January 30, 2025, 20:28:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817627
Hi all, I’m a UK lapsed PPL and, having listened to the recordings of the ATC comms during this incident, a number of things strike me.
1. The ATC (local controller, or LC) was entirely blameless and appears to have followed all the rules.
2. Likewise the crew of the airliner were entirely blameless, and appeared to be following the procedures perfectly.
3. The mistake, if that is the right word, clearly lies with the actions of the crew of the helicopter here, and the traffic they reported being visual with was obviously not the airliner involved. We will never know what they were looking at, but it wasn’t the CRJ referred to by the LC.
4. My guess is that the result of the investigation into this incident will point the finger at some sort of misunderstanding of radio comms, eg. The helicopter crew might have thought the LC was referring to another aircraft or something similar. Remember, misunderstood comms was responsible for Tenerife in 1977.
5. The troubling thing, though, was that it sounded to me as if the LC here was on the verge of being overwhelmed. He had to speak so quickly that his comms were bordering on being unfathomable. And yet it seems that this was ‘normality’ at DCA.
6. Effective radio comms depend on the people communicating speaking clearly and precisely, so that what they say is understood by all parties involved. That includes waiting for read-backs and acknowledgements.
7. This man was having to speak so fast in order to do his job that it seems strikingly obvious that the volume of traffic he was having to deal with was far too high.
8. I remember that in the UK when I was flying radio comms were set down in a detailed publication which I think was known as CAP413. What I heard of the comms at DCA last night fell rather short of that publication, but it was in no way the fault of the LC.
9. Rather, it was down to whoever set down how much traffic capacity was ‘safe’ to be handled at DCA, and the procedures allowed to accomplish that capacity. It was a fault of the procedures themselves, and my own personal opinion is that having low-level VFR helicopter traffic in potential conflict with low-level VFR airliner traffic in this way, and especially at night, is utterly bonkers.
10. Unless and until the authorities in the US reduce the volume of traffic that they deem to be safe at certain airports, these sorts of incidents will continue to be possible.
11. But of course they won’t reduce the volume, will they. Because the greater volume means more dollars, and dollars trumps safety, doesn’t it, regardless of the platitudes of politicians. It’s just that they have managed to get away with it for so long.
1. The ATC (local controller, or LC) was entirely blameless and appears to have followed all the rules.
2. Likewise the crew of the airliner were entirely blameless, and appeared to be following the procedures perfectly.
3. The mistake, if that is the right word, clearly lies with the actions of the crew of the helicopter here, and the traffic they reported being visual with was obviously not the airliner involved. We will never know what they were looking at, but it wasn’t the CRJ referred to by the LC.
4. My guess is that the result of the investigation into this incident will point the finger at some sort of misunderstanding of radio comms, eg. The helicopter crew might have thought the LC was referring to another aircraft or something similar. Remember, misunderstood comms was responsible for Tenerife in 1977.
5. The troubling thing, though, was that it sounded to me as if the LC here was on the verge of being overwhelmed. He had to speak so quickly that his comms were bordering on being unfathomable. And yet it seems that this was ‘normality’ at DCA.
6. Effective radio comms depend on the people communicating speaking clearly and precisely, so that what they say is understood by all parties involved. That includes waiting for read-backs and acknowledgements.
7. This man was having to speak so fast in order to do his job that it seems strikingly obvious that the volume of traffic he was having to deal with was far too high.
8. I remember that in the UK when I was flying radio comms were set down in a detailed publication which I think was known as CAP413. What I heard of the comms at DCA last night fell rather short of that publication, but it was in no way the fault of the LC.
9. Rather, it was down to whoever set down how much traffic capacity was ‘safe’ to be handled at DCA, and the procedures allowed to accomplish that capacity. It was a fault of the procedures themselves, and my own personal opinion is that having low-level VFR helicopter traffic in potential conflict with low-level VFR airliner traffic in this way, and especially at night, is utterly bonkers.
10. Unless and until the authorities in the US reduce the volume of traffic that they deem to be safe at certain airports, these sorts of incidents will continue to be possible.
11. But of course they won’t reduce the volume, will they. Because the greater volume means more dollars, and dollars trumps safety, doesn’t it, regardless of the platitudes of politicians. It’s just that they have managed to get away with it for so long.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 20:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817629
I'm m not going to do my UK vs US ting this time.
DCA does not seem to be inherently dangerous viewed by an outsider. Intense yes and the heli route does not make any sense. Certainly not if they are doing the 01/33 switch. Is there ground comms between the US mil heliport and the airport and can DCA put a temporary stop on a departure.
