Posts about: "ADSB (All)" [Posts: 130 Page: 7 of 7]¶

Thank you MechEngr for stating in detail, and explaining, the recommendations made by NTSB and their relation to ADS-B systems, both Out and In.

It appears I had mistakenly thought NTSB had made a recommendation after the accident about ADS-B. That was incorrect.

It would be interesting to try to unearth the document trail with respect to the agreement reached by FAA and the DoD with regard to ADS-B Out usage, which agreement was reached (per the NTSB Chair letter) after the accident. Of course unearthing documents which relate to controversial subjects could well be a fool's errand. .... ..... ...... oh wait, there's such a thing as pre-trial discovery, and the lawsuits are in federal district court.

Senator Cantwell gave two speeches in recent days on the Senate floor about Section 373. I'm not posting links to them, because "politics". Still, something worth noting from them is that the Senator, previously Chair of the Commerce Committe - the Committee with jurisdiction for civil aviation - and currently Ranking Member, stated she does not know who inserted the highly questionable Section 373 into the NDAA. And whether as prevention or preemption, yes, the families of Flight 5342, including the family of the First Officer, are raising a loud objection to Section 373 - but the concerns over the legislative provision are not based on any effort to serve or to please the trial lawyers suing on the families' behalf. Chairwoman Homendy of the NTSB does indeed operate in a political environment, no kidding, but she is conducting her public advocacy as a safety professional and not a politician. (I'm not lauding any Senator's bona fides as aviation safety advocates because, again "politics.")

It was probably brought to his attention after the vote? especially if it was a last-minute addition.

Though in hindsight, his initial comment "This legislation restores our military\x92s focus on lethality" is a bit on the nose.

It's just baffling why the Army doesn't keep the ADS-B equipment on their helicopters operable, it'd be safer at any altitude when they're sharing airspace with civilians.
I can only imagine someone thinking, "well we can't stop doing training flights when the equipment isn't working" (and Homendy glaring at them "then get it fixed").

As a non-lawyer and non-American, can I just clarify my understanding of this situation:

• Following the accident, the NTSB recommended that military helo flights not fly that route while 15/33 was in use;
• The FAA concurred, and this was implemented on a temporary basis;
• Section 373 of a bill that has already passed the House would allow military helo flights to resume, as prior to the accident, with 'waivers' to let them fly there as they like;
• The waivers could be granted by many military personnel at different levels of seniority, meaning the waivers would be effectively permanent;
• The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed.
• Section 373 takes away the requirement for ADS-B Out, reducing safety.
• Section 373 gets round the ADS-B Out requirement by specifying that military aircraft should only be required to be able to trigger to TCAS alerts.
• TCAS does not activate at low altitudes, such as when landing, so is useless on the route the helos use to pass DCA.
• Therefore the only reasonable safety measure is not to let military flights onto that route while 15/33 is in use. Section 373 reverses that safety measure.
• 'Someone' sneaked Section 373 into the bill, and nobody knows who or when.
• The bill passed without anybody noticing Section 373.
• So unless the Senate challenges, this legislation will go through
• The legislation would make it harder for families to blame the military/government for the DCA accident, by confirming the correctness of protocols at the time
• Chair Homendy is furious.

If I've got this wrong, can you correct me?

I'm absolutely staggered that something this important could have been 'slipped' into a major piece of legislation, without a final read-through of changes since the last version. Surely there's an audit trail of changes and who submitted or entered them?

Looks basically correct, though I would add some points.

- The bill mandates a "risk assessment", but does not explain what that entails, or how the person making that assessment should be qualifed. A simple check box on the waiver form, "I assessed the risk to civil aviation", would presumably suffice.

- The civil aviation authorities (DOT, FAA, airlines) have no input on these assessments. This is why Homendy calls it a "whitewash", because it sounds like someone cares about risk, but there's no actual assurance the risk would be managed.

- Because these and other important provisions are so poorly defined, Homendy called the section badly written, and she's right. You need to know what the bill is talking about, or the ambiguity leads to court cases.

