27th Aug 2010, 04:59
permalink Post: 133
Nick Thomas
[QUOTE]Going back to expansion and paint. With the aircraft expanding approx 6 inches and a temp change up to 127`c, I guess a special kind of paint; able to withstand such adverse conditions; must have been used? When deciding on the paint specification was any consideration given to the overall weight of the paint?[/QUOTE
Can't remember much about paint spec's, but a lot of experimentation/trial and error was carried out with different paints until the right one was found. I remember when G-BOAD was delivered, that copiuous sheets of paint had peeled off in flight. Finally a superb polyurithane paint was found that did the trick perfectly.
Yes Nick, the life of the airframe was limited by the number of supersonic cycles, however modifications carried out extended the life of the airframe significantly. (and more were planned).
And the 'hat in the gap' stories are quite true.
ChristiaanJ
This was the real beauty of the autostab' on all 3 axis; you could just safely take it all for granted. The Mach 2 engine out case was a classic, as not only would the aircraft yaw towards the dead engine but there was an adverse roll input, where the wing on the same side would LIFT due to the excess intake air for the failed automatically being 'dumped' through the now open spill door. If for any reason the aircraft HAD been under manual rather than autopilot control, then life without autostab would be rather uncomfortable to say the least. And putting further Concorde's achievements in terms of stability; the world's only previous large delta winged Mach 2 aircraft, the B58 Hustler, had the slightly awkward feature in the case of an outer engine failure at Mach 2, in that the yaw forces were sufficient to tear the fin off. This happened on more than one occasion during service life of the Hustler, but engine failure (or far more likely a deliberate precautionary shut-down) although hardly a non-event in the case of Concorde, it was routinely dealt with without drama or danger.
Dude
[QUOTE]Going back to expansion and paint. With the aircraft expanding approx 6 inches and a temp change up to 127`c, I guess a special kind of paint; able to withstand such adverse conditions; must have been used? When deciding on the paint specification was any consideration given to the overall weight of the paint?[/QUOTE
Can't remember much about paint spec's, but a lot of experimentation/trial and error was carried out with different paints until the right one was found. I remember when G-BOAD was delivered, that copiuous sheets of paint had peeled off in flight. Finally a superb polyurithane paint was found that did the trick perfectly.
Quote:
| Did the repeated expansion and contraction cycle have a detremental effect on the ulitamate life of the airframe? |
And the 'hat in the gap' stories are quite true.
ChristiaanJ
Quote:
| Many years later, I discovered that several airline Concorde pilots did not even know the function existed.... |
This was the real beauty of the autostab' on all 3 axis; you could just safely take it all for granted. The Mach 2 engine out case was a classic, as not only would the aircraft yaw towards the dead engine but there was an adverse roll input, where the wing on the same side would LIFT due to the excess intake air for the failed automatically being 'dumped' through the now open spill door. If for any reason the aircraft HAD been under manual rather than autopilot control, then life without autostab would be rather uncomfortable to say the least. And putting further Concorde's achievements in terms of stability; the world's only previous large delta winged Mach 2 aircraft, the B58 Hustler, had the slightly awkward feature in the case of an outer engine failure at Mach 2, in that the yaw forces were sufficient to tear the fin off. This happened on more than one occasion during service life of the Hustler, but engine failure (or far more likely a deliberate precautionary shut-down) although hardly a non-event in the case of Concorde, it was routinely dealt with without drama or danger.
Dude
29th Oct 2010, 16:25
permalink Post: 627
jodelistie
First of all Rod, welcome to our Concorde thread, and thank you very much for your kind words.
Now as far as the rumour goes, I'm afraid that it is nonsense, however the truth is an even more complex story of collusion, betrayal and intrigue. You may read that 'Concorde was retired by BA and Air France purely due to economic reasons', however that is not quite the case (and as far as THIS side of the English Puddle goes, is total poppycock!!). Now BA lost a huge amount of her regular traffic as a result of the 9/11 tragedy and also as a result of the 2003 Iraq war, but things were improving nicely. In her 27 years of operation, Concorde had survived countless dips in her traffic, only to return stronger as market conditions improved.
