23rd Aug 2010, 19:03
permalink Post: 86
Also, regarding the 4000psi pressure adopted - the control surfaces most definitely did need powerful actuators; as you now know they were very active, especially on approach and transonic, and as well as IASs of up to 530kts you have all the lever arm changes brought by shifting centres of pressure over the surfaces caused by shockwave movements.
If you want to fly supersonic, frontal area is everything so 4000psi also has the benefit of keeping the PFCU cross-section down.
I'm sure M2Dude will be able to give a better explanation of this aspect - it's nearly seven years since I flew the beast (that's depressing) and it's hard enough to remember detail of the flying bits, let alone the complex engineering aspects.
If you want to fly supersonic, frontal area is everything so 4000psi also has the benefit of keeping the PFCU cross-section down.
I'm sure M2Dude will be able to give a better explanation of this aspect - it's nearly seven years since I flew the beast (that's depressing) and it's hard enough to remember detail of the flying bits, let alone the complex engineering aspects.
24th Aug 2010, 09:48
permalink Post: 88
Biggles78
The tailwheel design really was the one exception in poor design terms, but I'm sure that if the aircraft was doing what she should be doing right now, (you know routinely flying across the Atlantic and beyond, instead of languishing in museums), modifications would have finally put this particular malady to bed). In design terms, the rest of the aircraft was nothing short of a flying work of art, a masterpiece. Having said that though, personally I would rather that four rather than three hydraulic systems had been used. Originally there were four systems in the design, but the RED system was deleted, as it was felt to be superfluous. My own view is that this particular decision was total poppycock. Oh, and Green, Blue and Yellow hydraulic systems was something else that Airbus copied from Concorde.... although we ourselves pinched that idea off of the Comet
).
As far as the hydraulic expansion joints go, I will scour around and see if I can find a diagram for you. Try and picture two titanium (or stainless) tubes, on inside the other, with a sealed chamber being formed at the join. Inside this chamber were multiple lands fitted with special viton GLT seals. They did work incredibly well, although occasionally one of the seals gave out, and things got wet, VERY WET.
As far as the 4000 PSI hydraulic system, as EXWOK quite rightly pointed out, the loading on the flying control surfaces were immense throughout the whole flight envelope. (Picture alone just the T/O from JFK RWY 31L, where the aircraft is tightly turning and the gear retracting, all at the same time). As well as the flying controls and landing gear, you also had the droop nose to consider, four variable engine intakes as well as a couple of hydraulically operated fuel pumps. Oh, and in emergencies, a hydraulically driven 40 KVA generator too. The reason that 4000 PSI was chosen was that if a large amount of hydraulic 'work' was to be done, the only way to keep the size of jacks and actuators to a reasonable size/weight was to increase the system pressure by 25% from the normal 3000 PSI. (On the A380 they've gone a step further and gone for 5000 PSI, saving them over a tonne on the weight of the aircraft).
Concorde used a special hydraulic fluid, Chevron M2V. This is a mineral based fluid, as opposed to the ester based Skydrol, used by the subsonics. The reason that we went for a different fluid was a simple one; Skydrol is rubbish at the high temperatures that Concorde operated at, no good at all in fact, so we needed something better and in M2V we found the PERFECT fluid. As an aside, unlike Skydrol, that attacks paintwork, certain rubber seals, skin, EYES etc., M2V is completely harmless, wash your hair in it. (I did, several times when we had leaks. Thinking about it, maybe THAT is why my hair is such a diminished asset
EXWOK
It's so great having another of my pilot friends diving in to this post, welcome welcome
I remember the Mech' Signalling part of the air tests, my lunch has just finished coming back up thank you.
(for interest chaps and chapesses, with mechanical signalling, using just the conventional control runs under the floor, there was no auto-stabilisation).
The artificialfeel system worked incredibly well I thought, I always found it curious that the peak load law in the computer was at the transonic rather that the supersonic speed range. It was explained to me long ago that this was because the controls really are at their most sensitive here, but at high Mach numbers are partially 'stalled out', due to shockwave movements along the surfaces, and were therefore less effective. (For this reason I was told, the inner elevons were so critical for supersonic control, being the most effective of all elevons at high speed).
To all , I forgot to mention in my previous post regarding the engine failure in G-BOAF in 1980; I remember an FAA surveyor, who was taking a look at the carnage within the engine bay, saying that in his opinion, no other aircraft in the world could have survived the intensity of the titanium fire that ensued. Analysis showed that the fire was successfully extinguished, possibly at the first shot of the fire bottle. This was a testament to the way that the Concorde engine bay could be completely 'locked down' when the fire handle was pulled, as well as to the way that the whole engine installation was technically encased in armour plate. To put all this in context, acording to Rolls Royce a titanium fire, once it takes hold, can destroy the compressor of a jet engine in four seconds.
Dude
Quote:
|
M2
, it appears the tailwheel was, so far, the only "fault" in an otherwise extreme machine. Were there any other items like the tailwheel that were unworthy to be in her?
Does anyone have a tech drawing of the "sliding seals" used in the hydraulics. I have trouble visualising something that could withstand the 4,000psi pressure. Why was such a high pressure used? After all the control surfaces couldn't have required that much input to effect an authority movement. I understand it was also a special fluid that was used. Was this because of the pressure it was under or the temperature extremes? |
).
As far as the hydraulic expansion joints go, I will scour around and see if I can find a diagram for you. Try and picture two titanium (or stainless) tubes, on inside the other, with a sealed chamber being formed at the join. Inside this chamber were multiple lands fitted with special viton GLT seals. They did work incredibly well, although occasionally one of the seals gave out, and things got wet, VERY WET.
As far as the 4000 PSI hydraulic system, as EXWOK quite rightly pointed out, the loading on the flying control surfaces were immense throughout the whole flight envelope. (Picture alone just the T/O from JFK RWY 31L, where the aircraft is tightly turning and the gear retracting, all at the same time). As well as the flying controls and landing gear, you also had the droop nose to consider, four variable engine intakes as well as a couple of hydraulically operated fuel pumps. Oh, and in emergencies, a hydraulically driven 40 KVA generator too. The reason that 4000 PSI was chosen was that if a large amount of hydraulic 'work' was to be done, the only way to keep the size of jacks and actuators to a reasonable size/weight was to increase the system pressure by 25% from the normal 3000 PSI. (On the A380 they've gone a step further and gone for 5000 PSI, saving them over a tonne on the weight of the aircraft).
Concorde used a special hydraulic fluid, Chevron M2V. This is a mineral based fluid, as opposed to the ester based Skydrol, used by the subsonics. The reason that we went for a different fluid was a simple one; Skydrol is rubbish at the high temperatures that Concorde operated at, no good at all in fact, so we needed something better and in M2V we found the PERFECT fluid. As an aside, unlike Skydrol, that attacks paintwork, certain rubber seals, skin, EYES etc., M2V is completely harmless, wash your hair in it. (I did, several times when we had leaks. Thinking about it, maybe THAT is why my hair is such a diminished asset
EXWOK
It's so great having another of my pilot friends diving in to this post, welcome welcome
I remember the Mech' Signalling part of the air tests, my lunch has just finished coming back up thank you.
(for interest chaps and chapesses, with mechanical signalling, using just the conventional control runs under the floor, there was no auto-stabilisation).
