Posts about: "G-BOAF" [Posts: 31 Pages: 2]

TURIN ,
I've read "By the Rivers of Babylon" too..... and there is some fact behind the fiction.

History does not relate if and where the El Al Concordes would have had APUs.

However, history DOES relate, that the two Concordes ordered by Iran Air WOULD have had APUs (which would have made sense in the Middle East).
Now, Iran Air was the very last company to cancel its orders, and by the time they did, Concorde 214 (now G-BOAG) and 216 (now G-BOAF) were already well underway (they ended up flying initially as white tails).

As a result, both 214 and 216 still have the mounting holes and fittings for an APU. Don't ask me where, but experts know where to find them to this day....

ChristiaanJ
Both A/C 214 (OAG) and 216 (OAF) were Variant 192 A/C (British Unsold A/C). 216 was later converted to a 102 (British Airways) Variant, where 214 more or less stayed as a Variant 192. I'm not disputing what you say about possible APU mountings (I guess it would HAVE to be at the front section of the lower cargo hold somewhere) but I for one have certainly never seen any evidence of them. I'm still trying to imagine where the air inlet and exhausts would have to be arranged, not to mention pneumatic services ducting/hydraulics. Wouldn't it be interesting to find out?

M2dude,

Nice set of photos of "The Thing" here :
MEPU at MAE at le Bourget .
This one is at the Air and Space Museum at Le Bourget, near Paris. My guess is that is was a spare, since the manufacturing date is 1973. 'SA flew in January '73 and 'SB in December '73.
IIRC, Delta Golf arrived at Brooklands with the MEPU still in place; I might have a photo.

As to the installation, we're obviously thinking along the same lines....

However, there were already several conduits through tank 11, such as hydraulics for the tail wheel, various electrics, and the 'backbone' fuel manifolds, that ended at the fuel jettison port in the tailcone.
A couple of fairly substantial air ducts would only have displaced a few hundred kgs of fuel at the most, out of the more than 10,000 kgs in tank 11.

And yes, of course, the whole point of the APU would be to have independent ground start and ground airco available, so clearly an APU would have been bigger and heavier than the MEPU (which was only just over 80 lbs), plus the problem of the air intake and bigger exhaust.
I'd have to get the drawings out to see how easy or difficult it would have been to fit one in the available space.

Since the tailcone was BAC, and both 214 and 216 were built at Filton, I wonder if anybody there still remembers?

I think we already do agree about the story that Iran Air was going to have an APU, that Rotring had already been put to Mylar to sort out the how and where, and that some traces are likely to be left in 214 and 216.

So I happily agree to disagree on the rest... between the two of us, each looking at our own clues, and with the help of anybody else who has more info, we might still find the answer!

One thought I had... with an APU in the forward baggage hold, you'd also have to take the air intake and exhaust through the pressure hull, and provide sound and thermal insulation for the entire APU itself.
From a design point of view, I'd have gone for the same location of the earlier pseudo-APU (the MEPU), and then solved the remaining problems from that starting point.

Biggles78
You are right on the button. Under NORMAL circumstances, Concorde never flew supersonically in level flight. You would always follow the Vmo bug on the ASI during the supersonic climb. (The ASI pointer actually nudged into the bug; it was a beautiful design). Initially this would be at a constant Vc of 400 kts, the 400 KT segment then went off towards 530 KTS as you climbed. You then 'stuck' to 530 knots until a fraction over 50,000', when 530 KTS became Mach 2. You would then continue the climb at between Mach 2 and around Mach 2.02, depending on the temperature of the day. (the colder the temperature, the faster you tended to fly). There was an extremely complex AFCS mode for the supersonic climb, that I promise to cover in anaother post.
So yes, on the whole, TOC did equal TOD.
The 'subsonic climb' wasn't quite as you thought; you'd normally subsonic climb to FL280, staying there (at Mach 0.95) until the acceleration point. Mach 0.95 was 'subsonic cruise'. But you were on the right track.
Oh, and NOPE, they never boomed us either
Nick Thomas
Keeping the powerplants as separate as possible was a major design headache, but generally they were just that; there was a titanium centre wall between the two engines and a really substantial heatshield above the engine also, to protect the wing above. To give you an idea how all this worked in practice, in 1980 G-BOAF, flying at Mach 2 between JFK and LHR had a major failure of one of the engines, caused by a defective material ingot used in the forging of one of the 1st stage LP compressor blades; which was subsequently shed. (The analysis done by Rolls Royce ensured that no such incident ever happened again in the life of Concorde). The resulting mayhem terminated in a large amount of engine debris flying around, and a titanium fire burning in the engine bay also. The aircraft however decelerated and landed at Shannon safely. On inspection, although there was extensive damage found in the engine bay, the adjacent engine was completely unmarked, protected by the titanium centre wall, and more importantly, when the heat shield werer removed, the wing was found to be completely undamaged!
The only problem you ever had with the dual nacelle arrangement was if you had an engine surge above Mach 1.6 (These were relatively rare, but could happen with an engine or intake control system malfuntion). If one engine surged, the other would surge in sympathy, because of the shock system being expelled from one intake severely distorting the airflow into it's neighbour. These surges were loud, quite scary (to the crew that is, most passengers never noticed much), but in themselves did no damage at all. Delicate movement of the throttles (employed during the subsequent surge drill) would invariably restore peace and harmony again to all. (The intake on Concorde was self-starting, so no manual movement of the intake variable surfaces should be needed in this event). After this was over, normal flying was resumed again As I said before, these events were relatively rare, but when they did occur, they would be dealt with smartly and professionally; the engine and intake structure being undamaged. (Post surge inspetion checks were always carried out on the ground after an event, on both engine and intake, but nothing much was EVER found).
The reduction of fuel flow as you climbed was quite interesting. Although the throttles would be 'at the wall' (dry power remember), the electronic control system was constantly winding fuel off as a function of Static Air Temperature, as well as falling Total Pressure. The system was always 'tweaking' as you climbed, and you only used as much fuel as you really needed to stay at Mach 2. There were various ratings that would also be manually selected at various phases of flight; each rating change 'detuned' the engine slightly, so yes, you did not run the engine when flying fast at anywhere near the levels you did at lower speeds/altitudes. The engine final ratings were changed from 'Climb' to 'Cruise' manually at FL 500, just as you hit Mach 2).