It is early 2003, and French Concorde traffic to the USA has almost vanished, down to single digit loads. This is due mainly to total French opposition the impending US/UK invasion of Iraq, and US businessmen using BA Concorde almost exclusively. (French business seems to be boycotting the US altogether, so their contribution to passenger loads virtually ceased). Due to the apalling loads, AF are losing absolutely MILLIONS of Euros, at a time when the carrier is trying to privatise itself ... but there is more:
In the same February, AF very nearly lost ANOTHER Concorde, yet again largely down to total incompetence and lack of adherence to established procedures. Aircraft F-BTSD was flying between CDG and JFK when there was a failure of the reheat delivery pipe that runs from the engine 1st stage fuel pump to the reheat shut-off valve. This failure, although not particularly serious, led to a chain of events that very nearly resulted in the loss of the aircraft, and all those onboard. (Air France engines were overhauled seperately to BA, who never experienced this particular failure). What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too late. The aircraft just managed to land in Halifax, with barely enough fuel left in the tanks to taxi!! So, herer we are, AF are horrified that they have come very close to yet another disaster, knowing full well that yet again human error was a major factor.
But there is more....
One week later another AF aircraft loses part of a rudder panel due to de-lamination of the honeycomb surface, not particularly serious in itself, but it put even more jitters up the trousers of AF. (Rudder failures had happened to BA aircraft many years previous to this, but BA had purchased brand new and improved rudders from Airbus UK in Filton, but Air France chose not too).
So it seems that the chairmen of both Air France and Airbus (who regards Concorde as a waste of its valuable resources) have a 'secret' meeting to plan what was effectively the murder of Concorde. There is no way that AF want BA to carry on flying Concorde while they have to cease operations, so the plan is for Airbus to make a huge hike in their product support costs; these costs would have to be borne by BA exclusively, which they both knew would not be possible. If these support costs were not met, there would be no manufacturers support, and without this there would be no type certificate, and without this, no more Concorde.
Their (AF & Airbus) hope was that BA would not challenge this move legally, and sadly for the world of aviation they did not. At a meeting, BA AND AIR FRANCE!!!! were told by Airbus about the hike in product support costs, and BA would also have to cease operations. BA were not even allowed to continue until March 2004 (the Barbados season was nearly fully booked already), and so would have to cease operations in October 2003.
But the British were far from blameless in all this; a now retired very senior British airline person had always obsessively HATED Concorde, so the French conspiracy was a very early Christmas present for him; he finally got what he had always wanted. The 'end of Concorde' anouncement by both airlines was made in April 2003; AF had got what their executives wanted and finished flying in May, reluctantly leaving BA to fly until late October. If you want a full (and extremely well informed) explanation of what happened in that whole debacle, the article by Don Pevsner is worth reading. It can be found at this website:
THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that without the truly disgusting events in France in early 2003, Concorde would still be proudly flying for BA. (And with modifications and enhancements would fly safely for many more years).
quote** "in the hands of true professionals, Concorde was the safest aircraft that ever flew. and in the hands of BA crews at least, she was always just that..*
Oh and yes you were correct, the Olympus (the world's first ever 2 spool engine) was originally a 'Bristol-Siddeley' design, before BS were absorbed into Rolls-Royce. Stanley Hookers book is in my view totally superb, a true classic.
Dude
Quote:
| On which there was a splendid rumour that what put the final nail in the great birds coffin was that our transatlantic allies realised that if hijacked there was nothing that could catch her !! |
Now as far as the rumour goes, I'm afraid that it is nonsense, however the truth is an even more complex story of collusion, betrayal and intrigue. You may read that 'Concorde was retired by BA and Air France purely due to economic reasons', however that is not quite the case (and as far as THIS side of the English Puddle goes, is total poppycock!!). Now BA lost a huge amount of her regular traffic as a result of the 9/11 tragedy and also as a result of the 2003 Iraq war, but things were improving nicely. In her 27 years of operation, Concorde had survived countless dips in her traffic, only to return stronger as market conditions improved.
It is early 2003, and French Concorde traffic to the USA has almost vanished, down to single digit loads. This is due mainly to total French opposition the impending US/UK invasion of Iraq, and US businessmen using BA Concorde almost exclusively. (French business seems to be boycotting the US altogether, so their contribution to passenger loads virtually ceased). Due to the apalling loads, AF are losing absolutely MILLIONS of Euros, at a time when the carrier is trying to privatise itself ... but there is more:
In the same February, AF very nearly lost ANOTHER Concorde, yet again largely down to total incompetence and lack of adherence to established procedures. Aircraft F-BTSD was flying between CDG and JFK when there was a failure of the reheat delivery pipe that runs from the engine 1st stage fuel pump to the reheat shut-off valve. This failure, although not particularly serious, led to a chain of events that very nearly resulted in the loss of the aircraft, and all those onboard. (Air France engines were overhauled seperately to BA, who never experienced this particular failure). What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too late. The aircraft just managed to land in Halifax, with barely enough fuel left in the tanks to taxi!! So, herer we are, AF are horrified that they have come very close to yet another disaster, knowing full well that yet again human error was a major factor.
But there is more....
