19th Aug 2010, 14:37
permalink Post: 28
Biggles78,
To complement M2dude's notes re nose and visor:
There were basically four 'positions':
Nose and visor up (supersonic),
Nose up, visor down only (subsonic climd and descent),
Nose down 5\xb0, visor down (take-off and initial climb),
Nose down 12.5\xb0, visor down (approach and landing).
Normally nose and visor are raised and lowered by the green hydraulic system (as is done until today on F-BTSD at Le Bourget).
In 'standby' mode, the visor was lowered by the yellow hydraulic system.
Then the nose uplocks were released by the yellow system, and the nose would free-fall to the 5\xb0 position.
Another switch allowed to hydraulically release the 5\xb0 downlocks, and the nose would free-fall again, now to the 12.5\xb0 psition.
In this 'standby' mode, the nose and visor could not be raised again.
In the best "belt, braces AND a piece of string" tradition of Concorde, if both the 'normal' and 'standby' system failed, there was a big handle on the F/O side of the central pedestal.
This released the nose uplocks manually, the nose would start to free-fall, automatically unlocking the visor, and both would then free-fall down: the nose only to the 5\xb0 position.
To complete the story... there is a 5th position: nose 17.5\xb0 down!
This was the 'nose fully down' position as designed originally and installed on 001 and 002.
It met with sharp criticism from the test pilots, because of the lack of a forward visual reference with the nose fully down. "It's like looking over the edge of a cliff", was the unanimous comment of the pilots.
So a couple of mechanical stops were added that limited the 'nose down' angle to 12.5\xb0.
But the basic design of the nose was not changed otherwise, so even on the production aircraft the nose could be lowered to 17.5\xb0, but only in the hangar, by removing the mechanical stops. It may have been done a few times, for better access to the visor and nose mechanism.
Minor anecdote... the nose and visor were up during supersonic flight, of course, but also when the aircraft were on the ground and parked outside, simply to keep the rain and dirt out.
But... the prototypes had a metal visor, with two tiny windows, and it was inconveniently dark on the ground in the cockpit with the visor up . So on the ground we always kept the visor down, unless the aircraft was parked outside for any length of time.
To complement M2dude's notes re nose and visor:
There were basically four 'positions':
Nose and visor up (supersonic),
Nose up, visor down only (subsonic climd and descent),
Nose down 5\xb0, visor down (take-off and initial climb),
Nose down 12.5\xb0, visor down (approach and landing).
Normally nose and visor are raised and lowered by the green hydraulic system (as is done until today on F-BTSD at Le Bourget).
In 'standby' mode, the visor was lowered by the yellow hydraulic system.
Then the nose uplocks were released by the yellow system, and the nose would free-fall to the 5\xb0 position.
Another switch allowed to hydraulically release the 5\xb0 downlocks, and the nose would free-fall again, now to the 12.5\xb0 psition.
In this 'standby' mode, the nose and visor could not be raised again.
In the best "belt, braces AND a piece of string" tradition of Concorde, if both the 'normal' and 'standby' system failed, there was a big handle on the F/O side of the central pedestal.
This released the nose uplocks manually, the nose would start to free-fall, automatically unlocking the visor, and both would then free-fall down: the nose only to the 5\xb0 position.
To complete the story... there is a 5th position: nose 17.5\xb0 down!
This was the 'nose fully down' position as designed originally and installed on 001 and 002.
It met with sharp criticism from the test pilots, because of the lack of a forward visual reference with the nose fully down. "It's like looking over the edge of a cliff", was the unanimous comment of the pilots.
So a couple of mechanical stops were added that limited the 'nose down' angle to 12.5\xb0.
But the basic design of the nose was not changed otherwise, so even on the production aircraft the nose could be lowered to 17.5\xb0, but only in the hangar, by removing the mechanical stops. It may have been done a few times, for better access to the visor and nose mechanism.
Minor anecdote... the nose and visor were up during supersonic flight, of course, but also when the aircraft were on the ground and parked outside, simply to keep the rain and dirt out.
But... the prototypes had a metal visor, with two tiny windows, and it was inconveniently dark on the ground in the cockpit with the visor up . So on the ground we always kept the visor down, unless the aircraft was parked outside for any length of time.
