. Inside this chamber were multiple lands fitted with special viton GLT seals. They did work incredibly well, although occasionally one of the seals gave out, and things got wet, VERY WET.
As far as the 4000 PSI hydraulic system, as EXWOK quite rightly pointed out, the loading on the flying control surfaces were immense throughout the whole flight envelope. (Picture alone just the T/O from JFK RWY 31L, where the aircraft is tightly turning and the gear retracting, all at the same time). As well as the flying controls and landing gear, you also had the droop nose to consider, four variable engine intakes as well as a couple of hydraulically operated fuel pumps. Oh, and in emergencies, a hydraulically driven 40 KVA generator too. The reason that 4000 PSI was chosen was that if a large amount of hydraulic 'work' was to be done, the only way to keep the size of jacks and actuators to a reasonable size/weight was to increase the system pressure by 25% from the normal 3000 PSI. (On the A380 they've gone a step further and gone for 5000 PSI, saving them over a tonne on the weight of the aircraft).
Concorde used a special hydraulic fluid, Chevron M2V. This is a mineral based fluid, as opposed to the ester based Skydrol, used by the subsonics. The reason that we went for a different fluid was a simple one; Skydrol is rubbish at the high temperatures that Concorde operated at, no good at all in fact, so we needed something better and in M2V we found the PERFECT fluid. As an aside, unlike Skydrol, that attacks paintwork, certain rubber seals, skin, EYES etc., M2V is completely harmless, wash your hair in it. (I did, several times when we had leaks. Thinking about it, maybe THAT is why my hair is such a diminished asset

EXWOK
It's so great having another of my pilot friends diving in to this post, welcome welcome
I remember the Mech' Signalling part of the air tests, my lunch has just finished coming back up thank you. (for interest chaps and chapesses, with mechanical signalling, using just the conventional control runs under the floor, there was no auto-stabilisation).

The artificialfeel system worked incredibly well I thought, I always found it curious that the peak load law in the computer was at the transonic rather that the supersonic speed range. It was explained to me long ago that this was because the controls really are at their most sensitive here, but at high Mach numbers are partially 'stalled out', due to shockwave movements along the surfaces, and were therefore less effective. (For this reason I was told, the inner elevons were so critical for supersonic control, being the most effective of all elevons at high speed).

To all , I forgot to mention in my previous post regarding the engine failure in G-BOAF in 1980; I remember an FAA surveyor, who was taking a look at the carnage within the engine bay, saying that in his opinion, no other aircraft in the world could have survived the intensity of the titanium fire that ensued. Analysis showed that the fire was successfully extinguished, possibly at the first shot of the fire bottle. This was a testament to the way that the Concorde engine bay could be completely 'locked down' when the fire handle was pulled, as well as to the way that the whole engine installation was technically encased in armour plate. To put all this in context, acording to Rolls Royce a titanium fire, once it takes hold, can destroy the compressor of a jet engine in four seconds.


Dude

Landroger
Wow, that's a very interesting question, do you mind if I give it a tiny slant of my own, namely system distribution?
Concorde had an ENORMOUS number of electronic control boxes, for example the powerplant alone used TWENTY SIX rather heavy computers and control units, all of which used conventional 1970's manufacturing technology. (Although the intake box was a work of art; rows and rows of double sided PCBs completely crammed with TTL chips). This whole entourage literally weighed a ton, and could be easily replaced by four modern relatively light units with multiple redundancy built in). Even the AFCS used a total of sixteen heavy boxes, again these could be reduced to three, for a modern triple channel system. The three INUs and two ADCs (Very heavy units all) could be replaced with a single ADIRU and SAARU. To complete the package two FMCs (which would also furnish autothrottle functions) could be added. A massive weight saving could be made on the FBW system, by removing the bulky mechanical components (the feel and relay jacks as well as all the mechanical control runs and the massive mixing unit under the rear floor). Careful design could easily provide a full authority triplex or quadraplex FBW system. The current controls could be replaced with either an Airbus or Boeing type system, using either a sidestick (Airbus) or retain a conventional control column system (B777/787) using electric backdrive. The pilots can decide this one. A modern databus system would also be required for providing communication and redundancy; ARINC 629 would be MY preferred choice). The wholesale replacement of the various control units and computers, not to forget miles of wiring, as well as some bulky mechanical hardware would in my view save around 3 tonnes or more in weight alone. A now far more accurate control of aircraft systems would also bring major efficiency savings. As far as saving space, that possibly free up a couple of seat rows, if it were all done properly.
We can all dream I suppose

Dude

Is this another item that Airbus used for the A330/340? I can't remember the exact arrangement for Concorde, but the 330 uses a clever lever arrangement at the top of the leg. Requires regular lubrication too or .