One week later another AF aircraft loses part of a rudder panel due to de-lamination of the honeycomb surface, not particularly serious in itself, but it put even more jitters up the trousers of AF. (Rudder failures had happened to BA aircraft many years previous to this, but BA had purchased brand new and improved rudders from Airbus UK in Filton, but Air France chose not too).
So it seems that the chairmen of both Air France and Airbus (who regards Concorde as a waste of its valuable resources) have a 'secret' meeting to plan what was effectively the murder of Concorde. There is no way that AF want BA to carry on flying Concorde while they have to cease operations, so the plan is for Airbus to make a huge hike in their product support costs; these costs would have to be borne by BA exclusively, which they both knew would not be possible. If these support costs were not met, there would be no manufacturers support, and without this there would be no type certificate, and without this, no more Concorde.
Their (AF & Airbus) hope was that BA would not challenge this move legally, and sadly for the world of aviation they did not. At a meeting, BA AND AIR FRANCE!!!! were told by Airbus about the hike in product support costs, and BA would also have to cease operations. BA were not even allowed to continue until March 2004 (the Barbados season was nearly fully booked already), and so would have to cease operations in October 2003.
But the British were far from blameless in all this; a now retired very senior British airline person had always obsessively HATED Concorde, so the French conspiracy was a very early Christmas present for him; he finally got what he had always wanted. The 'end of Concorde' anouncement by both airlines was made in April 2003; AF had got what their executives wanted and finished flying in May, reluctantly leaving BA to fly until late October. If you want a full (and extremely well informed) explanation of what happened in that whole debacle, the article by Don Pevsner is worth reading. It can be found at this website:
THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that without the truly disgusting events in France in early 2003, Concorde would still be proudly flying for BA. (And with modifications and enhancements would fly safely for many more years).
quote** "in the hands of true professionals, Concorde was the safest aircraft that ever flew. and in the hands of BA crews at least, she was always just that..*
Oh and yes you were correct, the Olympus (the world's first ever 2 spool engine) was originally a 'Bristol-Siddeley' design, before BS were absorbed into Rolls-Royce. Stanley Hookers book is in my view totally superb, a true classic.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 29th Oct 2010 at 16:52 . Reason: spelling (yet again) :-(
29th Oct 2010, 17:51
permalink Post: 631
Quote:
| What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too |
Now I do not know what event happened to require the engine to be shut down, and if it was for fuel loss then yes the crew should have been moitoring the difference between fuel on board and fuel used figures and I am sure they were. However if they were also slowing and descending then the fuel system would be quite active and the difference between fuel on board and intergrated fuel left could vary very much during this phase of flight as the fuel cooled and you found that the gauges were still showing a few hundred Kgs each, even though the pump low pressure lights were on
It would not have been until they had settled down at Mach 0.95 with fuel transfer still that a proper appraisal could be made of the difference between the two fuel remaining indication and now the loss of fuel in the appropriate collector tank.
Not sure where they were when they started their subsonic diversion but believe me even with everything going for you there would not have been huge amounts of fuel left, by the time the aircraft got to Halifax
Perhaps if there is any blame it should lie with the people who wrote the checklist, by not putting an item in to cover such a case as this
It seems to me thet poor old Air France are blamed when
1] They deviate from the checklist as was suggested in the crash
OR
2] Stick to the checklist as in this case
Now you might say what about airmanship, well they did use it, perhaps a bit earlier would have been better, but easy to say without knowing all the facts.
29th Oct 2010, 19:13
permalink Post: 635
Brit312
mm I guess they were not to blame for flying for over one hour with a red throttle light on (the engine is under no electronic control), resulting in the severe engine overspeed (N1 overspeed protection amplifier already disabled) and the subsequent scrapping (on the orders of Rolls Royce) of the entire rotating assembly of the engine. Or for omitting TWO intake trunnion blocks during a ramp actuator replacement, and then the E/O continually and cyclically operating the intake lane selector switch, following a spill door runaway, until he manages a double engine surge and near destruction of the 'forgotton parts' intake and engine also. I suppose they are not to blame for the experimental tripping of the LPOG circuit breaker by the E/O, during an engine power mismatch, resulting in serious damage to the engine and intake due to the resulting massive over-fueling surge. I suppose again, that they were not to blame for ignoring
for over 6 months
a simple electrical load defect, eventually resulting in a not too minor fire in the electronics racks that had to be extinguished by the crew with extinguishers. And yet again, I suppose they are not to blame for putting skydrol into Concorde hydraulics systems, almost resulting in the loss of the aircraft, as well as a 9 month grounding while all of the hydraulic components were replaced. And it was not Air France that hammered Fox Delta twice into the runway at Dacca, resulting in so much airframe distortion that the aircraft performance was seriously compromised (and eventually broken up). And of course they were not responsible for the technical and operational failures, including the (forgotton
AGAIN
) missing spacer and overweight take-off etc.) on 25th July 2000. Silly me.