24th Aug 2010, 22:49
permalink Post: 101
ChristiaanJ
aaah yes, Max Climb/Max Cruise modes. I'd not forgotten this my friend, I was going to say a few words about that in a future post, but maybe we can do that now. (And I'd love to hear more of your comments on this here too, ChristiaanJ). The intake and autopilot modifications were in a way complimentary it's true, but really dealt with separate problems, at least in my view:
The intake control unit software change (a change to the control law that limited engine N1 as a function of intake local Mach number, Mo, and inlet total temperature, T1) was able to put an absolute limit on aircraft achievable Mach number during Mmo overshoots, but it would not PREVENT Mmo overshoots occurring altogether, it was more of a safety brake. This particular overspeed problem manifested itself well before route proving, and in fact the intake system 'fix' resulted in the Thrust Auto Reduce System being deleted, electronic control boxes and all. The TAR system was fitted on all development aircraft equiped with the digital intake system, and it tried (in vain) to limit extreme Mach overshoots. The production aircraft retained the TAR wiring and locked out circuit breakers, as well as two vacant spaces on the electronic racks. The prime reason for all these efforts were that some of the rapid excessive Mach overshoots quite often drove the intake into surge; the modification to this N1 limiter control enabled engine mass flow to be controlled in such a way that these surges could be prevented during temperature shears. The aircraft Mach limit was an extremely useful fringe benefit.
The AFCS mode change from what was Max Op and Max Op Soft (always loved that name) to Max Climb/Max Cruise was at a stroke able to deal with the regular Mmo overspeeds that kept on occuring during, as you say, the route proving trials of 1975, when British aircraft G-BOAC and the French aircrfraft F-BTSD carried out pre entry into service evaluation flights, SD sadly was the aircraft that was tragically lost at Gonez in July 2000). The Max Climb/Max Cruise AFCS mode combo is a mode like no other that I've personally seen before or since anywhere, (it for instance resulted an elsewhere taboo; an autopilot and an autothrotte working together IN A SPEED MODE).
This problem encountered primarily at lower lattitudes, (for example, G-BOAC doing route proving flights out of Singapore), occurring initially as the aircraft reached Mach 2. It was termed 'the insurmountable problem', but the AFCS designers (such as ChristiaanJ) fortunately did not have 'insurmountable problems' in their vocabulary. The issue was that the aircraft would have been climbing rapidly at Vmo of 530 KTS, with throttles at the gate as usual, At exactly 50,189' we hit what was known as 'the corner point' in the flight envelope, where 530 KTS IAS equated to Mach 2 exactly. Max Op mode would then 'let go' of the Vmo segment, and try and control the aircraft to Mach 2. (As the aircraft climbed, Vmo itself would progreesively decrease in order to equate to Mmo, or 2.04 Mach). But in very cold conditions, the aircraft still 'wanting' to accelerate, and the simple Max Op/Max Op Soft modes just could not cope with gentle pitch changes alone. The problem became even bigger during the cruise/climb when severe temperature shears occured, and routinely regular Mmo exceedences occured. Something had to be done, and something WAS done and how; enter Max Climb/Max Cruise. It was really a classic piece of design, where the aircraft would do the initial supersonic climb in Max Climb mode. This mode itself was relatively simple, in that it was more or less a Vmo -Vc hold mode. That meant that the difference at selection between indicated airspeed, Vc and Vmo would be maintained, with a vernier datum adjust to this being available. In practice this mode was selected pretty much at Vmo, so datum adjusting was not always required. Now comes the clever part; the autothrottle, this would operate in standy mode at this point, just waiting there doing nothing, with the throttles at maximum as before. So the aircraft would now climb as Vmo increased to 530 KTS, and then following a now constant Vmo of 530 KTS until the magic 'corner point' (51, 189' remember). Now all hell would break loose; the mode would automatically change to Max Cruise, the autothrottle would also be automaically selected to Mach Hold mode (initially datumed here to Mach 2) and the throttles would retard, attempting to hold this Mach 2 datum, and the autopilot is commands a 'fly up' signal, over a 20 second lag period to 600'/minute. Now comes an even cleverer (?) part; the autothrottle Mach Hold datum is gradually increased over a 100 second period towards Mach 2.02, and so in stable conditions the throttles would now gradually increase again until they once more reach the maximum limit. At this point, the autothrottles now come out of Mach Hold mode and back into the waiting in the wings standby mode. The autopilot would now cancel it's 600' fly up, demand, returning to a datum of Mach 2. There was a little more complexity built in also, where the difference between the 'commanded' and actual vertical speeds offset the autoplilot Mach 2 datum. This would apply whether the autothrottle had cut in (+600'/min demand) or with the throttles back at maximum (0'/minute demand. A positive climb error tweaked the cruise Mach up slightly, a negative error (eg. in a turn) the converse was true. The effect of all of this complexity was that the aircraft itself could 'scan' until it settled at a point where the throttles could be at maximum, and the speed between Mach 2 and 2.02. On the North Atlantic, with warmer ISA temperatures, there was usually just the initial routine with the autothrottle as you hit the corner point. However at lower lattitudes (eg. LHR BGI) there could be a few initial autothrottle intercepts before things settled down. This whole incredible routine completely took care of the insurmountable problem, a problem that was shown not only to be insurmountable, but was put to bed forever, by people like ChristiaanJ.
