ATC Page: 11 of 31

canigida
February 01, 2025, 18:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819206

landing 33

Quote:

Originally Posted by fdr

The CRJ was undertaking a CVP to RWY01, and was asked to take RWY 33 by ATC. That is kind of messy at that point,

Not necessarily disagreeing that it's not the most ideal operation, but I am not sure if operators consider it messy. This is extremely common. With winds from N in VFR, there's usually just the one sequenced traffic flow coming north up the river, and then on final ATC is giving clearance to landing visual or ILS RWY1, or depending on timing, sidestepping some RJ traffic over to a visual RWY33. You can look on Flightaware for the that airframe and a week or so ago prior to mishap, they landed 33 not once but twice (once in dark) the same day.

Having coffee this morning with my friend (my old CFI) who's a FO for one of the other American Eagle providers based at DCA, his opinion was that since that 5,200 ft on RWY33 is sufficient for an RJ, the primary reason he gets sidestepped to 33 about half the time is that it ends very close to the American's regional jet terminal and that using RWY33 saves wasting a couple hundred bucks to taxi for no reason which adds up with their large amount of activity. I don't fly there but as pax I on an RJ, with those winds in VFR, in my experience we landed 33 maybe 40% of the time.

My friend doesn't speak for all the RJ pilots obviously, but he didn't consider this sidestep to 31 to be at all unexpected or in his mind adding any significant risk and mentioned it was part of his localization checkout (his company has specific ground and line training required for the airfield). Most tellingly, he literally said it was not on his Top Ten gripes about DCA (he likes to complain a bit &#128512

Subjects ATC CRJ Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33) DCA VFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

RatherBeFlying
February 01, 2025, 20:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819292

Thanks to Henra for reminding us that the ATC radar displays altitudes to the nearest 100 \xb150'
The nytimes.com images of heli positions outside the depicted corridors posted by fdr in #578 is massive evidence of normalisation of deviance
I am beginning to suspect that the CAs noted by the controller are a commonplace occurrence. It would be interesting to learn the frequency of DCA CAs between the helicopters and traffic on approach and departure. How much and how long has deviance been normalized?
The CRJ crew was left out of the information loop. I have a dedicated traffic display on the top of my glider panel which shows ADS-B and Flarm traffic. A similar display would have enabled the CRJ crew to monitor traffic and get the hell out of the way when necessary.

Subjects ADSB (All) ATC CRJ DCA Radar

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

FullWings
February 01, 2025, 21:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819334

Quote:

Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan

Airline pilots do not, as a matter of course, avoid TCAS traffic unless given an RA, TCAS is notoriously inaccurate laterally, we will try to acquire traffic visually and may then react IF we can.

Also depending on the range selected on the TCAS or ND display you might get a load of garbled nonesense.

Yep, as you may be manoeuvring into a collision if you try and do it off the relative positions on the ND.

Also, with any kind of warning system, they lose effectiveness with the more that they go off. A full-blooded TCAS RA is, thankfully, pretty rare on an individual basis (I\x92ve had 3 over 30 years, two in the USA) and is trained and practiced regularly. The CA/STCA that ATC received might have been the 27th of the day in that airspace for all we know, given the traffic levels and the routings in and out of DCA and criss-crossing the area, plus they did have confirmation of visual acquisition which was now the sole means of separation.

Subjects ATC DCA Separation (ALL) TCAS (All) TCAS RA

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Lead Balloon
February 01, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819353

Quote:

Originally Posted by YRP

Absolutely on the lookout.

No the airspace does not take the blame. Apparently the hello pilots missed the lookout. And the controller could have been clearer, instead of “still in sight?” perhaps “the RJ is now 1/2 mile 10 o’clock, confirm you have him?”.

(not criticizing him, guessing that he saw them closer than expected, was concerned, and made a very quick call)

But the airspace & procedure seems to not tolerate mistakes. There ought to be some safety margin. While not the primary fault, it could be improved.

The procedures effectively abdicate separation responsibility to a single point of failure, where failure is not unlikely and, as a consequence of the airspace design, failure results in high probabilities of collision.

The difficulties of identifying a specific aircraft, at night, in a background of stationary and moving lights, when moving objects on a collision course will always appear stationary to each other, are well known, as are the probabilities of mis-identification. The airspace design 'squeezes' inbound aircraft and transiting helicopters to practicality the same altitude, when instrument and other tolerances are taken into consideration.

