Posts about: "ATC" [Posts: 614 Page: 13 of 31]

ATC Watcher
February 02, 2025, 10:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11819676
Originally Posted by meleagertoo
Heavens above!
Just because the helilane has a cieling of 200ft and the glideslope is 325 or whatever does not imply that helos can, would or might pass 125 ft under an aircraft on finals. That would be insane, as surely common sense tells you? Have you not read/heard the ATC transcripts? Helos are held short until landing traffic is clear - ie until it has passed unless the incoming is sufficiently far away for there to be no possible confliction.
How far off minimums (actually maximum) - you've already answered that question yourself. 125ft.
But this is not how the visual separation delegation concept works, and was used which is our main problem here

Subjects ATC  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Lead Balloon
February 02, 2025, 11:38:00 GMT
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Post: 11819710
Originally Posted by DP.
Mere SLF here - I work in risk management (in a different industry) and so have an interest here, along with a lifelong interest in aviation - fully ready to be modded if I'm talking out of turn!

I accept the point regarding the likely economic impact. However I think its worth making the point that in the context of that '16 years without a fatality' record. there have been a number of potentially serious near-misses on the ground (JBU at BOS, AAL/DAL at JFK, SWA/FDX at AUS, etc etc) that are indicative of a system operating beyond its capacity and implementing procedures that are deemed to be of an acceptable risk profile in order to stretch that capacity. It was fortunate that those previous incidents were narrowly avoided. Wednesday night was where that luck, sadly, ran out.
And thus the perpetually (usually unspoken) questions arise: Are the lives lost in this tragedy merely the price inevitably to be paid in return for airspace arrangements and an ATC system that would cost more than those lost lives were 'worth', if the system and arrangements had been more effective at preventing this kind of collision? Or is it mere luck that many other circumstances created by these airspace arrangements and the ATC system have ended with near misses rather than tragedy, thus justifying more expenditure on the airspace arrangements and the ATC system so as to prevent those near misses becoming collisions? (And let's not forget that the amount of concrete available on the ground at airports drives traffic capacity.)

Despite what's said almost universally by politicians and aviation authorities worldwide, the answers are driven and determined by politics, not the laws of physics and probabilities. "Safety is always our highest priority" is a meaningless but comforting sop for the public.

Ponder this question: If the POB the CRJ were senior politicians and important bureaucrats instead of the actual POB killed in this tragedy, would the investigation be carried out any differently, and its outcomes be any different, than if the POB were us nobodies?

I earnestly (perhaps naively) hope that the NTSB has and continues to have the corporate competence and the corporate integrity to investigate the circumstances of this tragedy, comprehensively, and to make frank and fearless findings and recommendations based on the objective facts and objective risks.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  Close Calls  Findings  NTSB

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lederhosen
February 02, 2025, 13:52:00 GMT
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Post: 11819808
When flying we have a mental picture of what is going on around us. Sometimes that picture is defective. The helicopter pilots saw a stream of landing aircraft for runway 01. Their mental picture may well have been to slot between the arrivals they could see lined up for that runway. The controller asks the CRJ if he can circle round to 33, maybe missed in the Blackhawk cockpit. But in any case the right and then left turn to align with 33 would have made them harder to see for the helicopter particularly from the right seat where the commander more often sits in helicopters. Self evidently the helicopter pilots did not see the CRJ. They thought they did and reported so. The controller clearly thought that they could see it. But I suspect the circle manouevre took the CRJ further left and possibly behind where the helicopter crew were looking.

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ

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island_airphoto
February 02, 2025, 13:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11819813
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
and from island air photo :

Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra .

Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance.

I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this .
This is conflating two issues:
1.The bat-s### crazy way they run helicopters around DCA.
2. The usual practice of visual approaches and spacing in good weather. It has been that way for as long as I have been flying and I am having a hard time even visualizing all IFR spacing to the pavement on a clear day. Maybe asking an American about this is like asking a fish if water is wet?

The OTHER unrelated (?) issue of sorting out ground traffic. I was one on the same trip cleared to take off with an aircraft on short final and then cleared to land with an airplane just pulling out onto the active. To make that one better, I knew the person flying that plane and couldn't resist being snarky: "Ah XYZ tower, we'll be going around, Bob says not to wreck his airplane by landing on it".

Subjects ATC  DCA  FAA  IFR  Land and Hold Short  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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smith
February 02, 2025, 14:47:00 GMT
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Post: 11819840
So when the helicopter pilot requests visual separation and is granted it by ATC does that mean he can go above 200\x92 and the responsibility lies on him to see and avoid or should he still maintain 200\x92?

Subjects ATC  See and Avoid  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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NIBEX2A
February 02, 2025, 15:41:00 GMT
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Post: 11819865
Once again, looking at the safety reports below. How many of these may have been caused by the helicopter having the wrong aircraft in sight when applying visual separation?

Safety reports, if assessed and promulgated correctly, act as another line of defence. They identify any deficiencies in procedures which may have been overlooked (or underestimated) in the original procedure safety assessment.

Hopefully the crash investigation will delve into these aspects to identify what action was taken on receipt of the reports below by the respective organisations.

I found it chilling to read how many factors associated with this accident had repeatedly occurred and been reported over the previous 20+ years. I’ve condensed the reports [see spoiler- mods] and highlighted in bold many of these deficiencies, identified by pilots.

Common Themes
  • Collision Avoidance taken on helicopters supposedly visually separating from the traffic.
  • Helicopters deviating from their cleared tracks or levels.
  • Helicopters on different frequencies
  • Lack of traffic information on conflicting traffic.
  • “Normalisation” of these incidents.
Multiple comments from experienced aircrew that these procedures were an accident waiting to happen. …………

Spoiler
 




Last edited by Saab Dastard; 2nd February 2025 at 17:15 . Reason: Make it legible

Subjects ATC  Accident Waiting to Happen  Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)  DCA  FAA  Frequency 119.1  Separation (ALL)  TCAS (All)  TCAS RA  Visual Separation

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henra
February 02, 2025, 16:21:00 GMT
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Post: 11819897
Originally Posted by cbradio
ATC did do what he is "supposed" to do. The Blackhawk was told to "pass behind". Nothing to do with vertical separation. It's a form of separation. That's how it works. Thousands of times every day, all over the place.
But why didn't the controller intervene then when the Helo kept closing in? What horizontal separation did he deem OK?

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  Pass Behind  Pass Behind (All)  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation

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PPRuNeUser134364
February 02, 2025, 16:35:00 GMT
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Post: 11819905
I know I'm fighting a losing battle but here goes.....

Originally Posted by DespairingTraveller
I'm struggling to make sense of the numbers being bandied about here. Apparently the NTSB has said that the CRJ was at 375 feet,

But from the beginning, various plots have shown the collision occurring in mid-river. A little work with Google Earth will show that the extended 33 centre line reaches mid-river about 3,300 feet from the aimpoint of runway 33. A 3 degree glideslope and some trig will put it at 175 feet at that range, with obvious implications. 375 feet would be a big error with not much more than half a mile left to run.

What am I doing wrong?

Also, helicopter route 4 hugs the eastern bank of the Potomac until Goose Island and doesn't cross to the western bank until Wilson Bridge. So why did the Black Hawk perform a 45 degree right turn while still abeam DCA? (See, e.g., post #25) Was it intending to route direct to Fort Belvoir, ignoring the heli routes? (I think I've seen it was operating out of Joint Base Anacostia en route to Fort Belvoir, so the fact it was still abeam DCA must have been more than obvious.)

Puzzled.
What you are doing wrong is making guesses based on incomplete/inaccurate data that is in the public domain.

Assuming the NTSB figure of 375ft is correct, you still need more info for it to mean anything. Was that the AGL, AMSL or SPS height/altitude?
How accurate are the 'various plots' that indicate the collision occurred mid-river? They may be right; they may not be.
Was the CRJ on final or was it still positioning to final? If it wasn't on final then the trigonometric calculations of what height it should be at might not be correct.
What official evidence is there that the Blackhawk made a 45 degree turn, or could that be a data error in the publicly available information?

In summary what I am saying is that, despite all of the internet sleuths plotting tracking data, none of it is official and it is all subject to various errors. Whilst interesting to form an understanding of the circumstances, it can't be assumed to be accurate to within a few feet (vertically or laterally).

