February 06, 2025, 13:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11822970
And thank you for sharing your experience. I asked this earlier but haven't gotten a direct reply: If you know, what would have happened if the controller had asked PAT25 to "hold" at the holding point near Hains Point? Is that the function of those holding points and is there some set procedure or pattern?
Subjects
ATC
PAT25
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February 06, 2025, 13:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11822971
The following article may not have a direct connection to the Collision being discussed but it certainly does mention issues that bear on the general environment under which the aircraft were operating and on how ATC capability might not have had assets that would have assisted in enhancing safety. It does mention DEI, the efforts to privatize the ATC function in the United States to a system similar to those in the UK and Europe and provides some background to why that has not happened. What it does point to is the question of if the US ATC system is adequate to today's needs of the Aviation Industry within the United States.
https://www.city-journal.org/article...control?skip=1
https://www.city-journal.org/article...control?skip=1
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ATC
DEI
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February 06, 2025, 13:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11822991
Island,
What an enlightened approach to discussing aviation safety you have.
You attack the source and ignore the content.
Others have already made note of their perception that the UK and EU have better ATC systems than does the United States..
That is raised in the article.
What say you discuss issues rather than sources as that might allow you to be seen in a far better light than you are with the quality of your post.
People that have flown the London and Paris helicopter lanes as well as the DC routes see the DC method lacking in the level of safety the other two provide.
Efforts to change the US ATC system to similar to that of the UK and the EU have been tried and failed....the article get that wrong?
Why not just discuss the issues raised in the article and prove your comment has some basis in fact.
What an enlightened approach to discussing aviation safety you have.
You attack the source and ignore the content.
Others have already made note of their perception that the UK and EU have better ATC systems than does the United States..
That is raised in the article.
What say you discuss issues rather than sources as that might allow you to be seen in a far better light than you are with the quality of your post.
People that have flown the London and Paris helicopter lanes as well as the DC routes see the DC method lacking in the level of safety the other two provide.
Efforts to change the US ATC system to similar to that of the UK and the EU have been tried and failed....the article get that wrong?
Why not just discuss the issues raised in the article and prove your comment has some basis in fact.
Subjects
ATC
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February 06, 2025, 13:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823003
The following article may not have a direct connection to the Collision being discussed but it certainly does mention issues that bear on the general environment under which the aircraft were operating and on how ATC capability might not have had assets that would have assisted in enhancing safety. It does mention DEI, the efforts to privatize the ATC function in the United States to a system similar to those in the UK and Europe and provides some background to why that has not happened. What it does point to is the question of if the US ATC system is adequate to today's needs of the Aviation Industry within the United States.
https://www.city-journal.org/article...control?skip=1
https://www.city-journal.org/article...control?skip=1
Several contributors earlier in this thread have pointed out that there's a conflict between the accident stats in commercial aviation in the USA (very enviable), and critical observations about the character of ATC interactions over here. They conclude that ATC and pilots are deploying their superior skills and 'can do' mentality to paper over the cracks in the system.
It would take an almost inconceivable act of collective insight and collective political will to absorb and internalise that assessment. We can but hope, but if it's going to start anywhere, it's articles like this.
Last edited by Wide Mouth Frog; 6th February 2025 at 14:05 .
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ATC
DEI
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February 06, 2025, 14:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823034
Now, if the article made that point clearly, and did not concern itself with:
The promise of Elon Musk\x92s DOGE
DEI
Democrats blocking privatization legilsation
Donald Trump sorting it out
etc etc
\x85then I would see what you mean.
But as it was a blatantly political article that did not focus at all on the key things that are pretty much obvious as causal from this discussion, then it is surely just a distraction to serious discussion in this thread.
The controller does not appear to have done anything wrong, so what have DEI policies to do with the ATC side of this accident?
The passenger aircraft followed a procedure and got hit, so what bit of the federal bloat caused that?
The 2-crew helicopter apparently never properly identified the aircraft they were supposed to avoid visually. You going to really argue that the DEI or the government caused that?
Unsafe procedures caused this. SASess, please take the ridiculous politics to Jet Blast.
The promise of Elon Musk\x92s DOGE
DEI
Democrats blocking privatization legilsation
Donald Trump sorting it out
etc etc
\x85then I would see what you mean.
But as it was a blatantly political article that did not focus at all on the key things that are pretty much obvious as causal from this discussion, then it is surely just a distraction to serious discussion in this thread.