And although I might have said 'precautionary engine shut-down', we are talking about a quite an eventful episode here indeed, you can NOT excuse the further mistakes made on that day, 'just because they are poor old Air France. With the greatest of respect Brit, there are 3 crew members on that flight deck, do you not think that the loss of over over 5 tonnes of fuel over a period of time might just be noticed????? The subsonic 3 engined leg was carried out for quite a time before it computed to them that they were still losing fuel. There is no excuse for flying with your eyes closed, I'm sorry.
For goodness sake, this is probably the biggest single episode that was behind the demise of Concorde, poor Air France my eye!!!
Dude
Quote:
|
1] It seems to me thet poor old Air France are blamed when
1] They deviate from the checklist as was suggested in the crash OR 2] Stick to the checklist as in this case |
And although I might have said 'precautionary engine shut-down', we are talking about a quite an eventful episode here indeed, you can NOT excuse the further mistakes made on that day, 'just because they are poor old Air France. With the greatest of respect Brit, there are 3 crew members on that flight deck, do you not think that the loss of over over 5 tonnes of fuel over a period of time might just be noticed????? The subsonic 3 engined leg was carried out for quite a time before it computed to them that they were still losing fuel. There is no excuse for flying with your eyes closed, I'm sorry.
For goodness sake, this is probably the biggest single episode that was behind the demise of Concorde, poor Air France my eye!!!
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 29th Oct 2010 at 22:55 . Reason: more spelling :-(
31st Oct 2010, 16:31
permalink Post: 646
M2Dude & Brit312:
FWIW the LP Cock to shutoff was added to the precautionary engine shutdown C/L - but I think this was after (and because of) the AF inceident.
But I had understood that their engine failure that day had been due to a problem with the engine which caused enough vibration to damage the fuel pipe leading to the leak. I don't know if they ran the Fire / Severe Damage C/L, but that C/L always involved shutting the LP Cock as part of the Cleanup Items. Maybe they did "only" run the Precautionary Shutdown C/L - I have no idea, but the LP Cock position (which turned out to be key to the near loss of the a/c) would depend on it prior to the addition of that step in that latter drill.
I do remember there was always controversy in training circles about the Cleanup Items and when or where (or even "IF"?) they should be run: but IF the AF flight had run the Fire / Severe Damage drill and IF they had run the Cleanup Items soon afterwards, then their situation would not have been so dire.
No critisism of anyone intended (AF crew or forum posters), it's all such a long time ago now, but the nuances involved in Precautionary Shutdown / Fire - Severe Damage / Cleanup Drills were far from clear-cut...
FWIW the LP Cock to shutoff was added to the precautionary engine shutdown C/L - but I think this was after (and because of) the AF inceident.
But I had understood that their engine failure that day had been due to a problem with the engine which caused enough vibration to damage the fuel pipe leading to the leak. I don't know if they ran the Fire / Severe Damage C/L, but that C/L always involved shutting the LP Cock as part of the Cleanup Items. Maybe they did "only" run the Precautionary Shutdown C/L - I have no idea, but the LP Cock position (which turned out to be key to the near loss of the a/c) would depend on it prior to the addition of that step in that latter drill.
I do remember there was always controversy in training circles about the Cleanup Items and when or where (or even "IF"?) they should be run: but IF the AF flight had run the Fire / Severe Damage drill and IF they had run the Cleanup Items soon afterwards, then their situation would not have been so dire.
No critisism of anyone intended (AF crew or forum posters), it's all such a long time ago now, but the nuances involved in Precautionary Shutdown / Fire - Severe Damage / Cleanup Drills were far from clear-cut...
1st Nov 2010, 00:01
permalink Post: 648
Sorry M2Dude, but although I agree that the reasons for the premature withdrawal from service lay south of La Manche, the AF incident we're talking about was not due to "forgetting to select the LP cock to shutoff" in your quote
<<What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve>>
At that time the Precautionary Engine Shutdown C/L did not call for the LP cock to be selected to shutoff (that stable door was subsequently closed). So no procedural errors there.
You could argue that the severe vibration which kicked off the incident should have called for the Engine Fire / Severe Damage C/L in which case the Cleanup C/L would have seen the LP Cock closed - but when? And was this the drill called? IF the Precautionary Shutdown drill was used then it is not surprising that the LP cock was not closed. That's all.
Easy when looked at through a retrospectoscope....
And for what it's worth I think AM and CF were a pair of [edited to say: "allegedly not supportive of the Concorde operation"] who should not have been allowed any authority at all over this precious project....