As we're on landing gear.
Why was the sidestay a telescopic affair? Most aircraft use a hinged geometric lock arrangement. More weight saving or down to available space in the landing gear bay?

TURIN
I was not even aware of this A33/340 similarity, sounds yet another case of Airbus using Concorde technology. (Immitation still is the greatest form of flattery I guess). As far as I am aware Concorde had none of the lubrication issues that you describe.
I think it's a space saving issue TURIN, I'm not even sure if 'our' telescopic strut arrangement was any lighter. (The Concorde solution was also somewhat more elegant don't you think)?

Dude

Ohhh.. and bits of Concorde on other aircraft etc:
The emergency generator (and generator control unit) were license built replicas of the units fitted to the F4K and F4M.
The air intake void (Pv) pressure sensor, built by Garrett Aireseach, was used in another 'case' as an inlet pressure sensor on the F14.
Carbon wheel brakes, pioneered on Concorde are now used by just about every modern commercial AND military aircraft. (Although originally trialled on a VC10 in a single brake installation).
(Already bleated on about Airbus pinching our audio warning tones etc).
The Triplex 10-20 glass, developed for and used on the visor panels were used in the automotive industry for many years to come.
I'm sure that there is stacks more.....

Dude

I would say so.

I agree with M2dude who said earlier it was not technically impossible, but the immense cost of rebuilding the necessary infrastructure (which no longer exists) is out of all proportion to the final result of a few 'heritage' flights at airshows.

What also is forgotten far too often, is that BAe accepted to maintain legacy Design Authority for the Tin Triangle, which was a pre-requisite for the Permit To Fly.

Airbus, on the contrary, returned the Type Certificate to the CAA/DGAC and thereby basically "washed their hands" of Concorde. Even if they were willing to transfer the necessary technical information to a third party, it's extremely unlikely they still would be capable of doing so.

CJ

I have always been of the possibly not substantiated opinion that all was done to make sure she would never fly again. I fully understand the significant costs incurred by EADS to provide maintenance but it would have been possible to nicely package all remaining spares and technical documentation, not mentioning the reckless butchering of many airframes.

atakacs ,

Opinions and remarks like yours really belong on forums like "SCG" or the comments columns of tabloids....

But I'll try to answer you.

The aircraft were "decommissioned".
That means that they were fully prepared as public museum exhibits, rather than being "mothballed", ready to be put back into service.
The purpose was not to make sure they would never fly again, it was to make sure they were safe for the public to visit.
That included draining all fuel, hydraulic liquid, etc.
That meant removing all pyrotechnics, like those in the RAT.
That implied venting and/or removing all high-pressure vessels, such as the emergency slides, fire bottles, oxygen systems, nitrogen tanks.
In the case of the BA aircraft, it also meant removing the electric ground power connections, to avoid incompetent amateurs trying to put ground power back on the aircraft, and start a fire.

Most of these things could have been rectified quite easily. But there was no intent to ever fly any of these aircraft again, so there was no effort made to "mothball" the aircraft, which would have been done quite differently, such as inerting some of the systems, dropping all of the engines, etc. and, far more importantly, keep a maintenance structure in place, not allow public access to any of the aircraft, etc.

Once Airbus relinquished the Type Certificate, that was the end.

Nice one...
You clearly have no idea what that would have been involved.
Just the spares alone... most of them are "lifed", and would regularly need to be either retested and requalified, or would have to be binned and replaced.

Quite what are you talking about here? No airframes were "recklessly butchered", unless you're talking about Fox-Delta, which was not really worth saving because of serious corrosion.

CJ

Sorry, no. I don't feel offended.... I suppose I've just seen too much of that particular "conspiracy theory"....

Think back a moment to the 2003 context.

Due to the economic and political situation at the time (to put it simply), Air France was already flying their Concordes nearly empty, and wanted out.
BA wasn't doing marvelously either.
Airbus (being a company, not a charity) explained that in that case BA would have to carry the full cost of the maintenance.... which WAS already going up as a consequence of maintaining a 35-year old antique flying.
So BA decided to end the service as well, even if in the end at least they went out with a bang, not a whimper.

In those last months, people like Rod Eddington and others DID have a very serious look at keeping one or two aircraft flying in a "heritage role", and there was even a look at a joint venture with the "Alliance" project.

So yes, all of the alternatives WERE explored, but, AT THE TIME, none of these were found to be viable.

So, British Airways, Air France and Airbus all drew their conclusions, which made sense AT THE TIME, and closed down the Concorde operation.
And, instead of scrapping the aircraft, every single one of them went to museums.

The two airframes that "had an angle grinder taken to them" were Alpha-Alpha and Delta-Golf.