Originally Posted by JohnDixson
Regarding UH-60L altimeters:
All UH-60 A and L Army aircraft incorporated the APN 209 radar altimeter. Our Sikorsky tech fellow for Avioics/electronis reports the accuracy in this area is 1-2 feet. The radar altimeter position in the instrument panel is just to the right of the attitude indicator and its top matches the top of the attitude indicator. The barometric altimeter is immediately below it.
Both pilots have the same setup.
That 1-2 feet error would be a theoretical accuracy. The readout in the cockpit would be subject to significant errors during turns/pitch changes etc; without knowing the exact installation on a Blackhawk, it might also unlock based on the surface conditions. More importantly, the ATC instructions would probably be based on an altimeter setting and not Rad Alt.

Originally Posted by uncle_maxwell
Instead of no RA below 500ft (or whatever the floor is), how about telling one conflict to climb and the other one to \x91not climb\x92? \x91Not climb\x92 could then be understood (and trained) to mean \x91descend a little, terrain/aircraft/wx permitting or fly level\x92. Lots of ifs and buts, spurious warnings, limitations for when 3 or more conflicts, TCAS vs. GPWS considerations etc. but perhaps worth a thought.
How would that have worked in this scenario? Who do you think should have been directed by TCAS to do what? Does the Blackhawk even have TCAS?



Subjects ATC  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  DCA  NTSB  Radar  Route 4  TCAS (All)

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island_airphoto
February 02, 2025, 16:36:00 GMT
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Post: 11819907
Originally Posted by henra
But why didn't the controller intervene then when the Helo kept closing in? What horizontal separation did he deem OK?
My guess is a tired and overworked controller will take your word for it you are going to miss the other aircraft and devote their mental energy to other things. To be fair he DID finally realize it looked close and prodded the helo pilot a couple of times.

Subjects ATC  Separation (ALL)

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uncle_maxwell
February 02, 2025, 16:54:00 GMT
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Post: 11819920
Originally Posted by SAR Bloke
I know I'm fighting a losing battle but here goes.....



What you are doing wrong is making guesses based on incomplete/inaccurate data that is in the public domain.

Assuming the NTSB figure of 375ft is correct, you still need more info for it to mean anything. Was that the AGL, AMSL or SPS height/altitude?
How accurate are the 'various plots' that indicate the collision occurred mid-river? They may be right; they may not be.
Was the CRJ on final or was it still positioning to final? If it wasn't on final then the trigonometric calculations of what height it should be at might not be correct.
What official evidence is there that the Blackhawk made a 45 degree turn, or could that be a data error in the publicly available information?

In summary what I am saying is that, despite all of the internet sleuths plotting tracking data, none of it is official and it is all subject to various errors. Whilst interesting to form an understanding of the circumstances, it can't be assumed to be accurate to within a few feet (vertically or laterally).



That 1-2 feet error would be a theoretical accuracy. The readout in the cockpit would be subject to significant errors during turns/pitch changes etc; without knowing the exact installation on a Blackhawk, it might also unlock based on the surface conditions. More importantly, the ATC instructions would probably be based on an altimeter setting and not Rad Alt.



How would that have worked in this scenario? Who do you think should have been directed by TCAS to do what? Does the Blackhawk even have TCAS?
It could have instructed the CRJ to climb (meaning initiate go-around immediately) and the heli to \x91not climb\x92 (meaning descend if practicable). Or it could have instructed heli to climb and CRJ to not climb (meaning continue descent or level and look out). I am saying that tech is there in principle and the 500ft RA floor was decided on 20-30y ago, probably to limit complexity and risk of dangerous RAs, but that this limitation could be revisited in future, especially with lots more data and modelling capability to assess.

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  NTSB  TCAS (All)  TCAS RA

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fdr
February 02, 2025, 17:30:00 GMT
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Post: 11819947
Originally Posted by remi
But I don't think this is a scenario that suffers from a lack of data. Near misses and incursions are frequent enough that they are well characterized. Nor is it that difficult to project risk from repetitive danger. The risk, in this case, and in many other cases, is known and has been accepted.
That mid airs happen, there is data, true
That there is adequate data of American airlines running into military helicopters in the terminal area? We have one data point. That is an exception event. The near misses, there is more data, but apparently not enough to get anyone's attention before a bad day out occurred (whether DEI dependent or not)

The intent of a safety system is to tend towards improved safety. To do so, it needs data to make rational assessments, and we have a system today that is based on responses to exceptions, and often responses to exceptions that arose due to responses to other exceptions, etc. We have a stack of bandaids that are our rules and regs, and they act as soporifics, great if you are suffering from insomnia.

As a system, it sucks.
Spoiler
 


Subjects ATC  Close Calls  DEI

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JohnDixson
February 02, 2025, 17:57:00 GMT
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Post: 11819965
To follow Henra’s on point question: where was the call from the ATC radar monitoring, saying, for example: Army XXX you have traffic, 12 o’clock 1.5 miles coming at you, make immediate left turn to YYY, climb to WWW??
The reporting made public to date leaves the impression that ATC in this instance is the tower controller and only the tower controller.
Is it possible that radar guidance ( to either party ) has not surfaced because the single tower controller was not ( possibly could not? ) monitoring the tower radar display ( assuming that there was such ).
And, if there was such a display, was there software in place that incorporated a triggered warning when two aircraft tracks predicted an intersection?
NTSB will certainly be looking into these aspects.
( An aside re the barometric altitude accuracy fed to the radar system in the case of the non ADSB helicopter-assume this will be part of the after accident homework? )

Subjects ADSB (All)  ATC  NTSB  Radar

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MPN11
February 02, 2025, 18:42:00 GMT
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Post: 11819995
@ JohnDixson \x85 thanks for that. Nobody that I can recall here has mentioned Tower having (or not) a slaved radar display from somewhere/someone. Lateral separation seemed to me a simple solution to the ensuing confliction, but \x85 is the TWR controller also radar rated? Could he legally even use the information that may have been presented to him (if such existed).

I had my Mil Tower and (DF) Approach ticket at least a year before I went on the GCA Course. OK, it was 1965 and no remote displays in Local, but would I have been legal to use what I could see?

Subjects ATC  Radar  Separation (ALL)

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Lost in Saigon
February 02, 2025, 19:19:00 GMT
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Post: 11820026
I have 2 questions regarding DCA ATC procedures.(they are probably related)


1) If PAT25 had said they were unable to identify the inbound CRJ, how would ATC have dealt with it?

2) Why was PAT25 requesting \x93Visual Separation\x94? What advantage did that give to PAT25?

Subjects ATC  CRJ  DCA  PAT25

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remi
February 02, 2025, 19:28:00 GMT
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Post: 11820031
Originally Posted by fdr
Where ATC errors involved the crew as the primary causal factor, there were less than 1% of the mandatory reports made.
The fact that it seems to have become acceptable to erase or overwrite or "forget" to preserve CVR following a near miss or incursion suggests problems deep within regulators and carriers. Fortunately, through completely unrelated activity, 25 hour recorders should mostly resolve this, as long as aircrews don't continue to religiously combine the parking brake and erase buttons. Unfortunately, for now, the only sure means of preserving a CVR is the expiration of the crew and/or loss of the hull.
Originally Posted by fdr
That is an exception event. The near misses, there is more data, but apparently not enough to get anyone's attention before a bad day out occurred

We've been fortunate and simultaneously unfortunate that 1000+ runway incursions per year and an increasing number of near misses has resulted in zero passenger deaths until now.

Last edited by remi; 2nd February 2025 at 19:38 .

Subjects ATC  Close Calls

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makobob
February 02, 2025, 19:39:00 GMT
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Post: 11820037
DCA Mishap

Hello fellow flyers, I am a 65 y/o retired pilot. I served 20 years in the Navy flying P-3C and trainers then served another 20 years flying for Southwest Airlines, nine of those years as Captain. Also, I am a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate Aviation Safety School with extensive hands on experience in military mishap investigation.

I have mostly enjoyed my latest years of not sitting at the front end of a jet. During my 40 years of flying people, I never really felt the stresses of being responsible for the well being of so many. Now that I spend most of my days on my boat fishing or growing tomatoes in my garden, life's pressures are minimal. This has opened my eyes to the gravity of the enormous responsibility I held on my shoulders, for the safety and well being of so many.

I have always had the mindset not to "arm-chair" quarterback any aviation mishap, regardless of how tempting it may be. But the aviation mishap that occurred at DCA on the evening of Wednesday, January 29 has compelled me to speak out.

Was it preventable? Sadly, It was entirely preventable.

How did it happen you may ask. After all both aircraft were clearly operating normally up until impact. First lets clear up one detail both the President and our news media has consistently made error.

