Posts about: "ADSB In" [Posts: 25 Page: 1 of 2]¶

Crossing runway finals at 200' at a distance that puts you wthin reach of the circling jet- tempting fate. TCAS in TA only, not RA by height, No ADSB In or Out improvement in this regime.

Final hole, see and avoid- target invisibe, sighted AAL3130 on Rwy1 straight in, not enough dissonance in all that to realize you cannot be following that next plane...

As a TCAS II owner, please don't change TCAS, change the flight paths. Every time we change TCAS version, Honeywell gets a boost to their bottom line. Honeywell is the company that makes Boeing look great.

Going from TCAS II Change 7.0 to 7.1/7.1a was a simple matter of handing over enough cash to buy a couple of Porsches, for the new computer to effect a simple software change. What is irritating is the change was not an enhancement of the system it had all the hallmarks of incorporating the standard for TCAS at the time. An iPad with Foreflight or Garmin pilot an ADSB-in input is frankly more value when operating in the weeds, While we are at it, it is remarkable that Garmin Pilot and Foreflight provide better obstacle alerting than the certified EGPWS system does.

Fairly confident (and reported earlier) that the Blackhawk only has Mode S, so no ADS-B. Mode S may report less than ADS-B which means that position updates can be (but not always) significantly slower than ADS-B out. I also believe that for RA to work both aircraft would need to have both ADS-B In and ADS-B Out so that 2 way data communication can take place.

That's incorrect. TCAS II can communicate to achieve coordinated RAs with Mode S in each aircraft. If a threat aircraft has only Mode 3/C (and therefore no TCAS) then an uncoordinated RA can be generated against it. If it has only Mode 3 then it will be shown without altitude information and can only generate a TA on another aircraft's TCAS.

Allow me few comments based on a long experience with TCAS evaluation et deployment .

1) TCAS II can still be improved : No end of the story by now , no version 8 in the pipeline . We spent millions and years on getting 7.1 accepted .. and even not everyone mandates it .

2) ADS-B gets already saturated , add TCAS type system and it will be .But developing a new Anti-collision system based on ADS-B is in the pipeline however it will; mean ASD-S be out mandated for every flying aircraft , including military . Here is your problem . Some military aircraft cannot be retrofitted , no space ..

3) interoperability .? No , 2 completely different systems , TCAS is analog 1970 technology ,

4) TCAS RAs on approach? you mean below 1000 ft ? No , in our scenario here , with the Blackhawk climbing , the logical RA would be a descent RA for the CRJ ,, you want a Descent RA at 300 ft ?

The only solution I personally see is airspace segregation based on equipment . Class A, B and C restricted to aircraft carrying ADS-B out and TCAS equipped , and both Working and on the MEL as no go item s ( not the case today ) Waiting for AOPA and ATA remarks

Both crews were set up to fail. Considering the near monthly DCA conflicts between helos and fixed wing over a number of years, the surprise is that a midair didn't happen sooner. The data was accumulating, but nobody caught on in time. Not transmitting ADS-B Out in busy airspace and flying in that airspace with night vision goggles restricting view is a major factor. The lack of ADS-B In in the cockpits is another. Then there's the FAA approval of a helo route with inadequate vertical separation from the 33 approach slope along with a lack of ATC procedure to ensure positive separation between helos and aircraft on approach to 33.

Somehow I doubt that all those responsible for those lapses in oversight were female - quite possibly they were all male.

I really struggle to comprehend why the helicopter not transmitting ADS-B Out is relevant to the accident. What benefit would the other two parties - the CRJ and the TWR Controller gained?
The CRJ didn't have ADS-B IN, and the ATC Surveillance system (radar) doesn't process the data.

DM as required to convince me otherwise.

TCAS gave a TA just prior to that, why should TCAS have lost track?
That's why I don't understand all the fuzz about ADS-B in the UH60. TCAS in the CRJ worked as designed, including RA inhibit down low.
the CRJ crew getting a visual on the UH60 some seconds earlier could have saved them as well, one of many items on the 'could have saved them' list.


I've wondered a couple of times, what if.... the CRJ crew had failed to spot the UH60 all together. Now a left-banking evasive manoeuver was started, and only the left wing was substantially shredded by the rotor.
If they would has kept wings level, maybe both wings would have narrowly escaped major damage, only MLG and belly at risk of the main rotor.
But it all doesn't matter, really. 'Fate is the hunter' and they got caught.

Published by Flight Global, August 8 (quoted with any changes)

DOT inspector launches probe into FAA\x92s Washington DC airspace management

The US Department of Transportation\x92s top inspector has launched an investigation into the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s management of airspace near Washington, DC.

The investigation will focus on the agency\x92s design of the airspace and its process of granting military exemptions to a requirement that aircraft use Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) systems.

The review, disclosed by the DOT\x92s Office of Inspector General on 8 August, comes amid scrutiny over the FAA\x92s operations \x96 a response to the 29 January midair collision involving a US Army Sikorsky UH-60L Black Hawk helicopter and a PSA Airlines MHIRJ CRJ700 regional jet.