Controller seriously over worked but split frequencies may not be an advantage in this situation but two controllers operating would. Take turns in monitoring.
How long would a shift be at that pace for DCA tower - I wouldn't last 10 minutes.
An avoidable accident and thinking of those who lost their lives.
DCA does not seem to be inherently dangerous viewed by an outsider. Intense yes and the heli route does not make any sense. Certainly not if they are doing the 01/33 switch. Is there ground comms between the US mil heliport and the airport and can DCA put a temporary stop on a departure.
Controller seriously over worked but split frequencies may not be an advantage in this situation but two controllers operating would. Take turns in monitoring.
How long would a shift be at that pace for DCA tower - I wouldn't last 10 minutes.
An avoidable accident and thinking of those who lost their lives.
Last edited by Pilot DAR; 30th January 2025 at 20:35 . Reason: typo
Subjects
ATC
DCA
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January 30, 2025, 20:57:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817647
Asking questions which can only be answered by demonstrating knowledge is an art. Asking a question related to discrimination of information that can be answered yes/no is easier but much less satisfactory.
That lack of mutual understanding seems to be a likely proximate cause of this tragedy.
Subjects
ATC
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January 30, 2025, 20:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817649
ATC asked for visual avoidance in darkness
\x85\x85\x85
I am a long retired aviator but with strong views that have been inflamed by today\x92s tragedy. I am writing this post for non professionals so for you guys, please tolerate my carefully chosen words.
\x85,..
US air traffic controlling has been awful since Ronald Reagan sacked all the ATCs in the mid 80\x92s. Their replacements were amateur (-ish) from the start and the previous highly regarded professionals\x92 ethos was not replicated. I stopped flying in 2010 so maybe it has improved since then.πππππ
\x85\x85
I know we have to wait for the formal investigation. But I have first impressions.
The crash today is an example that I can associate with.
The TV clips are very revealing to me.
The ATC (air traffic controller) asks the helicopter if he has the \x93CRJ insight?). The CRJ is the type of aeroplane. If the pilot replies \x93yes\x94 then the ATC is absolved from responsibility to deconflict them.
The problem with this issue is that it is difficult or impossible to see what type of plane it is in the dark. All we can see is the plane\x92s navigation and anti-collision lights. So when the helicopter replied \x93yes\x94 this morning in Washington, he clearly was not referring to the plane he collided with a few seconds later!!!!!! He must have seen a different plane (and there are many planes at any busy airport!!).
\x85\x85\x85
I had one memorable experience of this myself when leaving Los Angeles as a copilot in the mid 90\x92s. It was nighttime. \x85.The ATC asked me if I had \x93the DC9 ahead visual?\x94 I said \x93I have no idea if it is a DC9 but I can see aircraft lights\x94. He got the message!
What they want to do is dump their own responsibility and pass it on to the pilot using his/her own eyes. And they speak far too fast etc etc etc.
I feel sad for the airliner pilots of today\x92s crash. At that stage, at just over 200feet from touchdown (20-25seconds) their attention was on the runway, not looking 90degrees either side \x85..(They would not have been looking around in case another plane might be targeting them!!!)
May they all be resting in peace. Such an unnecessary accident.
i look forward to the accident report which will be done in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.
In particular, I will be looking forward to their recommendations for avoidance of a repeat of this kind of collision..
POTUS\x92s comments today are totally in conflict with Annex 15\x92s words: \x85..accident investigation is \x85\x94not to apportion blame or responsibility\x94.
I am a long retired aviator but with strong views that have been inflamed by today\x92s tragedy. I am writing this post for non professionals so for you guys, please tolerate my carefully chosen words.
\x85,..
US air traffic controlling has been awful since Ronald Reagan sacked all the ATCs in the mid 80\x92s. Their replacements were amateur (-ish) from the start and the previous highly regarded professionals\x92 ethos was not replicated. I stopped flying in 2010 so maybe it has improved since then.πππππ
\x85\x85
I know we have to wait for the formal investigation. But I have first impressions.
The crash today is an example that I can associate with.
The TV clips are very revealing to me.
The ATC (air traffic controller) asks the helicopter if he has the \x93CRJ insight?). The CRJ is the type of aeroplane. If the pilot replies \x93yes\x94 then the ATC is absolved from responsibility to deconflict them.
The problem with this issue is that it is difficult or impossible to see what type of plane it is in the dark. All we can see is the plane\x92s navigation and anti-collision lights. So when the helicopter replied \x93yes\x94 this morning in Washington, he clearly was not referring to the plane he collided with a few seconds later!!!!!! He must have seen a different plane (and there are many planes at any busy airport!!).
