Posts about: "Boeing SST" [Posts: 6 Pages: 1]

BA was able to make money on Concorde as in positive cash flow. But they were basically given the airplanes. The commercial failure aspect comes from the simple fact that no one wanted them to build any more (what I've heard is that at least one production Concorde was built but never put into service - basically becoming a donor for spares - not sure if that's true). I also suspect it was too much of a point design - it didn't have the range to be useful in the Pacific.

If BA (and Air France) honestly thought Concorde was a profit center (rather than brand prestige), they would have wanted more .

BTW, my comments about the flight deck were not intended as criticism - no doubt it was state of the art when it was designed. I was just commenting on how much things have changed since then.

I don't mean to dispute that the Concorde was an incredible airplane and engineering achievement. Just saying that it never really had a chance to be successful. The same thing would have applied to the Boeing SST if it hadn't been cancelled (I knew a guy that worked on the Boeing SST inlet control system - talk about complex ). Cancelling the SST is probably the best thing that ever happened to Boeing - it likely would have bankrupted the company.

Not as far as I know - the first UK "production" Concorde intended for testing rather than line flying (G-BBDG) did end up as a donor for spares, but it wasn't a case of an aircraft without a home - it was just the way things turned out - they never intended to sell it to an airline. In fact that very airframe is the one now living at Brooklands. Several things kiboshed Concorde as a going concern in the '70s - not least of which was the protest movement in the US making US airlines shy away. Above all it was not an issue with the project itself, but the early '70s oil crisis which had the most drastic effect. In fact, while the UK government effectively wrote off the cost in the '70s, the profits BA ended up making could have made a sizeable dent in the development costs.

There was a B model on the drawing board which could very well have been capable in that arena.

CONCORDE SST : CONCORDE B

In fact, BA significantly underestimated what customers would be willing to pay for Concorde service at first - it was this realisation that enabled them to turn a profit!

Well, that was kind of the crux of the issue. Boeing had already effectively bet the company on the 747 project, and the 2707 still had technical issues on paper that the Concorde project had already solved. As far as my reading suggests, the runaway success of the 747 in fact owed a lot to the issues that ended up swamping the DC-10 and L-1011 - essentially gifting Boeing a market leading position and rescuing the company from the abyss - the 2707 was cancelled long before that became a reality though. In effect, before the success of the 747 was a done deal, Boeing couldn't stretch to doing both.

The Concorde and Boeing SST business cases were built on a couple flawed assumptions.

First, jet fuel would remain dirt cheap and the higher fuel burn of supersonic travel not contribute significantly to cost of operation - which was blown out of the water by the first Arab oil embargo.

Second, that the majority of demand for air travel would remain for the 'premium' product - basically that the majority of people would happily pay a premium to get there faster. This assumption applied to most people who flew on jets in the 1960's - either business travelers or well to do people that weren't that worried about what it cost.
Reality was it went the opposite direction - a shift that started with the 747 and other widebodies. The economies of the wide body aircraft lowered the cost of air travel to the 'everybody' level. Suddenly there was a whole new class of air traveler - people for whom an extra $100 airfare meant they just wouldn't go, never mind that they'd get there in half the time. In short, they didn't foresee air travel becoming just another commodity - the low cost trend that continues today.

The reality was, both the Concorde and the SST needed to sell hundreds of copies to even begin to justify the development costs. The evolution of air travel into a low cost commodity, combined with the rising costs of jet fuel, insured that would never happen.

Well, the 2707 project never advanced to the point where such practicalities were considered - but it's certainly the case that part of the Concorde "B" spec was intended to do away with reheat (afterburner) entirely, and be much more fuel-efficient as a result.

Not necessarily - supersonic travel as a "premium" product was always intended to co-exist with subsonic offerings, much as it ended up doing. There's a revisionist narrative that has the USA betting on mass transit with the 747 versus Europe betting on supersonic transit with Concorde - but all the contemporary material I've read indicates no such thing. Even setting aside the protests within the US against the Concorde, the simple fact is that SST was never going to be a viable domestic solution, so that limited the market for the 2707. Whereas a transatlantic SST was very much a viable proposition due to the transoceanic nature of the journey. It could be argued that even with the oil crisis and the subsequent drop in orders, the UK and French governments gave up on the Concorde project too soon.

If that were genuinely the case, then there would have been no Airbus project or consortium. As Clive correctly points out, the A300 project started taking shape while Concorde was undergoing her proving flights. While there's no doubt that the Concorde project was completed for political reasons most of all, the idea that she was a forlorn hope before she went into service is grossly unfair.

Yet, as alluded to before, the R&D gains and technological knowledge coming from the project helped to lay the foundations of a pan-European aircraft maker which would eventually go toe-to-toe with the best the USA had to offer. The sidestick technology which led to an unprecedented level of commonality between short-haul and long-haul types was first tested on a Concorde airframe (Google "concorde minimanche"). Added to which is the fact that in Concorde, for all the project's problems, an airliner was produced which - on a technological level at least - left every competitor in the world in the dust. That is something that can never be taken away.

It would be a pitty!
I don't want to slide in a political argument here, that is not my point at all. I just want to highlight that lobbying against SST, even with totally foolish pleas, had a very negative impact on the commercial outcome of both Concorde and the Boeing SST. Put on top of that what has to be called an economic war between USA and Europe and the fate of Concorde was sealed, no matter how beautifull, technologically advanced and fantastic was the plane. And I think this is the main resaon why no other airliners but BAC and AF bought Concorde.

Most people are familiar with the space race between the US and the Soviets, but there was a very interesting race between the US, Europe and the Soviet Union to build a supersonic passenger aircraft. Europe built the successful Concorde, the US had the unsuccessful Boeing SST, and the Soviets had the unsuccessful Tu-144.

Somewhere there is a taped phone conversation of President Kennedy raising heck with someone over the fact that the US does not have a supersonic passenger aircraft program to compete with Concorde.