- we have seen a legislative effort to mandate ADS-B IN, which may be ongoing behind the scenes, and possibly scheduled to a push with the release of the final report. However, ADS-B IN is useless (in this context) if the military doesn't send ADS-B. I think that explains Homendy's level of anger.

I believe, without this provision, the Army needs to fix their ADS-B gear, and go to the FAA if they need a waiver for those top secret missions.

Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?

Administrator Bedford testified today before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. The ostensible calling of the hearing as noted above was for an update on implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 as well as general oversight. As was widely anticipated, several Members questioned the Administrator, at times pointedly, about the presence and effect of Section 373 in the FY2026 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), i.e., the controversial provision undoing safety-related changes made in the aftermath of the DCA midair collision on 29 Janaury of this year.

The video link I am including in this post is from the Forbes magazine website (and I apologize that it includes adverts). I don't know if the video link presumably available on the Subcommittee webpage (or it could be on the Committee webpage) has the same time-stamps as the Forbes video and since it's the one I watched, I'm using it here.

The families of at least some of the families of people who lost their lives in the DCA midair were present for the hearing.

Rep. Nehls (R.-TX), Chair of the Subcomm., and the other three leaders each gave opening statements (Comm. Chair Sam Graves (R.-MO.), Comm. Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D.-WA.), and Subcomm. Ranking Member Andre Carson (D.-IN)). Representative Nehls's opening statement hinted that ADS-B Out and Sec. 373 were going to see some emphasis (unsurprising, as Rep. Nehls had already issued a statement decrying Sec. 373).

The Administrator's testimony started at around 19:00. When he concluded, the Subcommittee Chair, Rep. Nehls, opened the questioning (at about 23:00). He asked, in a fairly pointed manner, about the controversial Section of the NDAA, Sec. 373. What did the Administrator answer, readers of the thread (who presumably have far better things to do than watch Congressional hearings) may wonder??

Mr. Bedford responded that FAA policy is not to comment on pending legislation. But he added that the section had shown up in the NDAA without any advice having been sought from or given by the FAA. And that both he and Secretary Duffy have "no intention" of going back to the airspace situation as it was on January 29.

At about 29:15 the Administrator referred to "someone in the Senate" having placed Section 373 into the NDAA. At about 29:45, he noted that after the accident the gaps in the safety situation were closed "and will remain closed." He also seemed to refer to "renegotiation" of the FAA Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Defense (and at least twice during the hearing noted that the DoD had been good partners with FAA with regard to DCA (and Capital Region, I believe) airspace usage).

Congresswoman Norton also questioned the Administrator about Section 373 (1:47:__) although without much follow-up.

At about 2:15:__ (oops, I didn't note who was questioning) Mr. Bedford again used the phrase, "not going back" to the airspace situation as it existed, and that mixed traffic situations (military and civil) were, "not gonna happen". He noted the Memorandum of Agreement between FAA and the DoD - in this instance not referring to any renegotiation process (whether presently or planned) - and added that he is "not aware of any desire to change it" (close to verbatim, but I'm not a court reporter).

The Administrator's testimony was noteworthy for several other reasons (not counting the evidence the hearing provided that not every single Member of the House of Representatives deserves categorization in MechEngr's "critter" status), and here are two I thought most significant - most significant to a pro pilot audience, that is.

The current Administrator is a very smooth operator and this should surprise no one (and this is meant as a compliment to professionalism). Dealing with sometimes ill-founded questions (to be polite) and a few outright stupid questions takes patience. Beyond that, there were no instances, at least to the extent of my knowledge, when the Administrator ran away from the truth of the situation across the FAA. And he still managed to be a good soldier (so to speak) as a member of the current Executive administration. Without getting into politics but strictly in the realm of operating as a professional, not everyone in high places at the moment has the ability as well as willingness to talk detailed "X's and O's" about complicated federal enterprises while still staying within the lanes drawn somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue (see? - not politics).