For a start, neither would have flown ever again, anyway...

Alpha-Alpha was never modified to post-2000 standard and would have slowly rotted away at LHR. Taking her to East Fortune was a great initiative, IMHO.

Delta-Golf was an ancient certication airframe, and cannibalised for years and years for spares, and destined for scrapping.
Instead, she's now at Brooklands, and rebuilt as one of the most interesting Concorde exhibits.

As to the "angle grinder", you really have to know where to look to find the traces......
And yes, I've seen both of them.

CJ

nomorecatering asked: M2dude answered:
The BA simulator, now at Brooklands, is a long story.
For various reasons, only the simulator 'cab' could be salvaged. It was taken to Brooklands to be used as a static exhibit of what the Concorde cockpit looked like.
It was only well after its arrival at Brooklands that people started to think about bringing it back to life.... a huge piece of work, since about all that was left was the 'cab' itself, with the instruments and controls... the computers and interface circuits, needed to make them work, were all gone.
A team of volunteers, a simulator firm and university students have now brought it back to a state where it can be 'flown'. Even if not everything works yet, ex-Concorde pilots who've 'flown' it were already full of praise.
As to the visuals, the original visual system was taken back by BA, since it was recent and the same as used on other BA simulators.
It's been replaced by a specialised video projector and a wide screen, which appears quite satisfactory, although I 've heard rumours about plans to replace it with a three-projector system.

The story of the Air France simulator, that was located at CDG, is very different.
After the end-of-service it was moved almost in its entirety to Toulouse (Airbus), minus only the visual display system and the motion platform.
A small team of volunteers (mostly Airbus engineers) are slowly bringing that one 'back to life' as well, but (contrary to Brooklands) using most of the original electronics.
The intention is to have it ready for display (and use) at the Toulouse 'A\xe9roscopia' museum, which hopefully will open within a few years.
Unfortunately, until then the sim is not accessible to the public, since it's inside one of the Airbus site buildings.
And no, of course that one isn't certified either....

One small bit of trivia... the BA and AF simulators were NOT built by the same firm. The BA one was built by, IIRC, Singer-Redifon, and the French one by LMT.
Today that's a pity, really, because the Brooklands and Toulouse teams have very little technical information they can exchange.

Oh and, yes, I've visited and sat in both of them, but so far I haven't flown either of them yet.

CJ

Mike-Bracknell
It is not nonsense, and you are quite at liberty to post here. Wow, that's still quite a question though Mike. There are two TECHNICAL issues that overshadow all others, namely airframe corrosion and hydraulic system deterioration. Unfortunately none of the BA aircraft were stored inside from the outset, so we have a real issue here as far as corrosion goes, plus all the hydraulic systems were drained, resulting in seal drying out and probable moisture ingress into the 3 systems. But given sufficient funds (and assuming you find an organisation to take over design responsibility from Airbus; ironic when you consider that without Concorde there would almost certainly have been no such organisation ) there is still no technical reason why the problems (and there are dozens of other problems to consider) could not be overcome, the money side of things is another matter
Looking first at the French fleet, the main candidate for restoration to flight status would be F-BTSD at Le Bourget. Not only has this aircraft been lovingly cared for and stored INSIDE, but the aircraft has had several systems (including the Green hydraulic system) powered and reservoirs not drained.
The British story is less clear; G-BOAA in East Fortune was effectively killed when the wings were cut off for transportation, so that one is out of the question. G-BOAB, the last and only Concorde at LHR has been left to rot outside, in fact holes were even drill in the fuselage to drain water, so this one is a no no too. G-BOAC at Manchester, now the oldest surviving production aircraft was initially stored outside, but now resides in a purpose built exhibition 'hangar'. Now she COULD be a potential candidate for consideration; when I last saw her just over a year ago she was absolutely pristine; a testament to the team that have been caring for her there. G-BOAD, stored next to the USS Intrepid in New York, we can probably forget, due to having been exposed to 7 years worth of salt water corrosion from the Hudson River. (Also, while she was temporarily stored in New Jersey a couple of years ago, some IDIOT in a truck bent the whole nose section when he hit her. The radome was smashed (replaced with a rather clever fibreglass fabrication) and the nose straightened with a blow-torch and hammer (I am not joking!!). G-BOAE at Grantley Adams airport in Barbados has been stored under cover for much of the time; provided she has not suffered too much from the wam damp atmosphere of Barbados, well she could be a potential candiitate too. G-BOAF in Filton, well PROVIDED she is still OK after her 'removal from public view' experience could also be a potential candidate also. And finally, G-BOAG in Seattle; well she had been left outside, right next to a highway (and close to a truck stop too). She did not look too good the last time I saw her; the undercarriage barrels werer all brown and discoloured and the paintwork was completely dull and matte. (She had a new paint job not too long before retirement too). So out of the 'BA Seven', I PERSONALLY would go for G-BOAF, G-BOAC or G-BOAG.
As I have said often here before, it is EXTREMELY unlikely that what you, Mike, suggest will ever happen, but in spite of what others might say, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. My own gut feeling is a resounding 'no', but I could be wrong, . (And NO ONE would be happier than I if I am wrong; I was with the BA aircraft through construction, flight testing and the entire service life with BA).
As for the cost? It really is a case of 'how long is a piece of string', but for 2 aircraft we could be looking in excess of $100 or more, who knows?
But as the Everly Brothers used to sing 'All I have to do is dream.'
Keep posting Mike.

