Posts about: "ATC" [Posts: 628 Page: 32 of 32]¶

There is one lawsuit pending in federal district court in Washington, D.C. - although I am fairly certain that it is a consolidation of claims arising from the accident brought by some different groupings of plaintiffs represented, in each instance, by different attorneys. This imprecision of my knowledge of the actual litigation at present, for which I am making no excuses, is another reason why I will have to shift some attention away from other pursuits and spend some time reading court filings on the Pacer U.S. court systems web portal. More on the first reason, later. (And among my other pursuits is actual legal work, and it happens to be in the aerospace domain - transactional, not litigation, however.)

I want to draw three distinctions about the lawsuit arising from the accident. First, insofar as deriding (and mocking, and disliking or worse) the legal profession in general and particular individual lawyers is concerned, I will say in advance that I will shake my head in disbelief if anyone in this forum community believes that litigation against the U.S. federal government relating to this accident is improper or just about lawyers enriching themselves. Essentially every single post here, or at the very least every line of inquiry or analysis or interpretation of the facts as they have emerged, points a very straight finger of blame at the FAA's way of doing things.

Related to that, secondly, in my reference to the advocacy by the parents of Bluestreak 5342's F/O I was not trying to highlight their grief or the grieving process. The point was - and in my mind (capable of being derided because it sometimes is a legal mind to some extent) still is - that although obviously connected to their grief, these survivors also appear to be on a quest to exonerate the F/O's conduct on the final approach in question. I suppose I could hope to have learned more aviation history and be able to recite some, maybe most, of the significant previous accidents in which survivors of aviators, when those aviators were blamed for accidents in which they were killed, sought to clear their names. I don't think the instance of 5342's F/O's parents is unique. I do think it is very relevant to the impact, the implications, of the lawsuit and the Board's report. (More on this also later.)

Soon after the accident, I read about two young attorneys who were passengers on Bluestreak 5342. From memory, they were mid-level associates (maybe four or five years in practice, not yet partners in the firm) in a comparatively small law firm. They were returning to D.C. from taking depositions. I realize no one (or probably no one) on this forum who qualifies for the first Papa letter in the forum title will care much about the travails of young lawyers doing the equivalent of building hours. I will just say that it is hard work, and often far more thankless than digs at the legal profession would have a reasonable person conclude. And ..... I mention these two particular victims of the accident because I could - when I read that news report soon after 29 January - largely relate to where they were in their careers. Say what you will, and say it with as much vitriol as forum rules will allow - their deaths in the accident deserve their day in court, despite digs at lawyers and the profession. Discussion of what is wrong with the court system and the legal process in the United States - well, this isn't Scotus blog or something; that's all another subject. But: I maintain strongly that the attorneys who represent accident victims' families and other survivors of those victims have as much right to attack the responsible parties in court as attorney-bashers do to make fun of their profit motive. I haven't done that kind of legal work. I have met very fine, very excellent attorneys who do, and I think it behooves aviation professionals to recognize that bringing their clients' claims forward to that ultimate day in court is honorable, and necessary work. (This is not to defend jackpot justice awards, or bad-attorney behavior, as if I need to make that clear.)

Third, and the "first reason" I'll need to start eating more time on Pacer, is that I continue to believe that the aviators of Bluestreak 5342 are being taken advantage of by an otherwise respectable legal process. If one believes that they did nothing wrong, then why is it that their estates are not represented in the courtroom in order to defend them? Aren't they implied or implicit defendants, though obviously not named as such? And as I said in an earlier post, one could argue, 'well, the Army pilots aren't there to defend themselves, and they're getting pretty seriously wrung out as having primary responsibility - in addition to the systemic factors of course - and these three deceased U.S. Army aviators, they don't have an active defense in the courtroom either, do they? So why should the airline pilots have one?" Pretty simple answer: the U.S. federal government admitted liability, so the Army pilots - admittedly indirectly - have had their possible defense as pilots waived out from under them.