\x85\x85\x85
I had one memorable experience of this myself when leaving Los Angeles as a copilot in the mid 90\x92s. It was nighttime. \x85.The ATC asked me if I had \x93the DC9 ahead visual?\x94 I said \x93I have no idea if it is a DC9 but I can see aircraft lights\x94. He got the message!
What they want to do is dump their own responsibility and pass it on to the pilot using his/her own eyes. And they speak far too fast etc etc etc.
I feel sad for the airliner pilots of today\x92s crash. At that stage, at just over 200feet from touchdown (20-25seconds) their attention was on the runway, not looking 90degrees either side \x85..(They would not have been looking around in case another plane might be targeting them!!!)
May they all be resting in peace. Such an unnecessary accident.
i look forward to the accident report which will be done in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.
In particular, I will be looking forward to their recommendations for avoidance of a repeat of this kind of collision..
POTUS\x92s comments today are totally in conflict with Annex 15\x92s words: \x85..accident investigation is \x85\x94not to apportion blame or responsibility\x94.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
ICAO
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January 30, 2025, 21:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817657
so so right. As well as rubbish procedures, the speed of conversation and lack of pauses for responding is disastrous, US ATC needs a whole review from top to bottom.
Subjects
ATC
Land and Hold Short
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 30, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817695
Yes, I saw that. Why wasn't ATC more specific, ie, do you see the traffic at your 1 o'clock, etc? Still, the question stands: ATC sees both aircraft, so why is ATC putting them on a collision course with AA setup to turn in front of the helicopter with almost no separation? The clock was ticking and ATC wasn't reacting with
instructions
\x96 ATC was just asking questions. Is that SOP?
In such close distance, on a collision course, there is no place for a question, but an INSTRUCTION, as ATC is the only one with a clear overview of the situation.
Not trying to put blame here, but the controller needs to step up once he gets a conflict warning and act, and ask questions later.
RIP to all involved, a truly sad and avoidable event.
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
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January 30, 2025, 22:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817697
Listening to the ATC transcript on YouTube, one can clearly hear ATC receive a conflict warning as the CRJ and the Blackhawk get close. Why on earth didn't ATC immediately instruct the helo simply to "PAT25 turn left hdg xxx IMMEDIATELY, I say again ..." , instead he again asked for verification that PAT 25 had the CRJ in sight?
In such close distance, on a collision course, there is no place for a question, but an INSTRUCTION, as ATC is the only one with a clear overview of the situation.
Not trying to put blame here, but the controller needs to step up once he gets a conflict warning and act, and ask questions later.
RIP to all involved, a truly sad and avoidable event.
In such close distance, on a collision course, there is no place for a question, but an INSTRUCTION, as ATC is the only one with a clear overview of the situation.
Not trying to put blame here, but the controller needs to step up once he gets a conflict warning and act, and ask questions later.
RIP to all involved, a truly sad and avoidable event.
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
PAT25
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January 30, 2025, 22:14:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817698
The audio is stitched back together.
But that's why nobody picked up the responses from the Helo crew, despite the LC clearly hearing and getting acks.
Complicating matters in that TRACON is that the military A/C also have their own controller on the assigned frequency. This is probably essential given the comings and goings at the Pentagon and local bases.
Given the track for the helo? It sure appears they expected the aircraft they were waiting on was lined up for 1, not 33. Given this, it is at least possible that they were watching the lights coming from the inbound AC from the Localizer for 1 (a A319 AA plane), not the CRJ descending through their position towards 33.
It's all conjecture, but the use of a separate frequency for the Pentagon-adjacent traffic is cited in several reputable reports as of this AM. Juan Brown's just uploaded an update with further information on the frequency split.
It seems clear from that the the CRJ likely could not hear the Blackhawk. And, with less certainty, that the Blackhawk probably didn't hear transmissions from the CRJ.
Last edited by TachyonID; 30th January 2025 at 23:14 . Reason: Clarify sources for statement about AC on two different frequencies.
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
KDCA
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January 30, 2025, 22:16:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817700
See and avoid in airline operations simply does not work. High workload, human factors, visual limitations, high closing speeds simply make it unreliable.
There have been countless similar cases of near misses. Near airports, crossing traffic, especially helicopters is a real issue, as is the totally inappropriate see and avoid principle with commercial traffic. In my view we need a complete rule change and rethink around lack of radar separation between IFR and VFR traffic.