The controller does not appear to have done anything wrong, so what have DEI policies to do with the ATC side of this accident?
The passenger aircraft followed a procedure and got hit, so what bit of the federal bloat caused that?
The 2-crew helicopter apparently never properly identified the aircraft they were supposed to avoid visually. You going to really argue that the DEI or the government caused that?
Unsafe procedures caused this. SASess, please take the ridiculous politics to Jet Blast.
Subjects
ATC
DEI
President Donald Trump
Thread Moderation
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February 06, 2025, 15:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823040
Island,
What an enlightened approach to discussing aviation safety you have.
You attack the source and ignore the content.
Others have already made note of their perception that the UK and EU have better ATC systems than does the United States..
That is raised in the article.
What say you discuss issues rather than sources as that might allow you to be seen in a far better light than you are with the quality of your post.
People that have flown the London and Paris helicopter lanes as well as the DC routes see the DC method lacking in the level of safety the other two provide.
Efforts to change the US ATC system to similar to that of the UK and the EU have been tried and failed....the article get that wrong?
Why not just discuss the issues raised in the article and prove your comment has some basis in fact.
What an enlightened approach to discussing aviation safety you have.
You attack the source and ignore the content.
Others have already made note of their perception that the UK and EU have better ATC systems than does the United States..
That is raised in the article.
What say you discuss issues rather than sources as that might allow you to be seen in a far better light than you are with the quality of your post.
People that have flown the London and Paris helicopter lanes as well as the DC routes see the DC method lacking in the level of safety the other two provide.
Efforts to change the US ATC system to similar to that of the UK and the EU have been tried and failed....the article get that wrong?
Why not just discuss the issues raised in the article and prove your comment has some basis in fact.
NO ONE is arguing that what goes on at DCA is a good idea and NO ONE thinks it is a good idea to do it without the helo controller on duty.
"A poor plan poorly executed"
Subjects
ATC
DCA
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February 06, 2025, 16:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823104
Ref para 3.2.3. e. 2 here https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...l%20separation .
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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February 06, 2025, 18:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823141
Very unlikely the helo crew could actually identify the right traffic 7nm away in half a second. My guess is they instantly say, \x91traffic in sight, request visual separation\x92, because they know that any other response (inferring traffic not in sight) obliges ATC to apply minimum 500ft/1.5mi separation in class B airspace and then a whole can of worms ensues. No other option available to the controller as far as I can see.
Ref para 3.2.3. e. 2 here https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...l%20separation .
Ref para 3.2.3. e. 2 here https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...l%20separation .
I have watched these comments in two threads with interest. Helo routes under busy approach lanes was (and I believe, still is) the norm at Boscombe Down when I arrived there in th eearly 90s. When the civvy incumbants left and the military took over we had to learn from scratch and one of the first things was to sort out the procedure for helicopters routing from Middle Wallop, along the railway line towards Boscombe Down before making a sharp right to go under the approach path to 23 before heading of north west into the Salisbury Plain play areas. As far as I remember this was a no-RT route and was a akin to a child crossing the road (look left, look right and when safe, cross). It was not unusal to have a jet on PAR and then a little blip appear about 2 miles finals crossing at 90 degrees. I seem to think this had been going on like this for years. After that it was mandated that a call to ATC must be made, and if traffic was busy, the helos held clear of the appraoch path. I cannot remember the exact details but think there was a150ft cap as well and a conspicuity squawk. Back then Boscombe was incredibly busy.
IMHO the crew on the helo were alerted to traffic, a misident occurs and they press on, maybe relaxing their altitude accuracy as they are not aware of any other threats besides the one they can see in the distance, which they will clearly pass behind as requested. They would have no clue as to aircraft type.
A very sad incident indeed and my heart goes out to all involved.
Subjects
ATC
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
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February 06, 2025, 18:50:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823160
A can of worms or a mid-air collison. I'll take the can of worms please. I can't see any aircrew being worried to give a truthful response just to aid ATC, not when it is their lives at stake. If this does happen then that is a whole new set of lessons that need to be learned.
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February 06, 2025, 19:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823184
Very unlikely the helo crew could actually identify the right traffic 7nm away in half a second. My guess is they instantly say, \x91traffic in sight, request visual separation\x92, because they know that any other response (inferring traffic not in sight) obliges ATC to apply minimum 500ft/1.5mi separation in class B airspace and then a whole can of worms ensues. No other option available to the controller as far as I can see.