I'm guessing that those focusing on the helo pilot's lookout and aircraft identification responsibilities haven't done much flying, at night, over a busy city. Maybe the procedure and airspace designers haven't either, though I get the distinct whiff of political and bureaucratic expediency in the helicopter lane design. I'm also guessing that earlier near misses in similar circumstances will be identified, where the ball on the Roulette Wheel fortunately didn't land on 00.

Last edited by Lead Balloon; 1st February 2025 at 23:06 .

Subjects ATC Close Calls Separation (ALL)

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

6 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Humpmedumpme
February 01, 2025, 23:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819370

Never have and never will confirm visual with another aircraft in the US just to absolve ATC of responsibility and speed up their traffic flows. As the most litigious country in the world why would I want to take on responsibility for someone else's job. Multiple RAs over many years, all in the US whilst under ATC control. All my MORs stated that this was an accident waiting to happen. An overloaded and increasingly casual system that is too arrogant to realise it. RIP to all, unfortunately you are the victims of an increasingly failed state.

Subjects ATC Accident Waiting to Happen TCAS RA

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

fdr
February 01, 2025, 23:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819382

Quote:

Originally Posted by canigida

Messy: taking an aircraft that is on a straight in approach that is parallel offset from the low level route (4) to instead cross the route south of the airport and then cross on final approach the same route again. If you find that comfortable, then have you heard about an accident recently in DC?

The problem with systemic failures is the come along looking like excellent alternatives until the wheels fall off the wagon and it ends in tears. You have to be lucky 100% of the time, the grim reaper only needs one win.

Subjects ATC Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33) DCA Route 4 VFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

7 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819398

Quote:

Originally Posted by dr dre

The CRJ were asked by ATC if they were able to accept an approach onto R33, they replied they could. They were well within their rights to refuse it, apparently one of the previous aircraft ahead of them had refused a request to to switch to R33.

If they had held the Helo short of the runway approach until enough radar separation to cross the approach path was available the Helo would have been orbiting for hours. When the helicopter crew confirmed they had the aircraft in sight they accepted responsibility they had identified the correct aircraft and could remain visual with it as they they crossed the approach path. If they had any doubt to this they should have stated so.

ATC intended for the helicopter to pass behind that CRJ not below it.

Actually ATC asked the Helicopter twice if they had the CRJ visual about 40 seconds apart, both times the helicopter replied yes, and the helicopter crew, not ATC, asked to maintain visual separation.

Yes, the CRJ could have not accepted ATC's request to divert to 33. They would have then been set to go around to set up again for Runway 1, the usual runway.

ATC put the CRJ on an intersecting runway, which added complexity to the pattern picture. The helo would have only had to hold for a short time to wait for the CRJ that was diverted to a runway not normally used for commercial air carriers.

Knowing that, they asked the helo to maintain visual separation, placing everything on that crew to see and avoid the CRJ. I have read that they didn't even tell them where to actually look to see the traffic, no bearing, no altitude. The helo likely saw traffic, just not where they were supposed to look. There were plenty incoming and departing Runway 1, which is why the CRJ was asked to divert. Add to that, both aircraft were low and operating over an urban area at night where it is difficult to see other aircraft. Worse even if the helo crew was using NVG.

ATC should have held the helo short, waiting for an unusual approach to a runway not used normally, so to let the CRJ pass. The CRJ crew was already saturated in tasks at the time I have not hear ATC asking them to look out for the helo.

IMO, ATC created a "single point of failure" relying on the helo to see and avoid the CRJ. Had they held the helo, and helos can hover, for even a minute, this doesn't happen. ATC's main purpose is to keep aircraft from occupying the same place at the same time. In this case, they didn't.

I am sure that the helo pilots made]mistakes. But, this appears to be a massive failure of ATC.

Last edited by Denflnt; 2nd February 2025 at 00:46 .

Subjects ATC CRJ Hover Night Vision Goggles (NVG) Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Radar See and Avoid Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

photonclock
February 02, 2025, 00:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819407

Just finished watching the NTSB briefing, which stated that the CRJ was at 325 feet AGL, and helicopter max allowed altitude is 200 feet.

