Posts about: "FBW (Fly By Wire)" [Posts: 35 Pages: 2]

Hi Nick, thanks again for your comments. As far as not being a commercial success, for the airline this side of the Channel it was a HUGE commercial success (but of course I accept that in manufacturing terms this was far from the case. The project suffered from very poor financial control). Concorde was the first commercial FBW aircraft as you rightly surmised.
A huge amount of Airbus work was 'burried' in the Concorde project; at Filton a large amount of Airbus components came through that were almost identical to those on Concorde. (witness the STRIKING similarity between the A300 main gear and that of Concorde). Apologies if this post is a little tardy, it's done from my IPhone).

No thanks needed.. I like plunging back into the history, especially when people are interested, and I have a sneaky suspicion that M2dude does too!
As M2dude says... to some extent, yes!

As an example in my particular field, you have to be an expert to distinguish the Concorde ADI (Attitude Director Indicator) and HSI (Horizontal Situation Indicator) - the two big central instruments on the pilot's and copilot's panel - from those on the first Airbus, the A300, or the early A310s. Apart from a couple of lights and buttons, they were the same, and the innards were pretty well identical.

And a lot of the technology in the AFCS (Automtic Flight Control System, i.e., the autopilots, etc.) was also virtually indistinguishable (the circuitry was obviously different... an A300 did not do Mach2).

But even more than the technical foundations, Concorde also laid the foundations for an effective and successful international cooperation in aircraft design, development and production.
We learned a tremendous amount from Concorde... Airbus might still have happened without Concorde, but it certainly would have happened years later.

Yes, you're right.
The one difference with "modern" FBW commercial planes (such as the A320) is that Concorde still did have a mechanical back-up for when all else failed.
At the time, there was still a doubt about all these new-fangled elektriks replacing good old rods and cables, so when you look under the floor in a Concorde, the rods and cables are still there.
But apart from tests and training for emergencies, essentially they were never used.

Biggles78
Sorry Biggles78, I'd forgotten to answer your CofG query, so here we go: CofG was a really critical parameter on Concorde, being a delta, with no tailplane made it more so at take off speeds, and as we've previously said, was how we trimmed the aircraft for supersonic flight. CG was expressed as a percentage of the aerodynamic chord line. To get indication of CG you needed to know the mass of fuel in each tank; easy, from the FQI system. You needed to know the moment arm of each tank, (fixed of course). You then needed the zero fuel weight (ZFW) and zero fuel CG (ZFCG); these were manually input into the CG computers by the F/E, from load control data. The final parameter you needed was total fuel weight, again easy from the FQI system.
The 'normal' T/O CG was 53.5%, but in order to increase fuel weight (and hence range) an extra 'bump' was enabled to allow a max T/O CG of 54%. (CG was indicated on a linear gauge, with forward and aft limit 'bugs' either side of the needle. These bugs would move as a function of Mach and at the lower end of the speed range, A/C weight also). As the A/C accelerated, the limit bugs would move rearwards (with of course the rearward shifting centre of pressure) and so the fuel would be moved from the two front trim tanks 9 & 10 to the rear tank. 11. Once tank 11 reached it's preset limit (around 10 tonnes), the remainder of the 'front' fuel would automatically over-spill into tanks 5 & 7. (Once the fuel panel was set up, the whole process was controlled with a single switch). At Mach 2, the CG would be around 59%, the whole rearwards shift being in the order of 6'. As we said before, the 'final' CG could be tweaked to give us a 1/2 degree down elevon, for minimum drag.
I really hope this helps Biggles78.

Guys, back to the Airbus thing; My friend ChristiaanJ gave some really accurate insights, (he always does) but there is another legacy that carries on the this day; some of the audio warning tones were COPIED from Concorde into Airbus. (For example, the A/P disconnect audio is identical). I think this is great, and gives 'our' aircraft a lasting everyday legacy.