Second, the Administrator provided several answers in his testimony about the status of the modernization program. As a possibly interesting even if small point, I don't think I heard "brand new ATC system" or even just "new ATC system" even once; it consistently was Air Traffic Control Modernization. Substantively, he outlined four layers: copper wire to fiber; analog to digital systems (and TDMA to VOIP); analog architecture in general to digital architecture; and a fourth layer of "compute" meaning that now, each facility has its own computing resources and the program intends to move this into one cloud-based layer. He also emphasized work that has already been done and gave a slam-dunk defense of selection of Peraton, and sorry for this disrespect, to an outright stupid question about FAA selecting Peraton as systems integrator.

(I realize the ATC Modernization program isn't exactly about DCA but in two senses it is; the accident greatly motivated the program to be drawn up and to receive the first tranche of appropriations, and the families of the accident victims were present for the hearing today. And a third factor: the facts about the modernization program are important as a counterpoint to Section 373's troubling content, not to mention its illegitimate sourcing. I have not heard one single voice of a legitimate aviation wise-person, not a single legitimate worthy, say it is a good provision. How modern can the NAS become if something like Section 373 -- no wait, if Section 373 itself actually -- becomes law?)

Link: https://youtu.be/UJM4YsV_hmw?si=116yx6W1AnJaIELY

The Senate has passed the legislation with the controversial Section 373 still included. According to The Wall Street Journal, the bill now goes to the President for signature into law. (Also, I should have checked my knowledge of legislative process more thoroughly - my previous post stating a House-Senate conference would follow Senate passage was incorrect.)

But there is other action regarding Section 373. Excerpt from the WSJ article:
________________
"The bill passed despite concern from federal officials and senators over an airport-related measure in the 3,086-page package. Lawmakers said it was unclear how the provision ended up in the final version, and senators quickly approved a bill that would overrule it. That measure still needs to be passed by the House.
......... [ paragraphs with background re: accident omitted ]......

"Anger at Section 373
Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Maria Cantwell (D., Wash.) led a bipartisan effort to remove Section 373 and replace it with the ROTOR Act, which would require aircraft in controlled airspace to be equipped with ADS-B and would impose stricter oversight of military flights in the area. At a press conference Monday, Cruz, Cantwell and families of victims from the collision denounced the section.

\x93There\x92s no reason to have this language in the National Defense Authorization Act unless you\x92re somebody who wants to continue to see letting the military do whatever they want to do in a congested airspace,\x94 Cantwell said.

Trump administration officials have also criticized the measure. \x93It\x92s a safety whitewash,\x94 said Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, last week. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy said that regardless of any legislation passed by Congress, he will ensure that there is no cross traffic between planes and helicopters.

After the vote Wednesday on the NDAA, Cruz took to the floor and passed the ROTOR Act by unanimous consent, a shortcut to quickly approve legislation when no senator objects. A spokesman for the Defense Department said the Pentagon supports the bill."
________________________

This has an interesting assertion that because the CRJ has ADS-B Out, the knee-mounted tablets of the helo pilots would have shown its position (meaning they had ADS-B In enabled?), but the helo pilots are trained to keep their eyes outside the cockpit near DCA because it is congested. Could the technology have alerted the helo pilots to the risk?

I've seen pictures of US military aircraft using devices such as Sentry to feed EFBs with ADSB data, but have no idea if that's widespread throughout the services or indeed was in use during this accident. However, what I do know is that it would be very unlikely that either helo pilot would have the capacity to scan down onto a knee-mounted EFB while flying VFR over a dark river on NVG at 200 feet (and in the non-handling pilot's case, monitoring the handling pilot's height and talking her down). Integration of an audio warning from the EFB to the intercom system would be needed to draw attention to conflictions, and I very much doubt that would have been implemented. Remember, they thought they had the traffic in sight, so there was nothing pressing them to check for other traffic given they were in (supposedly) fully-controlled Class B.

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.