In my case, my time is no longer THAT valuable, being retired for several years !
And I enjoy answering those questions, if and whenever I can!
There WERE differences... after its misadventure at Dakar, F-BVFD definitely consumed more fuel, although IIRC he was already reputed as a gas guzzler even before that incident.
It was one reason why, when Air France withdrew an aircraft from service, Fox Delta was the first one to go.
Also, due to the gradual improvements in production methods, and minor redesign, the last British production Concorde, G-BOAF, was about a ton lighter than the first one (G-BOAC). While the differences weren't huge, they were noticeable.
Of course... but there I have no figures at all, and I doubt the differences, evened out over four engines, were really significant.
Interesting question, and I hope somebody will come in and answer it.
According to 'Wikipedia', 67 engines were built, which would mean, in theory , 64 engines for 16 aircraft and 3 spares....
In practice, of course, fewer aircraft flew at any one time, so the statistics are different, but even so, a lot of engine swapping went on over the years.
As to the MTBO, I don't know... it's not my field at all....

Biggles78
The tailwheel design really was the one exception in poor design terms, but I'm sure that if the aircraft was doing what she should be doing right now, (you know routinely flying across the Atlantic and beyond, instead of languishing in museums), modifications would have finally put this particular malady to bed). In design terms, the rest of the aircraft was nothing short of a flying work of art, a masterpiece. Having said that though, personally I would rather that four rather than three hydraulic systems had been used. Originally there were four systems in the design, but the RED system was deleted, as it was felt to be superfluous. My own view is that this particular decision was total poppycock. Oh, and Green, Blue and Yellow hydraulic systems was something else that Airbus copied from Concorde.... although we ourselves pinched that idea off of the Comet ).
As far as the hydraulic expansion joints go, I will scour around and see if I can find a diagram for you. Try and picture two titanium (or stainless) tubes, on inside the other, with a sealed chamber being formed at the join. Inside this chamber were multiple lands fitted with special viton GLT seals. They did work incredibly well, although occasionally one of the seals gave out, and things got wet, VERY WET.
As far as the 4000 PSI hydraulic system, as EXWOK quite rightly pointed out, the loading on the flying control surfaces were immense throughout the whole flight envelope. (Picture alone just the T/O from JFK RWY 31L, where the aircraft is tightly turning and the gear retracting, all at the same time). As well as the flying controls and landing gear, you also had the droop nose to consider, four variable engine intakes as well as a couple of hydraulically operated fuel pumps. Oh, and in emergencies, a hydraulically driven 40 KVA generator too. The reason that 4000 PSI was chosen was that if a large amount of hydraulic 'work' was to be done, the only way to keep the size of jacks and actuators to a reasonable size/weight was to increase the system pressure by 25% from the normal 3000 PSI. (On the A380 they've gone a step further and gone for 5000 PSI, saving them over a tonne on the weight of the aircraft).
Concorde used a special hydraulic fluid, Chevron M2V. This is a mineral based fluid, as opposed to the ester based Skydrol, used by the subsonics. The reason that we went for a different fluid was a simple one; Skydrol is rubbish at the high temperatures that Concorde operated at, no good at all in fact, so we needed something better and in M2V we found the PERFECT fluid. As an aside, unlike Skydrol, that attacks paintwork, certain rubber seals, skin, EYES etc., M2V is completely harmless, wash your hair in it. (I did, several times when we had leaks. Thinking about it, maybe THAT is why my hair is such a diminished asset

EXWOK
It's so great having another of my pilot friends diving in to this post, welcome welcome
I remember the Mech' Signalling part of the air tests, my lunch has just finished coming back up thank you. (for interest chaps and chapesses, with mechanical signalling, using just the conventional control runs under the floor, there was no auto-stabilisation).

The artificialfeel system worked incredibly well I thought, I always found it curious that the peak load law in the computer was at the transonic rather that the supersonic speed range. It was explained to me long ago that this was because the controls really are at their most sensitive here, but at high Mach numbers are partially 'stalled out', due to shockwave movements along the surfaces, and were therefore less effective. (For this reason I was told, the inner elevons were so critical for supersonic control, being the most effective of all elevons at high speed).

To all , I forgot to mention in my previous post regarding the engine failure in G-BOAF in 1980; I remember an FAA surveyor, who was taking a look at the carnage within the engine bay, saying that in his opinion, no other aircraft in the world could have survived the intensity of the titanium fire that ensued. Analysis showed that the fire was successfully extinguished, possibly at the first shot of the fire bottle. This was a testament to the way that the Concorde engine bay could be completely 'locked down' when the fire handle was pulled, as well as to the way that the whole engine installation was technically encased in armour plate. To put all this in context, acording to Rolls Royce a titanium fire, once it takes hold, can destroy the compressor of a jet engine in four seconds.