Ref para 3.2.3. e. 2 here https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...l%20separation .
Ref para 3.2.3. e. 2 here https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/publ...l%20separation .
Subjects
ATC
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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February 06, 2025, 21:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823226
A quick note for dbcooper:
The accident investigators will probably be asking questions similar to yours, and a great many more.
As to Dulles and rail: I am happy to inform you that the metro now goes out that far .
I had heard some years ago that the Metro was eventually going to get out that far into Northern Virginia, and it seems that "eventually" has arrived.
The accident investigators will probably be asking questions similar to yours, and a great many more.
As to Dulles and rail: I am happy to inform you that the metro now goes out that far .
I had heard some years ago that the Metro was eventually going to get out that far into Northern Virginia, and it seems that "eventually" has arrived.
Now, if the article made that point clearly, and did not concern itself with:
[stuff]
But as it was a blatantly political article that did not focus at all on the key things that are pretty much obvious as causal from this discussion, then it is surely just a distraction to serious discussion in this thread.
The controller does not appear to have done anything wrong, so what have DEI policies to do with the ATC side of this accident?
The passenger aircraft followed a procedure and got hit, so what bit of the federal bloat caused that?
The 2-crew helicopter apparently never properly identified the aircraft they were supposed to avoid visually. You going to really argue that the DEI or the government caused that?
Unsafe procedures caused this. SASess, please take the ridiculous politics to Jet Blast.
[stuff]
But as it was a blatantly political article that did not focus at all on the key things that are pretty much obvious as causal from this discussion, then it is surely just a distraction to serious discussion in this thread.
The controller does not appear to have done anything wrong, so what have DEI policies to do with the ATC side of this accident?
The passenger aircraft followed a procedure and got hit, so what bit of the federal bloat caused that?
The 2-crew helicopter apparently never properly identified the aircraft they were supposed to avoid visually. You going to really argue that the DEI or the government caused that?
Unsafe procedures caused this. SASess, please take the ridiculous politics to Jet Blast.
We all know there are issues with American ATC. But primarily, they are ordinary problems that don't need radical solutions. The solutions are generally more resources and more rigorous enforcement.
* One of my go-to complaints: Pilots not disciplined for erasing or overwriting CVRs following runway incursions and near misses. No blowback for aircrews refusing to meet with NTSB following incursions/near misses. I mentioned this earlier; hopefully 25 hr recorders will fix the overwrite part of this. Ideally the "erase" button would be removed in all cockpits where it still remains. I understand aircrews wanting to erase their CVRs and avoid meetings with investigators after doing something careless (or straight up idiotic) with a plane full of people, but, folks, how can coming to Jesus *not* be part of the job? We are blessed to live in a country where fatal transportation accidents are not presumed to be criminal (unlike most every other non-Commonwealth nation), and aircrews hardly ever have personal liability for damages. Yes a career might take a hit. That's careers for ya.
* Runway incursions in general: Over 1k per year for many years ... we have systems to manage this but they need to be continually funded, resourced, and improved ... HNL, MDW, LAX need to be sorted out aggressively (LAX is no longer the poster child for incursions, good work there, it's HNL now)
* See-and-avoid: It works as well as it does because of the very high standard of air"person"ship prevalent in the US, but it is absolutely guaranteed that see-and-avoid is insufficient to avoid midair collisions, as it is impossible to see all potential collision aircraft even in broad daylight
* Manufacturer quality: Until MCAS I'd have never thought that US manufacturing processes would (once again) become a significant safety risk, but, here we are, with no indication that the trend has been reversed (it's fair to say that there is some promise that there has been a reversal at the top of Boeing management, but effects haven't appeared at this early date)
* ATC hiring: Pay more, hire more, create alternative career structures that allow qualified "old" people in their 30s to start jobs at ATC while giving them a fair framework for retirement
None of this needs "AI" or "satellites" or "complete rework" or "woodchipper" to fix. It just needs money and constant re-commitment to safety, and commitment to compromising in favor of safety when a decision of "revenue vs safety" arises. Honestly I think it's mostly about money. Perhaps 99% about money. Perhaps 100%.
Last edited by remi; 6th February 2025 at 22:31 .