I hope that my explanation here does not sound too much like gibberish.
EXWOK
I think you've guessed right as far as my identity goes; it's great that it's not just Concorde pilots I can bore the socks off now
PS. I bet the ex-SEOs LOVED your comments
Dude
aaah yes, Max Climb/Max Cruise modes. I'd not forgotten this my friend, I was going to say a few words about that in a future post, but maybe we can do that now. (And I'd love to hear more of your comments on this here too, ChristiaanJ). The intake and autopilot modifications were in a way complimentary it's true, but really dealt with separate problems, at least in my view:
The intake control unit software change (a change to the control law that limited engine N1 as a function of intake local Mach number, Mo, and inlet total temperature, T1) was able to put an absolute limit on aircraft achievable Mach number during Mmo overshoots, but it would not PREVENT Mmo overshoots occurring altogether, it was more of a safety brake. This particular overspeed problem manifested itself well before route proving, and in fact the intake system 'fix' resulted in the Thrust Auto Reduce System being deleted, electronic control boxes and all. The TAR system was fitted on all development aircraft equiped with the digital intake system, and it tried (in vain) to limit extreme Mach overshoots. The production aircraft retained the TAR wiring and locked out circuit breakers, as well as two vacant spaces on the electronic racks. The prime reason for all these efforts were that some of the rapid excessive Mach overshoots quite often drove the intake into surge; the modification to this N1 limiter control enabled engine mass flow to be controlled in such a way that these surges could be prevented during temperature shears. The aircraft Mach limit was an extremely useful fringe benefit.
The AFCS mode change from what was Max Op and Max Op Soft (always loved that name) to Max Climb/Max Cruise was at a stroke able to deal with the regular Mmo overspeeds that kept on occuring during, as you say, the route proving trials of 1975, when British aircraft G-BOAC and the French aircrfraft F-BTSD carried out pre entry into service evaluation flights, SD sadly was the aircraft that was tragically lost at Gonez in July 2000). The Max Climb/Max Cruise AFCS mode combo is a mode like no other that I've personally seen before or since anywhere, (it for instance resulted an elsewhere taboo; an autopilot and an autothrotte working together IN A SPEED MODE).
This problem encountered primarily at lower lattitudes, (for example, G-BOAC doing route proving flights out of Singapore), occurring initially as the aircraft reached Mach 2. It was termed 'the insurmountable problem', but the AFCS designers (such as ChristiaanJ) fortunately did not have 'insurmountable problems' in their vocabulary. The issue was that the aircraft would have been climbing rapidly at Vmo of 530 KTS, with throttles at the gate as usual, At exactly 50,189' we hit what was known as 'the corner point' in the flight envelope, where 530 KTS IAS equated to Mach 2 exactly. Max Op mode would then 'let go' of the Vmo segment, and try and control the aircraft to Mach 2. (As the aircraft climbed, Vmo itself would progreesively decrease in order to equate to Mmo, or 2.04 Mach). But in very cold conditions, the aircraft still 'wanting' to accelerate, and the simple Max Op/Max Op Soft modes just could not cope with gentle pitch changes alone. The problem became even bigger during the cruise/climb when severe temperature shears occured, and routinely regular Mmo exceedences occured. Something had to be done, and something WAS done and how; enter Max Climb/Max Cruise. It was really a classic piece of design, where the aircraft would do the initial supersonic climb in Max Climb mode. This mode itself was relatively simple, in that it was more or less a Vmo -Vc hold mode. That meant that the difference at selection between indicated airspeed, Vc and Vmo would be maintained, with a vernier datum adjust to this being available. In practice this mode was selected pretty much at Vmo, so datum adjusting was not always required. Now comes the clever part; the autothrottle, this would operate in standy mode at this point, just waiting there doing nothing, with the throttles at maximum as before. So the aircraft would now climb as Vmo increased to 530 KTS, and then following a now constant Vmo of 530 KTS until the magic 'corner point' (51, 189' remember). Now all hell would break loose; the mode would automatically change to Max Cruise, the autothrottle would also be automaically selected to Mach Hold mode (initially datumed here to Mach 2) and the throttles would retard, attempting to hold this Mach 2 datum, and the autopilot is commands a 'fly up' signal, over a 20 second lag period to 600'/minute. Now comes an even cleverer (?) part; the autothrottle Mach Hold datum is gradually increased over a 100 second period towards Mach 2.02, and so in stable conditions the throttles would now gradually increase again until they once more reach the maximum limit. At this point, the autothrottles now come out of Mach Hold mode and back into the waiting in the wings standby mode. The autopilot would now cancel it's 600' fly up, demand, returning to a datum of Mach 2. There was a little more complexity built in also, where the difference between the 'commanded' and actual vertical speeds offset the autoplilot Mach 2 datum. This would apply whether the autothrottle had cut in (+600'/min demand) or with the throttles back at maximum (0'/minute demand. A positive climb error tweaked the cruise Mach up slightly, a negative error (eg. in a turn) the converse was true. The effect of all of this complexity was that the aircraft itself could 'scan' until it settled at a point where the throttles could be at maximum, and the speed between Mach 2 and 2.02. On the North Atlantic, with warmer ISA temperatures, there was usually just the initial routine with the autothrottle as you hit the corner point. However at lower lattitudes (eg. LHR BGI) there could be a few initial autothrottle intercepts before things settled down. This whole incredible routine completely took care of the insurmountable problem, a problem that was shown not only to be insurmountable, but was put to bed forever, by people like ChristiaanJ.