The artificialfeel system worked incredibly well I thought, I always found it curious that the peak load law in the computer was at the transonic rather that the supersonic speed range. It was explained to me long ago that this was because the controls really are at their most sensitive here, but at high Mach numbers are partially 'stalled out', due to shockwave movements along the surfaces, and were therefore less effective. (For this reason I was told, the inner elevons were so critical for supersonic control, being the most effective of all elevons at high speed).
To all , I forgot to mention in my previous post regarding the engine failure in G-BOAF in 1980; I remember an FAA surveyor, who was taking a look at the carnage within the engine bay, saying that in his opinion, no other aircraft in the world could have survived the intensity of the titanium fire that ensued. Analysis showed that the fire was successfully extinguished, possibly at the first shot of the fire bottle. This was a testament to the way that the Concorde engine bay could be completely 'locked down' when the fire handle was pulled, as well as to the way that the whole engine installation was technically encased in armour plate. To put all this in context, acording to Rolls Royce a titanium fire, once it takes hold, can destroy the compressor of a jet engine in four seconds.
Dude
3rd Sep 2010, 08:43
permalink Post: 195
Nick Thomas
This of course is one for one of my pilot friends to answer properly again, but as galaxy flyer says, it's an 'eye to wheel' issue here when compared to other aircraft.
galaxy flyer
Again best answered by learned gentlemen such as my friends EXWOK or Bellerophon, but to the best of my feeble knowledge a resounding NO, at least as far as CRUISE flying was concerned. As the majority of the flight was carried out between FL500 and FL600 there was really no weather as such to avoid during supercruise. (As has been previously posted, at Mach 2 you would invariably be above FL500). Only at extremely low latitudes where the tropopause could theoretically extend up to around 70,000' was there ever any chance of seeing any cloud anywhere near your cruise altitudes. The only turbulence as such you would ever encounter was as the result of a temperature shear, but these never felt to be too much in the way of 'bumps' to me. And again, only at very low latitudes did you encounter severe shears anyway; anything encountered on the North Atlantic was generally very mild and civilised.
A CONCORDE PARADOX
The tropopause issue here is an interesting one, in that the coldest stratospheric temperatures we ever encountered were close to the equator, whereas the WARMEST temperatures possible are over the POLES
, where the tropopause can be as low as 22,000'. This is just one of the many paradoxes involving Concorde, and the reason why the aircraft would never be routed over the poles, BECAUSE THE DARNED TEMPERATURES ARE TOO HIGH, in terms of the stratosphere. The result here would be that the aircraft is temperature (Tmo) limited all the time to 127 deg's C. (I previously mentioned in another post in this thread that only 5 deg's C above ISA, -51.5 deg's C, would mean Tmo being reached at Mach 2; any warmer and we HAD to slow down) The relatively high polar temperatures mean that we are unable to fly anywhere near Mach 2. Another paradox would then come into play, the slower your cruise speed, the HIGHER your fuel burn. It was originally proposed in the early 1970's that Concorde would fly from London to Tokyo, and the routing for that needed two things: It could not be polar, and possibly just as important , you required a refuel stop. The Soviet Union amazingly proposed granting a supersonic corridor over Siberia, refuelling at the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. This was hardly an ideal routing (definitely far from a great circle) but was arguably one of the very few that was possible at all. This by the way was not some early iteration of glasnost, but the Soviets fully expected that flying thoroughbred, the TU-144 (bad dude
) to be a success, and could compete side by side with Concorde.
ANOTHER CONCORDE PARADOX
If anyone wonders why when you flew faster you burned less fuel, it was primarily down to drag, actually a thing frighteningly termed as 'pre-entry spill drag'. As most people (???) are aware, the Concorde engine inlet utilised a series of carefully controlled and focused shockwaves to slow the air down entering the engine; in 14 feet of engine intake you lost in the order of 1,000 mph of airspeed! Now most of these different shocks varied with a combination of intake variable surface angle, intake local Mach number and also engine mass flow demand. However the oblique shock coming off the top lip of the intake produced a shock that varied with Mach alone, and would project downwards, just forward of the intake bottom lip. Due to the air downstream of this fairly weak shock still being supersonic, a measured amount of this air spills downwards, away from the intake. If you can possibly picture it, we have this wall of air spilling downwards over the lower lip of all four intakes, the combined effect of this supersonic forespill is a fair amount of drag. The faster we go, the more accute the angle of the shock and therefore the less air is spilled, and in consequence the lower the spill drag. Remembering that cool temperatures could produce a higher Mach number, temperature really could either be our friend or enemy, but cool was COOL
I hope this explanation does not sound like too much gibberish, but it really was a fact that 'More Mach = Less Fuel'. Hope it makes some sense.
Dude
This of course is one for one of my pilot friends to answer properly again, but as galaxy flyer says, it's an 'eye to wheel' issue here when compared to other aircraft.
galaxy flyer
Again best answered by learned gentlemen such as my friends EXWOK or Bellerophon, but to the best of my feeble knowledge a resounding NO, at least as far as CRUISE flying was concerned. As the majority of the flight was carried out between FL500 and FL600 there was really no weather as such to avoid during supercruise. (As has been previously posted, at Mach 2 you would invariably be above FL500). Only at extremely low latitudes where the tropopause could theoretically extend up to around 70,000' was there ever any chance of seeing any cloud anywhere near your cruise altitudes. The only turbulence as such you would ever encounter was as the result of a temperature shear, but these never felt to be too much in the way of 'bumps' to me. And again, only at very low latitudes did you encounter severe shears anyway; anything encountered on the North Atlantic was generally very mild and civilised.
A CONCORDE PARADOX
The tropopause issue here is an interesting one, in that the coldest stratospheric temperatures we ever encountered were close to the equator, whereas the WARMEST temperatures possible are over the POLES
, where the tropopause can be as low as 22,000'. This is just one of the many paradoxes involving Concorde, and the reason why the aircraft would never be routed over the poles, BECAUSE THE DARNED TEMPERATURES ARE TOO HIGH, in terms of the stratosphere. The result here would be that the aircraft is temperature (Tmo) limited all the time to 127 deg's C. (I previously mentioned in another post in this thread that only 5 deg's C above ISA, -51.5 deg's C, would mean Tmo being reached at Mach 2; any warmer and we HAD to slow down) The relatively high polar temperatures mean that we are unable to fly anywhere near Mach 2. Another paradox would then come into play, the slower your cruise speed, the HIGHER your fuel burn. It was originally proposed in the early 1970's that Concorde would fly from London to Tokyo, and the routing for that needed two things: It could not be polar, and possibly just as important , you required a refuel stop. The Soviet Union amazingly proposed granting a supersonic corridor over Siberia, refuelling at the Siberian city of Novosibirsk. This was hardly an ideal routing (definitely far from a great circle) but was arguably one of the very few that was possible at all. This by the way was not some early iteration of glasnost, but the Soviets fully expected that flying thoroughbred, the TU-144 (bad dude
) to be a success, and could compete side by side with Concorde.
ANOTHER CONCORDE PARADOX
If anyone wonders why when you flew faster you burned less fuel, it was primarily down to drag, actually a thing frighteningly termed as 'pre-entry spill drag'. As most people (???) are aware, the Concorde engine inlet utilised a series of carefully controlled and focused shockwaves to slow the air down entering the engine; in 14 feet of engine intake you lost in the order of 1,000 mph of airspeed! Now most of these different shocks varied with a combination of intake variable surface angle, intake local Mach number and also engine mass flow demand. However the oblique shock coming off the top lip of the intake produced a shock that varied with Mach alone, and would project downwards, just forward of the intake bottom lip. Due to the air downstream of this fairly weak shock still being supersonic, a measured amount of this air spills downwards, away from the intake. If you can possibly picture it, we have this wall of air spilling downwards over the lower lip of all four intakes, the combined effect of this supersonic forespill is a fair amount of drag. The faster we go, the more accute the angle of the shock and therefore the less air is spilled, and in consequence the lower the spill drag. Remembering that cool temperatures could produce a higher Mach number, temperature really could either be our friend or enemy, but cool was COOL
I hope this explanation does not sound like too much gibberish, but it really was a fact that 'More Mach = Less Fuel'. Hope it makes some sense.
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 3rd Sep 2010 at 11:08 . Reason: clearing up some gibberish
19th Sep 2010, 18:27
permalink Post: 398
Anecdotal rther than aerodynamic evidence here - but there was a noticable buffet as one decelerated, accompanied by a significant step in thrust requirement. That point was where we (flight crew) decided we were in vortex lift.
Typical speeds would be 270-280 kts at TO mass and about 230-250kts at landing mass.
I'm not naive enough to believe that it was a 'switch' in aerodynamic modes, but the outcome felt like one.
I'd be slightly surprised if there was much of a vortex at M0.95 since the alpha was fairly low here and I would expect there to be plenty of shockwave activity on the upper surfaces which would suggest that a standing vortex would be likely to be badly disrupted.
Anyone know some definite answers?
Typical speeds would be 270-280 kts at TO mass and about 230-250kts at landing mass.
I'm not naive enough to believe that it was a 'switch' in aerodynamic modes, but the outcome felt like one.
I'd be slightly surprised if there was much of a vortex at M0.95 since the alpha was fairly low here and I would expect there to be plenty of shockwave activity on the upper surfaces which would suggest that a standing vortex would be likely to be badly disrupted.
Anyone know some definite answers?
28th Sep 2010, 18:14
permalink Post: 478
NICK THOMAS
It was perfectly safe to hand fly the aircraft even at Mach 2. There was at least one legendary captain who always believed in hand flying. The controls were not overly sensitive as the outer and middle elevons were partly stalled out due to shockwave formation at Mach 2. (The load law of the Artificial Feel Computers actually decreased above transonic speeds).
And Nick.... No clues
Dude
It was perfectly safe to hand fly the aircraft even at Mach 2. There was at least one legendary captain who always believed in hand flying. The controls were not overly sensitive as the outer and middle elevons were partly stalled out due to shockwave formation at Mach 2. (The load law of the Artificial Feel Computers actually decreased above transonic speeds).
And Nick.... No clues
Dude
29th Sep 2010, 14:30
permalink Post: 495
A memory which really stuck re. hand flying supersonic was how solid it felt - and how the extreme TAS (about 1200kts) vividly demonstrated the relationship between TAS / angle of bank and turn rate: you rolled on 15 degrees of bank and it seemed like the HSI heading reference had stuck - it just didn't turn. From memory turn radius with 30 degrees AOB at M2 was about 50nms...
Re the autostabs: it felt like the puppet's strings were cut with them off, but switching to Mechanical Signalling as well made it truly horrible. I only ever flew the sim in this config, I understood they used to do it at base but stopped it because they feared lives would be lost. A pal once memorably described it as like trying to fly a dustbin lid around. And so it was! Plug it all back in (Electrical Signalling and Autostabs) and it all snapped back into shape beautifully. So ahead of its time...
There were no doubt pitch trim changes transonic due to the mach trim system, but a more obvious effect in the 0.99-1.3 range was due to shockwaves forming and fading assymetrically causing minor oscillations in all axes: if you watched out front while hand flying the accel or decel you could make out the nose descibing what felt like figures of eight as the trim changed in pitch and yaw. Roll too, and gentle pressure was required on the cc to avoid overcontrolling and PIO - a bigger problem with the Conc than some other types...
Memory lane - this is fun!
Re the autostabs: it felt like the puppet's strings were cut with them off, but switching to Mechanical Signalling as well made it truly horrible. I only ever flew the sim in this config, I understood they used to do it at base but stopped it because they feared lives would be lost. A pal once memorably described it as like trying to fly a dustbin lid around. And so it was! Plug it all back in (Electrical Signalling and Autostabs) and it all snapped back into shape beautifully. So ahead of its time...
There were no doubt pitch trim changes transonic due to the mach trim system, but a more obvious effect in the 0.99-1.3 range was due to shockwaves forming and fading assymetrically causing minor oscillations in all axes: if you watched out front while hand flying the accel or decel you could make out the nose descibing what felt like figures of eight as the trim changed in pitch and yaw. Roll too, and gentle pressure was required on the cc to avoid overcontrolling and PIO - a bigger problem with the Conc than some other types...
Memory lane - this is fun!
21st Dec 2010, 12:21
permalink Post: 920
quote:Also, regarding the 4000psi pressure adopted - the control surfaces most definitely did need powerful actuators; as you now know they were very active, especially on approach and transonic, and as well as IASs of up to 530kts you have all the lever arm changes brought by shifting centres of pressure over the surfaces caused by shockwave movements.unquote
Yup, I agree with that. I did the original control hinge moment calculations before we joined up with Sud, and the static hinge moments generated are quite impressive!
In fact the most critical zone is the transonic region and some (most) of the CG boundaries in the 'transonic corridor' are defined by hinge moment capability to provide the necessary manoeuvre 'g', especially with one system inoperative. The control rates aren't all that demanding, but the static hinge moment definitely was critical, and as you say, frontal area is everything and the jacks lie outside the wing section profile.
CliveL
Yup, I agree with that. I did the original control hinge moment calculations before we joined up with Sud, and the static hinge moments generated are quite impressive!
In fact the most critical zone is the transonic region and some (most) of the CG boundaries in the 'transonic corridor' are defined by hinge moment capability to provide the necessary manoeuvre 'g', especially with one system inoperative. The control rates aren't all that demanding, but the static hinge moment definitely was critical, and as you say, frontal area is everything and the jacks lie outside the wing section profile.
CliveL
4th Feb 2011, 03:09
permalink Post: 1172
Thanks for your reply Shaggy Sheep Driver,
I had read about the Compressor lift that cause by the intake shockwave on
XB-70. It help to improve the movement of CP and I think maybe L/D ratio.
I'm know that Concorde has this kind of behavior too (engine shutdown during M2.0) but did they intend to use the compressor lift method in Concorde?
Thanks for all reply.
Best regards
I had read about the Compressor lift that cause by the intake shockwave on
XB-70. It help to improve the movement of CP and I think maybe L/D ratio.
I'm know that Concorde has this kind of behavior too (engine shutdown during M2.0) but did they intend to use the compressor lift method in Concorde?
Thanks for all reply.
Best regards
3rd Apr 2011, 21:17
permalink Post: 1253
How many shockwaves does the concorde's inlet produce? I've been told it was like 3 or so, but looking at some diagrams it looks like there are 7... two stronger ones, three weaker ones, a bendy stronger one, a gap and then the terminal shock.