As far as the fly by wire goes, Concorde had a relatively simple analog system, with little or no envelope protection (Except at extreme angles if attack). As has been previously poted before, production series test aircraft 201, F-WTSB, pioneered the use of a sidestick within a new digital fly by wire Controlled Conviguration Vehicle sytem, with envelope protection and attitude rate feedback. (This evolved into the superb system known and loved by the Airbus community). It is a really bizaar twist of fate that the Concorde FBW system has more mechanical similarities to the system used in the B777 than Airbus. (Mechanically similar at the front end, with an electric backdrive system moving the column in A/P mode; Concorde being backdriven by a hydraulic relay jack).
As a final piece of irony; the Primary Flight Control Computers on the B777 are designed and built by GEC Marconi Avionics in Rochester Kent, now BAe Systems. This is the same plant where Elliot (becoming Marconi and finally GEC Marconi Avionics) developed and built the UK half of the AFCS computers. Isn't this aviation world strange?
Galaxy Flyer
Your inputs here are great, and I'm sure appreciated by all. (I assume from your name that you were a C5A pilot. While I was in the RAF on C-130's, our Lockheed rep' used to supply us all with company magazines, that were full of stuff on this new (it was then) giant of the sky. I fell in love with it there and then).
Anyway, back to Conc': The decel' positions were carefully worked out and adhered to; the aim was to be subsonic to within (I think) 50 nm of the east coast. I'll wait for one of my Concorde pilot friends to confirm that here, but i think I'm correct. I do have a fond memory of one flight out of JFK; we were temporarily 'held' by Boston ATC to Mach 1.6 (and at around FL440) because of an Air France Concorde heading for JFK. We saw this guy above us, at around FL580 on a near reciprical , doing Mach 2, screaming straight over the top of us. We were excited by this amazing spectacle, and so were the AF crew over the VHF ('you never boomed us, did we boom you?'). But the most excited person of all was this guy in Boston ATC. ('I've never seen anything like it guys, your two blips whistled over each other on my my screen like crazy').
Stliton
As far as the F/D noise levels were concerned, once the nose and visor were raised, it was as if someone had switched off the noise . The main source of noise up there was just the equipment cooling, and that was not bad either. It was, in my view, little noisier up than most subsonics. (But not the 744, where you are so far away from all the racket ).
Ozgrade3
You're making us blush here; thanks for your comments, I think we are just trying to share some of our experiences (and 'bit's we've picked up over the years).
From my perspective, I did write some stuff used by our pilots, AF even got a copy or two I think.

What I omitted to say about the Concorde FBW was that autostabilisation commands were superimposed onto the manual/autopilot demands directly at powered flying control unit (PFCU) level, on all 3 axis. . This made the aircraft superbly stable and precise to handle at almost any speed or condition. Apologies for IPhone again

Galaxy Flyer
We never had a case of lost pressurisation, ever. The cabin windows had dual laminated panes; an inner pressure pane and an outer thermal pane. We had dual systems that kept the cabin at a max diff' of 10.7 PSI, the engine bleeds pushing about 200lb of air per minute into the cabin. This allowed you to fly the cabin at an altitude of around a 6000' maximum only, right up to TOD. If you HAD to fly subsonically, the ideal was Mach 0.95 at FL290. (Subsonically the aircraft had similar range to normal, but took well over twice as long of course). If however you had to shut down an engine, your range deteriorated quite dramatically, and a diversion was usually sought.