But since I haven't been delving into all the various court filings which by now presumably have piled up during pre-trial discovery, it is possible that the Bluestreak 5342 aviators' estates have retained their own counsel and are seeking to intervene in the case. I'll find out. Though I should apologize for repeating myself, and while admitting that intense study of intracacies of federal procedure was something I left behind when I picked up the J.D. (after all, reading Advisory Committee Notes about amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, it's fascinating stuff, amiright?), the gross unfairness of alleging negligence against the pilots who do not have their own legal representation in the case strikes me as an error and an injustice. And I am not a stranger to dealing with insurance carriers who want to settle, while the client wants to fight on - if the pilots' estates had separate representation, their lawyers would need to make sure their cowboy or hiking boots are on snuggly - the stuff to be thrown at them by the airline's corporate types and the insurance carrier attorneys who mostly call the shots, would seem likely to be intense.

Almost last, with mega-billions coming out of Congress for a totally new ATC system, it continues to seem obvious to yours truly that in designing it, and then doing all the many steps of implementing it, the lessons learned from the Board report will have a window of opportunity not usually present in the U.S. NAS. It should not go to the same fate of being ignored or shrugged off as so many Board reports have suffered. If the litigation - though of course separate from the Board work - creates leverage for such a beneficial outcome, I would say "Who wants it?" (with apologies to WSJ sportswriter extraordinaire, Jason Gay - about the U.S. Women's Hockey Team and the Wisconsin Badgers Women's Hockey Team as well). Or in less cryptic terms, Go fo It.

Last, Uberlingen. One of the Skyguide officials who was deeply involved with the aftermath of the accident delivered several presentations about it, most all of which went into some depth, during my academic residence at that certain Air and Space Law graduate law degree program located in Montreal, Quebec. Those presentations, as the old saying goes, "left a mark."

Uberlingen
during th\xe9 ATC strike in the early 80s Swiss control employed a controller from Chicago ..he was qualified to operate on all the sectors bar the balloon frequency which was in swiss German. Mark left because he foresaw the accident as the boundary handovers were made with aircraft climbing but passed on as level. He had one which involved a dan air flight whom responded immediately with turn right order. The fellow controllers left a Der Spiegel on his chair with the head line \xab auslanders Raus \xbb
I was always concerned with the southern boundary with Italy where we were often passing climbing.
I had one air miss leaving the Ekron hold with a Cessna whose pilot had a cigar in his mouth.

As to the effect on families and others;
I did my twin flying at hamble paired with P2 on Papa India, followed by the Trident conversion course including base at Prestwick, along with the late Andy Russell.
I’m still in contact with what’s left of his family 53 years later; his sister who emigrated several years after the accident, no doubt precipitated by what happened to their mother and father afterwards.
The inquiry was fiddled with a back dated stall procedure issued to all fleets some 6 weeks after the crash - no one mentioned this. There were blatant lies told and Jerry’s dad who had been shot down during the Battle of Britain whilst on a solo bombing raid on Berlin, was at the inquiry throughout.
I managed to access the testimonies a few years ago.
Jerry’s mum drank herself to an early death and on every visit I was asked did Jeremy kill all of those people.
It also helped destroy my first marriage, as my wife was close to Jerry and wanted me to leave BEA as she didn’t believe in working for such a moral individuals.
I mentioned to Jerry’s sister a couple of years ago that I had recently met Captain X who was one of the managers involved and had visited the family - she told me that her mother saw through him and detested him.
50 years on and I read bannisters Concorde book or rather what a clever, outstanding pilot I am - he writes about that the accident kick started CRM in BEA/BA - absolute rubbish - the same bullying and cover ups continued for a decade plus.

In 1978 I escaped to the VC10 and on my first line trip the crew bringing the aircraft into Colombo which we were to take over damaged it. The training captain seeing that a fellow course mate was diverting around a rocket cloud steered through it with the result of one broken back and another 6/7 casualties being taken to hospital along with the need for a tailplane check which grounded the aircraft for a couple of days; The BA horror comic stated clear air turbulence.

A couple of months ago I attended a mates funeral, he retired as a trainer on the 777. The eulogy contained a story of flying the ILS with full inflight reverse and the destruction of the quick access FDR tape along with a notice to pilots \xab would they please only destroy the magnetic tape as we are running out of cassettes \xbb

Accidents have far reaching consequences and surely we owe it to the victims and their families to be told the truth.

But the cover ups keep coming..Mull of Kintyre..covid ….

I suspect there are very few reading this thread who are not appalled at the suggestion of negligence on the part of the CRJ pilots.

The Air Traffic Controller on duty that night was murdered though, by a victim\x92s relative.