5th Apr 2011, 08:23
permalink Post: 1256
Jane-DoH
OK here we go:
1) The first shock was generated from the top lip of the intake
2) A second shock is generated from the fwd ramp hinge
3) A third isentropic fan shock is generated from the progressively
curved section of the fwd ramp
4) A 4th shock was generated fron the bottom lip
5) A terminal shock system is generated by the coalescence of
still supersonic and now subsonic air at the upper section of the ramp
area.
Hopefully these two diagrams will help. The first hand illustration above gives the 'theoretical' shock pattern and the second below gives an illustration of practical flows within the inlet. Both assume critical operation at Mach 2.
I hope all this blurb helps
Best regards
Dude
Quote:
| How many shockwaves does the concorde's inlet produce? I've been told it was like 3 or so, but looking at some diagrams it looks like there are 7... two stronger ones, three weaker ones, a bendy stronger one, a gap and then the terminal shock. |
1) The first shock was generated from the top lip of the intake
2) A second shock is generated from the fwd ramp hinge
3) A third isentropic fan shock is generated from the progressively
curved section of the fwd ramp
4) A 4th shock was generated fron the bottom lip
5) A terminal shock system is generated by the coalescence of
still supersonic and now subsonic air at the upper section of the ramp
area.
Hopefully these two diagrams will help. The first hand illustration above gives the 'theoretical' shock pattern and the second below gives an illustration of practical flows within the inlet. Both assume critical operation at Mach 2.
I hope all this blurb helps
Best regards
Dude
Last edited by M2dude; 5th Apr 2011 at 08:35 .
6th Apr 2011, 23:58
permalink Post: 1268
CliveL
Must have been a highly efficient inlet for a Mach 2 plane: Two traditional oblique waves; a fan-shock (also oblique); a shockwave off the lip that is normal and oblique depending on how far you are away from the lip, and a normal terminal shock.
So, isentropic would, in this context, mean that no shock-losses occurred at all?
Makes sense for an airliner that you would design an inlet this way
Quote:
| The first bit of the moveable front ramp was carefully shaped to give a sequence of weak shocks that reduced the Mach Number so gradually that shock losses were minimised. |
Quote:
| This was close to an isentropic process, hence the name. |
Quote:
| The whole point of the intake geometry was that the purely aerodynamic boundary between main duct and ramp void was infinitely flexible in shape, which made the design very tolerant of flow disturbances. |
7th Apr 2011, 11:16
permalink Post: 1270
Quote:
| Must have been a highly efficient inlet for a Mach 2 plane: Two traditional oblique waves; a fan-shock (also oblique); a shockwave off the lip that is normal and oblique depending on how far you are away from the lip, and a normal terminal shock. |
Quote:
| So, isentropic would, in this context, mean that no shock-losses occurred at all? |
12th Apr 2011, 03:04
permalink Post: 1294
Hi all,
I have read through some book and it said that in cold ambient condition [ISA -15C or less], the intake can suffer a supercritical condition and I did look up a picture of intake in supercritical condition and it show that the shock wave seems to get "sucked" in and the shockwave isn't concentrate at lip area. I don't understand that if the aircraft is travelling at M2.0 then the air passing through the engine should have the same mach no and hence the shockwave should be identical to the normal condition but it isn't. Can some explain this for me please.
Best regards
I have read through some book and it said that in cold ambient condition [ISA -15C or less], the intake can suffer a supercritical condition and I did look up a picture of intake in supercritical condition and it show that the shock wave seems to get "sucked" in and the shockwave isn't concentrate at lip area. I don't understand that if the aircraft is travelling at M2.0 then the air passing through the engine should have the same mach no and hence the shockwave should be identical to the normal condition but it isn't. Can some explain this for me please.
Best regards
22nd Jun 2011, 22:24
permalink Post: 1395
NW1
I assume in the US then you were restricted to 250 kts below 10,000 feet just like all other aircraft?
Why higher speed? That have to do with shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences?
No, I meant the airspeed you'd be flying at while climbing (post takeoff)
Wow, that's pretty bad. You'd figure with a T/W ratio of around 0.40 you'd do far better than most other aircraft.
Were you allowed to get over 250 below 10,000 feet in the US, or UK? Regardless, what rate of climb would you get at that speed?
408,000 pounds?
Quote:
| It was expressed in the flight manual as "Lowest Authorised" speed, Vla, and didn't depend on weight. 0-15,000' Vla=V2 or Vref as appropriate, 15,000'-41,000' Vla=250kias |
Quote:
| 41,000'-60,000' Vla=300kias |
Quote:
| I'm guessing you mean rate of climb rather than IAS? |
Quote:
| if restricted to 250kts (way below min drag) you'd get pretty poor rates of climb - about 1000fpm if you were lucky |
Quote:
| and IIRC - you'd quickly want to lower the nose, just barely climb and get her up to 400kts when she'd really fly... |
Quote:
| most transatlantic takeoffs were at MTOW - around 185 tonnes |
24th Jun 2011, 00:15
permalink Post: 1399
<<
I'm guessing you mean rate of climb rather than IAS?
>>
<<No, I meant the airspeed you'd be flying at while climbing (post takeoff)>>
OK, then the answer to your Q's:
Also what was the typical climb speed
- At lift-off? About 200kts
- Once 240 kts is achieved? 240kts
- At minimum maneuvering speed at typical takeoff weight? Vla after takeoff was V2 until 15,000'. I.E. about 220kts
- At MTOGW? V2 didn't vary much by weight
Out of JFK we flew at Vmo once further than 12nms from the coast. Vmo=400kts IAS at low level.
Out of LHR overland the IAS restriction was 300kts until past the speed limit point early in the SID - much less draggy than 250kts and hence better climb rates. But you'd quickly be released to get to 400kts (barder's pole) where it was designed to be flown.
<<Why higher speed? That have to do with shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences?>>
The flight envelope was bigger and more complex than subsonic types: it was developed in flight test and probably had many considerations involved. I think someone posted it earlier in this thread in graphical form (from the flight manual) if you want to see it. In practice, you had to be aware of three basic parameters - IAS, Mach and CG position (the CG "corridor"). Once understood, it wasn't that difficult to keep up with it...and the IAS and Machmeters had barber's poles handily programmed to show the limiting values (including, cleverly, max temp on the nose Tmo=127 degrees celcius).
Regarding climb rates - best ROC was at 400kts (MTOW) or 380kts (MLW). As speed reduced below that, drag increased and ROC reduced. At MTOW and 400kts you'd get about 4000fpm max dry power. At 250kts it was all noise and very few feet per minute - after noise abate procedures you had to lower the nose, just barely climb, and get IAS up toward min drag as soon as possible. With an engine failed go for 300kts minimum - Vmo as soon as you can.
<<shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences>>
You had to avoid the "transonic" region due to these effects: maximum subsonic cruise was 0.95M due to the auto-stabilised flying controls become over-active as shockwaves started to "dance" around the airframe (usually asymmetrically). This calmed down by about 1.3M in the acceleration (when the intake ramps started to do their thing). To accelerate to 2.0M you needed reheat until 1.7M so you didn't hang around between 0.95M and 1.7M. FL260 was best for subsonic cruise because at that level 400kts IAS = 0.95M...