Elevation refers to the height above sea level of the ground. These two aircraft were flying altitudes, not elevations. Aircraft fly altitudes and above 18,000 feet they are called flight levels. Example, flight level 180 is 18,000 feet. The ill-fated regional jet was at approximately 325 feet when it was impacted by the Army UH-60 helicopter. I have flown into Washington National since the first days Southwest began operations at DCA. I was already a Captain at this point, and I can tell you this airport is one of the most technically challenging of any I have flown.

However, that is not why this disaster happened.

I would be very surprised if the RJ black box revealed either of the two young PSA pilots were aware up until the moment of impact. Why you may ask? Because when you are flying a jet on short final, at 325 feet, you are focused on the flare and touch-down point on the runway. Perhaps the young First Officer may have seen the UH-60 just with enough warning to make a call-out, just prior to impact. From the angle of impact, very unlikely the more seasoned Captain would have even been able to see anything at all. If the First Officer was making the landing, it is most certain that neither of them saw it coming and there was nothing said on the microphone. I have no doubt, the pilots on the regional jet will be completely vindicated. In any aviation mishap, there is a chain of events that lead up to the accident. If any one of the links in the chain are broken, the accident will not happen. In this case, there are two remaining main causal factors.

DCA control tower: Tower controller made a fatal error in communicating with the Army UH-60. Time was clearly critical and was wasted by asking the H-60 if they had jet traffic in site. Clearly, they did not. What should have been said in a very assertive voice, "PAT25 (UH-60's callsign), IMMEDIATE TURN TO XXX HEADING, CLIMB AND MAINTAIN XXX ALTITUDE TO AVOID COLLISION. Tower was no help at all. First they cleared the RJ for a last minute change to 33, and then failed to ensure their approach corridor was clear of traffic. In my view, the tower controller could have easily prevented this fatal collision.

Army UH-60 crew: In military aviation training, we have always have preached the importance for pilots to maintain situational awareness. That philosophy by the way is also a cornerstone to commercial aviation safety. Were the pilots tuned up to tower when the controller gave the RJ clearance to land runway 33? Had they been aware the commuter jet was going to track over the ground through their intended flight direction, something should have been said. Request vector, due to traffic! One H-60 pilot responded, yes we have traffic in site, we will maintain VFR (visual flight rules) which means "see and avoid" yes even at night. Clearly he was looking at the wrong traffic which by the way is a very common occurrence, especially at night. No doubt the Army crew was engaged in training, which may have been a distractor to situational awareness.

In the end, the chain of events were allowed to happen as did this horrible accident that took the lives of sixty-seven beautiful souls. The President is totally correct in that we need to hire pilots and air-traffic controllers based on merit and experience, nothing else! I have witnessed first hand, the failed attempts to ensure diversity while training pilots, at the expense of safety. That practice, both military and commercial aviation, needs to stop! The current administration has their hands full but I have complete confidence they will make significant headway. Clearly we need to train and educate more air traffic controllers! The shortage and perhaps poor training standards are likely the primary cause of this mishap. I have no doubt our new Transportation Secretary is on it with both feet running. We need to maintain pilot standards also. The pilot shortage resulted in the FAA reducing the flight hours required to be hired to fly commercially. Why didn't they allow experienced pilots age 65-67 to work? In this country, we have effectively dumbed down just about everything, in the name of getting everyone through.

Just like on the operating table, you want the most experienced individuals in the most demanding jobs!

Last edited by T28B; 3rd February 2025 at 02:17 . Reason: formatting and paragraph breaks

Subjects ATC  DCA  FAA  PAT25  President Donald Trump  See and Avoid  Situational Awareness  VFR

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Sven Sixtoo
February 02, 2025, 19:56:00 GMT
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Post: 11820054
Originally Posted by Lost in Saigon
I have 2 questions regarding DCA ATC procedures.(they are probably related)


1) If PAT25 had said they were unable to identify the inbound CRJ, how would ATC have dealt with it?