Dude

A small article in flight global suggest unspecified work is being carried out on the bristol based G-BOAF.

Any ideas/rumours?

BRIT312
This story is totally hilarious, can't quite get this visual out of my head. ('100 KTS, POWER SET' sounds so boring in comparison). I never had the good fortune to meet any of the Braniff guys; sounds like there was certainly a character or two there. It really is a pity that their operation never really got a chance to expand into the proposed Pacific Rim service, who knows, it might really have done something.
It's generally known that the BA aircraft were temporarily re-registered to facilitate Braniff's operation out of IAD to DFW; G-BOAA, B, D & E were re-registered from G-BOAA and so on, to G-N94AA etc. Being an older registration, G-BOAC was re-registered as G-N81AC. At IAD, the 'G' part of the registration was covered over, leaving a now perfect 'American' tail number. Only five aircraft were involved in the operation (at the time BA operated just six aircraft, G-BOAF was still at the manufacturers at Filton, and G-BFKW (later to become G-BOAG) was on loan from British Aerospace. In order for the necessary FAA certification, required for operation by a US airline, a modification package were required by the FAA. Some of these modifications seemed a little 'picky' and irrelevant at the time (they still do). However some modifications were certainly not in this category, and quite honestly should have been 'picked up' by the CAA & DGAC during original certification of the aircraft. As an example, if the flying controls had been operating on GREEN or BLUE hydraulics only (due to an indicated spool valve jam) and that particular hydraulic system was subsequently lost, there was originally no automatic switching to select the standby YELLOW system into the flying controls; the controls would have been completely unpowered until a manual selection was made by the pilot. . One of the 'FAA Mods' was to facilitate just that, so if this (extremely unlikely I grant you) scenario had occurred, then YELLOW would automatically been selected into the controls, and at no time would the controls have been in an unpowered state.
The Braniff operation ended in May 1980, due to heavy losses on the subsonic only route, and it's a rather sad irony that aircraft G-BOAF had been modified and reregistered at Filton, from it's original registration of G-BFKX to G-N94AF. Unfortunately the aircraft was delivered to BA in June 1980, one month too late to participate, and prior to delivery it's registration was converted to it's 'normal' British registration; all other aircraft also reverted to original registrations also.
ChristiaanJ
Not really, being the sad b****d that I am, I still remember the Concorde flare law of: h+5h. = 0, so it was fairly easy to work out the programmed descent rates. (I did have to check the final 1.7'/second figure though). The rest I'm afraid is straight out of this sad old memory of mine.
Bellerophon
A brilliant description of the mechanics of final approach. It's so easy for us mere mortals to forget just what an involved and skilled process it was, to fly, and in particular land our totally amazing aircraft.

Dude

There was some titanium, such as in the engine nacelles, but only in critical locations.
The first production Concorde (204, G-BOAC) was about a ton heavier than the last on (216, G-BOAF). IIRC most of that was achieved by judicious use of titanium in certain locations.
The aluminium alloy was not Dural, but a special alloy called RR58, AU2GN or hiduminium which was used because of its superior 'creep' properties ('creep' = slow permanent deformation under a combination of mechanical stress and high temperatures).

Nearly all of the primary load-bearing structures and a non-negliable amount of the secondary ones.
(As an example of the latter, ever looked at a photo of the top of the wing of a Concorde with all those oval-shaped access panels? They were all machined.
It may look wasteful at first sight, but the resulting panels were lighter than a conventional 'sheet and ribs' structure, and that weight gain remained a gain during the life of the aircraft.
It also made for greater precision and repeatablity, more consistent quality, etc.
And the scrap from the milling operation was recovered and recycled....