Assuming the CRJ was at an expected/typical altitude at that point in it's approach, if the helicopter was at 200 feet, or lets say for their benefit 175 feet, then they would have avoided collision by a mere 150 feet of vertical separation if everything else about the position of the two aircraft remained the same.

Is 125 feet of vertical separation (with no horizontal separation) considered acceptable?

If the CRJ movement is controlled by ATC, and the helicopter is responsible for avoiding all other aircraft, then there is no question the helicopter was at fault here as the primary cause, and ATC as the secondary.

Given the collision course these aircraft were clearly on, why wouldn't ATC have diverted one of them prior to impact? Does ATC have any reason to believe that the helicopter sees everything with the same degree of detail and accuracy as ATC? This is not a sarcastic question. I'm genuinely curious. Would ATC, hearing the helicopter twice affirming visual separation, have had any plausible reason to doubt that the helicopter was unaware of the impending collision?

What's the point of having Air Traffic "Control"...if they're not actually in control?

Subjects ATC CRJ NTSB Separation (ALL) Vertical Separation Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Lead Balloon
February 02, 2025, 00:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819412

That's assuming perfect equipment accuracy. My understanding is that the tolerance of e.g. an IFR altimeter in the USA is 75'. If that's correct, one IF aircraft with a 'legal' altimeter indicating 325' could in fact be at 250' and another IFR aircraft with a 'legal' altimeter indicating 175' could in fact be at ... 250'. I'm hoping that the avionics in the aircraft involved in this terrible tragedy were more accurate than that, but I always exercise caution in taking numbers out of avionics and ATC systems as 'gospel truth' to the foot. The altitudes on RADAR displays don't increase and decrease in 1 foot increments; nor do the outputs of aircraft transponders. RADALT is different.

Subjects ATC IFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819416

Quote:

Originally Posted by photonclock

125'? God no.

The helo should have been told to hold some half mile away and wait for crossing traffic to clear.

The NTSB is going to have a field day with the FAA on this.

Subjects ATC CRJ FAA NTSB Separation (ALL) Vertical Separation Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

photonclock
February 02, 2025, 00:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819419

Quote:

Originally Posted by Lead Balloon

Of course. So lets assume the readings to be at the outside of the envelope to the benefit of both aircraft, ie, CRJ at 350 (325 +/- 25 as stated by NTSB), and 200 +/- 75 for the helicopter, so 125. That's 225 feet of vertical-only separation. Is that considered acceptable? If not, why did ATC allow it?

Subjects ATC CRJ IFR NTSB Separation (ALL)

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819424

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bratchewurst

Couldn't the same result be achieved by landing on RWY 01 and (assuming 15/33 is not in use) simply taxiing off 01 onto 33? It wouldn't be slower, there'd be no hazard from landing or departing traffic on 01, and, as the ground track would be shorter and one engine could be shut down to taxi, quite possibly more fuel-efficient.

The CRJ was diverted to 33 because of traffic. No other reason. The pattern was congested, so ATC diverted them to relieve those issues for them at the time. The CRJ could have declined the ATC's request, but they would have had to circle for another approach to R1. From what I have seen, the CRJ adapted to that request professionally and ATC should have made sure that they were safe. Instead, ATC put the onus on the helo crew to maintain a safe airspace. That't the ATC's job, especially given the situation.

Ws should expect more.

Subjects ATC CRJ

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

artee
February 02, 2025, 01:26:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819432

Quote:

Originally Posted by Denflnt

My understanding is that the helo crew requested VFR, which ATC accepted. So essentially the helo crew requested the onus. Whether ATC should have accepted is a valid question, but it seems to have been commonplace. Normalisation of deviance?

Subjects ATC CRJ VFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

DIBO
February 02, 2025, 01:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819437

Or all three?? As one of them did not follow ATC instructions ("cross behind")

Subjects ATC

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

gretzky99
February 02, 2025, 01:58:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819442

My understanding is that the practice of circling aircraft onto RWY 33 is entirely to increase the arrival rate during peak times. Alternating RWY 33-01 arrivals means that the spacing between aircraft landing only has to be enough to ensure preceding aircraft landing on RWY 33 has crossed RWY 01 before the trailing aircraft can land on RWY 01. Compare this to RWY 01 only ops, which would require extra spacing to allow for a complete landing roll and time to vacate entirely.

It's a symptom of a system operating beyond its capacity.