2) Why was PAT25 requesting \x93Visual Separation\x94? What advantage did that give to PAT25?
Having done slightly similar things in the London Heli-routes (and once, in emergency, flat out across LHR at 150 ft) LHR would in case 1 have given me a mandatory heading to incresase separation as fast as possible, and (speculation: I've never been a professional civilian fixed-wing pilot) likely told the conflicting traffic to go around, and in case 2 if I could not guarantee visual separation I would again have been told to leave by whatever route resulted in maximum rate of increase in separation; thus by acknowledging I could see the aircraft referred to in the clearance, enabling me to get on with what I wanted to achieve. But of course one is not allowed to hang around in the immediate vicinity of LHR at 200 ft in a helicopter. The last time I crossed LHR north to south, my clearance was "at 1000 ft, behind the landing Concorde". The last time east to west was "We're shut to traffic, cleared as you require on 28R", which was an invitation to fly the length of the place at about 10 ft at 2am.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  DCA  PAT25  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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patrickal
February 02, 2025, 23:05:00 GMT
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Post: 11820185
Regarding the collision of American Eagle JIA342 and Army Blackhawk PAT25, I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of both the FAA and the United States Army Aviation Branch. If the NTSB in any way blame the pilots in the incident, they are not doing their job. Let’s look at all of the holes in this swiss cheese:

1. In an effort to maximize commercial air traffic in and out of DCA, the FAA has created the “deviate to RWY 33 procedure” for air traffic in-bound to RWY 01. This requires a right-hand turn from the RWY 01 approach followed by an immediate hard left-hand turn to line up on RWY 33. FAA criteria for a stabilized approach states that you have to be stable at 500 feet AGL on final in VMC or perform an immediate go-around. But on this particular approach, you will be at or below 400 feet AGL as you come out of the left turn to final. So the FAA has granted an exception to the “stabilized requirements” at DCA to allow for this maneuver. This allows ATC to shorten the distance between arriving and departing aircraft that are utilizing conflicting RWYs. The FAA in essence violates its own safety standards on stabilized approaches for the sake of expediency.

2. The FAA creates the Route 1/4 helicopter route through the DCA airspace as a VFR route with constantly changing altitude requirements. The lowest limit is at 200 ft MSL through the area east of DCA. Any pilot will tell you that flying that low over water at night is a best a tense experience. Try not to break that limit flying at night while also trying to communicate with ATC and simultaneously searching for possible conflicting aircraft.

3. The United States Army Aviation Branch deems it acceptable to allow training missions for Army Reserve pilots with limited flying experience to fly these helicopter routes through this complex and extremely active airspace. Compounding this, training flights at night using night-vision goggles are deemed “safe” in spite of the fact that using said goggles severely limits peripheral vision and makes it difficult if not impossible to perceive any color other than green and white. Picking out particular lights against the background of urban lighting is challenging, as is depth perception. Scanning key cockpit instruments is also made more difficult, making it challenging to accurately maintain altitude. Add to that workload the need to be in constant communication with ATC as well as monitoring all other comms traffic not directed to you but necessary in order to maintain good situational awareness. Given the density of commercial air traffic on this route, common sense would dictate that this route be flown by only the most experienced pilots and only when absolutely necessary. Reasonable logic would understand that conducting training missions should not be using final approach areas with heavy commercial traffic.

4. The Army crew on PAT25 are flying a mission they have been ordered to fly, at night and using night vision goggles. Although they may feel it is difficult and may be anxious about it, their command structure has determined that it is an appropriate training procedure and as such must meet minimum safety requirements. They do not have the authority to question the mission or the orders to fly it.

5. JIA342 is on approach for RWY 01, but is asked at the last minute by ATC to deviate to RWY 33, requiring the “circle to land” maneuver. Therefore, they are now on approach different from what they briefed for.

6. Any aircraft following the “circle to land” approach to RWY 33 will most likely have both pilots focused on RWY 33 as they come out of the left turn to final, especially if it was a last-minute request by ATC. In this case they will be looking to make sure that AA1630, which has just been given clearance to depart from RWY 01, is clear of the intersection with RWY 33 as they complete their final approach, and be ready for a go-around if it is not. In addition, this left bank makes it extremely difficult for the first officer to see any conflicting traffic coming towards them from the 1 to 2 o’clock position, as that traffic will probably be below the right window level. For the pilot, who is on the left side of the cockpit, visibility of such conflicting traffic will be nearly impossible.

7. For whatever reason, ATC is working with “split frequencies while controlling this airspace, so that although the controller hears both the aircraft on approach and the helo traffic south-bound on “Route 1”, the pilots of those respective aircraft only hear information directed at them. Thus they are not aware of all that is going on around them, and as such their situational awareness is limited by factors outside of their control.