I hope that my explanation here does not sound too much like gibberish.
EXWOK
I think you've guessed right as far as my identity goes; it's great that it's not just Concorde pilots I can bore the socks off now
PS. I bet the ex-SEOs LOVED your comments
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 25th Aug 2010 at 01:14 . Reason: missed out some info' (sorry)
16th Sep 2010, 20:50
permalink Post: 379
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by
bizdev
However, whenever Concorde turned up, my overriding memory was of my colleage who was obsessed with 'keeping her warm" - at all costs.
|
They still don't like being too warm or too cold, to this day....
In the French Le Bourget Air and Space Museum, Sierra Delta (F-BTSD) has to live in a big hall, without any heating or air conditioning.
He (yes, "he", French Concordes are "he"s unlike their British sisters) is the one that is still 'alive' to some extent, and that will still greet you by lowering and raising his nose if you're there at the right time.
And he too will tell you unequivocally, even today, whe it's simply too hot or too cold to 'perform'.
Luckily, his human friend, who's been taking care of him since he arrived at the museum, understands him very well.... I know there are some "sympathetic brain waves" there.....
CJ
28th Sep 2010, 22:58
permalink Post: 492
Quote:
|
Originally Posted by
Cron
My question concerns lighting. Not many decent pictures showing landing lights etc being used in anger.
Concorde appears to have a much reduced frontal area for the housing of such lighting. |
Nevertheless there were three separate sets of landing/taxi lights there.
Quoting from the manual:
Two main landing lamps, one mounted in each wing root leading
edge, have retractable/extensible mountings and when not in
use are retracted in the lamp housing.
Two land/taxi lamps, similar to the main landing lamps, are attached to the
nose landing gear bay doors. The land/taxi lamps extend to
an intermediate position for landing, upon which they
automatically extend to the full position for taxiing, thus
changing the beam angle to compensate for the attitude change.
Two taxi/turn-off lamps, one mounted on each side of the
forward fuselage, provide ground illumination to identify
runway turn-off points.
These are the 'main' lights in the wing leading edge (600W each).
These are the lights in the nosewheel doors ("only" 450W each).
Quote:
| There is also the question of lenses having to withstand supersonic flow. |
The heat was less of a problem, actually.
The lights themselves were high-power sealed-beam units, the main units were 6 00W each, and the ones in the nosewheel doors were 450W ... nothing like your car headlights.
As a matter of fact, on the ground you were not suppossed to turn them on any more than 5 minutes in any 10 minutes.... they got a lot hotter when switched on, than they did in supersonic flight.
Quote:
| And also the angle of attack on landing (hope I have the right terminology there) seemingly pointing any lighting into the sky. |
What happened was that the main landing lamps in the wing roots were angled such, that they pointed straight ahead at the right angle to "hit" the runway during the landing itself.
Once the aircraft touched down, the land/taxi lights in the nose gear door extended further and lit a wider expanse of the runway ahead (see the earlier quote from the manual).
And then the third set of lights in the nose helped you to find the turn-off to the taxiway.
One nice little detail.... on F-BTSD, the Concorde at the French Le Bourget museum, those lights still work, and on G-BBDG, the Concorde at the Brooklands museum that was saved from the scrapheap, they brought those lights back to life, too.