<<No, I meant the airspeed you'd be flying at while climbing (post takeoff)>>
OK, then the answer to your Q's:
Also what was the typical climb speed
- At lift-off? About 200kts
- Once 240 kts is achieved? 240kts
- At minimum maneuvering speed at typical takeoff weight? Vla after takeoff was V2 until 15,000'. I.E. about 220kts
- At MTOGW? V2 didn't vary much by weight
Out of JFK we flew at Vmo once further than 12nms from the coast. Vmo=400kts IAS at low level.
Out of LHR overland the IAS restriction was 300kts until past the speed limit point early in the SID - much less draggy than 250kts and hence better climb rates. But you'd quickly be released to get to 400kts (barder's pole) where it was designed to be flown.
<<Why higher speed? That have to do with shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences?>>
The flight envelope was bigger and more complex than subsonic types: it was developed in flight test and probably had many considerations involved. I think someone posted it earlier in this thread in graphical form (from the flight manual) if you want to see it. In practice, you had to be aware of three basic parameters - IAS, Mach and CG position (the CG "corridor"). Once understood, it wasn't that difficult to keep up with it...and the IAS and Machmeters had barber's poles handily programmed to show the limiting values (including, cleverly, max temp on the nose Tmo=127 degrees celcius).
Regarding climb rates - best ROC was at 400kts (MTOW) or 380kts (MLW). As speed reduced below that, drag increased and ROC reduced. At MTOW and 400kts you'd get about 4000fpm max dry power. At 250kts it was all noise and very few feet per minute - after noise abate procedures you had to lower the nose, just barely climb, and get IAS up toward min drag as soon as possible. With an engine failed go for 300kts minimum - Vmo as soon as you can.
<<shockwaves and the resulting pressure distribution differences>>
You had to avoid the "transonic" region due to these effects: maximum subsonic cruise was 0.95M due to the auto-stabilised flying controls become over-active as shockwaves started to "dance" around the airframe (usually asymmetrically). This calmed down by about 1.3M in the acceleration (when the intake ramps started to do their thing). To accelerate to 2.0M you needed reheat until 1.7M so you didn't hang around between 0.95M and 1.7M. FL260 was best for subsonic cruise because at that level 400kts IAS = 0.95M...
Last edited by NW1; 24th Jun 2011 at 09:09 .
8th May 2013, 16:05
permalink Post: 1714
For the french speaking (or reading) people here, I just found a mine of very interesting informations about Concorde on this website:
Accueil
This site has a database of thousand of concorde flights with the following datas: Date and time of the flight, airframe used, technical and commercial crews, guests, departure/arrival airports and flight type (regular, charter world tour...).
On top of that, many infos and stories around Concorde can also be found there.
I can't resist to translate one of those stories (I'm far from being a native english speaker or a professional translator; so forgive me for the misspellings and other translation mistakes). It is a report about one of the biggest incident that happened to the prototype 001 during the flight tests:
Shock of shockwaves
We were flying with Concorde at Mach 2 since 3 month already on both side of the Channel. The prototype 001 did outstrip 002 which was supposed to be the first to reach Mach 2.
Unfortunately, a technical issue delayed 002 and Brian Trubshaw fairly let Andr\xe9 Turcat be the first to reach Mach 2 with the 001 which was ready to go.
The flight tests were progressing fast and we were discovering a part of the atmosphere that military aircrafts hardly reached before. With Concorde, we were able to stay there for hours although limited by the huge fuel consumption of the prototypes.
The Olympus engines did not reached their nominal performance yet and, most of the time, we had to turn on the reheat in supersonic cruise to maintain Mach 2.
The reheat is what we call afterburner on military aircrafts. Fuel is injected between the last compressor stage of the low pressure turbine and the first exhaust nozzle. This increases the thrust for the whole engine and its nozzle.
The 4 reheats, one for each engine, are controlled by the piano switches behind the thrust leavers on the center pedestal between the two pilots. Air was fed into the engines through 4 air intakes, one for each engine, attached 2 by 2 to the 2 engine nacelle, one under each wing. The advantage in terms of drag reduction was obvious.
However, tests in wind tunnel showed that, at supersonic speed, if a problem happens on one engine, there was a great chance for the adjacent engine to be affected as well by the shockwave interference from one air intake to the other despite the presence the dividing wall between the two intakes. So we knew that an engine failure at mach 2 would result in the loss of 2 engines on the same side, resulting in a lateral movement leading to a strong sideslip that would likely impact the 2 remaining engines and transform the aircraft into the fastest glider in the world.
This is why an automatic anti sideslip device was developed and installed on the aircrafts.
The air intakes are very sophisticated. At mach 2, it creates a system of shockwaves that slows down the air from 600 m/sec in front of the aircraft to 200 m/sec in front of the engine while maintaining a very good thermodynamic performance. In supersonic cruise, the engines, operating at full capacity all the time, were sensitive to any perturbation and reacted violently with engine surge: the engine refusing the incoming air.
Stopping suddenly a flow of almost 200kg of air per second traveling at 600m/sec causes a few problems. As a result, a spill door was installed under the air intake and automatically opened in such event.
To control the system of shockwaves and obtain an efficiency of 0,96 in compression in the air intake, 2 articulated ramps, controlled by hydraulic jacks, are installed on the top of the air intakes in front of the engines. Each ramp is roughly the size of a big dining room table, and the 2 ramps, mechanically synchronized, move up or down following the instruction of an highly sophisticated computer that adapts the ramp position according to the mach number, the engine rating and other parameters such as skidding.
At that time, it was the less known part of the aircraft, almost only designed through calculation since no simulator, no wind tunnel, did allow a full scale test of the system.
The control of the system was analog and very complex but it was not easy to tune and we were moving ahead with a lot of caution in our test at mach 2.
On the 26th of January 1971, we were doing a nearly routine flight to measure the effect of a new engine setting supposed to enhance the engine efficiency at mach 2. It was a small increase of the rotation speed of the low pressure turbine increasing the air flow and, as a result, the thrust.
The flight test crews now regularly alternate their participation and their position in the cockpit for the pilots.
Today, Gilbert Defer is on the left side, myself on the right side, Michel R\xe9tif is the flight engineer, Claude Durand is the main flight engineer and Jean Conche is the engine flight engineer. With them is an official representative of the flight test centre, Hubert Guyonnet, seated in the cockpit's jump seat, he is in charge of radio testing.
We took off from Toulouse, accelerated to supersonic speed over the Atlantic near Arcachon continuing up to the north west of Ireland.
Two reheats, the 1 and the 3, are left on because the air temperature does not allow to maintain mach 2 without them.
Everything goes fine. During the previous flight, the crew experienced some strong turbulence, quite rare in the stratosphere and warned us about this. No problem was found on the aircraft.
We are on our way back to Toulouse off the coast of Ireland. Our program includes subsonic tests and we have to decelerate.
Gilbert is piloting the aircraft. Michel and the engineers notify us that everything is normal and ready for the deceleration and the descent.
We are at FL500 at mach 2 with an IAS of 530 kt, the maximum dynamic pressure in normal use.
On Concorde, the right hand seat is the place offering the less possibility to operate the systems. But here, we get busy by helping the others to follow the program and the checklists and by manipulating the secondary commands such as the landing gear, the droop nose, the radio navigation, comms, and some essential engine settings apart from the thrust leavers such as the reheat switches.