8. ATC informs PAT25 of the conflicting aircraft on approach for RWY 33 at 1200 feet MSL, but at the time, PAT25 is heading almost due east towards the Jefferson Memorial on Helo Route 4 while JIA342 (the CRJ) is executing its right turn departing from the RWY 01 approach and is now heading in a northeast direction as it prepares to make a hard left onto the RWY 33 short final approach. From their respective positions, PAT25 in all likelihood sees the landing lights of AA3130 which is trailing JIA342 and whose landing lights are pointed almost directly in his direction, and mistakenly identifies it as the aircraft approaching RWY 33. At no time does it appear that ATC notifies JIA342 of the conflicting helo traffic. They are most likely focused on their approach to RWY 33, which was just handed to them.

9. As JIA342 rolls out of its left hand turn to final on RWY 33, completing the deviation they were just handed and had not briefed for, it is now approaching the 9-11 o’clock position of PAT25. Since the pilot of PAT25 is on the right-hand side of the Blackhawk, visibility of the CRJ may be limited. Both pilots of PAT25 are now most likely visibly fixated on passing to the rear of AA3130, which is in their 1-3 O’clock position, and which is the conflicting aircraft they perceive as the one ATC initially warned them about.

10. ATC, now receiving a conflicting aircraft warning, asks PAT25 if they have JIA342 in sight. In the absence of any obvious difference from the first mid-identification of the conflicting traffic, confirmation bias raises its ugly head. The voice response from the training pilot is calm and confident in stating that they do have it in sight and claim visual separation, probably proving once again that he mistakenly has AA3130 in sight slightly to his right directly in front of him and more than a mile away. Both pilots are totally unaware of JIA342 which is now arriving in front of them from their left.

11. The collision occurs.



In my humble opinion, the crews of both aircraft involved were set up by both the FAA and the Army Department of Aviation through a series of poorly based decisions which focused on expediency and departed from any appropriate utilization of a rational use of risk assessment. Consider the following:

1. Approval of the circling to RWY 33 maneuver which violates normal stabilized approach standards.

2. The establishment of a series of complex VFR helicopter track complex and heavily restricted air space as well as through final approach paths.

3. A 200 foot maximum altitude requirement over water and required even at night, which may result in a less than 200 foot vertical separation between aircraft on approach to RWY 33 and those traveling on Helo Route 1/4.

4. The decision to conduct military training missions in this complex and busy airspace with an abundance of commercial passenger traffic either arriving to or departing from DCA.

5. The use of split frequencies by the FAA which negatively impacts the situational awareness of all of the pilots in the airspace.

6. The use of night vision goggles to place even more limitations on the pilots.

Granted, all pilots involved may not have had the thousands of hours senior commercial and military pilot possess. But even the most senior individuals when placed in the task saturated environments these two crews faced would have at the very least felt their “pucker factor” increase through this. And there is probably an equal chance that the lack of common sense and appropriate safety design exhibited by the controlling entities would have resulted in a similar outcome. The odds were significantly stacked against these two flight crews, and unfortunately, against the passengers and flight attendants as well. If ever there were an example of an accident waiting to happen, this is it.



Subjects ATC  Accident Waiting to Happen  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  DCA  FAA  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  VFR  Vertical Separation  Visual Separation

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photonclock
February 03, 2025, 01:03:00 GMT
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Post: 11820210
Originally Posted by photonclock
Here's a Blackhawk pilot saying, and I quote, "they could have totally pulled that thing into a hover and stopped". Can't post a link. Tack on to youtube dot com.
He is not a Blackhawk pilot, and has given quite inaccurate advice
Senior Pilot
Fair enough. I inferred his experience in military helos from his many discussions of his experience training flight crews. I'm not sure what other of his statements you consider "inaccurate" though, and you don't bother to back that statement up with any specifics. Would you care to expand on what inaccurate advice he gave?

What I can say about Mike is: he puts his name and his face and his reputation out there in public to have open discussions about flight safety, and in the context of this totally preventable collision, it would be beneficial to all if every expert here and elsewhere on the interwebs participated in a similarly open and public debate in relation to this incident. If you disagree with him, message him and invite a public debate.