CJ
Last edited by ChristiaanJ; 28th Sep 2010 at 23:14 . Reason: Addng pics and typo
27th Oct 2010, 22:33
permalink Post: 616
Mike-Bracknell
It is not nonsense, and you are quite at liberty to post here. Wow, that's still quite a question though Mike. There are two TECHNICAL issues that overshadow all others, namely airframe corrosion and hydraulic system deterioration. Unfortunately none of the BA aircraft were stored inside from the outset, so we have a real issue here as far as corrosion goes, plus all the hydraulic systems were drained, resulting in seal drying out and probable moisture ingress into the 3 systems. But given sufficient funds (and assuming you find an organisation to take over design responsibility from Airbus;
ironic when you consider that without Concorde there would almost certainly have been no such organisation
) there is still no technical reason why the problems (and there are dozens of other problems to consider) could not be overcome, the money side of things is another matter
Looking first at the French fleet, the main candidate for restoration to flight status would be F-BTSD at Le Bourget. Not only has this aircraft been lovingly cared for and stored INSIDE, but the aircraft has had several systems (including the Green hydraulic system) powered and reservoirs not drained.
The British story is less clear; G-BOAA in East Fortune was effectively killed when the wings were cut off for transportation, so that one is out of the question. G-BOAB, the last and only Concorde at LHR has been left to rot outside, in fact holes were even drill in the fuselage to drain water, so this one is a no no too. G-BOAC at Manchester, now the oldest surviving production aircraft was initially stored outside, but now resides in a purpose built exhibition 'hangar'. Now she COULD be a potential candidate for consideration; when I last saw her just over a year ago she was absolutely pristine; a testament to the team that have been caring for her there. G-BOAD, stored next to the USS Intrepid in New York, we can probably forget, due to having been exposed to 7 years worth of salt water corrosion from the Hudson River. (Also, while she was temporarily stored in New Jersey a couple of years ago, some IDIOT in a truck bent the whole nose section when he hit her. The radome was smashed (replaced with a rather clever fibreglass fabrication) and the nose straightened with a blow-torch and hammer (I am not joking!!). G-BOAE at Grantley Adams airport in Barbados has been stored under cover for much of the time; provided she has not suffered too much from the wam damp atmosphere of Barbados, well she could be a potential candiitate too. G-BOAF in Filton, well PROVIDED she is still OK after her 'removal from public view' experience could also be a potential candidate also. And finally, G-BOAG in Seattle; well she had been left outside, right next to a highway (and close to a truck stop too). She did not look too good the last time I saw her; the undercarriage barrels werer all brown and discoloured and the paintwork was completely dull and matte. (She had a new paint job not too long before retirement too). So out of the 'BA Seven', I PERSONALLY would go for G-BOAF, G-BOAC or G-BOAG.
As I have said often here before, it is EXTREMELY unlikely that what you, Mike, suggest will ever happen, but in spite of what others might say, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. My own gut feeling is a resounding 'no', but I could be wrong, . (And NO ONE would be happier than I if I am wrong; I was with the BA aircraft through construction, flight testing and the entire service life with BA).
As for the cost? It really is a case of 'how long is a piece of string', but for 2 aircraft we could be looking in excess of $100 or more, who knows?
But as the Everly Brothers used to sing 'All I have to do is dream.'
Keep posting Mike.
Dude
.
Quote:
| IF funding were secured to get 1 Concorde from each fleet into the air again, which one out of each fleet would be the easiest to return to service, given what has gone on since retirement? Also, a subpoint, does anyone have any finger-in-the-air figures as to how much cost it would take and whether there's any fundamental issues that would need to be sorted aside from the airworthiness certificate etc. |
Looking first at the French fleet, the main candidate for restoration to flight status would be F-BTSD at Le Bourget. Not only has this aircraft been lovingly cared for and stored INSIDE, but the aircraft has had several systems (including the Green hydraulic system) powered and reservoirs not drained.