The fact that this sort of procedure is so normalised that many crew don’t even see this as a threat is quite telling about the safety culture within the US aviation sector. Someone above mentioned that night circling approaches are not approved in many company Ops Manuals, so ATC issue late visual approaches instead, as a means to work around this limitation. This should be ringing alarm bells to all.

This sort of thing wouldn’t even be attempted in most parts of the world, let alone allowed to become normal sop.

Last edited by gretzky99; 2nd February 2025 at 02:42 .

Subjects ATC

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

10 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

YRP
February 02, 2025, 01:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819443

Quote:

Originally Posted by arc698

A red collision alert was flashing at this point on the controllers screen, the instruction should\x92ve been for the CRJ to go around, not wasting time on the helicopter pilots.

Secondly, why shouldn\x92t we criticise the controller? Imho his actions need to be criticised. Not the individual but the environment, procedures and training he operated in. The mission of ATC is to prevent exactly this from happening and they failed in their mission.

It is Conflict Alert not Collision Alert. It notifies the controller that two targets might get close, in case they weren\x92t aware.

It would happen all the time with visual separation. It\x92s nothing like the RA must-follow-without-question alert. Issuing a go around would often be the exact wrong thing to do.

In this case the controller was aware they were close.

The accepted procedures look like quite likely the culprit here. They seem to allow a single mistake (misidentifying visual traffic) to become catastrophic.

The controller\x85 he\x92s required to use the accepted procedures. If the procedure after safety analysis is to allow helicopters to visually separate from jets, he can\x92t just say not on his shift. He can double check of course, and imho that\x92s what his \x93still got \x91em in sight\x94 call was about, since it clearly concerned him.

Anyway my point about not criticizing him was just that my post was not intended that way. I don\x92t have access to listen to the full conversation. If you do, then go ahead.

And certainly the environment/procedures/etc are all in question here.

Subjects ATC CRJ Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

4 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 02:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819469

Quote:

Originally Posted by artee

The helo was always always flying VFR. ATC's job was protecting the CRJ.

Subjects ATC CRJ VFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

gretzky99
February 02, 2025, 03:00:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819475

Quote:

Originally Posted by dr dre

There does seem to be a bit of a \x93we do things differently over here because we\x92re (quote/unquote) better pilots\x94 attitude. Maybe this will be a wake up call, but given the reluctance to change culture I doubt it.

I agree completely.

It almost seems backwards to me. Late runway changes should only be applied in quiet environments, allowing plenty of room for manoeuvring without separation issues. The same for visual separation, where only one or two aircraft in the area make misidentification of traffic an improbability. Unfortunately the reverse is true. The busier and more congested the airspace, the more likely these procedures are to be used. From a risk identification and management perspective, I just don't see how operating like this can ever have been deemed acceptable.

Again though, it's used because it's the only way to squeeze an extra 1% out of an over burdened system. And worst of all, everyone involved, from pilots to ATC, think they're the worlds best for making it "work".

Last edited by gretzky99; 2nd February 2025 at 03:24 .

Subjects ATC Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

5 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 03:02:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819477

Quote:

Originally Posted by PuraVidaTransport

If the Army pilots mistook another aircraft for the CRJ they were warned of at least three times, can someone look at the radar and explain which aircraft they thought was the CRJ? I see none they could have possible been watching instead. Considering the distance from one warning to the next and the Army pilot's assurance of seeing the CRJ both times, I don't see how any light on the ground could have been their focus either.

OK, let's go down that route, as dumb as it is. How many times was the CRJ warned of traffic? I don't recall hearing them being alerted at all, though on short final, low and configured for landing there wasn't much they could do at that point. It is ATC's job to ensure separation for controlled aircraft. If ATC relied solely on the helo to keep from hitting the CRJ, that is a big effing problem.

Subjects ATC CRJ Radar Separation (ALL)

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

galaxy flyer
February 02, 2025, 03:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11819478

Quote:

Originally Posted by Denflnt

The helo was always always flying VFR. ATC's job was protecting the CRJ.

In Class B, all aircraft are separated, it might visual, it ATC is required to provide separation, IFR or VFR traffic. This standard goes back to the original TCA in 1972.

Subjects ATC CRJ IFR Separation (ALL) VFR

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Posts about: "ATC" [Posts: 614 Page: 11 of 31]¶