<<What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve>>
At that time the Precautionary Engine Shutdown C/L did not call for the LP cock to be selected to shutoff (that stable door was subsequently closed). So no procedural errors there.
You could argue that the severe vibration which kicked off the incident should have called for the Engine Fire / Severe Damage C/L in which case the Cleanup C/L would have seen the LP Cock closed - but when? And was this the drill called? IF the Precautionary Shutdown drill was used then it is not surprising that the LP cock was not closed. That's all.
Easy when looked at through a retrospectoscope....
And for what it's worth I think AM and CF were a pair of [edited to say: "allegedly not supportive of the Concorde operation"] who should not have been allowed any authority at all over this precious project....
Last edited by NW1; 1st Nov 2010 at 10:02 .
1st Nov 2010, 05:45
permalink Post: 649
NW1
I agree that my wording regarding precautionary engine shut-down was not quite correct my friend
; with WW3 going on out there under the wing I think we can both agree that that check list ddi not in any shape or form cover the events ensuing.
And as for the AM/CF dynamic duo; I could not agree more; these two wankers/toss-pots/cretins etc (being a gentleman forbids me from printing here my real thoughts on these veritable slime buckets) I would not place them in charge of a broken down manure truck.
. One had the avowed aim of destroying Concorde and the other, in a position to do some good did his master's bidding and was party in no small way to this madness. Pity 'skippy' did not have some balls too!!
Best Regards
Dude
I agree that my wording regarding precautionary engine shut-down was not quite correct my friend
; with WW3 going on out there under the wing I think we can both agree that that check list ddi not in any shape or form cover the events ensuing.
And as for the AM/CF dynamic duo; I could not agree more; these two wankers/toss-pots/cretins etc (being a gentleman forbids me from printing here my real thoughts on these veritable slime buckets) I would not place them in charge of a broken down manure truck.
. One had the avowed aim of destroying Concorde and the other, in a position to do some good did his master's bidding and was party in no small way to this madness. Pity 'skippy' did not have some balls too!!
Best Regards
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 1st Nov 2010 at 09:34 .
7th Nov 2010, 00:09
permalink Post: 672
NW1
and
ChristiaanJ
Ahh yes, the super hi-tech 'HUD'. It was right up there with the 'eye level datum' indicator and not to forget, the reheat capabiliy indicator in terms of sophistication. (Extremely reliable though
).
As far as 3 engined ferries went; well NW1, not sure if you'd call me seasoned or just just clapped out and wrinkly, but it did happen a very few times in days of yore, mostly from SNN back to LHR. There were at least two; OAF in 1980 when she had the infamous LP1 blade fail (and Monty Burton's immortal words during the 'event' "what *** ing drill?). The second one that I can remember was OAA in 1991 when there was another far less serious compressor blade failure. In each case for the ferry flight, the broken engine was 'swaged' to prevent it windmilling and the aircraft would be flown back to the LHR garage by a management crew. There was however another required ferry measure as well as the engine swaging, this measure was to prevent the good engines going into contingency, due to the very slightly flamed out dead 'donk'. This procedure required the Engine Speed Unit to be removed from the electronics rack and a special jumper plug fitted in it's place (without the jumper fitted the start switch would never latch in. In this case also the E/O would also need to manually disengage the start switch at 25% N2). I have to admit that I never in my life ever saw this jumper plug, and in the cases that I can remember the aircraft departed SNN with the three engines at contingency. I remember that the case of OAA back in '91 most certainly was; I was flown out to SNN equiped with a pile of circuit diagrams and test boxes to investigate what we all thought was just a surge related engine shutdown. only to find a slightly more hairy state of afairs, with a very broken engine indeed. As a matter of interest, this particular failure was the only one ever in the history of Concorde in BA attributed to the engine having run for a protracted time in rotating stall. (This had happened on the previous day). A lot was learned by both BA and Rolls Royce after this event, and this failure never occured again.
Dude
Ahh yes, the super hi-tech 'HUD'. It was right up there with the 'eye level datum' indicator and not to forget, the reheat capabiliy indicator in terms of sophistication. (Extremely reliable though
).