I've lurked and read this forum for a long time. Decades? I can't even remember how long. Much as I enjoy reading it when a major incident occurs, it frustrates me to no end how it is filled with so many examples of institutional inertia, acquiescence to mind-numbingly antiquated regulations, ridiculous politics, and endless excuses, all of which inhibit the progress of technology and safety...not to segue into a rant but the most obvious example being, and which 99% of the non-flying public would agree with, that there is almost zero reason at this point to not have cameras in the cockpit and perhaps even live transmission of video and/or audio feeds on every commercial aircraft at this point \x96 the power and data/bandwidth requirements being miniscule relative to the benefits, at this point it is simply absurd that such features do not exist; the Jeju incident's loss of CVR data being the best recent example of what a hindrance to technological progress aviation regulations have become, when for a few dollars a consumer can own a tiny little dashcam that records stunning 4K video and broadcast quality audio in near total darkness with 100mph wind noise running on a small and safe lithium batteries trickle charged from a 5 watt power supply for days on end, which can be broadcast via wifi link to Starlink-satellite based internet across the entire planet. We live in the Space Age, but the data storage and recovery procedures for commercial aircraft still hearkens back to WW2...

That rant aside, as the videos posted above by others demonstrate:

- A Blackhawk can in fact stop on a dime (so whatever you're suggesting Mike Blackstone was wrong about, it certainly wasn't that).

- Obviously that shouldn't be the plan , but it still a legitimate question to ask, in the context of an emergency, and when every other safety precaution has already failed, why couldn't it be done? Other poster's rationalize: at the low altitude, there's nowhere to go. The videos demonstrate otherwise. You can stop a Blackhawk 50 feet above the ground in seconds. If deviating in any direction is a risk, why didn't ATC just say " PAT25 slow to stop and hover!" \x96 as a Very. Last. Resort?

- I don't understand how we can have a system of "Air Traffic Control" that defers its control to aircraft at night around a busy airport with intersecting approaches. It's nonsensical. I honestly didn't know it was a thing. I thought all major airports had flight paths that kept inbound and outbound aircraft in separate non-conflicting lanes at all times. Obviously, I'm extremely naive. From my perspective, it seems as though the professionals involved are allowed no intuition to deviate when the procedures clearly compromise safety? Apparently they're all reduced to being bots who can only read checklists? If that's the case, then why not run the whole system on "AI"? I know I'm being spicy by saying that, given all the pilots on this forum who harp on about how stupid AI is (true for the moment, but not for much longer, rest assured), yet many consider it perfectly reasonable for ATC procedures being to read out the type of aircraft to a pilot who is flying in total darkness in order to fulfill delegation of its responsibility to control air traffic, as if that procedure actually helps? Are we through the looking glass? It doesn't take a three year NTSB investigation to infer how stupid that is. Yet some defend it. Why?

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  Hover  NTSB  PAT25

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vegassun
February 03, 2025, 01:06:00 GMT
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Post: 11820211
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
and from island air photo :

Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra .

Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance.

I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this .
"I wish you good fortune in the wars to come"

The \x93single point of failure\x94 thing has been around forever. Reminds me of when ATC decided it was OK to start using land and hold short procedures at major air carrier airports. My airline immediately put out ALL CAPS memo that we were not to accept LAHSO clearance under any circumstances. It wasn\x92t long after that I was operating into BOS landing 27, when controller says \x93______ 123 you are cleared to land 27, ________ XYZ will be landing 22L and holding short of your runway.\x94 I politely said we can\x92t accept that clearance. Controller got PO\x92ed a bit and wanted to debate it, but in the end he removed the LAHSO clearance from the other aircraft/cancelled our landing clearance/told us to continue then subsequently cleared us to land after the other aircraft landed. The gist of all that is that ATC was miffed because everybody else was going along with their questionable tactics until I came along. In my mind it was clear: technically we would not have been accepting a land and hold short clearance, but we would all be cemetery dead if the other guy screwed up. We would be \x93dead right.\x94

Over the course of the next few weeks/months I queried every check airman/chief pilot I came across and got differing opinions from nearly every one. The majority of them leaned towards the \x93 it\x92s ok you are not landing/holding short,\x94 idea. When I would point out the \x93dead right\x94 concept they would just look at me like I was speaking Mandarin Chinese.

It seems like most pilots (myself included) have a can do attitude and are willing to help ATC out whenever they can so long as it\x92s \x93legal.\x94

There was an old captain I flew with years ago that said \x93We get paid the big bucks to say no.\x94

Subjects ATC  FAA  IFR  Land and Hold Short  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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