The helicopter had not been transmitting ASB-B \x93Out\x94 information when, flying higher than permitted, it collided with the CRJ700, which was moments from landing at Ronald Reagan Washington National airport, the National Transportation Safety Board has said.

Both aircraft plummeted into the Potomac River, killing all 65 people on the regional jet and all three on the Black Hawk. The Black Hawk had been operating a pilot training flight.


\x93We are initiating this audit to review FAA\x92s oversight of existing safety gaps in the management of DCA\x92s airspace, including the exemption process for ADS-B Out,\x94 says the DOT inspector\x92s office. \x93Our audit objectives are to assess FAA\x92s oversight and management of the airspace surrounding DCA, and policies and procedures to oversee ADS-B Out exemptions.\x94

The office intends to begin the audit this month.

The investigation comes at the request of two senators who asked the inspector general \x93to review a wide-ranging set of safety issues surrounding the accident\x94, the DOT office adds.

The FAA has since 2020 required aircraft have and use ADS-B Out, a system that transmits an aircraft\x92s position and other information about is flight to air traffic controllers. Aircraft equipped with ADS-B \x93In\x94 \x96 which the FAA does not mandate \x96 also receive the position reports. The ADS-B system is intended to give controllers and pilots more information about air traffic, helping prevent collisions.

Under a compromise with military and government aircraft operators, the FAA permits government aircraft operating \x93sensitive\x94 missions to be exempt from the ADS-B Out requirement. It has allowed those operators to define which missions are sensitive.

The US Army has used that exemption extensively when flying helicopters in the Washington, DC region.

On 29 July, senator Ted Cruz introduced a bill that if passed would prohibit government training flights from qualifying for the exemption. It would also require that all aircraft, within five years, have and use ADS-B In.

From Senate Commerce Committee website, following is a summary of the ROTOR Act - Rotorcraft Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform Act. Commerce Committee vote may take place next week.
___________
Rotor Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform (ROTOR) Act
Upgrading In-Flight Safety Technology and Fixing Helicopter Operations to Eliminate Risk
[Sponsors] Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Todd Young (R-IN)

The Problem : The midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29th was preventable. For decades, the airspace around the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) operated without an accident, but with thousands of close calls that should have resulted in preventive action. The Black Hawk was likely operating in congested airspace without transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out\x97a satellite beacon technology that can transmit location, altitude, and velocity to air traffic control and other nearby aircraft faster than radar or other transponders. The airspace is only as safe as its least equipped aircraft, which is why military aircraft must not play by different rules.

The Solution: The ROTOR Act
The ROTOR Act improves aviation safety, addresses FAA knowledge and oversight of ADS-B, and directs the Army Inspector General (OIG) to reevaluate its aviation safety practices. The bill requires:
1. All aircraft operators to equip with ADS-B In technology and transmit such information. ADS-B In is a technology for aircraft to receive location signals from other nearby aircraft and ground technology, improving safety in the sky and on runways.
2. Closes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) loophole that permitted the Army Black Hawk to fly without broadcasting ADS-B Out. The ROTOR Act allows the FAA to only grant exceptions for \x93sensitive government missions,\x94 not training flights.
3. Requires the FAA to review helicopter routes near airports. The FAA would comprehensively evaluate the airspace at congested airports\x97where helicopters and airplanes are flying near each other\x97nationwide.
4. Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army\x92s aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety.
5. Initiates FAA study on dynamic restricted area for helicopters near airports. The FAA would review whether audio and visual signals could be deployed to reduce airspace confusion and avoid traffic conflicts.
6. Repeals a Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA provision that exempted the Department of Defense from enacted ADS-B transmission requirements.

Why This Matters: The tragic midair collision earlier this year exposed serious and systemic weaknesses in how civilian and military aircraft share and operate in congested airspace. While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation continues, initial findings show glaring failures in oversight and coordination that must be addressed now, not later. The ROTOR Act was drafted in direct response to the operational shortcomings that led to the midair collision. Deconflicting congested airspace and establishing better communication standards between civilian and military aircraftis not optional\x97it is essential. The ROTOR Act does exactly that, ensuring American skies remain the safest in the world.

What load of codswallop. Now we'll have every dogsbody pilot peering at their ADS-B In screens and asking ATC "is that return going to miss us?". TCAS does not require ADS-B, only a transponder (Mode S best). ADS-B In in busy CTAs/zones will be a distracting nightmare for crews.

Every pax jet is separated by SIDs and STARs, with either lateral and/or vertical separation. That is what is required here with the choppers. Playing TCAS dodgem-cars below 1000ft when you're trying to land is not the way to go.

Point 3 is the only one that makes any real sense. The rest sound good only to the great-unwashed.

As a non-technical poster on this forum I sure as shucks won't comment on the ADS-B content of the proposed legislation. But point 4 of the summary:
"Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety."

Why does this not make real sense?

The NTSB will very likely (undoubtedly, I think) include, in its report, quite extensive findings about the Army's operations. It was at least very unusual, if not unprecedented, for the NTSB to issue urgent recommendations to FAA in the immediate aftermath of January 29 with regard to use of the helicopter routes. On these facts, why is it not sensible to require the Army to undergo an IG review?