CJ

As promised here are the answers to our trivia quiz.
Actually there were 14 (but if you are not necessarily a Concorde person, 13 is acceptable). There were '13 fuel tanks, numbered 1 - 11' as we used to tell all the visitors to the aircraft, (The wingtip tanks 5A & 7A making up the extra 2) PLUS a single small scavenge tank at the rear of the aircraft that was used to remove fuel from the vent lines and return this fuel via a transfer pump back to tank 3. (A fuel level sensor would trigger the pump with only 1 US Gallon of fuel in the tank). If the trim gallery became over-pressurised (ie tank 3 already full to the brim) an overflow relief valve (ORV) underneath the rear of the aircraft would open and dump the contents of the tank overboard. There was a flight deck indication if the scavenge pump was running in flight to give the crew an indication that a tank somewhere was probably over-filling and to take the appropriate action. There was one added goody about the ORV; If you were on the ground with the refuel door open and due to a refuelling overfill anywhere, fuel entered the scavenge tank, at 7 gallons the ORV would open and rapidly dump the fuel on the floor. For this reason a vent pipe and fuel drum was often placed underneath the ORV during high load refuels. If this was not fitted and you just happened to walk underneath the aircraft at the wrong moment during fuelling........
As a total aside to all this (or me going off on a tangent yet again) the fuel tanks themselves were gently air pressurised above 44,000' to around 2.2 PSIA. This was to prevent the beginnings of any boiling of the fuel in the tanks, due to the low ambient pressure/high fuel temperatures, causing pump cavitation. (Boiling itself could not occur much below 65,000'). A small NACA duct at the right side of the fin was used to supply the ram air for tank pressurisation, the two vent valves in the tail cone, one per trim gallery, closing off automatically at around 44,000', the pressure being controlled by a pneumatic valve, with full automatic over-pressure protection. OK sorry guys and gals, back to the answers:
This is the stinker.... there were 114 (although at entry into service there were 115!!). 100 passenger seats + 6 cabin crew seats + 5 flight deck seats (including the fold up seat in the aisle at the rear) PLUS 3 LOO SEATS (Originally 4 loos, the fourth loo being removed in the early 1980's).
50,189' and 530 KEAS, but we'll settle for anything around FL500 being correct.
Aircraft 216, G-BOAF, the last Concorde ever built. When 216 first flew in 1979 she was a variant 192 'British Unsold Aircraft' and was registered as G-BFKX. In late 1979, BA purchased the aircraft and it was subsequently converted to a Type 102 British Airways variant, and after modifications were complete, test flights were carried out from Filton under the registration of G-N94AF. This registration was to enable the aircraft to participate in the Braniff interchange between IAD and DFW, but when the Braniff Concorde adventure unfortunately ended in 1980, she was again re-registered to G-BOAF, this is how she was delivered to BA later that year.
Easy one this I hope; 60.000'. (As we've said before this limitation was imposed because of the dual window failure / emergency descent time consideration, not as a performance issue. On test flights 63,000' was routinely attained, and altitudes of up to 68,000' were achieved during development flying. (On her maiden flight, G-BOAB achieved 65,000' and Mach 2.04; the first British constructed Concorde to achieve Mach 2 on her maiden flight, and the ONLY one of the original five BA aircraft to achieve this).
Hopefully an easy one... there were TWELVE: 2 nose wheels, 8 main wheels and 2 tail wheels. (No, even I'm not nasty enough to include the wheels on the bar trolleys ). Oh, and there were 9 wheel brakes, one for each main wheel and as was mentioned in a previous post, a single steel disc brake for the nose wheels (the nose having a live axle), for automatic use during gear retraction only.
Three modes; Blue electronic signalling, green electronic signalling and mechanical signalling. I suppose we COULD be pedantic here and include the Emergency Flight Control mode where even with a jammed control column/control wheel, strain gauges (and Safety Flight Control Computers of course) would still enable you to control the elevons.
OK, three basically. Up (Duh!), 5 degrees for taxi/take off and low speed flight and 12.5 degrees for landing. As ChristiaanJ quite rightly pointed out in an earlier post, the prototype (and pre-production) aircraft landing position was 17.5 degrees of droop. (In my view the nose of the aircraft looked a little like an armadillo in this extreme configuration).
In 1977 the new digital Plessey PVS 1580 Aircraft Integrated Data System was progressively fitted to the BA fleet, this being the first microprocessor application on Concorde, this application being followed in several other systems during the life of the aircraft. The 'final' applications being TCAS and the superb retrofitted Bendix RDR-4A weather radar system.
No we are not including torch batteries and emergency lights etc. There were a total of seven main power sources: 4 x 60KVA AC generators, one per engine, a single 40KVA hydraulically powered emergency generator and 2 lead acid (or ni-cad in the case of G-BOAG) main aircraft batteries. (Not a terribly Re-Volting question I hope).

I hope this quiz was fun and not too perplexing to any of you guys.

Dude

I copied this off M2dude's post a couple of days ago, and tried to answer it all offline without cheating by looking up the answers elsewhere.

1) How many fuel tanks were there on Concorde?
LOL... 13.
I suppose that, for the same reason there was no row 13 in the cabin, somebody decided to name two of the tanks "5A" and "7A", rather than call the tail trim tank (named no.11) number 13.
Yes, I forgot the scavenge tank.
And since it was "BA Concordes only" I didn't want to add the hydrazine tank on the two preprod and the two certification aircraft.

2) How many seats were there?
Good question.
As Nick asked, which seats?
Nominally there were 100 pax seats in the cabin, although originally up to 127 were certified.
Five (three plus two jump seats) in the cockpit.
Cabin seats for the cabin crew.... I honestly don't know. Seven?
Wrong twice... six cabin crew seats, AND I forgot to count the loos!

3) At what approximate altitude and KNOTS EAS was Mach 2 achieved?
Roughly, FL500 and 530 kts.
But not being a pilot I had to check an instant on my flight envelope crib sheet, which I have at hand all the time.....
It seemed pointless to be TOO precise, because that assumed ISA and creeping exactly up the right edge of the envelope.

4) Only one BA Concorde had three different registrations, what was it?
Without looking it up, no idea. My guess is G-BOAF, with a white-tail reg, a "British" reg, and a pseudo-American reg.
IIRC, G-BOAG never had a pseudo-American reg, but I'm not sure without looking it up.
Brain not completely addled, then.

5) What was the maximum permitted altitude in passenger service?
FL600, as certified.

6) How many wheels on the aircraft?
Twelve, if you count the two Spitfire wheels at the back

7) How many flying control modes were there?
Four. Blue, green, mechanical and ... what did we call it? Control jam, CWS?
Ah, thanks, Emergency Flight Control. I always considered it as a separate mode, even if it was virtually never used.

8) How many positions of nose droop were there?
Four. 0\xb0, 5\xb0, 12.5\xb0 and 17.5\xb0 (the latter only on the prototypes, and purely mechanically, after removing a stop, on the other aircraft).

9) What was the first microprocessor application on the aircraft?
No idea... you (M2dude) mentioned a Plessey data acquisition system?
It was after "my time"...

