January 30, 2025, 02:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816788
Updated info says it is a DC Police Eurocopter, others say US Army. PSA operating as AA5342, Wichita to DCA.
Collision captured on Kennedy Center web cam, link to X post with it:
Collision captured on Kennedy Center web cam, link to X post with it:
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
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January 30, 2025, 04:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11816850
Video of collision
News coming in of an incident with an American Eagle CRJ operating AA5342 colliding with a military Sikorsky over Washington
Plane crashes near Washington DC after mid-air collision with military helicopter \x96 follow live
Flightradar24 snot showing anything of note.
Update - everything grounded at Reagan International and Helicopters searching over the Potomac
Plane crashes near Washington DC after mid-air collision with military helicopter \x96 follow live
Flightradar24 snot showing anything of note.
Update - everything grounded at Reagan International and Helicopters searching over the Potomac
Subjects
AA5342
CRJ
FAA
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January 30, 2025, 20:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817633
Comms
Since the Blackhawk pilot was on a different (military) band is it possible he thought AA5342 was landing on 1, not 33?
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.
Subjects
AA5342
Blackhawk (H-60)
Situational Awareness
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January 30, 2025, 21:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817677
Since the Blackhawk pilot was on a different (military) band is it possible he thought AA5342 was landing on 1, not 33?
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.
He may have missed the landing permission to 33 for 5342, even as he lost SA being focused on a plane further out on approach to 1.
He clearly heard the instructions of the LC and responded to the LC, but was badly out of position WRT the approach to 33.
The recreation makes it appear that he was staying parallel to the 1 approach, probably waiting for the "next in line", the landing lights he probably was fixated on.
Subjects
AA5342
Blackhawk (H-60)
Situational Awareness
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January 31, 2025, 03:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817877
TWR gives AA5342 as traffic to the helicopter, stating they are over the Woodrow (Wilson) bridge, however the helicopter crew keeps flying into the final approach path of R33. 40 seconds later TWR again asks if they have the “CRJ” in sight, and they reply they have, but at this point the CRJ is less than 200’ above them and only 0.5nm away. At the same time the following aircraft on approach to R01, an AA A319 on flight 3130, is above the Woodrow Bridge on finals. Possibly the helicopter crew at some point confused the A319 for the CRJ.
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
It doesn't seem "fair" for aircraft like the CRJ, that in busy, complex airspace, another aircraft can request and receive VFR, meaning in broad terms, they're outside of ATC's guardrails. CRJ now have an aircraft in the vicinity that isn't being controlled by ATC.
Doesn't seem like a good process to an outsider.
Subjects
AA5342
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 04:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817916
TWR gives AA5342 as traffic to the helicopter, stating they are over the Woodrow (Wilson) bridge, however the helicopter crew keeps flying into the final approach path of R33. 40 seconds later TWR again asks if they have the “CRJ” in sight, and they reply they have, but at this point the CRJ is less than 200’ above them and only 0.5nm away. At the same time the following aircraft on approach to R01, an AA A319 on flight 3130, is above the Woodrow Bridge on finals. Possibly the helicopter crew at some point confused the A319 for the CRJ.
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
The helicopter crew again confirms they have “the aircraft” in sight and requests visual separation, but surely if they had the CRJ in sight at less than 200’ vertically and half a mile away they would be taking immediate evasive action and not requesting visual separation???
It seems pretty clear what happened. The helicopter crew had confirmed they had the CRJ in sight and were happy to remain clear and pass behind. The ATC cleared them to maintain visual separation, the helicopter turned right as presumably this put them on the shortest course to where they wanted to go. At this point the ATC has NO further responsibility for separation, that is now the SOLE responsibility of the helicopter crew who accepted it. Clearly they did not have the CRJ in sight, what they were looking at will only ever be conjecture. Visual separation at night in such a busy piece of airspace is clearly a ridiculous procedure..... but it is a procedure that can currently be used. The ATC did nothing wrong, the CRJ crew did nothing wrong and more than likely the helicopter crew PROBABLY didn't do anything g wrong on purpose, there was o ly one airaft though out of place, a situation ONLY possible through an outdated and potentially dangerous procedure. My airline doesn't allow visual separation either day or night and only allows visual approaches by day, why be GA in Jets with paying passengers?
With only one other airplane, it's clear, with more than 1, it becomes a gamble.
This has been “litigated†before on PPRUNE. In the US, there is NO Missed Approach Procedure.
AIM 5-4-23
e. A visual approach is not an IAP and therefore has no missed approach segment. If a go around is necessary for any reason, aircraft operating at controlled airports will be issued an appropriate advisory/clearance/instruction by the tower. At uncontrolled airports, aircraft are expected to remain clear of clouds and complete a landing as soon as possible. If a landing cannot be accomplished, the aircraft is expected to remain clear of clouds and contact ATC as soon as possible for further clearance. Separation from other IFR aircraft will be maintained under these circumstances.