The British story is less clear; G-BOAA in East Fortune was effectively killed when the wings were cut off for transportation, so that one is out of the question. G-BOAB, the last and only Concorde at LHR has been left to rot outside, in fact holes were even drill in the fuselage to drain water, so this one is a no no too. G-BOAC at Manchester, now the oldest surviving production aircraft was initially stored outside, but now resides in a purpose built exhibition 'hangar'. Now she COULD be a potential candidate for consideration; when I last saw her just over a year ago she was absolutely pristine; a testament to the team that have been caring for her there. G-BOAD, stored next to the USS Intrepid in New York, we can probably forget, due to having been exposed to 7 years worth of salt water corrosion from the Hudson River. (Also, while she was temporarily stored in New Jersey a couple of years ago, some IDIOT in a truck bent the whole nose section when he hit her. The radome was smashed (replaced with a rather clever fibreglass fabrication) and the nose straightened with a blow-torch and hammer (I am not joking!!). G-BOAE at Grantley Adams airport in Barbados has been stored under cover for much of the time; provided she has not suffered too much from the wam damp atmosphere of Barbados, well she could be a potential candiitate too. G-BOAF in Filton, well PROVIDED she is still OK after her 'removal from public view' experience could also be a potential candidate also. And finally, G-BOAG in Seattle; well she had been left outside, right next to a highway (and close to a truck stop too). She did not look too good the last time I saw her; the undercarriage barrels werer all brown and discoloured and the paintwork was completely dull and matte. (She had a new paint job not too long before retirement too). So out of the 'BA Seven', I PERSONALLY would go for G-BOAF, G-BOAC or G-BOAG.
As I have said often here before, it is EXTREMELY unlikely that what you, Mike, suggest will ever happen, but in spite of what others might say, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. My own gut feeling is a resounding 'no', but I could be wrong, . (And NO ONE would be happier than I if I am wrong; I was with the BA aircraft through construction, flight testing and the entire service life with BA).
As for the cost? It really is a case of 'how long is a piece of string', but for 2 aircraft we could be looking in excess of $100 or more, who knows?
But as the Everly Brothers used to sing 'All I have to do is dream.'
Keep posting Mike.
Dude
.
29th Oct 2010, 16:25
permalink Post: 627
jodelistie
First of all Rod, welcome to our Concorde thread, and thank you very much for your kind words.
Now as far as the rumour goes, I'm afraid that it is nonsense, however the truth is an even more complex story of collusion, betrayal and intrigue. You may read that 'Concorde was retired by BA and Air France purely due to economic reasons', however that is not quite the case (and as far as THIS side of the English Puddle goes, is total poppycock!!). Now BA lost a huge amount of her regular traffic as a result of the 9/11 tragedy and also as a result of the 2003 Iraq war, but things were improving nicely. In her 27 years of operation, Concorde had survived countless dips in her traffic, only to return stronger as market conditions improved.
It is early 2003, and French Concorde traffic to the USA has almost vanished, down to single digit loads. This is due mainly to total French opposition the impending US/UK invasion of Iraq, and US businessmen using BA Concorde almost exclusively. (French business seems to be boycotting the US altogether, so their contribution to passenger loads virtually ceased). Due to the apalling loads, AF are losing absolutely MILLIONS of Euros, at a time when the carrier is trying to privatise itself ... but there is more:
In the same February, AF very nearly lost ANOTHER Concorde, yet again largely down to total incompetence and lack of adherence to established procedures. Aircraft F-BTSD was flying between CDG and JFK when there was a failure of the reheat delivery pipe that runs from the engine 1st stage fuel pump to the reheat shut-off valve. This failure, although not particularly serious, led to a chain of events that very nearly resulted in the loss of the aircraft, and all those onboard. (Air France engines were overhauled seperately to BA, who never experienced this particular failure). What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too late. The aircraft just managed to land in Halifax, with barely enough fuel left in the tanks to taxi!! So, herer we are, AF are horrified that they have come very close to yet another disaster, knowing full well that yet again human error was a major factor.
But there is more....
One week later another AF aircraft loses part of a rudder panel due to de-lamination of the honeycomb surface, not particularly serious in itself, but it put even more jitters up the trousers of AF. (Rudder failures had happened to BA aircraft many years previous to this, but BA had purchased brand new and improved rudders from Airbus UK in Filton, but Air France chose not too).
So it seems that the chairmen of both Air France and Airbus (who regards Concorde as a waste of its valuable resources) have a 'secret' meeting to plan what was effectively the murder of Concorde. There is no way that AF want BA to carry on flying Concorde while they have to cease operations, so the plan is for Airbus to make a huge hike in their product support costs; these costs would have to be borne by BA exclusively, which they both knew would not be possible. If these support costs were not met, there would be no manufacturers support, and without this there would be no type certificate, and without this, no more Concorde.
Their (AF & Airbus) hope was that BA would not challenge this move legally, and sadly for the world of aviation they did not. At a meeting, BA AND AIR FRANCE!!!! were told by Airbus about the hike in product support costs, and BA would also have to cease operations. BA were not even allowed to continue until March 2004 (the Barbados season was nearly fully booked already), and so would have to cease operations in October 2003.