10) How many main electrical sources were there?
Again, not sure... You're presumably are talking about primary sources.
There was an AC constant-drive generator on each engine.
Then there were two DC batteries.
And IIRC there was an AC generator running off the RAT hydraulic generator when pillar came to post.
Reading M2dude's answer, I suppose the emergency generator just ran off the hydraulics, not specifically off the RAT. Far more logical.

Nice one, M2dude!
And certainly not all trivia!

CJ

Mike-Bracknell
It is not nonsense, and you are quite at liberty to post here. Wow, that's still quite a question though Mike. There are two TECHNICAL issues that overshadow all others, namely airframe corrosion and hydraulic system deterioration. Unfortunately none of the BA aircraft were stored inside from the outset, so we have a real issue here as far as corrosion goes, plus all the hydraulic systems were drained, resulting in seal drying out and probable moisture ingress into the 3 systems. But given sufficient funds (and assuming you find an organisation to take over design responsibility from Airbus; ironic when you consider that without Concorde there would almost certainly have been no such organisation ) there is still no technical reason why the problems (and there are dozens of other problems to consider) could not be overcome, the money side of things is another matter
Looking first at the French fleet, the main candidate for restoration to flight status would be F-BTSD at Le Bourget. Not only has this aircraft been lovingly cared for and stored INSIDE, but the aircraft has had several systems (including the Green hydraulic system) powered and reservoirs not drained.
The British story is less clear; G-BOAA in East Fortune was effectively killed when the wings were cut off for transportation, so that one is out of the question. G-BOAB, the last and only Concorde at LHR has been left to rot outside, in fact holes were even drill in the fuselage to drain water, so this one is a no no too. G-BOAC at Manchester, now the oldest surviving production aircraft was initially stored outside, but now resides in a purpose built exhibition 'hangar'. Now she COULD be a potential candidate for consideration; when I last saw her just over a year ago she was absolutely pristine; a testament to the team that have been caring for her there. G-BOAD, stored next to the USS Intrepid in New York, we can probably forget, due to having been exposed to 7 years worth of salt water corrosion from the Hudson River. (Also, while she was temporarily stored in New Jersey a couple of years ago, some IDIOT in a truck bent the whole nose section when he hit her. The radome was smashed (replaced with a rather clever fibreglass fabrication) and the nose straightened with a blow-torch and hammer (I am not joking!!). G-BOAE at Grantley Adams airport in Barbados has been stored under cover for much of the time; provided she has not suffered too much from the wam damp atmosphere of Barbados, well she could be a potential candiitate too. G-BOAF in Filton, well PROVIDED she is still OK after her 'removal from public view' experience could also be a potential candidate also. And finally, G-BOAG in Seattle; well she had been left outside, right next to a highway (and close to a truck stop too). She did not look too good the last time I saw her; the undercarriage barrels werer all brown and discoloured and the paintwork was completely dull and matte. (She had a new paint job not too long before retirement too). So out of the 'BA Seven', I PERSONALLY would go for G-BOAF, G-BOAC or G-BOAG.
As I have said often here before, it is EXTREMELY unlikely that what you, Mike, suggest will ever happen, but in spite of what others might say, IT IS NOT IMPOSSIBLE. My own gut feeling is a resounding 'no', but I could be wrong, . (And NO ONE would be happier than I if I am wrong; I was with the BA aircraft through construction, flight testing and the entire service life with BA).
As for the cost? It really is a case of 'how long is a piece of string', but for 2 aircraft we could be looking in excess of $100 or more, who knows?
But as the Everly Brothers used to sing 'All I have to do is dream.'
Keep posting Mike.

Dude .

speedbirdconcorde
Yes we did, just a couple if I remember correctly and relatively minor failures at that. (Regular ultrasonic NDT inspections had been instigated to pre-empt these failures from actually occuring). New elevon purchases were rightly seen to be the answer to the problem; the poorly designed trailing edge extension modifications of the late 1970's were as was said before, the source of these failures, due to moisture ingress in the honeycombe structure).

Mr Vortex
As has been posted previously, there was a small NACA duct on the right hand side of the fin, that provided the air source for fuel tank pressurisation. This pressure was controlled to 1.5 PSIG.
This switch operated two valves that would drain out any residual fuel for maintenance (for example, replacing a vent valve); it was not used very often however.

Islander539 and ChristiaanJ
The actions of Airbus at Filton are nothing short of disgusting. By 'removing the insulation' you will need to strip the cabin completely bare (seats, galleys, ceiling panels and all of the side-wall panels). They say that 'Filton was only ever going to be an interim home for Concorde', what total crap !!
The idea is to 'cocoon' the aircraft 'until a permanent home is found'. I hope all readers here realise that this will involve BREAKING UP THE AIRFRAME to make it road transportable. The reasons that scarebus are giving for all this are vague and misleading, but here's my take. There are pressures around from various people and bodies 'to return a British Concorde to flying condition.' Now a lot (NOT ALL) of these people although very well intentioned are not that well informed and their wishes are not reasonably possible. But the pressures exist nonetheless, and scarebus will do anything to prevent this possibility, nomatter how unlikely, from being progressed. So we have G-BOAF, the youngest Concorde in the world, with the lowest airframe hours, in pretty good structural condition (she's suffered from being outside for 7 years, but nothing terminal) and actually in the hands of the dreaded scarebus (who would rather forget that Concorde ever existed, and was almost certainly the reason why they even noe exist). Doesn't take much working out now, does it?