AIM 5-4-23
e. A visual approach is not an IAP and therefore has no missed approach segment. If a go around is necessary for any reason, aircraft operating at controlled airports will be issued an appropriate advisory/clearance/instruction by the tower. At uncontrolled airports, aircraft are expected to remain clear of clouds and complete a landing as soon as possible. If a landing cannot be accomplished, the aircraft is expected to remain clear of clouds and contact ATC as soon as possible for further clearance. Separation from other IFR aircraft will be maintained under these circumstances.
One can discuss whether this is a procedure or not, though there is at least "something".
Subjects
AA5342
ATC
CRJ
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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February 01, 2025, 03:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818731
I shall remind you all again, as Pilot DAR has already reminded you all: keep the politics out of this.
If you can't post professionally on the aviation matters to hand, then don't post.
Whether or not the FAA has, or has not, fulfilled it's role is a functional, not political, matter if you can be bothered to constrain yourselves to the functional aspects of regulation.
You will not be warned again.
EDITED this post due to a link problem:
AA5342 Down DCA
Carry on.
If you can't post professionally on the aviation matters to hand, then don't post.
Whether or not the FAA has, or has not, fulfilled it's role is a functional, not political, matter if you can be bothered to constrain yourselves to the functional aspects of regulation.
You will not be warned again.
EDITED this post due to a link problem:
AA5342 Down DCA
The moderators have had a background discussion about this situation, and agreed to stand by the exclusion of political discussion as is the policy of PPRuNe. That said, this accident, and the investigation and introspection to come are going to run the ragged edge of political discussion. We want the aviation safety discussion, we don't want it lost in discussion and emotion about politics - we just don't have the page space! (and it's a lot of work to moderate!).
Posts referencing actual facts, reported from authoritative sources, and primarily on the topic of the accident, the investigation, and associated safety are welcomed here. If in doubt, just leave out the political part of what you're thinking to write, we all know that you have an opinion, we don't need to read it here. If your post touches to role of a government official as a factor of the event, without inflaming discussion, the moderation team will do it's best to find a favourable interpretation.
Thanks for working with the moderation team on this...
Pilot DAR
Posts referencing actual facts, reported from authoritative sources, and primarily on the topic of the accident, the investigation, and associated safety are welcomed here. If in doubt, just leave out the political part of what you're thinking to write, we all know that you have an opinion, we don't need to read it here. If your post touches to role of a government official as a factor of the event, without inflaming discussion, the moderation team will do it's best to find a favourable interpretation.
Thanks for working with the moderation team on this...
Pilot DAR
Last edited by T28B; 2nd February 2025 at 19:01 . Reason: link problem required an edit
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
FAA
Thread Moderation
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February 02, 2025, 19:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11820017
Greetings, esteemed colleagues.
Before Monday arrives and the posting rate increases, I will repeat the guidance that Pilot DAR provided a few days ago.
I will offer one further point of guidance:
If you are (as many PPRuNe members are) a fixed wing civil aviator, or air transport pilot, I'll ask you not to post about (1) helicopter operations and (2) military flying unless you also have experience in both of those areas of endeavor that relates to this tragic accident. There are a number of our members who have that experience, so let's not let our noise drown out their signal.
We've had to remove some noise. I have received a few well founded complaints about the uninformed commentary about both rotary wing flying, and military flying.
Please do not play the role of the sciolist, but instead speak from your own actual professional experience and knowledge. If you have something to critique about the mixing of helicopter and fixed wing operations at and around civil airports, please be temperate and professional in your language.
Thank you all in advance for your cooperation in keeping this discussion professional.
Before Monday arrives and the posting rate increases, I will repeat the guidance that Pilot DAR provided a few days ago.
AA5342 Down DCA
The moderators have had a background discussion about this situation, and agreed to stand by the exclusion of political discussion as is the policy of PPRuNe. That said, this accident, and the investigation and introspection to come are going to run the ragged edge of political discussion. We want the aviation safety discussion, we don't want it lost in discussion and emotion about politics - we just don't have the page space! (and it's a lot of work to moderate!).
Posts referencing actual facts, reported from authoritative sources, and primarily on the topic of the accident, the investigation, and associated safety are welcomed here. If in doubt, just leave out the political part of what you're thinking to write, we all know that you have an opinion, we don't need to read it here. If your post touches to role of a government official as a factor of the event, without inflaming discussion, the moderation team will do it's best to find a favourable interpretation.