But the British were far from blameless in all this; a now retired very senior British airline person had always obsessively HATED Concorde, so the French conspiracy was a very early Christmas present for him; he finally got what he had always wanted. The 'end of Concorde' anouncement by both airlines was made in April 2003; AF had got what their executives wanted and finished flying in May, reluctantly leaving BA to fly until late October. If you want a full (and extremely well informed) explanation of what happened in that whole debacle, the article by Don Pevsner is worth reading. It can be found at this website:
THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that without the truly disgusting events in France in early 2003, Concorde would still be proudly flying for BA. (And with modifications and enhancements would fly safely for many more years).
quote** "in the hands of true professionals, Concorde was the safest aircraft that ever flew. and in the hands of BA crews at least, she was always just that..*
Oh and yes you were correct, the Olympus (the world's first ever 2 spool engine) was originally a 'Bristol-Siddeley' design, before BS were absorbed into Rolls-Royce. Stanley Hookers book is in my view totally superb, a true classic.
Dude
Quote:
| On which there was a splendid rumour that what put the final nail in the great birds coffin was that our transatlantic allies realised that if hijacked there was nothing that could catch her !! |
Now as far as the rumour goes, I'm afraid that it is nonsense, however the truth is an even more complex story of collusion, betrayal and intrigue. You may read that 'Concorde was retired by BA and Air France purely due to economic reasons', however that is not quite the case (and as far as THIS side of the English Puddle goes, is total poppycock!!). Now BA lost a huge amount of her regular traffic as a result of the 9/11 tragedy and also as a result of the 2003 Iraq war, but things were improving nicely. In her 27 years of operation, Concorde had survived countless dips in her traffic, only to return stronger as market conditions improved.
It is early 2003, and French Concorde traffic to the USA has almost vanished, down to single digit loads. This is due mainly to total French opposition the impending US/UK invasion of Iraq, and US businessmen using BA Concorde almost exclusively. (French business seems to be boycotting the US altogether, so their contribution to passenger loads virtually ceased). Due to the apalling loads, AF are losing absolutely MILLIONS of Euros, at a time when the carrier is trying to privatise itself ... but there is more:
In the same February, AF very nearly lost ANOTHER Concorde, yet again largely down to total incompetence and lack of adherence to established procedures. Aircraft F-BTSD was flying between CDG and JFK when there was a failure of the reheat delivery pipe that runs from the engine 1st stage fuel pump to the reheat shut-off valve. This failure, although not particularly serious, led to a chain of events that very nearly resulted in the loss of the aircraft, and all those onboard. (Air France engines were overhauled seperately to BA, who never experienced this particular failure). What was required in the case of this failure was a precautionary engine shut-down, closing off the fuel supply to the engine totally, and a descent/deceleration to subsonic speed, carefully monitoring fuel consumption all the time. Unfortunately the crew 'forgot' to shut down the fuel LP valve, and this resulted in the fuel continuing to gush out of the failed pipe at an alarming rate. (Oh, and also they forgot to monitor the fuel consumption). Only after the crew FINALLY noticed that they were still losing fuel did they remember to close the engine LP valve, but it was almost too late. The aircraft just managed to land in Halifax, with barely enough fuel left in the tanks to taxi!! So, herer we are, AF are horrified that they have come very close to yet another disaster, knowing full well that yet again human error was a major factor.
But there is more....
One week later another AF aircraft loses part of a rudder panel due to de-lamination of the honeycomb surface, not particularly serious in itself, but it put even more jitters up the trousers of AF. (Rudder failures had happened to BA aircraft many years previous to this, but BA had purchased brand new and improved rudders from Airbus UK in Filton, but Air France chose not too).
So it seems that the chairmen of both Air France and Airbus (who regards Concorde as a waste of its valuable resources) have a 'secret' meeting to plan what was effectively the murder of Concorde. There is no way that AF want BA to carry on flying Concorde while they have to cease operations, so the plan is for Airbus to make a huge hike in their product support costs; these costs would have to be borne by BA exclusively, which they both knew would not be possible. If these support costs were not met, there would be no manufacturers support, and without this there would be no type certificate, and without this, no more Concorde.
Their (AF & Airbus) hope was that BA would not challenge this move legally, and sadly for the world of aviation they did not. At a meeting, BA AND AIR FRANCE!!!! were told by Airbus about the hike in product support costs, and BA would also have to cease operations. BA were not even allowed to continue until March 2004 (the Barbados season was nearly fully booked already), and so would have to cease operations in October 2003.