Dude

Just some notes on the side.

With the lack of comm from Airbus, of course we don't know the details, but I would have thought the problem is essentially the under-floor insulation, the same that causes the musty smell in the Fox-Charlie cockpit. If so, I doubt they'd bother to strip the cabin.

This is nothing new.
For "Filton", read "Filton airfield and the Airbus site".
At present, the 'permanent home' is planned to be at Cribb's Causeway, where land is already available.
Since this is only just on the other side of Filton airfield, so far there is no question of breaking up the airframe, or road transport.

I doubt this.... The "pressures" from these bodies and people consist only of noises on internet forums and in the press. As long as BA (as the owner), Airbus (as the current 'guardian' and legacy manufacturer) and the CAA (as the regulatory body) say "NO", Airbus knows perfectly well it'll never happen, pressures or no pressures.

My own take is simply, that they're fed up with a Concorde on their site, that their early 'enthusiasts' who campaigned for 'A Concorde at Filton' have now left, and that it's now Airbus exerting pressure on the Concorde Trust and other bodies to provide that 'permanent home' they've been talking about for years.

To be exact, 18,257 hours and 5,639 supersonic cycles
As noted in another post, not the lowest, but a lot less than the 23,000+ hours of G-BOAD and G-BOAE.

In 2003, the issue with G-BOAF was that she was almost 'out of hours', with only a few hours left until the next big overhaul (an 'Inter', IIRC).
At the time, this was the reason why G-BOAF did not partake to the full extent in the flying during the last months, so as to have a few hours 'spare' for the last few flights, and of course the final flight.

Nowadays of course this is pretty irrelevant since any aircraft after seven years outside would need a 'Major' overhaul at the very least .
And that's another reason why Airbus wouldn't be bothered by those "pressures" mentioned earlier... they know perfectly well nobody is going to come up with the \xa3100M +++ to re-create the necessary infrastructure.

CJ

ChristiaanJ
With respect my friend that is utter codswallop. You can doubt things all you want, they've already said that they would remove it all; that by definition means all the cabin side-walls, galleys and roof panels, as well as the underfloor areas. When G-BBDG (202) was cocooned at Filton they did just that, and the only intact part of the interior left was the flight deck!!

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At present, the 'permanent home' is planned to be at Cribb's Causeway, where land is already available. Since this is only just on the other side of Filton airfield, so far there is no question of breaking up the airframe, or road transport.

Unfortunately, this lot have a habit of talking with forked tongue as far as Concorde goes; you can not in any way be sure about this, and we should really stop believing everything that this lot in Toulouse tell us . (Recent history here has taught us this all too well, and nothing would please scarebus more than there to be no reminders of Concorde at all on the airfield at Filton). More to the point, there is absolutely no certainty that the Cribb's Causeway site will ever be built anyway, you just can NOT say that the airframe will not ne broken up for road transportation, because if she does go to another museum in the absence of the Cribb's Causeway site being built, that will DEFINATELY happen. But at least we now have another 'written off' British Concorde; I guess this fact obviously pleases some people

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I doubt this.... The "pressures" from these bodies and people consist only of noises on internet forums and in the press. As long as BA (as the owner), Airbus (as the current 'guardian' and legacy manufacturer) and the CAA (as the regulatory body) say "NO", Airbus knows perfectly well it'll never happen, pressures or no pressures. My own take is simply, that they're fed up with a Concorde on their site, that their early 'enthusiasts' who campaigned for 'A Concorde at Filton' have now left, and that it's now Airbus exerting pressure on the Concorde Trust and other bodies to provide that 'permanent home' they've been talking about for years.

Total crap I'm afraid Christian. You can doubt it all you want; you're entitled to your opinions as we all are here. But the fact remains that there is a certain producer of airframes in Europe that has come out with nothing but lies and deceit with regard to Concorde, since early 2003, and it continues to do so to this day. (Guesses anyone?) You conveniently seem to forget that it was scarebus themselves who unilaterally closed the Concorde Filton exhibit...'for maintenace' .. YET ANOTHER TOTAL PACK OF LIES!!
And as far as responding to pressures; They could not give a flying about Concorde pressures, they JUST DO NOT WANT TO KNOW!! And yes they are fed up with Concorde.. poor dears. Perhaps OAF should never have gone to Filton in the first place; The continuing thought of Filton bending over backwards to please it's French masters makes one want to throw up. The basic fact remains that any British Concorde anywhere NEAR an Airbus plant is nothing more than an embarassment to them, and is fundimantally always in jeapordy.

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In 2003, the issue with G-BOAF was that she was almost 'out of hours', with only a few hours left until the next big overhaul (an 'Inter', IIRC). At the time, this was the reason why G-BOAF did not partake to the full extent in the flying during the last months, so as to have a few hours 'spare' for the last few flights, and of course the final flight.

Big deal, she needed a C Check. Unlike in France, a Concorde major (D check) here did not take over a year to complete, and an inter could be in and out of the shed in a couple of months. Oh, and the check was completed correctly and thoroughly.

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And that's another reason why Airbus wouldn't be bothered by those "pressures" mentioned earlier... they know perfectly well nobody is going to come up with the \xa3100M +++ to re-create the necessary infrastructure.