The normal procedure consists in stopping the reheat before lowering the throttle.
Gilbert asks me to do it. After, he will slowly reduce the throttle to avoid temporary heckler. Note that he did advise us during the training on the air intake to avoid to move the thrust leaver in case of engine surge.
As a safety measure, I shut down the reheat one by one, checking that everything goes fine for each one. Thus I switch off the reheat 1 with the light shock marking the thrust reduction. Then the 3\x85
Instantly, we are thrown in a crazy situation.
Deafening noise like a canon firing 300 times a minute next to us. Terrible shake. The cockpit, that looked like a submarine with the metallic and totally opaque visor obviously in the upper position, is shaken at a frequency of 5 oscillation a second and a crazy amplitude of about 4 to 5 G. To the point that we cannot see anymore, our eyes not being able to follow the movements.
Gilbert has a test pilot reaction, we have to get out of the maximum kinetic energy zone as fast as possible and to reduce speed immediately. He then moves the throttle to idle without any useless care.
During that time, I try, we all try to answer the question: what is going on? What is the cause of this and what can we do to stop it?
Suspecting an issue with the engines, I try to read the indicators on the centre control panel through the mist of my disturbed vision and in the middle of a rain of electric indicators falling from the roof. We cannot speak to each other through the intercom.
I vaguely see that the engines 3 and 4 seem to run slower than the 2 others, especially the 4. We have to do something. Gilbert is piloting the plane and is already busy. I have a stupid reaction dictated by the idea that I have to do something to stop that, while I can only reach a few commands that may be linked to the problem.
I first try to increase the thrust on number 4 engine. No effect so I reduce frankly and definitively. I desperately look for something to do from my right hand seat with a terrible feeling of being helpless and useless.
Then everything stops as suddenly as it started. How long did it last, 30 seconds, one minute?
By looking at the flight data records afterward, we saw that it only last\x85 12 seconds!
However, I have the feeling that I had time to think about tons of things, to do a lot of reasoning, assumption and to have searched and searched and searched\x85! It looked like my brain suddenly switched to a fastest mod of thinking. But, above all, it's the feeling of failure, the fact that I was not able to do anything and that I did not understand anything that remains stuck in my mind forever.
To comfort me, I have to say that nobody among the crew did understand anything either and was able to do anything, apart from Gilbert.
The aircraft slows down and the engine 3 that seemed to have shut down restart thanks to the auto ignition system. But the 4 is off indeed.
Michel makes a check of his instruments. He also notes that the engine 4 has shut down but the 4 air intakes work normally, which makes us feel better. After discussing together, we start to think that we probably faced some stratospheric turbulence of very high intensity, our experience in this altitude range being quite limited at that time. But nobody really believes in this explanation. Finally, at subsonic speed, mach 0.9, with all instruments looking normal, we try to restart engine 4 since we still have a long way to go to fly back to Toulouse.
Michel launches the process to restart the engine. It restarts, remains at a medium rotation speed and shuts down after 20 seconds, leaving us puzzled and a bit worried despite the fact that the instrument indicators are normal.
Gilbert then decide to give up and won't try to restart this engine anymore and Claude leaves his engineer station to have a look in a device installed on the prototype to inspect the landing gear and the engines when needed: an hypo-scope, a kind of periscope going out through the floor and not through the roof.
After a few seconds, we can hear him on the intercom:
"Shit! (stuttering) we have lost the intake number 4."
He then describes a wide opening in the air intake, the ramp seems to be missing and he can see some structural damages on the nacelle.
Gilbert reacts rapidly by further reducing the speed to limit even more the dynamic pressure.
But we don't know exactly the extent of the damage. Are the wing and the control surfaces damaged? What about engine 3?
We decide to fly back at a speed of 250 kts at a lower altitude and to divert toward Fairford where our british colleagues and the 002 are based. I inform everybody about the problem on the radio and tell them our intentions. However, I add that if no other problems occur, we will try to reach Toulouse since we still have enough fuel.
Flying off Fairford, since nothing unusual happened, we decide to go on toward Toulouse. All the possible diversion airport on the way have been informed by the flight test centre who follows us on their radar.
At low speed, knowing what happened to us and having nothing else to do but to wait for us, time passes slowly, very slowly and we don't talk much, each one of us thinking and trying to understand what happened. However, we keep watching closely after engine 3.
Personally, I remember the funny story of the poor guy who sees his house collapse when he flushes his toilets. I feel in the same situation.
Gilbert makes a precautionary landing since we don't rely much on engine 3 anymore. But everything goes fine.
At the parking, there is a lot of people waiting for us and, as soon as the engines stop, we can see a big rush toward the nacelles of the right hand side engines.
Gilbert and myself are the first to get off the plane and we are welcomed down the stairs by Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi who came out from the crowd watching at the right hand side nacelle.
They both behave the same way, with a slow pace attitude, the same look, a mix of disbelief and frustration.
Andr\xe9 is the first to speak: "I can't believe we were not on this flight, really unlucky\x85". Yes, this flight was supposed to be just a routine flight\x85!
The condition of the nacelle is impressive. We come closer and everybody move aside for us with a look of disbelief and respect as if we were hell survivors.
The ramps of the intake 4, those 2 "dining tables", have completely disappeared leaving a hole where we can see the hydraulic jacks and the stub rod where the ramps were attached.
Indeed, only the ramps were missing, apparently ejected forward which was unbelievable knowing how fast we were flying. The ramp slipped under the nacelle causing some damages on it and on the hood of one of the elevon's servo control. Fortunately, the control did not suffer any damage.
What is left of the rear ramp seems to be blocked down inside the intake in front of the engine and we can see behind it the first blades of the compressor, or what is left of it, not much.
The engine swallowed a huge amount of metal but no vital parts of the aircraft has been damaged, no hydraulic leaks, no fuel leaks. I remembered at that time the stories of some B58 Hustler accident where the loss of an engine at mach 2 almost certainly ended with the complete loss of the aircraft. Our Concorde has only been shaken. This incident strengthened the trust I had in this plane. And I was not unhappy to have experienced this ordeal, especially when I saw the frustration on the face of Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi.
But we had to understand what happened and how; and also why the ramp's fixing broke.
It didn't take much time to get the answers.
I unintentionally triggered the problem when shutting down the reheat of engine 3. The sudden stop of the fuel flow did of course stop the combustion and the back pressure behind the low pressure turbine. But, probably because of the modification made on the engine before the flight, the stop of the reheat has not been followed by the normal closing movement of the primary nozzle to compensate the pressure drop. So the low pressure turbine ran out of control, dragging down the low pressure compressor which reacts by surging.
Despite the opening of the spill door, the engine surge led to a sudden movement of the shockwaves in the air intake creating a surge in the intake itself. A similar surge happened in the adjacent intake 4 followed by a surge of the corresponding engine. This caused an excessive pressure above the ramps and the fixings of the intake 4 did not hold.
Since it was the first time we experienced a surge in the air intake, we had little knowledge of the stress it would create on the ramps. This led to miscalculation of the strength of the ramps's frames and they did brake.