Dude .

jodelistie
First of all Rod, welcome to our Concorde thread, and thank you very much for your kind words.
Now as far as the rumour goes, I'm afraid that it is nonsense, however the truth is an even more complex story of collusion, betrayal and intrigue. You may read that 'Concorde was retired by BA and Air France purely due to economic reasons', however that is not quite the case (and as far as THIS side of the English Puddle goes, is total poppycock!!). Now BA lost a huge amount of her regular traffic as a result of the 9/11 tragedy and also as a result of the 2003 Iraq war, but things were improving nicely. In her 27 years of operation, Concorde had survived countless dips in her traffic, only to return stronger as market conditions improved.
It is early 2003, and French Concorde traffic to the USA has almost vanished, down to single digit loads. This is due mainly to total French opposition the impending US/UK invasion of Iraq, and US businessmen using BA Concorde almost exclusively. (French business seems to be boycotting the US altogether, so their contribution to passenger loads virtually ceased). Due to the apalling loads, AF are losing absolutely MILLIONS of Euros, at a time when the carrier is trying to privatise itself ... but there is more:
In the same February, AF very nearly lost ANOTHER Concorde, yet again largely down to total incompetence and lack of adherence to established procedures. Aircraft F-BTSD was flying between CDG and JFK when there was a failure of the reheat delivery pipe that runs from the engine 1st stage fuel pump to the reheat shut-off valve. This failure, although not particularly serious, led to a chain of events that very nearly resulted in the loss of the aircraft, and all those onboard. (Air France engines were overhauled seperately to BA, who never experienced this particular failure). What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too late. The aircraft just managed to land in Halifax, with barely enough fuel left in the tanks to taxi!! So, herer we are, AF are horrified that they have come very close to yet another disaster, knowing full well that yet again human error was a major factor.
But there is more....
One week later another AF aircraft loses part of a rudder panel due to de-lamination of the honeycomb surface, not particularly serious in itself, but it put even more jitters up the trousers of AF. (Rudder failures had happened to BA aircraft many years previous to this, but BA had purchased brand new and improved rudders from Airbus UK in Filton, but Air France chose not too).
So it seems that the chairmen of both Air France and Airbus (who regards Concorde as a waste of its valuable resources) have a 'secret' meeting to plan what was effectively the murder of Concorde. There is no way that AF want BA to carry on flying Concorde while they have to cease operations, so the plan is for Airbus to make a huge hike in their product support costs; these costs would have to be borne by BA exclusively, which they both knew would not be possible. If these support costs were not met, there would be no manufacturers support, and without this there would be no type certificate, and without this, no more Concorde.
Their (AF & Airbus) hope was that BA would not challenge this move legally, and sadly for the world of aviation they did not. At a meeting, BA AND AIR FRANCE!!!! were told by Airbus about the hike in product support costs, and BA would also have to cease operations. BA were not even allowed to continue until March 2004 (the Barbados season was nearly fully booked already), and so would have to cease operations in October 2003.
But the British were far from blameless in all this; a now retired very senior British airline person had always obsessively HATED Concorde, so the French conspiracy was a very early Christmas present for him; he finally got what he had always wanted. The 'end of Concorde' anouncement by both airlines was made in April 2003; AF had got what their executives wanted and finished flying in May, reluctantly leaving BA to fly until late October. If you want a full (and extremely well informed) explanation of what happened in that whole debacle, the article by Don Pevsner is worth reading. It can be found at this website:
THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that without the truly disgusting events in France in early 2003, Concorde would still be proudly flying for BA. (And with modifications and enhancements would fly safely for many more years).
quote** "in the hands of true professionals, Concorde was the safest aircraft that ever flew. and in the hands of BA crews at least, she was always just that..*

Oh and yes you were correct, the Olympus (the world's first ever 2 spool engine) was originally a 'Bristol-Siddeley' design, before BS were absorbed into Rolls-Royce. Stanley Hookers book is in my view totally superb, a true classic.

Dude