As far as 3 engined ferries went; well NW1, not sure if you'd call me seasoned or just just clapped out and wrinkly, but it did happen a very few times in days of yore, mostly from SNN back to LHR. There were at least two; OAF in 1980 when she had the infamous LP1 blade fail (and Monty Burton's immortal words during the 'event' "what *** ing drill?). The second one that I can remember was OAA in 1991 when there was another far less serious compressor blade failure. In each case for the ferry flight, the broken engine was 'swaged' to prevent it windmilling and the aircraft would be flown back to the LHR garage by a management crew. There was however another required ferry measure as well as the engine swaging, this measure was to prevent the good engines going into contingency, due to the very slightly flamed out dead 'donk'. This procedure required the Engine Speed Unit to be removed from the electronics rack and a special jumper plug fitted in it's place (without the jumper fitted the start switch would never latch in. In this case also the E/O would also need to manually disengage the start switch at 25% N2). I have to admit that I never in my life ever saw this jumper plug, and in the cases that I can remember the aircraft departed SNN with the three engines at contingency. I remember that the case of OAA back in '91 most certainly was; I was flown out to SNN equiped with a pile of circuit diagrams and test boxes to investigate what we all thought was just a surge related engine shutdown. only to find a slightly more hairy state of afairs, with a very broken engine indeed. As a matter of interest, this particular failure was the only one ever in the history of Concorde in BA attributed to the engine having run for a protracted time in rotating stall. (This had happened on the previous day). A lot was learned by both BA and Rolls Royce after this event, and this failure never occured again.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 7th Nov 2010 at 01:34 .
18th Nov 2010, 03:17
permalink Post: 722
Roger
My appreciation for your complement. Anyone, yank or otherwise, who does not appreciate the long term and continuing world wide cooperation that is required for any project like Concorde or Apollo is simply being xenophobic. Today, Boeing has a large engineering bureau in Moscow, BMW has a design office in California.
Many of the engineers that worked on Apollo, 747 and, even, the C-5, were Canadian ex-pats fired from the Avro Arrow program shutdown. BTW, my nomination for least appreciated, least known but most ambitious aircraft design.
GF
My appreciation for your complement. Anyone, yank or otherwise, who does not appreciate the long term and continuing world wide cooperation that is required for any project like Concorde or Apollo is simply being xenophobic. Today, Boeing has a large engineering bureau in Moscow, BMW has a design office in California.
Many of the engineers that worked on Apollo, 747 and, even, the C-5, were Canadian ex-pats fired from the Avro Arrow program shutdown. BTW, my nomination for least appreciated, least known but most ambitious aircraft design.
GF
18th Nov 2010, 17:39
permalink Post: 727
Galaxy Flyer
Quote:
|
Many of the engineers that worked on Apollo, 747 and, even, the C-5, were Canadian ex-pats fired from the Avro Arrow program shutdown. BTW, my nomination for least appreciated, least known but most ambitious aircraft design.
GF |
Roger.
21st Dec 2010, 09:02
permalink Post: 906
Once you know how the rating selections work, enabling the throttles to be left fully forward throughout normal flight, you can draw a line to the Airbus FBW thrust lever arrangement - the detents equating to different ratings.
Mercifully no-one had thought of that when Concorde was being designed; I still think it's a diabolical system.
BTW I was told in the conversion course that during the design phase the idea was mooted to only have one thrust lever for all four engines. This would probably have worked - even non-normal engine shutdown drills didn't require the engine's throttle to be closed, the first thing you did was pull the shutdown handle.
Mercifully no-one had thought of that when Concorde was being designed; I still think it's a diabolical system.
BTW I was told in the conversion course that during the design phase the idea was mooted to only have one thrust lever for all four engines. This would probably have worked - even non-normal engine shutdown drills didn't require the engine's throttle to be closed, the first thing you did was pull the shutdown handle.
21st Dec 2010, 16:53
permalink Post: 926
quote:
d putting further Concorde's achievements in terms of stability; the world's only previous large delta winged Mach 2 aircraft, the B58 Hustler, had the slightly awkward feature in the case of an outer engine failure at Mach 2, in that the yaw forces were sufficient to tear the fin off. This happened on more than one occasion during service life of the Hustler, but engine failure (or far more likely a deliberate precautionary shut-down) although hardly a non-event in the case of Concorde, it was routinely dealt with without drama or danger.unquote
To rub it in, a typical double engine surge - they were nearly always double surges as the first surge expelled the ramp shock waves and turned the flow into a pitot with a large standing shock ahead of the intake that screwed up the flow into its neighbour - would produce about 1 degree sideslip and 2 deg bank. There would be a +/- 0.2g variation in normal acceleration and that was it! Through Christiaan's kind offices I am posting the records of such an event.
Hustler pilots eat your heart out!
CliveL
To rub it in, a typical double engine surge - they were nearly always double surges as the first surge expelled the ramp shock waves and turned the flow into a pitot with a large standing shock ahead of the intake that screwed up the flow into its neighbour - would produce about 1 degree sideslip and 2 deg bank. There would be a +/- 0.2g variation in normal acceleration and that was it! Through Christiaan's kind offices I am posting the records of such an event.