I tend to agree with the RTF point, the \xa3\xa3\xa3\xa3\xa3's involved are generally prohibitive and it will probably never happen, but you and I have been in aviation long enough to realise that nothing is impossible. (At least not this side of the Channel). All aircraft left outside in the elements are obviously going to suffer, and it is irony of ironies that the FRENCH aircraft are generally stored indoors in the dry and warm, where the British were ALL intitially stored outside, exposed to the elements. (Only OAC in Manchester and OAE in BGI are now finally cared for under cover, the poor old 'wing clipped' OAA in Edinburgh does not really count). This ridiculous fact is is a source of both wonder and ANGER in the minds of most Concorde people in the UK. (Makes me sick personally!!).

Dude

Dozy Wannabe
I am afraid it is a case of 'go figure'. Recent history (as well as what is going on right now) shows that there is little interest in even caring for the aeroplane at Filton, let alone preserving her. Who built what is not the point here anyway.. When design and construction of the aircraft was carried out there were TWO airframe companies, A\xe9rospatiale and BAC. Now we just have Airbus, with virtually zero British input now. (Don't get me wrong, this is the fault of the British and not the French, we are the ones that threw everything away). I can not explain the attitude of Airbus to the aeroplane, it just remains a cold hard fact.... THEY ARE NOT INTERESTED

We are all well aware that the disposal of the aircraft was the decision of the airlines thank you, I did know that. Now like it or not, there really is a lot of anger behind the fact that no INTACT British aircraft has been stored under cover from the beginning, and only one of those aircraft in the UK itself is stored away from the elements. G-BOAC the oldest production Concorde in the world, is beautifully preserved and cared for in Manchester, which makes a hell of a contrast to G-BOAF, the YOUNGEST Concorde in the world at Filton. I am really sorry if all this discord saddens you, it pleases none of us I'm sure, but truth is often like that I'm afraid, we have to deal with it; a national disgrace.
There is also no point avoiding this truth as far as the ceasation of services goes, just because when you unravel the duplicity and deceit behind the happenings of 2003, you discover a sense of disgust and outrage on the part of the British Concorde community. Far from 'not making a blind bit of difference' it makes a huge amount of difference to where we are. I do agree that we should concentrate on celebrating this truly wonderful national icon (I do so every day), but we must not be afraid of looking at the history that has got us (the aeroplane) in the sorry state we are now.

Regards
Dude

I've got another question about the lady if I may. It was touched on before - about the deicing on her. Having watched a few Air Crash Investigation programs on TV (so, yes, completely NO knowledge about aircraft from any experience at all!), it seems that there are restrictions about how much ice can be on a wing and the aircraft still allowed to take off.

From what I've been told on concorde, how the wing was so radically different from subsonic craft, what limits were there for ice on her wings - was she as affected as other aircraft?

One other thing I was wondering about - how much of concorde is now still under the protection of patents / copyright etc? I suspect not much, as the information posted here is showing quite intimate parts - or are these all publicly available documents anyway? This isn't to question whether the information in this thread is in anyway secret - just wondering how much of the information about concorde is actually still under wraps and can't be told?

Lastly (its late!) is it actually possible for a supersonic aircraft to achieve *higher* fuel efficiency than subsonic aircraft? Only reason I ask is that with all the drag numbers quoted previously it seems that the fuel efficiency climbs higher the faster you go when above mach 1? Or am I just completely off-base with that?

Thanks for this WONDERFUL thread. I've had the wonderful opportunity to see G-BOAF at filton just before she closed, and just wish I still had the chance to fly on her. m2dude - if you have it within you to post your theories about why what happened in 2003, I'd love to hear it.

- DavvaP.

Landroger
The great thing about the OLY593 was the high specific thrust (in relative terms the Olympus is a tiny, compact design), it's growth potential/high potential mass flow. A bypass engine is not really ideal for supersonic cruise, and given what was available in terms of two-spool turbojets in the 1960s, the Olympus was the obvious choice for both the TSR-2 and Concorde alike. As far as for ships and power stations, well a turbojet is always going to be favourite, as all the gas energy is contained in the jet efflux; this can be efficiently transferred to the load in question by a gearbox coupled to the HP spool.

howiehowie93
Well the 593 did require a primary nozzle to match N1 against N2, bur apart from that she was a study of deceptive simplicity and elegance.
No mate, generally BI-HEX AF.
This really is fascinating stuff Howie, thank you. As I alluded to a few pages back, the primary nozzle on the OLY593 opened in response to the rising P7, kind of 'after the horse has bolted' in a way. To maintain the correct scheduled value of N1, the control system set, via a needle valve, a finite ratio between P7 and P3. As reheat lit as P7 attempted to rise it upset this ratio and the primary nozzle was opened in order to restore the aforementioned ratio. (Nozzle opens, P7 falls). When reheat was cancelled the opposite happened, and the nozzle closed sharply to prevent N1 overspeed.

Tom355UK
Glad you are enjoying our thread, and thank you for your kind words. (But apologies to your good lady wife though ).
Jeepers Tom that is one hell of a question. Assuming there was a market for such a venture (personally not sure right now) I think you are looking at BILLIONS of $, and for this reason alone I think you'd find that a multi-national/continental effort would be required. There is little doubt that technology is not the major barrier here, but economics and political will. (Nice thought though, I do agree).
As far as a powerplant goes, well the PW5000 is a really superb engine, although well down on the thrust requirement for an 'NG' SST. More likely I would have thought would be e development of the Olympus, there was/is still such an enormous amount of potential in this basic design. (But who knows, this is all pure speculation anyway).
And have no fears about posting here Tom, most of us are quite happy to answer away (We've said before that there is no such thing as a stupid question; you are most welcome here ).