Thanks for working with the moderation team on this...
Pilot DAR
The moderators have had a background discussion about this situation, and agreed to stand by the exclusion of political discussion as is the policy of PPRuNe. That said, this accident, and the investigation and introspection to come are going to run the ragged edge of political discussion. We want the aviation safety discussion, we don't want it lost in discussion and emotion about politics - we just don't have the page space! (and it's a lot of work to moderate!).
Posts referencing actual facts, reported from authoritative sources, and primarily on the topic of the accident, the investigation, and associated safety are welcomed here. If in doubt, just leave out the political part of what you're thinking to write, we all know that you have an opinion, we don't need to read it here. If your post touches to role of a government official as a factor of the event, without inflaming discussion, the moderation team will do it's best to find a favourable interpretation.
Thanks for working with the moderation team on this...
Pilot DAR
If you are (as many PPRuNe members are) a fixed wing civil aviator, or air transport pilot, I'll ask you not to post about (1) helicopter operations and (2) military flying unless you also have experience in both of those areas of endeavor that relates to this tragic accident. There are a number of our members who have that experience, so let's not let our noise drown out their signal.
We've had to remove some noise. I have received a few well founded complaints about the uninformed commentary about both rotary wing flying, and military flying.
Please do not play the role of the sciolist, but instead speak from your own actual professional experience and knowledge. If you have something to critique about the mixing of helicopter and fixed wing operations at and around civil airports, please be temperate and professional in your language.
Thank you all in advance for your cooperation in keeping this discussion professional.
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
Thread Moderation
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February 05, 2025, 19:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11822469
The position of the collision shown in the radar data overlay is consistent with the position of the RJ as shown in ADS-B Exchange at the time of the collision (approximately 01:47:59Z according to the NTSB timeline). See this link from DIBO for the RJ Track with timing AA5342 Down DCA In my experience, times in ADS-B Exchange are generally accurate to within 2 seconds. Given all that, I believe that the Black Hawk was within the horizontal bounds of Route 4 at the time of the collision and that it did not make the right turn we see in the ADS-B Exchange map.
Edit: Corrected route number and helicopter
Last edited by airplanecrazy; 6th February 2025 at 01:24 .
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
Blackhawk (H-60)
DCA
NTSB
Radar
Route 4
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February 07, 2025, 10:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823511
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
NTSB
PAT25
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
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February 07, 2025, 11:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823555
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
In another midair collision report, that happened in July 2022 at NorthLas Vegas airport, NTSB put out this:
Interviews with personnel at the air traffic control tower indicated that staffing was deficient, and most staff were required to work mandatory overtime shifts, reaching an annual average of 400 to 500 hours of overtime per controller. According to the air traffic manager (ATM), the inadequate staffing had resulted in reduced training discissions, and the management team was unable to appropriately monitor employee performance. The ATM stated that everyone on the team was exhausted, and that work/life balance was non-existent. It is likely that the cumulative effects of continued deficient staffing, excessive overtime, reduced training, and inadequate recovery time between shifts took a considerable toll on the control tower workforce.
I wonder, how this situation is with DCA ATC service.
I am not trying to blame ATC either. He issued clearance to PAT25 to cross behind and asked (and got) confirmation for CRJ in sight twice. It seems quite clear that helicopter crew did not look at the same airplane that ATC was asking about.
What baffles me here is, that it was obvious a routine procedure to let helicopters cross active runway heading less than 2 miles from runway treshold, leaving practically zero margin for error. Backups, designed to catch pilots or ATC errors (TCAS and ATC alarms) cannot catch up in short time left if someone makes a mistake, so this arrangement as based on "see and avoid" concept, in the night, with many lights in the background and a fact, that other aircraft on collision course does not move relatively on the screen, but just grows bigger. Unfortunatelly, that dot on the screen that will kill you starts growing bigger only in the last few seconds.
If I would ask ATC to cross runway heading DAY VFR so close to runway treshold at my airport with incoming commercial traffic, I would be denied 100 times out of 100 attempts. (and probably called nuts).
My guess on this tragedy is, that thru the years, the system was trying to pack more and more aircraft in the same space and same infrastructure, by gradually squeezing margins and safegueards, until one day, Jenga tower collapsed.
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
DCA
NTSB
PAT25
See and Avoid
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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February 07, 2025, 11:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823587
Originally Posted by
The Brigadier
There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342.
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
CRJ
NTSB
PAT25
TCAS (All)
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February 07, 2025, 11:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823592
The original NYT article thanks to the
Internet Archive (archive.org)
.