Hustler pilots eat your heart out!
CliveL
4th Feb 2011, 03:09
permalink Post: 1172
Thanks for your reply Shaggy Sheep Driver,
I had read about the Compressor lift that cause by the intake shockwave on
XB-70. It help to improve the movement of CP and I think maybe L/D ratio.
I'm know that Concorde has this kind of behavior too (engine shutdown during M2.0) but did they intend to use the compressor lift method in Concorde?
Thanks for all reply.
Best regards
I had read about the Compressor lift that cause by the intake shockwave on
XB-70. It help to improve the movement of CP and I think maybe L/D ratio.
I'm know that Concorde has this kind of behavior too (engine shutdown during M2.0) but did they intend to use the compressor lift method in Concorde?
Thanks for all reply.
Best regards
31st Jan 2012, 13:33
permalink Post: 1550
fizz57
As well as carrying sufficient fuel to arrive at BGI with standard fuel reserves remaining, there was also a requirement that sufficient fuel be carried to ensure that, following an engine shut-down at any stage in the flight, Concorde could divert, on three engines, to a suitable diversion airfield, and still arrive there with standard fuel reserves remaining.
It was this requirement - the three-engined diversion requirement - that often required more fuel to be loaded - above the basic LHR-BGI flight plan fuel figure - often bringing the total fuel required up to or over the full tanks figure and so became the limiting factor on this route.
Perhaps the main difference between Concorde and most subsonic aircraft, following an engine shutdown in cruise, was that Concorde would suffer a much greater loss in range. From four-engined supersonic flight to optimum three-engined subsonic cruise the loss in range would have been in the order of 30-35%.
This was mainly because Concorde, following an engine shut-down in cruise, would have to decelerate and descend, and thus leave a very efficient flight regime, at M2.0 and 55,000-60,000ft, with relatively low drag, low winds and very cold outside air temperatures, for a much less efficient regime, at M0.95, at around 30,000ft, in a higher drag subsonic cruise with warmer outside air temperatures and much stronger, probably adverse, winds.
The forecast weather at the principal en-route diversion airfields of Santa Maria, Lajes, Bermuda and Antigua, along with the calculated wind components at subsonic cruise levels to these airfields, were all taken into account at the flight planning stage, with the forecast subsonic cruise wind component to Antigua generally being the most critical factor.
If the weather conditions at and en-route to these diversion airfields were favourable, flight planning was straightforward. If the weather conditions were unfavourable, flight planning got more difficult, but the necessary fuel was always carried, passenger numbers limited or a re-fuelling stop planned.
No, not really.
LHR-BGI was certainly the most demanding route on Concorde, and required careful planning, good tactical awareness and diligent in-flight monitoring, however the flight planning procedures and tactical decision making processes were standard and would have been very familiar to any ETOPS rated pilot.
With one exception.
Concorde would still have got you to a diversion airfield following a second engine failure!
Best Regards
Bellerophon
Quote:
| ... Barbados route...half-way between the Azores and Barbados...a thousand miles from anywhere with limited diversion options and marginal fuel in case of engine failure and subsonic cruise...what sort of contingency plans were in place?... |
As well as carrying sufficient fuel to arrive at BGI with standard fuel reserves remaining, there was also a requirement that sufficient fuel be carried to ensure that, following an engine shut-down at any stage in the flight, Concorde could divert, on three engines, to a suitable diversion airfield, and still arrive there with standard fuel reserves remaining.
It was this requirement - the three-engined diversion requirement - that often required more fuel to be loaded - above the basic LHR-BGI flight plan fuel figure - often bringing the total fuel required up to or over the full tanks figure and so became the limiting factor on this route.
Perhaps the main difference between Concorde and most subsonic aircraft, following an engine shutdown in cruise, was that Concorde would suffer a much greater loss in range. From four-engined supersonic flight to optimum three-engined subsonic cruise the loss in range would have been in the order of 30-35%.
This was mainly because Concorde, following an engine shut-down in cruise, would have to decelerate and descend, and thus leave a very efficient flight regime, at M2.0 and 55,000-60,000ft, with relatively low drag, low winds and very cold outside air temperatures, for a much less efficient regime, at M0.95, at around 30,000ft, in a higher drag subsonic cruise with warmer outside air temperatures and much stronger, probably adverse, winds.
The forecast weather at the principal en-route diversion airfields of Santa Maria, Lajes, Bermuda and Antigua, along with the calculated wind components at subsonic cruise levels to these airfields, were all taken into account at the flight planning stage, with the forecast subsonic cruise wind component to Antigua generally being the most critical factor.