All too frequently ATC allow IFR and VFR far too close on approach and are permitted to just inform the VFR traffic to visually manoeuvre themselves all too close to IFR traffic. The book 'The Naked Pilot' years ago established that see and avoid does not work, simple as that.
Class D airspace whilst not necessarily involved here often causes such issues. Pilot's wrongly believe ATC separates IFR and VFR. Frequently ATC allow conflicts to develop on the basis of law, rather than duty of care. We need to get back to common sense, and that is ATC must stop VFR traffic getting anywhere near airliners on final approach or from crossing the go around track. Either lateral or vertical separation needs to be enforced or repeats of this type of accident will definitely repeat.
Lessons have not been learned previous to this accident. I fear we will see a repeat, and low level near airport ATC separation needs to improve.
We need the industry to wake up and realise, see and avoid is unreliable, and air law does not protect IFR traffic from VFR traffic enough.
There have been countless similar cases of near misses. Near airports, crossing traffic, especially helicopters is a real issue, as is the totally inappropriate see and avoid principle with commercial traffic. In my view we need a complete rule change and rethink around lack of radar separation between IFR and VFR traffic.
All too frequently ATC allow IFR and VFR far too close on approach and are permitted to just inform the VFR traffic to visually manoeuvre themselves all too close to IFR traffic. The book 'The Naked Pilot' years ago established that see and avoid does not work, simple as that.
Class D airspace whilst not necessarily involved here often causes such issues. Pilot's wrongly believe ATC separates IFR and VFR. Frequently ATC allow conflicts to develop on the basis of law, rather than duty of care. We need to get back to common sense, and that is ATC must stop VFR traffic getting anywhere near airliners on final approach or from crossing the go around track. Either lateral or vertical separation needs to be enforced or repeats of this type of accident will definitely repeat.
Lessons have not been learned previous to this accident. I fear we will see a repeat, and low level near airport ATC separation needs to improve.
We need the industry to wake up and realise, see and avoid is unreliable, and air law does not protect IFR traffic from VFR traffic enough.
Subjects
ATC
Close Calls
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Vertical Separation
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January 30, 2025, 22:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817705
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 22:32:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817714
Dont assume this type of procedure is only in USA. Approaching Scottish airport ATZ, 'HOLD AT ALEXANDRIA', 9 orbits, 'CONTINUE APPROACH' , 'BREAK OFF, ORBIT XXXX' ,5 orbits 'REJOIN AFTER 777' (more traffic behind 777) I'm at a position in orbit pointing away from approach track, and quite dizzy,
how the h do I identify the aircraft I'm instructed to follow,slotting in between approaching traffic, and not being a plane spotter identifying which of the 7XX I'm supposed to follow as no. 2. Fortunately no.2 head on a swivel, 'Its that one', follow him. ATC should quit asking us to identify aircraft types as a means of sequencing traffic.
how the h do I identify the aircraft I'm instructed to follow,slotting in between approaching traffic, and not being a plane spotter identifying which of the 7XX I'm supposed to follow as no. 2. Fortunately no.2 head on a swivel, 'Its that one', follow him. ATC should quit asking us to identify aircraft types as a means of sequencing traffic.
Subjects
ATC
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January 30, 2025, 22:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817716
OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
CRJ
IFR
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 22:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817719
ATC's paramount role, it's predominant, principal reason for existing is
separation.
In the US, controllers are much too eager to pass that buck over to the pilots. Far too eager to hand off their traffic onto a visual approach, often intimidatingly so. It happens nowhere else.
Subjects
ATC
ATCO
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 23:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817743
I can't speak for the USA, but my understanding was always that the flight rules for the CRJ don't change, unless the crew cancel their IFR plan: ie flying a visual approach doesn't change the flight rule status. The crew can still expect IFR separation from other IFR & SVFR flights, & traffic information on conflicting VFR flights.
In the US does an agreement to make a visual approach regardless of airspace classification, cancel IFR separation requirements for the ATCO?
Subjects
ATC
ATCO
CRJ
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 23:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817745
a good test of that principle is what happens if the crew go around having commenced a visual approach. They are expected to fly the MAP and not go off script.
In Europe, the radar service can be terminated on an instrument approach once descending into uncontrolled airspace. But the a/c is still IFR.
In Europe, the radar service can be terminated on an instrument approach once descending into uncontrolled airspace. But the a/c is still IFR.
Subjects
ATC
IFR
Radar
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January 30, 2025, 23:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817756
OK so what's your interpretation of the rules here then?
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
The airliner is under IFR rules on its flight plan until it gets changed to a different runway, when it's then VFR.
The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone.
Radar useless as the aircraft are too low.