But the British were far from blameless in all this; a now retired very senior British airline person had always obsessively HATED Concorde, so the French conspiracy was a very early Christmas present for him; he finally got what he had always wanted. The 'end of Concorde' anouncement by both airlines was made in April 2003; AF had got what their executives wanted and finished flying in May, reluctantly leaving BA to fly until late October. If you want a full (and extremely well informed) explanation of what happened in that whole debacle, the article by Don Pevsner is worth reading. It can be found at this website:
THE BETRAYAL OF CONCORDE
There is absolutely no doubt in my mind that without the truly disgusting events in France in early 2003, Concorde would still be proudly flying for BA. (And with modifications and enhancements would fly safely for many more years).
quote** "in the hands of true professionals, Concorde was the safest aircraft that ever flew. and in the hands of BA crews at least, she was always just that..*
Oh and yes you were correct, the Olympus (the world's first ever 2 spool engine) was originally a 'Bristol-Siddeley' design, before BS were absorbed into Rolls-Royce. Stanley Hookers book is in my view totally superb, a true classic.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 29th Oct 2010 at 16:52 . Reason: spelling (yet again) :-(
10th Nov 2010, 15:43
permalink Post: 694
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Originally Posted by
Biggles78
All due respect but this is the CONCORDE thread and it would be really nice if it could stay as such.
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LandLady said in a post many moons ago that there was a pool of some 240 "Concorde Ambassadors" (sorry but CC and FAs don't sound right for this aeroplane) for Her. What was the numbers of Captains, First Officers and the all important Flight Engineers (sucking up to M2 with that one
)
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I looked at the photos posted by a thoughtful member in an earlier post and wonder how former crew felt looking at them. The photos give the impression that you could kick the tyres and light the fires and they would be once again gracing the skies. Obviously they are unairworthy BUT the photos project a different image.
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As an example, F-BVFC at Toulouse, which was the last one to remain at least taxyable, now has some patches of corrosion starting to show, when you know where to look. Not to mention the nasty smell of damp and mould in the cockpit which bodes no good for what's going on underneath the floor.
And even F-BTSD, kept "live" to some extent at Le Bourget, leaks some hydraulic fluid (like all Concordes did on the ground), so it's easy to imagine the dried-out hydraulic and fuel seals on the other museum aircraft.
And yes, that's kitty litter...
The composite material of the floor and the hydraulic fluid don't agree too well.
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| Final one for this post. If She was still flying, do you still think that BA (sorry but going to ignore AF on this one) would have sufficient patronage to keep Her as a going and profitable concern? |
CJ
Last edited by ChristiaanJ; 14th Nov 2010 at 11:32 . Reason: typo
30th Dec 2010, 14:00
permalink Post: 1050
Bell Inn Charter
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Peronally, I still remember vaguely there's a tale of the customers of a country pub somewhere in England actually chartering a Concorde for a "round-the-bay" flight, but I've never been able to find the full story.
CJ |
A little bit of further digging on this trip has revealed ..
"Brian Calvert was a pilot on the very first commercial Concorde flight, and a regular at The Bell Inn. Ian Macaulay asked whether it would be possible to take a trip on it and Brian made it possible to arrange. As a result, on 19th September 1978 one hundred people paid \xa3100 each to make the first ever chartered flight in the supersonic airliner."
I wonder how many drinks it took them to convince Brian Calvert it would be a good idea
There is also a reference to Concorde in the Aldworth Millennium Tapestry that was made in 1999 showing. Aldworth Millennium Tapestry
I am very lucky to live only 30 miles from G-BOAC and have made several visits including doing the technical tours - although nothing like the detail that I have learnt from yourselves
In response to Christiaan's question about how the technical tours were done in comparision to F-BTSD at Le Bourget, unfortunatley it only looks like lighting power is supplied to the A/C - no hydraulics seem to be 'left intact' and working which is a huge shame.
For me it only shows that 'she' (or 'he'
) is a very special entity that did prove to be so much more than just a 'machine'. Even though she isn't flying, you still catch yourself standing in awe each time you see her. at first I wasn't sure about AC's new 'hangar', but apart from keeping her dry, I must admit it does add atmosphere to the occasion.
Cheers
Andy
15th Jan 2011, 16:29
permalink Post: 1104
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Originally Posted by
CliveL
Don't want to be 'picky', but my photograph was of AS's 201 at Toulouse on the occasion of the party to celebrate the 20th anniversary of 001's first flight. If I understand correctly, the 'Pepsi' aircraft was 213 and belonged to AF. I don't think 201 flew with that Tricolour paint scheme. Can anyone throw more light on this?
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F-WTSB (201) was painted in that horrific scheme by students at Toulouse.
Since that was in 1989, and 'SB made his last flight in 1985, and was not maintained airworthy, he never flew with that colour scheme....
The 'Pepsi' aircraft was indeed F-BTSD (213), and leased from AF for the occasion.
CJ