If the weather conditions at and en-route to these diversion airfields were favourable, flight planning was straightforward. If the weather conditions were unfavourable, flight planning got more difficult, but the necessary fuel was always carried, passenger numbers limited or a re-fuelling stop planned.
Quote:
| ...While I'm sure you had all the angles covered, was it really a nail-biting moment... |
LHR-BGI was certainly the most demanding route on Concorde, and required careful planning, good tactical awareness and diligent in-flight monitoring, however the flight planning procedures and tactical decision making processes were standard and would have been very familiar to any ETOPS rated pilot.
With one exception.
Concorde would still have got you to a diversion airfield following a second engine failure!
Best Regards
Bellerophon
5th Mar 2013, 01:31
permalink Post: 1711
I'll second that Stilton !
Was lucky enough to catch the Concorde as she came into Schenectady Airport ( now Stratton ANG) on a solid overcast day. We heard her coming long before she popped out of the clouds at about 500 feet, perfectly lined up and ready to land on Runway 4. But she had other ideas, as she went gear up and flew by us at about 100 feet, and then climbed back up into the overcast sky. After circling around the field, the Concorde once again popped out of the clouds at the same exact spot and made a flawless landing.
After a short taxi and shut-down, we were allowed to take a walk-through before the charter flight(s) began. What a day to leave the camera at home...sigh
Recently, while surfing around on You Tube, I came across some footage of the Concorde flying the checkerboard approach into Kai Tak. What a thrill that must have been for the pilots, crew, and passengers.
Does anyone have any more details to share about that particular flight?
Was lucky enough to catch the Concorde as she came into Schenectady Airport ( now Stratton ANG) on a solid overcast day. We heard her coming long before she popped out of the clouds at about 500 feet, perfectly lined up and ready to land on Runway 4. But she had other ideas, as she went gear up and flew by us at about 100 feet, and then climbed back up into the overcast sky. After circling around the field, the Concorde once again popped out of the clouds at the same exact spot and made a flawless landing.
After a short taxi and shut-down, we were allowed to take a walk-through before the charter flight(s) began. What a day to leave the camera at home...sigh
Recently, while surfing around on You Tube, I came across some footage of the Concorde flying the checkerboard approach into Kai Tak. What a thrill that must have been for the pilots, crew, and passengers.
Does anyone have any more details to share about that particular flight?
6th Oct 2015, 19:47
permalink Post: 1904
Long time lurker - I was addicted to this thread real-time from late 2010 - I guess I must have broken away at some point and didn't realise the posts were still coming.
I re-read most of it mid-2011 and came back recently to read all over again.
I have a question that I don't think has been covered (but will happily stand corrected).
But first, my love of Concorde has been life-long - each time I go to Barbados I visit the exhibit there and it brings a tear to my eye every single time without fail -- and, I didn't design, engineer, maintain or fly her -- so I can fully appreciate the emotions the beautiful lady must evoke in those that did.
in about 2002/2003, I was finally in a position to financially support a flight on Concorde, but it never happened in time before the shutdown - honestly, this is one of the biggest regrets of my life.
This thread is my favourite read of all time - absolutely and totally priceless and the full and generous contributions from the people that were there are so very much appreciated.
And now, to the question.
Concorde was limited to 60k feet and M2.04 for all the reasons stated.
Just suppose for a moment, that these restrictions were removed.
I've read of her attaining 68k feet and M2.23 (from memory), but what could she have achieved in the opinion of those qualified to judge such things.
If all altitude and speed restrictions were removed (and related issues solved), then what could have been the result - I am assuming that range would have gone up quite considerably?
Thanks again to all for this stupendous thread.
I re-read most of it mid-2011 and came back recently to read all over again.
I have a question that I don't think has been covered (but will happily stand corrected).
But first, my love of Concorde has been life-long - each time I go to Barbados I visit the exhibit there and it brings a tear to my eye every single time without fail -- and, I didn't design, engineer, maintain or fly her -- so I can fully appreciate the emotions the beautiful lady must evoke in those that did.
in about 2002/2003, I was finally in a position to financially support a flight on Concorde, but it never happened in time before the shutdown - honestly, this is one of the biggest regrets of my life.
This thread is my favourite read of all time - absolutely and totally priceless and the full and generous contributions from the people that were there are so very much appreciated.
And now, to the question.
Concorde was limited to 60k feet and M2.04 for all the reasons stated.
Just suppose for a moment, that these restrictions were removed.
I've read of her attaining 68k feet and M2.23 (from memory), but what could she have achieved in the opinion of those qualified to judge such things.
If all altitude and speed restrictions were removed (and related issues solved), then what could have been the result - I am assuming that range would have gone up quite considerably?
Thanks again to all for this stupendous thread.