Regarding to the Pavlovian - if PAL25 wouldnt have requested 'visual separation', what "punishment" would they expect from the Tower? Orbit(s)? Vectors? Or somethin wild, considering 200/300' altitude limits along the river and buildings/infrastructure left and right (what diameter would an orbit cost with a Blackhawk, is it feasible over black water at 200')? Therefore I am asking - would a non-request of a 'visual separation' mean major complications to such a helicopter at night? That as well would then be a significant flaw in the design.
Subjects
AA5342
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
New York Times
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 07, 2025, 12:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823605
Thanks for the picture. So three possible light blobs very close together AA5307 (short of landing), AA5342 (the CRJ), AA3130 (which was picked by PAl25 as conflict)
Regarding to the Pavlovian - if PAL25 wouldnt have requested 'visual separation', what "punishment" would they expect from the Tower? Orbit(s)? Vectors? Or somethin wild, considering 200/300' altitude limits along the river and buildings/infrastructure left and right (what diameter would an orbit cost with a Blackhawk, is it feasible over black water at 200')? Therefore I am asking - would a non-request of a 'visual separation' mean major complications to such a helicopter at night? That as well would then be a significant flaw in the design.
Regarding to the Pavlovian - if PAL25 wouldnt have requested 'visual separation', what "punishment" would they expect from the Tower? Orbit(s)? Vectors? Or somethin wild, considering 200/300' altitude limits along the river and buildings/infrastructure left and right (what diameter would an orbit cost with a Blackhawk, is it feasible over black water at 200')? Therefore I am asking - would a non-request of a 'visual separation' mean major complications to such a helicopter at night? That as well would then be a significant flaw in the design.
Waiting for the tower to have no aircraft below ~700ft in the approach area, if we're assuming a 1.5Nm separation, could be quite a while.
Subjects
AA5342
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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February 07, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823982
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
The recertification flight might specifically need to be at night. It might even specifically require NVG. I also wonder if both pilots would be on NVG or just one of the two.
Last edited by YRP; 7th February 2025 at 22:49 . Reason: Edited to sound 10% less grumpy
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
NTSB
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
PAT25
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
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February 22, 2025, 13:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11833660
The glide path for London City is 5\xbd\xb0 and obviously requires some bespoke training and approvals. I am not suggesting that you would do the same at DCA, but a 4\xb0 slope should be achievable for R33, which would add a margin that would take out many of the 'incursions' shown in airplancrazy's excellent diagram. If you don't have the training to fly a 4\xb0 slope, you simply refuse the request to circle.
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
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March 26, 2025, 03:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11854333
I have 2 questions
I have used HUD and FLIR, but never NVG's. Could the helo crew actually see the aircraft on final for 01? I think at the time they were 6 miles apart.
Also, AA5342 received a TA and continued the approach for 18 seconds until the collision occurred. I realize an RA would not occur there, but would their SOP's suggest a G/A on receiving a TA at that position on the approach?
Apologize if these have been answered.
Regards,
OBD
Also, AA5342 received a TA and continued the approach for 18 seconds until the collision occurred. I realize an RA would not occur there, but would their SOP's suggest a G/A on receiving a TA at that position on the approach?
Apologize if these have been answered.
Regards,
OBD
Last edited by Old Boeing Driver; 26th March 2025 at 03:35 . Reason: Grammar
Subjects
AA5342
HUD
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
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July 31, 2025, 23:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11931584
No matter, radalt only gives the altitude above some actual thing, not a shared pressure altitude that all air vehicles can agree on. AA5342 was not on a radalt path. AA5342 was flying over buildings.
EDIT: I also appreciate the arriving jet was on a geometric glide slope and that radalt under the glideslope could have been sufficient, but if one is expecting that vertical separation is sufficient then there needs to be certainty to that altitude and clearly that isn't possible on barometric altimeter and should never have been accepted by anyone.
EDIT: I also appreciate the arriving jet was on a geometric glide slope and that radalt under the glideslope could have been sufficient, but if one is expecting that vertical separation is sufficient then there needs to be certainty to that altitude and clearly that isn't possible on barometric altimeter and should never have been accepted by anyone.
Last edited by MechEngr; 1st August 2025 at 05:39 .
Subjects
AA5342
Barometric Altimeter
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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August 12, 2025, 04:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11937043
As I posted on here before I had that exact same scenario happen to me on runway 33 in DCA. Traffic closing on a collision course on TCAS. Tower reported the traffic had us in sight. When the traffic closed to \xbd mile with no vector change apparent We went around from 400 feet. We never saw the traffic. Tower chewed my butt saying the traffic had us in sight. I didn\x92t care.
In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Traffic in Sight
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August 23, 2025, 02:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11942779
Actually, it's not the exact same scenario.
In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?
In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?
Subjects
AA5342
DCA
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Traffic in Sight
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