Subjects
ATC
Accountability/Liability
Close Calls
DEI
NTSB
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February 07, 2025, 03:43:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823374
Without context. Helo below the jet only sounds good, it follows no actual vertical separation standards/procedures/rules.
The CRJ was given the right of way by ATC, who did not control the conflict. All lateral issues, because the vertical does not matter until more than 500' separation can be maintained. Even at 200', the helo was in the CRJ's airspace in all 4 dimensions.
The CRJ was given the right of way by ATC, who did not control the conflict. All lateral issues, because the vertical does not matter until more than 500' separation can be maintained. Even at 200', the helo was in the CRJ's airspace in all 4 dimensions.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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February 07, 2025, 04:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823381
I've not read the entire chain of thoughts and comments, so please excuse me if my thinking has already been brought out:
Further, seems to me that the helicopter was reporting 200 feet via the IFF (transponder), probably from the AAU-32 Baro altimeter instrument in the cockpit.
.
Further, seems to me that the helicopter was reporting 200 feet via the IFF (transponder), probably from the AAU-32 Baro altimeter instrument in the cockpit.
.
https://www.reddit.com/r/aircrashinv...radar_sources/
Of course, I think the whole altitude issue is a red herring and the concentration of attention on this "discrepancy" reduces the attention on other issues that aren't as easily "corrected".
Subjects
ATC
PAT25
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February 07, 2025, 08:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823435
* ATC hiring: Pay more, hire more, create alternative career structures that allow qualified "old" people in their 30s to start jobs at ATC while giving them a fair framework for retirement
None of this needs "AI" or "satellites" or "complete rework" or "woodchipper" to fix. It just needs money and constant re-commitment to safety, and commitment to compromising in favor of safety when a decision of "revenue vs safety" arises. Honestly I think it's mostly about money. Perhaps 99% about money. Perhaps 100%.
Since the Strike back in '81 ATC pay has gone up and is very good. There are always more applicants than positions,. Hiring more gets into the political, which 'd like to avoid but keep in mind, it's not just how many you hire, but how many complete training and check out to become a Full Performance Level controller. Controllers are allowed to retire at a younger age than many other Government jobs. The 30 year hiring cutoff, as I understand it, is to allow a controller to have at least 25 years in when required to leave at age 56.
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ATC
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February 07, 2025, 11:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823555
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
In another midair collision report, that happened in July 2022 at NorthLas Vegas airport, NTSB put out this:
Interviews with personnel at the air traffic control tower indicated that staffing was deficient, and most staff were required to work mandatory overtime shifts, reaching an annual average of 400 to 500 hours of overtime per controller. According to the air traffic manager (ATM), the inadequate staffing had resulted in reduced training discissions, and the management team was unable to appropriately monitor employee performance. The ATM stated that everyone on the team was exhausted, and that work/life balance was non-existent. It is likely that the cumulative effects of continued deficient staffing, excessive overtime, reduced training, and inadequate recovery time between shifts took a considerable toll on the control tower workforce.
I wonder, how this situation is with DCA ATC service.
I am not trying to blame ATC either. He issued clearance to PAT25 to cross behind and asked (and got) confirmation for CRJ in sight twice. It seems quite clear that helicopter crew did not look at the same airplane that ATC was asking about.
What baffles me here is, that it was obvious a routine procedure to let helicopters cross active runway heading less than 2 miles from runway treshold, leaving practically zero margin for error. Backups, designed to catch pilots or ATC errors (TCAS and ATC alarms) cannot catch up in short time left if someone makes a mistake, so this arrangement as based on "see and avoid" concept, in the night, with many lights in the background and a fact, that other aircraft on collision course does not move relatively on the screen, but just grows bigger. Unfortunatelly, that dot on the screen that will kill you starts growing bigger only in the last few seconds.
If I would ask ATC to cross runway heading DAY VFR so close to runway treshold at my airport with incoming commercial traffic, I would be denied 100 times out of 100 attempts. (and probably called nuts).
My guess on this tragedy is, that thru the years, the system was trying to pack more and more aircraft in the same space and same infrastructure, by gradually squeezing margins and safegueards, until one day, Jenga tower collapsed.
Subjects
AA5342
ADSB (All)
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
DCA
NTSB
PAT25
See and Avoid
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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February 07, 2025, 12:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823616
1.5NM is obviously not applied, look at the south flow arrivals TCAS RA the day prior. It, a PAT merged previously with a SWA 737 at TCAS TA altitudes with Collision Alert to ATC radar, before causing the later RA.