It's great that Bellerophon is posting here again; we need a steely eyed Concorde pilot's input here (not just the boffins/nutters and nerds [that's me ]. To touch more on a couple of his valid points;
Fuel burn: The aircraft would naturally require less fuel as she became lighter and as a consequence gently climbed to maintain cruise Mach number, this is what the engine control system was doing all the time, even though the throttles were wide open it was 'tweaking'.. BUT, the decreasing IAS as you climbed, due of course to the reducing density, just like any other aircraft meant that drag was reducing too, so it was a combination of both of these factors, reducing weight and reducing drag.
Flying controls: It was a slightly weird but wonderful arrangement; pilots inputs would move a servo valve in the hydraulic relay jack, the jack would move in response and drive both a resolver AND mechanical linkages. The resolver ourput was sumed with the flying control position resolvers, and the error signal was fed into an autostab' computer, where it was summed with stabilisation demands (primarily axis rate and acceleration). The autostab computer would the directly drive the surface, and the reducing error signal would reduce the demand etc. While all this was going on, the mechanical linkages would slavishly follow, but as long as you were in FBW (what we used to call 'signalling') mode, these mechanical inputs were de-clutched at the PFCU, so did nothing at all. Only if there was an EXTREMELY unlikely failure of BOTH FBW channels would these inputs be clutched in and the flying control group (rudders, inner elevons or outer and mid' elevons) would then be in Mechanical signalling. The system redundancy was checked after engine start on every flight. But to reinforce what Bellerophon stated, there was no mechanical reversion here; without hydraulics you had nothing. Another aside here; the designers, being paranoid like all good designers (no offence Christiaan ) were worried what would happen if the controls would somehow jam up. A jammed mechanical flying control input run itself would have no effect on FBW operation whatsoever, due to spring boxes being fitted to the runs. A 'Mech Jam' light would be set, together with a separate red light and audio warning, but this was all. But to completely protect against the aircraft was fitted with a Safety Flight Computer (SFC) system. The idea was, if a control axis (pitch or roll only) jammed up, the captain could press down on a switch light set between the two halves of his control wheel, (at the centre of the 'W') and the Emergency Flight Controls would activate. Strain gauges at the front of the control wheel, two sets on each control column for pitch and roll axis, would input into an SFC that would covert the control force into an elevon demand. These commands were then fed into the autostab' computers, and hence directly into the controls. (A little like L-1011 CWS in a way). There was a little test button that was used to test this system, again after engine start. So although the controls were jammed, the aircraft could still be flown. (Never used in anger I'm pleased to report).
But there was a problem; if this system was inadvertantly used, the results could have been catastrophic, as the system was extremely sensitive indeed, and full elevon movement could be enabled with only moderate effort. Because of this hairy prospect some safeguards were obviously put in place. The first safeguard was an interlock in the autostab' engage logic; If the switchlight had been inadvertently selected beforehand (the light was green by the way) you would not be able to engage pitch or roll autostab's (both channels too) so you would not be going flying until that was fixed. The second safeguard was a little more subtle; A plastic, frangible cover was fitted over the switchlight, unless the captain pressed reasonably hard the cover would prevent the switchlight from being pressed. At least that was the theory, in practice this little bit of plastic could be a pain in the ass . It was carefully fashioned, and I seem to remember BAe charging the airlines a few hundred pounds each for these things. If some wally fitted the cover upside down (and unless you were careful it was easy to do) THE THING WOULD NOT BREAK!! I remember at Fairford in 1976, G-BOAD was on pre-delivery flight testing, and the late great test pilot John Cochrane was doing a test of the system. The cover on this occasion HAD been fitted upside down, and of course he could not plunge his thumb through it and engage the EFC button. After trying everything, in the end he removed a shoe, took out his pen, and smashed the plastic cover until it broke. (It's OK, the autopilot was engaged at the time). Unfortunately, his combined shoe/pen emergency device also wrecked the switchlight as well, so the system still could not engage. (There was only a switchlight on the captain's side). After he landed and he confronted us all with his dilemma, he was shaking; not with rage but with laughter. (This was the great John Cochrane, sometimes the dour Scotsman but he was always able to see the lighter side). After that event, careful instructions were issued regarding the fit of the cover, and it was modified and made a little more frangible.

EXWOK , more than happy to take a hint........PLEASE! and welcome to this gem of a thread.

With the FBW, was there any feedback built into the yoke? The Airbus with it's "joystick" has, I believe, no feel unlike a Flight Sim force feedback one.
If there was a yoke movement on one side did the other side mirror the movement or like the Airbus did the sidestick play dead?

M2 , it appears the tailwheel was, so far, the only "fault" in an otherwise extreme machine. Were there any other items like the tailwheel that were unworthy to be in her?

Does anyone have a tech drawing of the "sliding seals" used in the hydraulics. I have trouble visualising something that could withstand the 4,000psi pressure. Why was such a high pressure used? After all the control surfaces couldn't have required that much input to effect an authority movement. I understand it was also a special fluid that was used. Was this because of the pressure it was under or the temperature extremes?