DavvaP It really did not matter what airframe we used for the test flight; the sole purpose was just to find out just what effect (if any) the tank liners had on the performance of the fuel system. (The handsome chap who you see on TV most, installing the liners, Mr Marc Morley left BA and now resides in Australia).
I am honoured to say that I was lucky enough to be onboard G-BOAF for that flight from LHR-BZZ and as far as I could tell, the liners had no impact whatsoever. One amusing part of the flight was when we deliberately allowed tank 3 to run dry and see just what the indicated fuel quantity was as #3 engine flamed out (we were subsonic at this point of course). The gauge slowly crept down (in order for the tank to to run dry, the tank 7 & 8 transfer pumps were switched off) and we all watched in eager anticipation/dread....... as the counters reached zero weeeeeee... the engine flamed out. I am being completely honest here, the engine wound down EXACTLY at ZERO indicated contents).
Those 7 aircraft really did look magnificent I know, it was just sad as to the reason they were all lined up there.

Mr.Vortex
Well she was a delta without a tailplane, so the short answer is 'yes', but remember that we used fuel to move the CG backwards and forwards for long term trimming.
OK, this is a little complicated, so bear with me. The intake had a finite limit, in terms of the mass flow that it could deliver to the engine and so an automatic N1 limitation signal was transmitted from the intake 'box' (the AICU) to the engine 'box' (the ECU) full time above Mach 1.6. Now this limitation was referenced against TEMPERATURE compensated N1, ( N1/ \xd6 q) and at normal ISA temperatures this limit was above the 'normal' 101.5% N1 running line. (The lower the temperature, the lower the effective limit became). At ISA -7 the limit now became less than 101.5% N1, and so the demanded value of N1 was reduced to this value. But this limit signal was always there, it's just that at normal temperatures it was effectively ignored by the ECU. If this limitation signal failed for any reason, the AICU would detect this by way of the ramp angle becoming uncomfortably close to it's MINIMUM variable limit (this limit was scheduled as a function of intake local Mach number) and an amber light would illuminate on the associated N1 gauge, along with an amber INTAKE master warning would illuminate (plus an audible 'BONG' from the audio warning system). The only course of action was to manually reduce throttle setting away from the Mach 2 norm of maximum, in order to reduce N2, and consequently N1 and mass flow demand. There was in intake pressure ratio indicator at the top of the intake control panel that would show where the power setting would have to be set to. It was an indirect indication of intake shock geometry.
This manual N1 datum reset control was only used during flight test trials into just how much N1 would have to be controlled/reduced at low temperatures in order to give optimim intake geometry. It had absolutely nothing to do with afterburner/reheat and had no place in the production aircraft as all the research was complete

Best regards to all
Dude

Hi Guys, quite a few little points here, so here's my angle(s):
Pedalz
Ooo yes. The biggest problems we ever had associated with the ramps themselves were wear in the seals at the sides of the forward ramp. Even a few thou' over the maximum allowable side gap was enough to make the intake unstable and susceptible to surging. (It is quite interesting that the rear ramp side gaps were not in the least bit critical, and if Concorde intake development had continued, the rear ramps were going to be deleted altogether). Other failure factors were control unit malfuntions, rapid sensor drift; all of these causing either ramp/spill door drift or runaway. Primary nozzle misbehaviour could also result in intake surges. Having said all that, the monitoring of the intake system was truly superb, and surface runaways, themselves quite rare, would usually be picked up by the control system monitors causing either a lane switch or if that did not work, a total 'red light' failure with the surfaces frozen. No surge was treated as 'just one of those things', and much midnight oil was burned and hair pulled out (so that's what happened to mine ) to try and find the cause of the surge.
My friend EXWOK perfectly answered the intake hydraulics allocations.
EXWOK was right on the ball here as usual, in fact above Mach 1.6 an interactive surge was more or less guaranteed. The cause of interactive surge had nothing to do with the wing leading edge position, but to the radially generated distortion field coming out of the FRONT of the surging intake, severely distorting the adjascent intakes airflow. It mattered not if the originating surge was an inboard or an outboard intake, the other guy would always go also, above Mach 1.6.
You might want to take a look at 'When Intakes Go Wrong Part 1:
Concorde engine intake "Thrust"
and Parts 2 & 3:
Concorde engine intake "Thrust"
Not to mention Part 3:


dixi188
I can never recall this particular event happening with BA , certainly not as a result of a ramp failure. Although in the near 28 years of operation we had quite a few SNN diversions, none that I can ever recall were as the result of a ramp structural failure. The two major SNN diversions that I can recall were G-BOAF in the early 80s when an LP1 blade failed and resulted in a totally wrecked engine (although a completely contained failure) and G-BOAA in 1991, with another wrecked engine due to running in rotating stall. (Both of these events were covered previously in our thread). ChristiaanJ has mentioned quite rightly the event with A/C 001 spitting a ramp out, and Air France had a ramp failure going into JFK. (Covered previously in our thread, due to certain 'human foul ups'). I am not sure, but I think that this one in JFK DID require a double engine change in JFK. (Usually from SNN a BA aircraft would be 3 engine ferried back to LHR).

ChristiaanJ
Nope, you are quite right, no more French or British development aircraft ever suffered a ramp linkage failure again. The 001 ramp failure was a salutary lesson to the design team, and the intake assembly became tougher than old boots after that, nomatter WHAT you threw at it.


Due to the lateness of the hour (and me being up at 4 ), that will have to do for now guys.

Best regards to all
Dude