Another mistake: instead of installing the motion detectors on the ramp itself, to make the production easier, they have been placed on the arms of the hydraulic jacks. This is why Michel R\xe9tif thought that the position of the ramps were correct. The hydraulic jacks did not suffer any damage and were still working normally even if the ramps were missing.
All the data recorded during this event helped us in redesigning the air intakes and the flight test program resumed three month later.
After this, we deliberately created dozen and dozen of air intake surge to fine tune the way to regulate them with digital calculator this time.
From now on, even if it was still very impressive, it was safe and their intensity was not comparable with what we experienced with the missing ramps.
However, a french president may kept a lasting memory of this, much later, during a flight back from Saudi Arabia. This time, I was on the left side, Gilbert on the right and Michel was still in the third seat\x85 But that's another story.
For me, the lasting impression of failing and being helpless during this incident made me wonder what a commercial pilot would have done in this situation. This plane was designed to be handled by standard commercial pilots and not only by the flight test pilots.
At that time, I was interested in taking in charge the management of a training center for the pilots of the future Airbus's clients. This event pushed me that way and I made it clear that I wanted to add the flight training on Concorde in this project. This has been agreed and I did it.
And the Concorde training program now covers the air intake surges and how to deal with them.
Jean PINET
Former test pilot
Member and former president of the Air and Space Academy
Accueil
This site has a database of thousand of concorde flights with the following datas: Date and time of the flight, airframe used, technical and commercial crews, guests, departure/arrival airports and flight type (regular, charter world tour...).
On top of that, many infos and stories around Concorde can also be found there.
I can't resist to translate one of those stories (I'm far from being a native english speaker or a professional translator; so forgive me for the misspellings and other translation mistakes). It is a report about one of the biggest incident that happened to the prototype 001 during the flight tests:
Shock of shockwaves
We were flying with Concorde at Mach 2 since 3 month already on both side of the Channel. The prototype 001 did outstrip 002 which was supposed to be the first to reach Mach 2.
Unfortunately, a technical issue delayed 002 and Brian Trubshaw fairly let Andr\xe9 Turcat be the first to reach Mach 2 with the 001 which was ready to go.
The flight tests were progressing fast and we were discovering a part of the atmosphere that military aircrafts hardly reached before. With Concorde, we were able to stay there for hours although limited by the huge fuel consumption of the prototypes.
The Olympus engines did not reached their nominal performance yet and, most of the time, we had to turn on the reheat in supersonic cruise to maintain Mach 2.
The reheat is what we call afterburner on military aircrafts. Fuel is injected between the last compressor stage of the low pressure turbine and the first exhaust nozzle. This increases the thrust for the whole engine and its nozzle.
The 4 reheats, one for each engine, are controlled by the piano switches behind the thrust leavers on the center pedestal between the two pilots. Air was fed into the engines through 4 air intakes, one for each engine, attached 2 by 2 to the 2 engine nacelle, one under each wing. The advantage in terms of drag reduction was obvious.
However, tests in wind tunnel showed that, at supersonic speed, if a problem happens on one engine, there was a great chance for the adjacent engine to be affected as well by the shockwave interference from one air intake to the other despite the presence the dividing wall between the two intakes. So we knew that an engine failure at mach 2 would result in the loss of 2 engines on the same side, resulting in a lateral movement leading to a strong sideslip that would likely impact the 2 remaining engines and transform the aircraft into the fastest glider in the world.
This is why an automatic anti sideslip device was developed and installed on the aircrafts.
The air intakes are very sophisticated. At mach 2, it creates a system of shockwaves that slows down the air from 600 m/sec in front of the aircraft to 200 m/sec in front of the engine while maintaining a very good thermodynamic performance. In supersonic cruise, the engines, operating at full capacity all the time, were sensitive to any perturbation and reacted violently with engine surge: the engine refusing the incoming air.
Stopping suddenly a flow of almost 200kg of air per second traveling at 600m/sec causes a few problems. As a result, a spill door was installed under the air intake and automatically opened in such event.
To control the system of shockwaves and obtain an efficiency of 0,96 in compression in the air intake, 2 articulated ramps, controlled by hydraulic jacks, are installed on the top of the air intakes in front of the engines. Each ramp is roughly the size of a big dining room table, and the 2 ramps, mechanically synchronized, move up or down following the instruction of an highly sophisticated computer that adapts the ramp position according to the mach number, the engine rating and other parameters such as skidding.
At that time, it was the less known part of the aircraft, almost only designed through calculation since no simulator, no wind tunnel, did allow a full scale test of the system.
The control of the system was analog and very complex but it was not easy to tune and we were moving ahead with a lot of caution in our test at mach 2.
On the 26th of January 1971, we were doing a nearly routine flight to measure the effect of a new engine setting supposed to enhance the engine efficiency at mach 2. It was a small increase of the rotation speed of the low pressure turbine increasing the air flow and, as a result, the thrust.
The flight test crews now regularly alternate their participation and their position in the cockpit for the pilots.
Today, Gilbert Defer is on the left side, myself on the right side, Michel R\xe9tif is the flight engineer, Claude Durand is the main flight engineer and Jean Conche is the engine flight engineer. With them is an official representative of the flight test centre, Hubert Guyonnet, seated in the cockpit's jump seat, he is in charge of radio testing.
We took off from Toulouse, accelerated to supersonic speed over the Atlantic near Arcachon continuing up to the north west of Ireland.
Two reheats, the 1 and the 3, are left on because the air temperature does not allow to maintain mach 2 without them.
Everything goes fine. During the previous flight, the crew experienced some strong turbulence, quite rare in the stratosphere and warned us about this. No problem was found on the aircraft.
We are on our way back to Toulouse off the coast of Ireland. Our program includes subsonic tests and we have to decelerate.
Gilbert is piloting the aircraft. Michel and the engineers notify us that everything is normal and ready for the deceleration and the descent.
We are at FL500 at mach 2 with an IAS of 530 kt, the maximum dynamic pressure in normal use.
On Concorde, the right hand seat is the place offering the less possibility to operate the systems. But here, we get busy by helping the others to follow the program and the checklists and by manipulating the secondary commands such as the landing gear, the droop nose, the radio navigation, comms, and some essential engine settings apart from the thrust leavers such as the reheat switches.
The normal procedure consists in stopping the reheat before lowering the throttle.
Gilbert asks me to do it. After, he will slowly reduce the throttle to avoid temporary heckler. Note that he did advise us during the training on the air intake to avoid to move the thrust leaver in case of engine surge.
As a safety measure, I shut down the reheat one by one, checking that everything goes fine for each one. Thus I switch off the reheat 1 with the light shock marking the thrust reduction. Then the 3\x85
Instantly, we are thrown in a crazy situation.
Deafening noise like a canon firing 300 times a minute next to us. Terrible shake. The cockpit, that looked like a submarine with the metallic and totally opaque visor obviously in the upper position, is shaken at a frequency of 5 oscillation a second and a crazy amplitude of about 4 to 5 G. To the point that we cannot see anymore, our eyes not being able to follow the movements.
Gilbert has a test pilot reaction, we have to get out of the maximum kinetic energy zone as fast as possible and to reduce speed immediately. He then moves the throttle to idle without any useless care.
During that time, I try, we all try to answer the question: what is going on? What is the cause of this and what can we do to stop it?
Suspecting an issue with the engines, I try to read the indicators on the centre control panel through the mist of my disturbed vision and in the middle of a rain of electric indicators falling from the roof. We cannot speak to each other through the intercom.