Last edited by moosepileit; 7th February 2025 at 15:53 .
Subjects
ATC
Radar
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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February 07, 2025, 13:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823651
"wait" , for sure.
How? considering where they have been at the first briefing about the conflict, just about entering Washington Channel ?
I have learned here:
speed around 90kt min, when orbiting
hovering not a safe option at night over black water (despite lights left and right and everywhere else)
Washington Channel: 200 yards wide
plus golf course and Potomac: less 1 mile wide
runway ends 01 and 15
city to the left with stadions etc.
I really run out of an idea what ATC would clear if the PAT25 crew didnt ask for "visual separation"...
How? considering where they have been at the first briefing about the conflict, just about entering Washington Channel ?
I have learned here:
speed around 90kt min, when orbiting
hovering not a safe option at night over black water (despite lights left and right and everywhere else)
Washington Channel: 200 yards wide
plus golf course and Potomac: less 1 mile wide
runway ends 01 and 15
city to the left with stadions etc.
I really run out of an idea what ATC would clear if the PAT25 crew didnt ask for "visual separation"...
Last edited by 51bravo; 7th February 2025 at 13:42 .
Subjects
ATC
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 07, 2025, 14:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823680
There is also route RT6 from Bolling to Woods Corner, but I don't think that the steep climb from Hains Point 200ft to Bolling 1400ft is reasonable.
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ATC
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 07, 2025, 15:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823730
With proper ATC staffing would it be a practicle proceedure for helicopter traffic travelling Southbound on route 1 to be given an expected further clearance time for Hains Point. This would allow the helicopter to adjust its speed or hold at Hains until traffic on approach to 33 is clear before the helicopter is then given clearance to enter route 4 and proceed Southbound crossing the approach to 33?
Subjects
ATC
Route 4
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February 07, 2025, 15:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823731
1.5Nm is longer than Rwy 1. Any traffic on the runways basically knocks out helicopters within a circle more or less encompassing Memorial Bridge, Capitol St Bridge, the sewage treatment plant, and Route 5. The approach paths to the two runways are pretty close together compared to a 1.5Nm separation.
Anything approaching Rwy 1 should be below ~700ft anywhere north of the sewage treatment marker; use the Wilson Bridge for a bit of headroom because not all aircraft are going to be perfectly on glideslope.
The river is far narrower than 1.5Nm so clearly a southbound helicopter on Route 4 can never cross a northbound aircraft approaching runway 1 north of the Wilson Bridge.
You'd have to hold a southbound helicopter north of either the Memorial or Capitol St Bridges until previous traffic had landed. Then have a sufficiently large gap with no arrivals (or departures until south of the runways) for the helicopter to reach the Wilson St Bridge before the next arrival crosses that bridge.
That's the preceding aircraft covering ~3Nm at 140kt (~80s), followed by the helicopter covering ~6Nm at ~100kt (another 3.5min), and accurately timing the next arrival so it doesn't cross the Wilson bridge until after the helicopter, or it needs to do a go-around.
Anything approaching Rwy 1 should be below ~700ft anywhere north of the sewage treatment marker; use the Wilson Bridge for a bit of headroom because not all aircraft are going to be perfectly on glideslope.
The river is far narrower than 1.5Nm so clearly a southbound helicopter on Route 4 can never cross a northbound aircraft approaching runway 1 north of the Wilson Bridge.
You'd have to hold a southbound helicopter north of either the Memorial or Capitol St Bridges until previous traffic had landed. Then have a sufficiently large gap with no arrivals (or departures until south of the runways) for the helicopter to reach the Wilson St Bridge before the next arrival crosses that bridge.
That's the preceding aircraft covering ~3Nm at 140kt (~80s), followed by the helicopter covering ~6Nm at ~100kt (another 3.5min), and accurately timing the next arrival so it doesn't cross the Wilson bridge until after the helicopter, or it needs to do a go-around.
Hence the issue requiring metering the helicopters on the numbered Routes.
I don't suggest a hard 1.5NM, but anywhere standard fixed wing ops cannot assure 500' vertical separation, Rotary wing traffic must be gated and controlled.
If rotary wing mission dictates, then fixed wing traffic will have to wait/go missed/discontinue approach. Visual Sep, ATC and a Pavlovian environment killed an airliner.
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ATC
Route 4
Route 5
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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