Biggles:

Yep, there was feedback. In this respect, the implementation of FBW had a rather different philosophy to FBW Airbus'.

Below 200kts it was basically a spring feedback, above that speed it was achieved throught the feel system, not entirely unlike conventional aircraft.

Of course, the feel was tempered also by the autostab system, which didn't feedback through the yoke, but did make control surface inputs. A basic analogy is to imagine a yaw damper, but on all three axes. (It was of course rather more sophisticated, especially in pitch).

During airtests we would fly portions of the supersonic accel without autostabs and it was then very obvious exactly how much input was being made - great care was needed to remain within sensible bank angles in the low supersonic regime.

Also - watch a video of the control surfaces in the latter stages of the approach and landing - all those rapid deflections are the autostabs overlaid on the pilot's inputs. One has to remember that the aircraft is effectively statically unstable in pitch at approach speeds, so a pilot up-elevator input would soon be followed by a countering autostab elevon-down to contain the tendency to keep pitching up, and vice-versa. Gusts affecting the IAS would also create an input.

All of which means the basic spring feel below 200kts is not as basic as it sounds.....and in normal signalling modes (ie FBW and autostab active) the amazing thing is that the aircraft handled beautifully through an 1100kt speed range.

If you look at a picture of the flightdeck you will see a row of 14 white switches full width of the fwd edge of the overhead panel. These were autostab pitch/roll/yaw, feel pitch/roll/yaw left and right systems and the two pitch trim switches (which played a big part in the low-speed protection).

If any of them dropped out you could be sure that the first thing the nearest pilot would do would be to try to re-engage them, as it made for a vastly more pleasant life.

Landroger
Wow, that's a very interesting question, do you mind if I give it a tiny slant of my own, namely system distribution?
Concorde had an ENORMOUS number of electronic control boxes, for example the powerplant alone used TWENTY SIX rather heavy computers and control units, all of which used conventional 1970's manufacturing technology. (Although the intake box was a work of art; rows and rows of double sided PCBs completely crammed with TTL chips). This whole entourage literally weighed a ton, and could be easily replaced by four modern relatively light units with multiple redundancy built in). Even the AFCS used a total of sixteen heavy boxes, again these could be reduced to three, for a modern triple channel system. The three INUs and two ADCs (Very heavy units all) could be replaced with a single ADIRU and SAARU. To complete the package two FMCs (which would also furnish autothrottle functions) could be added. A massive weight saving could be made on the FBW system, by removing the bulky mechanical components (the feel and relay jacks as well as all the mechanical control runs and the massive mixing unit under the rear floor). Careful design could easily provide a full authority triplex or quadraplex FBW system. The current controls could be replaced with either an Airbus or Boeing type system, using either a sidestick (Airbus) or retain a conventional control column system (B777/787) using electric backdrive. The pilots can decide this one. A modern databus system would also be required for providing communication and redundancy; ARINC 629 would be MY preferred choice). The wholesale replacement of the various control units and computers, not to forget miles of wiring, as well as some bulky mechanical hardware would in my view save around 3 tonnes or more in weight alone. A now far more accurate control of aircraft systems would also bring major efficiency savings. As far as saving space, that possibly free up a couple of seat rows, if it were all done properly.
We can all dream I suppose

Dude

Thanks Brit312 and ChristiaanJ.

Living in Bristol we used to see her go over on the way in to LHR and on a quiet day with the wind in the right direction we could sometimes here a very faint version of the "BaBoom" that was in the linked video.

Such a shame that they didn't keep at least one in a relatively easier to restore to flight condition and send it on the air show circuits with the Vulcan. With the talk of analogue FBW and PFCUs it reminded me of some of the Vulcan controls that I have read about, was there much technology transfer from the Vulcan to Concorde in the design stage?

DozyWannabe
Good point I suppose, but you could say that the six Concorde prototypes, Pre-Production and Production Series Test aircraft were also development aircraft, and yet more or less worked just as it said on the tin', where the TU144, in spite of all the facilities of Andrei Tupolev's design bureaux, not to mention more or less unlimited Soviet state funds produced a machine that in my opinion really BELONGED in a tin can. (I know this is all off topic, honest guys, I won't mention this stuff again ).
In reality the Soviets really lacked both propulsion technology as well as the systems expertise required to build an aircraft with even a remote hope of Mach 2 cruise, let alone safe and comfortable enough for fare paying passengers. The original aircraft had all for engines in one giant nacelle, and the landing gear retracted into the engine inlet duct itself, great for an undistorted flow path to the engines . The variable inlets were manually operated by the flight engineer as well, no automatics here. In the mid 1970's the Russians even approached PLESSEY to build a digital engine control unit for the TU144. A similar PLESSEY unit had been VERY successfully flight trialled on production series aircraft 202 (G-BBDG) and only lack of funds prevented it being used on the production aircraft. As this unit could obviously be used for Soviet military applications, there was objection from the UK government, and more than just a little trans-Atlantic pressure applied, and so this venture never happened.
Until the advent of the Mig-29 and Sukhoi SU-27 this really was not the case. I'm afraid I'm with galaxy flyer on this; If you look at the air war over Vietnam, when an F4 met a MIG 19 or MIG 21 in an even air-to-air combat, the MIG was going down. (OK this could be partially down to superior US pilot traing etc, but if you look at the handful of skirmishes where the 1960's/1970's Soviet aircraft were engaged in Combat against US or French built fighters, the MIGs never really did very well at all). However, the aircraft that the Russians have been producing from the Mig 29 onwards seem to be in a completely different class now; hope they really are the good guys now.
ANYWAY, back on topic
Lurking SLF
No problem at all Darragh, please keep visiting us and post here also anytime.
Nick Thomas
I'm not sure that I can describe the DEBOW process remotely as eloquently as my friend Bellerophon did, I particularly loved the 'out of balance tumble-drier' bit, but starting a hot or even warm engine, even at DEBOW, you could certainly 'feel' the noise on the flight deck, until the shaft distortions evened out.
Now for the PFM bit, equally eloquently alluded to by Bellerophon:
DEBOW itself was maintained by a special sub-idle datum in the electronic Engine Control Unit, and once the engine was accelerated towards normal idle (61-65% N2, depending on the temperature of the day) even if the switch described by Bellerophon was accidently re-selected, an electronic inhibit gate in the ECU prevented this sub-idle datum from being used again that engine cycle.
You're welcome Nick, actually the roll and yaw trims operated in a similar manner to the pitch, although of course these was applied by a manual trim wheel only. (No French bike bell either ). Rotation of either wheel (more a giant knob actually) merely shifted the neutral datum of the relevant artificial feel unit, which in turn shifted the rudder pedals or control yoke; the resolvers for the FBW system would in consequence demand this 'trimmed' control surface movement.

Dude

2% seems a bit high to me - but I haven't tried to calculate it yet.

Coriolis effect was measurable if you looked for it - about 1 degree of bank, I recall.

I believe the control laws of the FBW Airbii have to take it into account, as they command 1g in level flight. I'm sure there are people out there who know.....

Sure, Concorde was the first aircraft to fly with FBW flight controls, but electric signalling on a major aircraft system was introduced on the Proteus engines that powered the Bristol Britannia. These were of course built by the same company, Bristol Aero Engines, that built the Olympus.

There are some (I am not among them) who would say that the Concorde project was a good way to learn how NOT to run a major international collaboration

Clive,
Re the autotrim, tell us some more?
I wasn't directly involved with the control laws themselves, more with trying to assure those control laws were respected to well below 1%.

I thought it was the first civil aircraft, and that the Vulcan had already been there and done that...

I know what you're saying.....
Still, I think you'll agree that lessons were learnt, rather than totally ignored.
I would say Airbus can trace its history back to the lessons learned from Concorde.

CJ

Once you know how the rating selections work, enabling the throttles to be left fully forward throughout normal flight, you can draw a line to the Airbus FBW thrust lever arrangement - the detents equating to different ratings.

Mercifully no-one had thought of that when Concorde was being designed; I still think it's a diabolical system.

BTW I was told in the conversion course that during the design phase the idea was mooted to only have one thrust lever for all four engines. This would probably have worked - even non-normal engine shutdown drills didn't require the engine's throttle to be closed, the first thing you did was pull the shutdown handle.