Airliner TCAS useless as inhibited, even if it can decode the military transponder's data.
Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. So each aircraft can neither hear the other nor the ATC instructions to that aircraft.
It's difficult to see aircraft at night against a backdrop of a city with thousands of lights. And when you're gonna hit something, as others have said, that light doesn't move relative to you, so you don't notice it - it just blends into the background lights.
It only takes the chopper to misidentify the aircraft it's supposed to go behind and to therefore turn into the path of the airliner it was supposed to avoid - draw the map with the vectors and it all makes sense. These two aircraft ended up in the Potomac, but they could have ended up in much worse places in terms of loss of life on the ground.
Seems to me it's been an accident waiting to happen for some time.
"Radar useless as the aircraft are too low." - It seems there's valid radar returns from both aircraft. the FAA has a good diagram of the Potomac TRACON radar sites, about 10 different radars, and having visited the TRACON several times, they readily explain there's another nearly facility that is a duplicate of their radar feed, but for national security. I assume there's coverage till the river service for security to prevent someone from sneaking up the river with bad ideas
"Radio situational awareness compromised as chopper on UHF, airliner on VHF. " - I fly in the area and in my experience everyone is on the same VHF, they might be also duped to UHF and can hear everybody on my handheld. You hear AF-1 all the time on freq.
"The chopper is under VFR, stooging along a river at 200 ft and avoiding traffic" - Most of the area NE of the airfield in a prohibited area, and there's a lot of military installations within 5 miles of DC that they are shuttling around, so that path seems perfectly acceptable given the numerous constraints. there's nothing wrong with a helo corridor as long as you stay within it and maintain the prescribed altitude. Also, it's not like KDCA is some secret place, the flight paths are pretty well known if that's where you work. It's popular to sit in parks on both ends and watch the planes, there's literally millions of local people that know exactly the planes are coming and going on both directions. so if you're a helo there, you know where the hot spots are. Likewise, its not just any helo in that area, everyone is vetted, fingerprinted in the inner FRZ.
" on approach to Reagan by visual clues alone" - The UH-60 was not going to DCA, the assumption was it was using the helo route 4 corridor. All the UH-60Ls I've seen have full glass with moving map and I'm assuming a magenta line for the helo corridor.
Fun Fact - Calling it "Reagan" will get you tarred and feathered in the area. Folks refuse to utter the name and for years (decades) the Metro refused to rename the station until legally forced.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 31st January 2025 at 00:05 . Reason: Prescribed/proscribed
Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
DCA
FAA
Hot Spots
IFR
KDCA
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
Route 4
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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January 30, 2025, 23:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817762
Assuming the youtube clips are accurate, why did ATC tell the helicopter to pass behind a CRJ when both aircraft were approaching each other head on? How would that even work?
And as stated by other people earlier, but it bears repeating, at night you're *never* sure what traffic you are seeing. Even during the day it's extremely hard to differentiate between different aircraft types. At night *everyone* is guessing that the light blob they see is a CRJ or a 737 or even a PC12 or a C172. Visual separation only works when it's not necessary: in low traffic areas.
And to deviate a little bit, I'm afraid the next incident will involve landing clearances to runways that are not clear at all.
And as stated by other people earlier, but it bears repeating, at night you're *never* sure what traffic you are seeing. Even during the day it's extremely hard to differentiate between different aircraft types. At night *everyone* is guessing that the light blob they see is a CRJ or a 737 or even a PC12 or a C172. Visual separation only works when it's not necessary: in low traffic areas.
And to deviate a little bit, I'm afraid the next incident will involve landing clearances to runways that are not clear at all.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 30, 2025, 23:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817772
The real problem here is expecting one pilot to be responsible for visual separation (at any time, but especially at night). At what point do we agree to release ATC from the responsibility of keeping us separated by sufficient margins? I know a miss is as good as a mile but if I've got a bunch of people sitting behind me, I'd prefer 500/1000 feet just to be on the safe side thanks.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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January 31, 2025, 00:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817780
AIM 5-4-23
e. A visual approach is not an IAP and therefore has no missed approach segment. If a go around is necessary for any reason, aircraft operating at controlled airports will be issued an appropriate advisory/clearance/instruction by the tower. At uncontrolled airports, aircraft are expected to remain clear of clouds and complete a landing as soon as possible. If a landing cannot be accomplished, the aircraft is expected to remain clear of clouds and contact ATC as soon as possible for further clearance. Separation from other IFR aircraft will be maintained under these circumstances.
Subjects
ATC
IFR
Separation (ALL)
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January 31, 2025, 00:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11817791
Subjects
ATC
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