Although without a service record, I do generally understand the idea that the Army's task and purpose is lethality, at least in the meaning of that term before the assemblage at Quantico earlier this fall. Surely operating in domestic airspace doesn't make safety irrelevant "becasue lethality", does it?

One other aspect of this tragic and from many perspectives senseless midair collision is that very dedicated professional people in the aviation field are going to have their respective actions and failures to act in the events of January 29 scrutinized in the most harshly critical light in a courtroom. Bluntly, their performance will be trashed - the Army pilots, one or more controllers, and as discussed recently on this thread, the airline aviators too. On these facts, and hoping that reasonable minds may differ, I think the IG review isn't just a sensible idea, it's a necessity. It is something owed to those people, who are not going to speak up in their defense, or in their eternal regrets, from the great beyond. The least the United States can do is to find out what to do better. I'll work for the IG project, gratis, .... if they'd take me.

Having had ADS-B traffic displayed in my cockpit for over the last decade, I beg to report it has vastly reduced the urgency of necessary avoidance of conflicting CAT since I can now deal with them several miles away.

For one example before ADS-B display, ATC once dumped me in front of CAT that required a 90\xb1\xb0 bank to avoid. There were other interesting encounters with CAT in Class E - no longer.
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As we saw here, ATC can fall short and altitudes can be missed. An ADS-B display is a valuable backstop - for a small fraction of the cost of TCAS.

I 100% disagree. ADS-B, among other things, lets YOU see who is going to come close to you without asking ATC what they think about it.

I personally do not think ADS-B on the helicopter would have changed anything , From what I understand , if it had it could have been spotted earlier by ATC , the conflict alert might have sounded a couple of seconds earlier , etc .. pure speculation .

It would not have changed much for the AA CRJ either , the TA would have been more precise and maybe a second or two earlier , but he had already 2 TAs and most certainly so short from landing the PF was focusing on the PAPI not his TA display

It might have changed something if the Heli was equipped with a CDTI ( ADS-B in display) as it is a powerful tool to help identify traffic visually. But not separate yourself from another aircraft . One thing people in offices making such statements forget is that to provide separations maneuvers ATC needs a stable radar picture , with antennas firmly on the ground facing North . Inside an aircraft constantly moving the picture moves with it , (as you can see on your TCAS display ) Extremely complex to separate yourself using that kind of picture when both you and the target are moving. AWACS operators are trained to do this , but not your average pilot .

So I think this ADS-B on the Military Helis is a red herring made by politicians wanting to appear to \x93do something \x93 and perhaps distract the public from the FAA and regulator failures on both the design of the airspace / routes and the lack of action after numerous previous serious incidents reports ,

I disagree. The operating theory was that the helicopter crew was looking at a plane that was farther out and not the one they hit. If they had had the presence of mind to look at an ADS-B display they would have seen two airplanes, not one, and seen the one they THOUGHT was #1 was really #2.
Can I add some sympathy for the AA crew - A night over water runway change on final combined with dodging traffic is a LOT to ask of anyone. I can't say for sure what they would have done with ADS-B on the chopper, they said they would miss us, not by how much and we are 30 seconds from landing. The benefit here is the helo crew realizing they are dodging the wrong airplane.
* full disclosure, I have had a close call with the helo traffic there more than once, back in the day they did some crazy stuff. I would have LOVED to have seen them coming on a screen if such a thing had existed.

I think we misunderstood each other or I was was not clear enough : I was refereeing to ADS-B out not in ;
That would mainly be for the benefit of ATC .
ADS-B in, together with a CDTI, is what I said to be L So in fact we both agree .

Sort of. I think everyone needs ADS-B in and out. That said, in this particular case it would have helped the helicopter immensely and AA maybe. It also is no substitute for common sense, no one not in a mental institution would think helicopters should be dodging and ducking planes below 500 feet on short final.

Big speculation . Have you experience with an ADS-B-in CDTI display ? I have one in my glider . It is not a TCAS display , TCAS ( or FLARM in my case) display the altitude relative to you ( e,g + 13 ot - 5 ) while ADS-B gives the barometric altitude . (e.g 05 ) not that easy to differentiate and it takes a second or 2 make the mental calculations and ADS-B also does not give alerts , ( at least on the CDTIs I saw ) it is just displaying traffic , and in our case here all pilots in both aircrfat were looking outside at this point , not focusing on displays inside the cockpit ..My guess at least. So yes maybe it would have helped but am not so sure it would have made a difference in here .
Absolutely ! .and even more so at night

The crew in the helicopter could not focus on an ADS-B In display as they didn't have one. However, if they had one, they could have glanced at the ADS-B In display to see which aircraft the ATC was referring to and to compare that position to the outside. They would know the airliner was very close and crossing just ahead of them. There was no need to check altitude as they knew the other plane was on final and they were not trying to scoot under it.

The following video is from NTSB, about 8 years ago concerning the midair collision between Cessna 150M, N3601V and Lockheed Martin F-16CM, 96-0085

From the description: