Posts about: "ADSB In" [Posts: 25 Page: 2 of 2]ΒΆ

Sailvi767
October 20, 2025, 23:10:00 GMT
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Post: 11973389
Originally Posted by island_airphoto
Sort of. I think everyone needs ADS-B in and out. That said, in this particular case it would have helped the helicopter immensely and AA maybe. It also is no substitute for common sense, no one not in a mental institution would think helicopters should be dodging and ducking planes below 500 feet on short final.
They had TCAS in the RJ. I am not sure what additional aid ADSB would have provided. ADSB would however have provided extremely valuable data to the Helo if the RJ had ADSB out. It still may have provided data even without ADSB out if the RJ was still painting on the approach radars depending on altitude. A radar rebroadcast is not quite as accurate but at least as good as TCAS.

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out  Radar  TCAS (All)

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ATC Watcher
October 22, 2025, 14:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11974342
From the Ops group :
A US Senate Panel is considering a broad aviation safety package today, Oct 21, that addresses concerns raised by the collision over the Potomac River back in Jan 2025. This includes a potential mandate for all aircraft already required to have ADS-B Out to also be equipped with ADS-B In by 2031. It also aims to end most military ADS-B exemptions. If the process runs smoothly, this may become law in a matter of months.
The key words are " potential mandate " and " by 2031 , so as we say in French :this is more to "amuse the gallery "( i.e. please the onlookers , appearing to do something ) than to address a safety issue .

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out

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MechEngr
December 13, 2025, 05:20:00 GMT
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Post: 12004479
NTSB:
​What We Recommended

​​​​​As a result of this investigation, we issued 2 urgent new recommendations. ​We issued recommendations to:

​To the Federal Aviation Administration:

​Prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). (Urgent)
Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (Urgent)
It is true that if the -only- change was using ADS-B Out on the helicopter, this accident would still have happened.

The CRJ was equipped with TCAS, which may or may not have been applicable at this low altitude as it is suppressed at 400 ft. The preliminary report does not indicate the helicopter having a TCAS or having an operating one. It did have the ability to produce ADS-B Out. Neither aircraft is reported to have had ADS-B In.

Since many operators seem to loath spending money on ADS-B In, the recommendation from the NTSB was to (1) stop simultaneous flight path use and (2) go elsewhere when the approaches were in use. The FAA agreed.

Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-001 the FAA did what was recommended about simultaneous use.
Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-002 the FAA made a satisfactory response concerning planning the alternate route(s)

This legislation is the exact opposite of that recommendation.

No doubt the anger isn't just that the NTSB has yet again been ignored, it's that the FAA agreements to safety measures are targeted for destruction in a way that recreates the circumstance of the tragic event.

I said at first, on seeing this collision a few hours after the event, that I felt rage that so many safety measures are available and yet none of them was actually used.

This section, 373, is what I consider an intentional sabotage of the safe operations around DCA.

The FAA literally had advertising videos showing the use of ADS-B In on helicopters for this exact purpose, to give situational awareness to the pilots long before there would be a need to deconflict with other traffic (see end) . No sudden swerves as TCAS attempts to make a last moment save of a terrible situation. TCAS alone cannot be the solution as TCAS gets shut off to avoid nuisance complaints about the terrain the plane is intentionally going to run into or other proximate planes waiting for takeoff.

ADS-B In is for noting where everyone else is in the neighborhood of the aircraft. Had the helicopter been equipped with ADS-B In they would have known the speed and direction of the CRJ and seen it was on a collision course.

As usual it appears there is no name attached nor meeting notes about who submitted what became Section 373. There is certainly no justification paper that will see the light of day.

If those exist, please, someone, prove me wrong.


duplicate:

I cannot find it on YouTube.

An actual user who avoided a mid-air using ADS-B In (Trent Palmer, if anyone wants to avoid him; not everyone is liked):

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out  CRJ  DCA  FAA  NTSB  Preliminary Report  Route 4  Section 373 of the FY26 NDAA  Situational Awareness  TCAS (All)

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WillowRun 6-3
December 14, 2025, 21:41:00 GMT
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Post: 12005424
Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out  DCA  FAA  NTSB  Preliminary Report  Route 4  Section 373 of the FY26 NDAA

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scard08
December 20, 2025, 04:24:00 GMT
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Post: 12008323
Originally Posted by PEI_3721
An independent US view focussed on safety:- "The night everything at DCA finally went wrong"

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...pecial-report/
This has an interesting assertion that because the CRJ has ADS-B Out, the knee-mounted tablets of the helo pilots would have shown its position (meaning they had ADS-B In enabled?), but the helo pilots are trained to keep their eyes outside the cockpit near DCA because it is congested. Could the technology have alerted the helo pilots to the risk?

Subjects ADSB (All)  ADSB In  ADSB Out  CRJ  DCA

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