Posts about: "G-BOAA" [Posts: 12 Pages: 1]

M2dude
4th Sep 2010, 10:49
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Post: 212
BRIT312
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Now the F/E had a couple of calls to make prior to V1 relating to how good the engines were performing the most important being at 100 kts, however before we got that far the Braniff F/E stood up in his harness and let out the cry " Gee Whiz look at the son of a bitch go".
This story is totally hilarious, can't quite get this visual out of my head. ('100 KTS, POWER SET' sounds so boring in comparison). I never had the good fortune to meet any of the Braniff guys; sounds like there was certainly a character or two there. It really is a pity that their operation never really got a chance to expand into the proposed Pacific Rim service, who knows, it might really have done something.
It's generally known that the BA aircraft were temporarily re-registered to facilitate Braniff's operation out of IAD to DFW; G-BOAA, B, D & E were re-registered from G-BOAA and so on, to G-N94AA etc. Being an older registration, G-BOAC was re-registered as G-N81AC. At IAD, the 'G' part of the registration was covered over, leaving a now perfect 'American' tail number. Only five aircraft were involved in the operation (at the time BA operated just six aircraft, G-BOAF was still at the manufacturers at Filton, and G-BFKW (later to become G-BOAG) was on loan from British Aerospace. In order for the necessary FAA certification, required for operation by a US airline, a modification package were required by the FAA. Some of these modifications seemed a little 'picky' and irrelevant at the time (they still do). However some modifications were certainly not in this category, and quite honestly should have been 'picked up' by the CAA & DGAC during original certification of the aircraft. As an example, if the flying controls had been operating on GREEN or BLUE hydraulics only (due to an indicated spool valve jam) and that particular hydraulic system was subsequently lost, there was originally no automatic switching to select the standby YELLOW system into the flying controls; the controls would have been completely unpowered until a manual selection was made by the pilot. . One of the 'FAA Mods' was to facilitate just that, so if this (extremely unlikely I grant you) scenario had occurred, then YELLOW would automatically been selected into the controls, and at no time would the controls have been in an unpowered state.
The Braniff operation ended in May 1980, due to heavy losses on the subsonic only route, and it's a rather sad irony that aircraft G-BOAF had been modified and reregistered at Filton, from it's original registration of G-BFKX to G-N94AF. Unfortunately the aircraft was delivered to BA in June 1980, one month too late to participate, and prior to delivery it's registration was converted to it's 'normal' British registration; all other aircraft also reverted to original registrations also.
ChristiaanJ
Quote:
Reading your description of the autoland, you must be quoting from documentation, no?
Not really, being the sad b****d that I am, I still remember the Concorde flare law of: h+5h. = 0, so it was fairly easy to work out the programmed descent rates. (I did have to check the final 1.7'/second figure though). The rest I'm afraid is straight out of this sad old memory of mine.
Bellerophon
A brilliant description of the mechanics of final approach. It's so easy for us mere mortals to forget just what an involved and skilled process it was, to fly, and in particular land our totally amazing aircraft.

Dude

Last edited by M2dude; 4th Sep 2010 at 13:12 .
M2dude
12th Sep 2010, 08:57
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Post: 326
Hi again Stilton. We really need one of the flying folk to answer this one fully, I am not sure what drill there was for this scenario, but I'm sure there was one. The Concorde flying manual had a drill for everything, from a four engine flame out at Mach 2 to a blocked toilet (ok, maybe not the loo thing ), and one of my winged friends EXWOK, Bellerophon, SEO Brit312 would remember one.
As far as your point about moving the CG further aft; you never had oodles of fuel to play with , and I'm sure that the guys will mention about handling the aircraft on approach with the CG too far aft. (After landing four tonnes of fuel were transferred from Tanks 5 & 7 into the empty fwd Trim Tank 9, 'to aid ground stability'. ie, help stop the aircraft from trying to sit on it's rear end as the passengers got off).
As far as your visor query goes, well the visor is either up, or retracted into the nose. The nose itself (which I suspect is what you are really referring to) would already be at the fully down 12 1/2 degree setting for landing anyway.
Oh, and back to the ground stability issue, was Concorde ever sat on it's tail by accident? Oh yes, just once to my knowledge. In May 1977, aircraft G-BOAA was returned to Filton for some modifications that were required, and part of these 'mods' was some improvements to the main trim-transfer pipes connecting the three trim transfer tanks 9, 10 & 11, as well as the trim tanks 5 & 7. Now the flow into tank 11 (the rear tank) had to be checked, but there was insufficient fuel at the front of the aircraft for stability. This shortcoming was passed on to the BAe manager in charge of everything, who stuffily refused to listen, and INSISTED that these transfer checks were carried out, 'do as I tell you, I am the manager here'. The man's sole concession to any sort of common sense was to allow a BAe employee to sit on the flight deck 'and watch the CG indicator', what the point of this was, well your guess is as good as mine. The name of the guy sitting on the flight deck was... John Thomas. (Hilarious I know, but true). So in goes the fuel, and in a very short period of time, John Thomas notices that the roof of the Filton assembly hangar seems to be slowly getting closer, and closer, and BANG!! The aircraft nose is high into the roof section of the hangar, but fortunately because the hangar is so huge, the nose did not hit anything, it was just stuck up there, complete with a very worried/terrified John Thomas who is sitting terrified in the captain's seat, staring at the hangar roof. The rear of the aircraft however was not so lucky. The right hand inner elevon came down on top of a hydraulic rig, damaging the elevon badly, as well as FLATTENING the rig. The opened #3 engine bay door came down on some large access steps, tearing the corner of the door. (not much left of the steps either). The rear fuselage, in the area of the hydraulic tanks, was holed quite badly by some access staging, entire spectacle coming to a very 'grinding' halt.
So now we have this Concorde G-BOAA, due to be returned to BA the following day, sat down on top of a lot of equipment, it's nose high in the air with a terrified John Thomas requiring a change of underwear. (The brilliant manager of course was nowhere to be seen). The aircraft was eventually returned to it's rightful attitude by someone WITH some sense instructing Mr Thomas on how to slowly, a little at a time, pump the fuel from Tank 11 forward into Tank 9.
And was OAA returned to BA the following day? errr no. The best skin repair man that BAe had to offer was sent from Weybridge to sort out the holes in the rear fuselage (he did an amazing job) and the crunched bits of aeroplane were repaired or replaced. OAA flew back to Heathrow four short (??) days later.

Dude
ChristiaanJ
13th Sep 2010, 14:54
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Post: 343
Quote:
Originally Posted by M2dude
Oh, and back to the ground stability issue, was Concorde ever sat on its tail by accident? Oh yes, just once to my knowledge.
In May 1977, aircraft G-BOAA was returned to Filton for some modifications that .....
See post #328 for the rest of the story.
In "Concorde - The Inside Story" by Brian Trubshaw there is actually a photo of what is almost certainly the same incident.

But there is another story....

After the first-ever landing at Bahrain, a crowd of Very Important Persons was allowed to visit the aircraft.
Of course they had to see it all, including the rear cabin.
Since the aircraft hadn't been refuelled yet, the inevitable happened... the aircraft started slowly but inexorably tilting backwards.
A very undignified stampede towards the front resulted, just in time, so the aircraft did not actually sit on its tail.

But there was a sequel. The incident had been watched by the airport manager, who promptly decreed that from then on a tractor would have to be chained to the nose gear whenever the aircraft was on the ramp.

Urban legend has it, that from then on there was a new item in the pre-taxy checklist for Bahrain.

CHAIN REMOVED FROM NOSEWHEEL - CHECK

CJ
M2dude
17th Sep 2010, 22:20
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Post: 388
Shaft109
In your superb video link that you posted there is another 'face from the past'. Without naming the man there is the same production manager featured in the video that was directly responsible for G-BOAA sitting on its hind quarters that I mentioned in post #238.
To further clarify my post; the fuel was NOT being transferred from the front of the aircraft into tank 11 as I previously stated, but it was being pumped directly into the 'broken down' fuel transfer pipes and then into the tank. The forward trim tanks were in fact EMPTY, and that soiled underwear wearing Mr Thomas was little more than a spectator in the flight deck, with not much that he could do. (But he at least had a much closer view of the assembly hangar roof than most people ever did).
Thanks again for the video link, it was superb.

Dude
M2dude
27th Oct 2010, 22:33
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Post: 616
Mike-Bracknell
Quote:
IF funding were secured to get 1 Concorde from each fleet into the air again, which one out of each fleet would be the easiest to return to service, given what has gone on since retirement? Also, a subpoint, does anyone have any finger-in-the-air figures as to how much cost it would take and whether there's any fundamental issues that would need to be sorted aside from the airworthiness certificate etc.
It is not nonsense, and you are quite at liberty to post here. Wow, that's still quite a question though Mike. There are two TECHNICAL issues that overshadow all others, namely airframe corrosion and hydraulic system deterioration. Unfortunately none of the BA aircraft were stored inside from the outset, so we have a real issue here as far as corrosion goes, plus all the hydraulic systems were drained, resulting in seal drying out and probable moisture ingress into the 3 systems. But given sufficient funds (and assuming you find an organisation to take over design responsibility from Airbus; ironic when you consider that without Concorde there would almost certainly have been no such organisation ) there is still no technical reason why the problems (and there are dozens of other problems to consider) could not be overcome, the money side of things is another matter
Looking first at the French fleet, the main candidate for restoration to flight status would be F-BTSD at Le Bourget. Not only has this aircraft been lovingly cared for and stored INSIDE, but the aircraft has had several systems (including the Green hydraulic system) powered and reservoirs not drained.
The British story is less clear; G-BOAA in East Fortune was effectively killed when the wings were cut off for transportation, so that one is out of the question. G-BOAB, the last and only Concorde at LHR has been left to rot outside, in fact holes were even drill in the fuselage to drain water, so this one is a no no too. G-BOAC at Manchester, now the oldest surviving production aircraft was initially stored outside, but now resides in a purpose built exhibition 'hangar'. Now she COULD be a potential candidate for consideration; when I last saw her just over a year ago she was absolutely pristine; a testament to the team that have been caring for her there. G-BOAD, stored next to the USS Intrepid in New York, we can probably forget, due to having been exposed to 7 years worth of salt water corrosion from the Hudson River. (Also, while she was temporarily stored in New Jersey a couple of years ago, some IDIOT in a truck bent the whole nose section when he hit her. The radome was smashed (replaced with a rather clever fibreglass fabrication) and the nose straightened with a blow-torch and hammer (I am not joking!!). G-BOAE at Grantley Adams airport in Barbados has been stored under cover for much of the time; provided she has not suffered too much from the wam damp atmosphere of Barbados, well she could be a potential candiitate too. G-BOAF in Filton, well PROVIDED she is still OK after her 'removal from public view' experience could also be a potential candidate also. And finally, G-BOAG in Seattle; well she had been left outside, right next to a highway (and close to a truck stop too). She did not look too good the last time I saw her; the undercarriage barrels werer all brown and discoloured and the paintwork was completely dull and matte. (She had a new paint job not too long before retirement too). So out of the 'BA Seven', I PERSONALLY would go for G-BOAF, G-BOAC or G-BOAG.
As I have said often here before, it is EXTREMELY unlikely that what you, Mike, suggest will ever happen, but in spite of what others might say, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. My own gut feeling is a resounding 'no', but I could be wrong, . (And NO ONE would be happier than I if I am wrong; I was with the BA aircraft through construction, flight testing and the entire service life with BA).
As for the cost? It really is a case of 'how long is a piece of string', but for 2 aircraft we could be looking in excess of $100 or more, who knows?
But as the Everly Brothers used to sing 'All I have to do is dream.'
Keep posting Mike.

Dude .
M2dude
7th Nov 2010, 01:34
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Post: 674
Oh darn it Feathers, if you insist (LOL).
First of all, what is rotating stall? All gas turbine engines are prone to this to some degree or another, the Olympus was particularly prone (so we discovered to our cost). What happens is that extremely LOW figures of N2, small cells of stalled air rotate around the anulus of the early stages of the HP compressor (at approximately half the rotational rpm), resulting in parts of the airflow becoming choked and highly distorted. This often results in the combustion process being disturbed to the extent that combustion instead of occuring in the combustion chamber, occurs in the turbine itself. This of course results in massive overheating of the turbine blades and stators (and is what is suspected occured in the #2 engine on G-BOAA in 1991.
To prevent running in rotating stall, the Olympus automatic fuel start schedule would accelerate the engine quickly to around 67% N2 before dropping back to the normal idle figure of around 65% N2. (The stall clearance N2 figure was ambient temperature dependant, the higher the temperature the higher the N2 that was required and hence scheduled by the automatics).
What had happened on G-BOAA was an engine starting/accelerating problem, where the N2 ran at a sub-idle of around 40% N2 for several minutes. This was enough for the malignant effects of rotating stall to take hold, and the resulting turbine blade failure over the Atlantic the following day. In all fairness to everyone involved, none of us, including Rolls Royce realised just how potentially serious this phenonomen was, and salutary lessons were learned by one and all. (The following year Air France had a similar failure; their first and last also).
I flew out to Shannon on a BAC 1-11, that was sent to fly the Concorde passengers back to London. As I and my colleague were coming down the ventral door steps of the 1-11, a chirpy Aer Lingus engineer asks 'have you guys come to fix the broken engine?, there are bits of it lying in the jet pipe'. Now up to now, from the information we'd been given in London, we thought that we were going to be looking at either an intake or engine induced surge, a few systems checks and boroscope inspections and we'd all be on our way, so we naturally thought the Aer Lingus guy was joking. He was most certainly was not; as you looked into the jetpipe (through the secondary nozzle buckets) you could see a large quantity of metal debris, accompanied by a strong smell of burnt oil. I remember this day well, it was the day that the first Gulf war ended; how ironic.
The aircraft departed on three engines, flown by a management crew late the following day, my colleague and I returned to London by Aer Lingus one day later. (No passengers whatsoever are permitted on ferry flights, even expendable ones like me).

Dude
M2dude
11th Dec 2010, 22:17
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Post: 856
Talking Them darn intakes

Hi Guys, quite a few little points here, so here's my angle(s):
Pedalz
Quote:
were the intake ramps in front of the engines ever known for problems? Especially during supersonic cruise where the airflow through the compressors and position of the ramps was determined by an exacting science which could turn into quite a situation if disturbed. Which hydraulic system actuated these ramps?
Ooo yes. The biggest problems we ever had associated with the ramps themselves were wear in the seals at the sides of the forward ramp. Even a few thou' over the maximum allowable side gap was enough to make the intake unstable and susceptible to surging. (It is quite interesting that the rear ramp side gaps were not in the least bit critical, and if Concorde intake development had continued, the rear ramps were going to be deleted altogether). Other failure factors were control unit malfuntions, rapid sensor drift; all of these causing either ramp/spill door drift or runaway. Primary nozzle misbehaviour could also result in intake surges. Having said all that, the monitoring of the intake system was truly superb, and surface runaways, themselves quite rare, would usually be picked up by the control system monitors causing either a lane switch or if that did not work, a total 'red light' failure with the surfaces frozen. No surge was treated as 'just one of those things', and much midnight oil was burned and hair pulled out (so that's what happened to mine ) to try and find the cause of the surge.
My friend EXWOK perfectly answered the intake hydraulics allocations.
Quote:
Due to the shape of the leading edge and positioning of the intakes themselves, could it be possible that disturbed airflow from a problem ramp or donk could also effect it's outboard neighbour (if I'm right in presuming that only the inboard engine surging etc. could effect the outboard and not vice versa)?[/
EXWOK was right on the ball here as usual, in fact above Mach 1.6 an interactive surge was more or less guaranteed. The cause of interactive surge had nothing to do with the wing leading edge position, but to the radially generated distortion field coming out of the FRONT of the surging intake, severely distorting the adjascent intakes airflow. It mattered not if the originating surge was an inboard or an outboard intake, the other guy would always go also, above Mach 1.6.
You might want to take a look at 'When Intakes Go Wrong Part 1:
Concorde engine intake "Thrust"
and Parts 2 & 3:
Concorde engine intake "Thrust"
Not to mention Part 3:


dixi188
Quote:
A certain CFI (I think) at BA flying club, High Wycombe, who was also F/O on concorde, showed me some photographs of an engine that had eaten a piece of intake ramp. I think he said that the adjacent engine had surged and a piece of ramp went out the front and down the other engine. This resulted in a double engine failure mid atlantic. They landed in Shannon with very little fuel left.
I can never recall this particular event happening with BA , certainly not as a result of a ramp failure. Although in the near 28 years of operation we had quite a few SNN diversions, none that I can ever recall were as the result of a ramp structural failure. The two major SNN diversions that I can recall were G-BOAF in the early 80s when an LP1 blade failed and resulted in a totally wrecked engine (although a completely contained failure) and G-BOAA in 1991, with another wrecked engine due to running in rotating stall. (Both of these events were covered previously in our thread). ChristiaanJ has mentioned quite rightly the event with A/C 001 spitting a ramp out, and Air France had a ramp failure going into JFK. (Covered previously in our thread, due to certain 'human foul ups'). I am not sure, but I think that this one in JFK DID require a double engine change in JFK. (Usually from SNN a BA aircraft would be 3 engine ferried back to LHR).

ChristiaanJ
Quote:
PS I have no record of any of the British development aircraft ever having lost a ramp, notwithstanding the number of deliberate engine surges they went hrough. But then maybe I wasn't told....
Nope, you are quite right, no more French or British development aircraft ever suffered a ramp linkage failure again. The 001 ramp failure was a salutary lesson to the design team, and the intake assembly became tougher than old boots after that, nomatter WHAT you threw at it.


Due to the lateness of the hour (and me being up at 4 ), that will have to do for now guys.

Best regards to all
Dude

Last edited by M2dude; 12th Dec 2010 at 04:51 . Reason: Adding a bit and correcting another
M2dude
25th Dec 2010, 00:38
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Post: 1004
ChristiaanJ
Quote:
M2dude will have to confirm that the 'lateral stiffeners' he is thinking of are indeed the very roughly 2' long and 5" strips at the location of each spar just outboard of the engine, that are very clearly visible on Coffin Dodger's photo of 'AA.
Yippeeeee we have a winner. Coffin Dodgers photo of my poor old G-BOAA shows the stiffeners perfectly. (I was starting to think that I had gone even more bonkers than usual, and was imagining the things ).

Best regards to all
Dude
Lord Bracken
16th Jan 2011, 01:28
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Post: 1108
I went to have a poke around G-BOAD this afternoon at the Intrepid museum.

Am sad to say she's in a bit of a sorry state - paint peeling off in places which is no doubt due to being outside in the full weather of NYC. For example, there's still several inches of snow on the wings/elevons from the storm half a week ago.

Inside is no better - visible mould on some of the seats which are enclosed underneath a plastic display case type affair, printed on which are some alleged facts about Concorde, but at least one of them was completely wrong.

Such a shame. I have only been to see two of the preserved frames, this one and G-BOAA at East Fortune and I have to say the latter is a far better experience. At least someone seems to care about educating people about the aircraft and keeping it in good 'nic, which is not what you can say about the one in New York.
M2dude
23rd Apr 2011, 09:13
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Post: 1316
CliveL (And ChristiaanJ)
Quote:
Dude, can I join Christiaan in requesting more information on that '5000' series numbering; I have never come across it before.
Sure can Clive. These are the BA 5102 numbers, Air France 5101 numbers were corespondingly identical chronologically.: G-BOAC - 5102-01. G-BOAA - 5102-02. G-BOAB - 5102-03. G-BOAD - 5102-04. G-BOAE - 5102-05. Although G-BOAG (G-BFKW) and G-BOAF (G-BFKX) were originally Variant 192 (British Unsold) aircraft, these correspondingly became 5102-06 and 5102-07. I wonder if anyone here remembers G-BOAF doing her pre-delivery flying at Filton registered as G-N91AF? I remember when I was at Filton doing one of my Concorde type courses in 1980, and there was good old Foxy Lady with her 'Branniff' registration. She was re -re-registered to G-BOAF prior to delivery to BA.

Quote:
Also, I have asked the CAA surveyor who was most likely to have made that reskinning decision for more data. Perhaps he can remember the problem with the forward fuselage skins. Certainly when we were standing together inside 102 last week and talking about fuselage modifications for relifing the aircraft the problem of Component 30 was not mentioned!
The Component 30 skin thickness issue was not relevant for RELIFE 2 ; you and I know that the major 'skin' issue here was the centre fuselage crown area. The issue of Component 30 was a 201/202 issue only. (Assuming that the French had the need/desire/capability of adding another airframe to their fleet.
And sorry everyone about the \xa330 cost of converting 202 into an airliner, I meant (dumb ass that I am) \xa330 MILLION.

Best regards
Dude
steve-de-s
13th Aug 2011, 12:00
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Post: 1427
Filton

Save Bristol\x92s Concorde and the Brabazon Hangar

The Brabazon Hangar dominates the south side of Filton Airfield. During the 1960s it became the home of the UK Concorde production line, but Concorde wasn\x92t the first aircraft to be built within this amazing structure.
The hangar was originally built during the 1940s to enable the construction of the massive Bristol Aircraft Company\x92s type 167, which is better known as the Brabazon and hence this is where the name of the hangar came from . This giant airliner aircraft had a 230ft wingspan, and was powered by eight pair-coupled Bristol Centaurus piston engines and was Britain\x92s attempt at a non-stop trans-Atlantic airliner.

The prototype flew in 1949 six years and \xa33 million after the conception, and sadly the aircraft was already obsolete. The British de Havilland Comet jet-powered airliner was already well on the way and on the other side of the Atlantic, Boeing were developing their 707, and both of these would fly faster and carry more passengers than the Brabazon The prototype flew for a short while and a second turboprop-powered prototype (Brabazon II) was being built when the project was abandoned. Both aircraft were subsequently broken up in 1953.
With the demise of the Brabazon project Bristol was then left with one of the largest aircraft production facilities in Europe and therefore the giant Brabazon hangars were put to other uses, these included being used for the production line for the much more successful Bristol Britannia airliner.

But the Brabazon hangar has become more famous today as the birthplace of all the British built Concordes, ten airframes were built there, one prototype known as 002, one pre-production known as 01, one development production known as Delta Golf, and of course the seven airliner production airframes detailed below\x85
G-BOAA
G-BOAB
G-BOAC
G-BOAD
G-BOAE
G-BOAF
G-BOAG
Concorde 216 G-BOAF was the last Concorde built anywhere in the world, and of course the very last one to fly in November 2003. During her final flight she flew back to her birthplace, to Filton to form a major part of a new planned Bristol aviation museum. The plan was to house the whole of the Bristol Aviation Collection, known as the BAC, in one building, a centre to celebrate Bristol\x92s incredible aviation history, and let\x92s not forget that Bristol led the world.
But like so many things in this fast changing world, ideas and directions soon change and as in this case not for the better.
Heritage Concorde has heard of one idea that it wishes to push forward with anyone who would be willing to work alongside the group. With next years closure of Filton airfield, one incredible heritage building stands at risk of being ripped down and lost forever, the Brabazon Hangar. So why not use this building as the centre of the history of Bristol aviation and space industry, and in memory of the man who started it all, Sir George White. It\x92s large enough to form one of the most incredible museums in the world; it would be able to house the whole BAC collection with Concorde 216 at the centre, where she was built.
This idea needs to be looked into and not dismissed so easily by the people leading the effort for the new museum. Heritage Concorde will start to develop this idea further.

Any ideas, any offer of help or advice???
Steve de Sausmarez
Dont Hang Up
17th Oct 2013, 11:58
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Post: 1726
Quote:
To my eternal regret, I never had a chance to get close to the old girl in her "lifetime", but I'll never forget the day she overflew my Mum's house at what can't have been more than a couple of thousand feet on her way back from Farnborough.
You can still get up close and personal with G-BOAA at the National Museum of Flight in East Fortune. I know it is a bit out of the way, but if you are ever in that region I can thoroughly recommend a visit. The old girl has her own exhibition hall and looks magnificent.

(The rest of the museum isn't bad either - a good day out).