ChristiaanJ
Not quite right I'm afraid here my friend. The superb Vulcan used self-contained electro-hydraulic PFCUs, similar in concept to the VC10. The pilot signalling from the fighter type joystick to the PFCUs however was still mechanical, no FBW here.

EXWOK
Oh Amen to that. Although quite complex in its concept, at least 'our' system was logical and intuitive, with full pilot control throughout.

Best Regards
Dude

And how do we know they weren't designed by the very same people?

PBL

quote:I remember at Fairford in mid 1974, a CAA test pilot (I honestly forget the gentleman's name) was taking the British pre-production A/C 101 (G-AXDN) for a special test flight.unquote

It was almost certainly Gordon Corps, possibly the finest 'engineering' test pilot I have ever worked with. After Concorde certification Gordon went to work at Toulouse wher he did most of the development flying that led to the A320 FBW system. BZ was the public 'face' of the design, but knowing the two men I have a very shrewd idea as to who did the original thinking! Perhaps Andy could confirm?

Tragically Gordon died young whilst trekking to an A300 crash site somewhere in the Himalayas

ClivL

SpeedbirdConcorde
Hi again my friend. To further expand on CliveJ's superb explanation: Mechanical control inputs were fed to each of the 8 Powerd Flying Control Units (PFCUs), but in electronic signalling (either Blue or Green) these inputs were de-clutched at the PFCU input lever. When Fly By Wire' signalling is not available, the mechanical inputs (which as CliveL quite rightly points out) are driven by the Relay Jacks, now are locked to the input lever and can now move the input jack of the PFCU (known as the spool valve) and subsequently cause the PFCU to drive the control surface. (The body of the PFCU moved, the main jacks were attached at each end to structure and so obviously did not move). Hopefully this diagram will help visualising the process a little easier:

The diagram shows Green & Blue hydraulics supplied but the electro-valves (opened by the respective FBW channel) are both closed. You can see that the mechanical input lever is 'locked' to the PFCU input lever which will drive the SPOOL VALVE directly. When FBW is enabled, either the Blue or Green (never both together) ELECTRO-VALVE are signalled open, the ensuing hydraulic pressure then pushing the input clutch upwards and disengaging the mechanical input. FBW demands are now fed to the respective SERVO VALVE which will hydraulically send the SPOOL VALVE in the desired direction.
The Relay Jacks could be considered to be a little like a PFCU (you had 2 RJs per axix) but instead of the servo valves being driven by the FBW system they were driven by the autopilot and instead of driving a control surface, they drove the control runs. In manual flight the input spool was driven via a mechanical input lever, which would drive the RJ spool a little like Mech' signalling drove the PFCU spool. In A/P mode the mechanical input rod was de-clutched \xe0 la PFCU, but (and here's the clever part) this input was locked to the body of the Relay Jack which when it moved, drove the pilot's control in sympathy. (Control column, yoke or rudder pradals). As the respective control(s) was moved by the Relay Jack, the corresponding FBW position sensor (resolver) would change position and generate the FBW demand. (As the surface moved there was a feedback resolver at PFCU level).
As far as the FBW channels themselves went; there were 2 electronic signalling modes, Blue and Green, sub-divided into 3 groups (Inner Elevons, Outer & Mid Elevons and Rudders). Each group was independently monitored, and a fault in say the Rudder channel alone, would result in the rudders ONLY changing lanes. NOW ( ), The normal control channel was BLUE, and if this failed you would drop the respective channel into GREEN and if this failed you would drop into MECH. The selector switches (1 per group) enabled you to select BLUE/GREEN/MECH in that order. If for some reason you were selected to GREEN, a failure of that signalling lane would not drop you 'up' into BLUE, but into MECH. Your switch would only be in this position if you'd had a problem with BLUE, however you would select this on pushback while you were testing the flying controls, otherwise you spent your whole life selected to BLUE. As far as BA went, I can never remember a time personally when all 3 groups dropped from BLUE to MECH, but very rarely you might get a fault that caused a single group to briefly drop to MECH. Just about one of the very few common mode failures to each of the 3 groups would be a failure of the respective FBW static inverter. This thing, which was rightly monitored up to the hilt, produced a 26 Volt 1800 Hz output. (1800 Hz was chosen as this is not a harmonic of aircraft mainline 400 Hz AC supply)
Best regards