I vaguely see that the engines 3 and 4 seem to run slower than the 2 others, especially the 4. We have to do something. Gilbert is piloting the plane and is already busy. I have a stupid reaction dictated by the idea that I have to do something to stop that, while I can only reach a few commands that may be linked to the problem.
I first try to increase the thrust on number 4 engine. No effect so I reduce frankly and definitively. I desperately look for something to do from my right hand seat with a terrible feeling of being helpless and useless.
Then everything stops as suddenly as it started. How long did it last, 30 seconds, one minute?
By looking at the flight data records afterward, we saw that it only last\x85 12 seconds!
However, I have the feeling that I had time to think about tons of things, to do a lot of reasoning, assumption and to have searched and searched and searched\x85! It looked like my brain suddenly switched to a fastest mod of thinking. But, above all, it's the feeling of failure, the fact that I was not able to do anything and that I did not understand anything that remains stuck in my mind forever.
To comfort me, I have to say that nobody among the crew did understand anything either and was able to do anything, apart from Gilbert.
The aircraft slows down and the engine 3 that seemed to have shut down restart thanks to the auto ignition system. But the 4 is off indeed.
Michel makes a check of his instruments. He also notes that the engine 4 has shut down but the 4 air intakes work normally, which makes us feel better. After discussing together, we start to think that we probably faced some stratospheric turbulence of very high intensity, our experience in this altitude range being quite limited at that time. But nobody really believes in this explanation. Finally, at subsonic speed, mach 0.9, with all instruments looking normal, we try to restart engine 4 since we still have a long way to go to fly back to Toulouse.
Michel launches the process to restart the engine. It restarts, remains at a medium rotation speed and shuts down after 20 seconds, leaving us puzzled and a bit worried despite the fact that the instrument indicators are normal.
Gilbert then decide to give up and won't try to restart this engine anymore and Claude leaves his engineer station to have a look in a device installed on the prototype to inspect the landing gear and the engines when needed: an hypo-scope, a kind of periscope going out through the floor and not through the roof.
After a few seconds, we can hear him on the intercom:
"Shit! (stuttering) we have lost the intake number 4."
He then describes a wide opening in the air intake, the ramp seems to be missing and he can see some structural damages on the nacelle.
Gilbert reacts rapidly by further reducing the speed to limit even more the dynamic pressure.
But we don't know exactly the extent of the damage. Are the wing and the control surfaces damaged? What about engine 3?
We decide to fly back at a speed of 250 kts at a lower altitude and to divert toward Fairford where our british colleagues and the 002 are based. I inform everybody about the problem on the radio and tell them our intentions. However, I add that if no other problems occur, we will try to reach Toulouse since we still have enough fuel.
Flying off Fairford, since nothing unusual happened, we decide to go on toward Toulouse. All the possible diversion airport on the way have been informed by the flight test centre who follows us on their radar.
At low speed, knowing what happened to us and having nothing else to do but to wait for us, time passes slowly, very slowly and we don't talk much, each one of us thinking and trying to understand what happened. However, we keep watching closely after engine 3.
Personally, I remember the funny story of the poor guy who sees his house collapse when he flushes his toilets. I feel in the same situation.
Gilbert makes a precautionary landing since we don't rely much on engine 3 anymore. But everything goes fine.
At the parking, there is a lot of people waiting for us and, as soon as the engines stop, we can see a big rush toward the nacelles of the right hand side engines.
Gilbert and myself are the first to get off the plane and we are welcomed down the stairs by Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi who came out from the crowd watching at the right hand side nacelle.
They both behave the same way, with a slow pace attitude, the same look, a mix of disbelief and frustration.
Andr\xe9 is the first to speak: "I can't believe we were not on this flight, really unlucky\x85". Yes, this flight was supposed to be just a routine flight\x85!
The condition of the nacelle is impressive. We come closer and everybody move aside for us with a look of disbelief and respect as if we were hell survivors.
The ramps of the intake 4, those 2 "dining tables", have completely disappeared leaving a hole where we can see the hydraulic jacks and the stub rod where the ramps were attached.
Indeed, only the ramps were missing, apparently ejected forward which was unbelievable knowing how fast we were flying. The ramp slipped under the nacelle causing some damages on it and on the hood of one of the elevon's servo control. Fortunately, the control did not suffer any damage.
What is left of the rear ramp seems to be blocked down inside the intake in front of the engine and we can see behind it the first blades of the compressor, or what is left of it, not much.
The engine swallowed a huge amount of metal but no vital parts of the aircraft has been damaged, no hydraulic leaks, no fuel leaks. I remembered at that time the stories of some B58 Hustler accident where the loss of an engine at mach 2 almost certainly ended with the complete loss of the aircraft. Our Concorde has only been shaken. This incident strengthened the trust I had in this plane. And I was not unhappy to have experienced this ordeal, especially when I saw the frustration on the face of Andr\xe9 Turcat and Jean Franchi.
But we had to understand what happened and how; and also why the ramp's fixing broke.
It didn't take much time to get the answers.
I unintentionally triggered the problem when shutting down the reheat of engine 3. The sudden stop of the fuel flow did of course stop the combustion and the back pressure behind the low pressure turbine. But, probably because of the modification made on the engine before the flight, the stop of the reheat has not been followed by the normal closing movement of the primary nozzle to compensate the pressure drop. So the low pressure turbine ran out of control, dragging down the low pressure compressor which reacts by surging.
Despite the opening of the spill door, the engine surge led to a sudden movement of the shockwaves in the air intake creating a surge in the intake itself. A similar surge happened in the adjacent intake 4 followed by a surge of the corresponding engine. This caused an excessive pressure above the ramps and the fixings of the intake 4 did not hold.
Since it was the first time we experienced a surge in the air intake, we had little knowledge of the stress it would create on the ramps. This led to miscalculation of the strength of the ramps's frames and they did brake.
Another mistake: instead of installing the motion detectors on the ramp itself, to make the production easier, they have been placed on the arms of the hydraulic jacks. This is why Michel R\xe9tif thought that the position of the ramps were correct. The hydraulic jacks did not suffer any damage and were still working normally even if the ramps were missing.
All the data recorded during this event helped us in redesigning the air intakes and the flight test program resumed three month later.
After this, we deliberately created dozen and dozen of air intake surge to fine tune the way to regulate them with digital calculator this time.
From now on, even if it was still very impressive, it was safe and their intensity was not comparable with what we experienced with the missing ramps.
However, a french president may kept a lasting memory of this, much later, during a flight back from Saudi Arabia. This time, I was on the left side, Gilbert on the right and Michel was still in the third seat\x85 But that's another story.
For me, the lasting impression of failing and being helpless during this incident made me wonder what a commercial pilot would have done in this situation. This plane was designed to be handled by standard commercial pilots and not only by the flight test pilots.
At that time, I was interested in taking in charge the management of a training center for the pilots of the future Airbus's clients. This event pushed me that way and I made it clear that I wanted to add the flight training on Concorde in this project. This has been agreed and I did it.
And the Concorde training program now covers the air intake surges and how to deal with them.
Jean PINET
Former test pilot
Member and former president of the Air and Space Academy
Last edited by NHerby; 9th May 2013 at 17:24 .