To WR6-3s points about lawyers. They should be going after the \x93system\x94, not individuals, especially not the guys on Bluestreak.

We are going now a bit off topic , but there are indeed similarities between DCA and Uberlingen on how the families and lawyers react , and most likely how the judges will react in the end to find who are responsible and award damages to the families.
Lawyers represent both sides so sometimes it is shocking for us professionals who know the truth , confirmed by the official accident report to hear their arguments . .

In Uberlingen there were 13 holes in the cheese layer , any one of them closed and there would likely not have been an accident .For the judges to select only a few of them and concentrate on the person responsible for that hole is not what we, professionals would do , but this is how their system works. ,
Some of the holes were plain bad luck , but many others were man made. The BFU investigated and (tried to) explain all the holes, , the judges only a couple.

The similarities with DCA : on the accident itself , , for the controllers : normalization of deviance , being trained to do things which are not in the book .The judge will look at the book and say the controller did not follow the procedures . . Lawyers from the other side will be exploiting this loophole .
On the pilots : both the Russians and the Bluestreak did things not in their book either , for instance on reactions to TCAS alerts , or on accepting a procedure not briefed.. Lawyers are likely to exploits that as well.

We should not expect the truth coming from the legal system and even when the legal system brings out the truth in the end it does not necessary close the grief for the families . . Taking the Nantes Collison of 1973, , the final trial came 9 years after the event, and after major objections from the Government and the Military which tried to cover up the evidence. and had already delivered their version of the "facts: on the media and State television . .
Still today , 50 years later , the French Government and especially the Armeee de l'Air , still refuse the judgement conclusion ( saying that they are responsible for the collision ) , saying it was false , and still refuse to acknowledge the evidence . For the victim's families , mostly British and Spanish, the wound is still wide open as no-one was held responsible in the end , only "the State " in all its anonymity .

The 100ft in the altimeter is within IFR tolerance , not really the point here , yes you should check against elevation airfield before start , but we learn there is a small discrepancy when on the ground and when the rotor blows over the static holes, and ATC will check again in flight the alt against mode C, it is mandatory on first contact with ATC , but mode C is calibrated on 1013 not QNH , anyway not the major cause here, just another hole on the cheese that night .

As to the lack of experience of the PF , I think 56 h of flying visual and manual an helicopter is significantly more important experience wise that the same number on say, a 747 .I also do not think this was factor.
The reasons and direct causes of this accident are within the 50 NTSB recommendations , not in the altimeter or experience of the PF , unless she had a couple of close calls herself doing visual separation at night before and did not learn from that.

Once only, not repeatedly. She's following the river when they come out of the side arm, but in the wrong direction. My understanding is that the PNF is supposed to be navigating, though.
The landing at the helipad where she abandoned because the wind made the helicopter hard to control, and she lost sight of the landing zone? and then the instructor calls "go around", possibly because of some deer?
I don't think the handling played a part at all.

What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well.

There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this: .
and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'.

For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading.

I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat.

With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did).
There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me.

Pages 238 and 253-254 deal with this:

• "The speed of the accident IP\x92s reply suggests a rote response that occurred without positively identifying flight 5342. This also seems likely because the IP never pointed out or discussed the traffic with the pilot" (p238)
• "requesting and receiving approval for visual separation was normal practice" (p253)
• "An Army standardization instructor pilot stated in a post accident interview that he sometimes responded to traffic advisories before visually acquiring the traffic if he knew that it was far away and was not an imminent threat. The accident IP\x92s significant experience flying on the DC helicopter routes and the speed of his reply to the controller\x92s traffic advisory support the likelihood that he 253 Aviation Investigation Report AIR-26-02 had also developed this habit." (p253-254)

My experience is in two-seat fast jets, but when acting as PIC/PF I would absolutely not expect PNF or WSO to seek my approval before requesting routine clearances from ATC. It's abundantly clear that "visual separation" was routine here, and although it seems likely to have been a rote response in this instance, in my opinion it would have been perfectly in order for PNF to make the request without consulting PIC if he had positively identified the traffic.

Clearly, he hadn't. I'm impressed with the NTSB's reporting on this aspect: the difficulties of using NVG to identify and visually separate from other aircraft are very well described in the narrative, and the photographs through NVG from representative vantage points illustrate them superbly for the uninitiated.