Dude

NW1
Ahhh the Tech refresher days. Not being an EO it would not have been me, no. But the 'trainers' often used to come seek me out in the hangar and (over coffee, not beer I'm afraid) confer about various system quirks and nasties to use on you guys during the tech' refreshers. (So I guess can be blamed for a few of the 'stinkers', sorry ). And I definately know who you mean by describing him as a 'chatty' EO.... a truly great guy though.
Mech' signalling during decel'??, OUCH!! I would have thought that the 'supersonic dustbin lid' description would have been quite an accurate description of what must have been a very uncomfortable experience indeed. It was quite a vivid and scary description, I can just imagine trying to move the 3 switches up to BLUE from MECH and stabbing the reset buttons while your seat and the selector panel are seemingly going backwards and forwards, up and down in different directions!! . On the C of A renewal test flights I seem to remember that MECH was only tried fairly briefly at a very subsonic 300 KTS during the early stages of the flights, but even then it felt like the aeroplane was riding a sea of different sized golf balls and the outer wing sections seemed to flap about quite enegetically in a world of their own; it was pure bliss when we reset into BLUE. It really shows us all just how good the FBW and autostab really was, the fact that the aeroplane handled so beautifully throughout such an enormous envelope. Well done CliveL and ChristiaanJ and all you designer chaps. .
Now NW1, I bet you can still really do the flying control check in your sleep ( ), but 'Great times, great aircraft, great people' is certainly a marvelous way to sum up such an amazing time of our lives. I still feel honoured and very lucky to have been a small part of it all for so many years.
And as for March... Yes I will be there; see you on the 4th.
Best regards

Dude

I so remember the BAe AST images from the 1980s, I always thought what a potentially nice looking aeroplane she was. I guess that vastly improving the L/D & T/W ratios could go quite a long way to improving the operating economics, but the noise issue was always going to be the crippler. (I know that they were looking at a 'leaky' version of the OLY593, ie. a very low bypass ratio, but this of course would still not really cut the mustard as far as noise goes). I guess there are no current takers then
Clive, you really surprise me when you say you don't think that composites would be used from a future SST, is there a material reason for this? (I'm curious because being of a simple avionic brain, I always assumed composites would be used. But if anyone knows this stuff, you certainly would Clive ).
To answer Mike-Bracknell's original query, as far as avionics goes we can really go to town. For her age Concorde had some truly amazing aircraft systems, for instance the flying controls. To enable mechanical control (both FBW channels failed) there was a highly complex and heavy mixing unit under the rear floor. (To mix pitch and roll pilot mechanical demands into differential elevon demand inputs). This of couse would have to be done away with, as well as the relay jacks and replaced with a pair of side-sticks. (See posts on previous page). A 2 crew operation would obviously be the way to go, but neither desirable or possible in my view when Concorde was designed. A triplex or quadruplex flying control system (possibly even integrating autoflight) would replace the Concorde collection of several analog boxes with a very small handful of lightweight digital units.. The powerplant control will have major weight savings, just take a look at this lot. 8 Engine Control Units, 4 Bucket Control Units, 2 Nozzle Angle Scheduling Units, 4 Reheat Amplifiers, 8 AICUs, 4 Air Intake Sensor Units and a single Air Intake Test Unit could potentially be replaced by just 4 multi-channel EEC type units. (On subsonic aircraft the EECs are mounted on the engine itself, not sure if that's a good idea for an SST, given the operating environment. Air Data and Navigation systems take a major simplification and weight saving, the 3 INUs and 2 ADCs (All of them straight from the 'rent a hernia' store as far as weight goes), could be replaced by a single ADIRU and a SAARU. The fuel indication/management side of things (2 FQI packs, 2 level switching packs and 3 CG computers) would probably be replaced by a single Fuel Processing unit. Ahhhh perchance to dream

Best regards
Dude