Posts about: "ATC" [Posts: 614 Page: 8 of 31]¶

FYI: When positions get combined, the controller hears all the frequencies he is working and can transmit on two or more at once. The aircraft don't hear the other frequencies.

My recollection may also be a little hazy but I recall the rules in the UK were changed a few years ago to permit VFR at night.
I'm not saying I agreed with this but that I believe is the situation in the UK.

That would defeat the original intent of the separate helo controller herding them around without having to deal with the very busy airplane tower frequency. Obviously this totally fails when there is only one person

Note/apologies to moderators: As a private pilot who doesn’t even fly anymore, I normally wouldn’t contribute to a thread like this, but I live in the great Washington, DC, area, so I know what the weather was like (very clear, visibility 26 miles, low wind, warming up after a very cold cold snap, the ice on the river was breaking up..) I’ve been to Hains point and the park across the river due south of the airport, as well as flying in and out of DCA as a pax, etc., etc.

BTW, the Potomac River is subject to sea tides by the airport, so that can’t help in the recovery, plus it was carrying a lot of melted snow at the time, adding to the cold and volume.

It’s been on the news 24/7 around here.

Anyway, there are a few stories in the Washington Post that might be of interest, or completely irrelevant​​​​​​:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...eagan-airport/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...potomac-river/

P.S., Apparently the helicopter controller had to leave early that evening, but it was considered a slow time, so was allowed without someone else being called in.

Sadly, the answer to your implied question ("if the SMS works the same as everywhere else in the world") is NO. Certainly not when it comes to SMS in ATC.

I was comparing the ATC to the Heathrow BA38 recordings, Heathrow much calmer and clearer (but then maybe it is because I am a Brit and easier to understand my own accent)

mate , Heathrow controllers are brilliant , best of the best . They consistently impress , nothing seems to rattle them ( I know they are human and stress like we all do ) .

Heathrow is great, calm and polite.
Even as they apologize for setting up a near miss, they are, polite and calm.
They are human, and subject to the same frailties as the rest of us.
They are sure polite though.

Heathrow suffers from the problem that their local airspace is.. logical, as are the flight paths, and generally the runway utilisation. They don't have the benefit of the special design skills applied to JFK's terminal procedures which seem to have been designed to give cardio workouts for the controller and the pilots. Masterful airspace design.

JFK, making Abuja look attractive.

This endless discussion about UHF/VHF frequencies is a bit disturbing.
Please read the helicopter route chart.
https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/09-05...-Wash_Heli.pdf
There is a DCA tower frequency dedicated to helicopters: "134.35 (HELI)".
And it looks VHF to me.

Edit: Sorry, didn't see that skwdenyer had already answered

Everyone seems to have missed this earlier post. Please take this into consideration before bashing the controller.

From the Washington Post:

https://archive.ph/lQ3js (Avoids paywall)

I have been watching this thread for a while now and felt compelled to respond, mainly due to some of the comments on here, a proportion of which, come from professionals within our industry which in itself is troubling.

Lets break it down based on what we know so far:

See and Avoid We have years and years and years of evidence about the limitations of see and avoid. It is not and never will be effective mitigation to a collision risk on its own. It needs to be backed up with other barriers such as ACAS etc. The human eye is particularly bad at spotting stationary objects, which would have been the case in this instance with another aircraft on a steady bearing. Those who criticise the aircrew for not keeping a good lookout are being disingenuous. The ability to judge distance at night, is difficult. Those who suggest the helicopter was looking up at the night sky, omit to recognise that the cameras on which you are basing that opinion, were at ground level. The crew of the Helo would have been at a similar altitude, looking at a background of many lights, with other aircraft barely above the horizon. The reports state that the aircrew may have been on NVG. This exacerbates the issue as they narrow your field of view, make depth perception even worse and of course, those I know of, do not display different colours, such as navigation lights. So see and avoid needs to be backed up by other measures and one can also see how VFR at night is fraught with danger.

Procedures - There is nothing inherently wrong with helicopter lanes close to aerodromes as long as the procedures that control such traffic are robust. I do not know what the local procedures state for routes 1 and 4 but I would expect them to include a limitation to ensure that you cannot use route 4/1 if an approach is being made to Rwy 33 or vice versa, an approach cannot be made to Rwy 33 if there is traffic on route 1/4. If such a procedure does no t exist then we could argue negligence. Lets assume one does exist. In that case, I would expect some process to block the route or the approach, using an aide memoire such as a flight strip or other electronic means. The recent crash at Haneda, highlights the need for such a safety barrier.

The Controller - Reports suggest that controller numbers were down to 19, which is woefully inadequate for an operation such as this and I hope the NTSB looks at what actions were taken by the airport to close in the face of staff limitations. We assume from reports, that the controller concerned was working in a combined position, with band-boxed frequencies. Looking at FR24 replays, it was quite busy at the time and we also do not know what level of fatigue the individuals were under. If the procedures above were in force, was a blocking strip forgotten? Was the controller overloaded or distracted? I hope they were not combining Radar and tower!

Phraseology - Others on here have mentioned about phraseology used. First of all, I cannot understand this machismo, that US controllers have to speak fast. Stop it! It is dangerous and you only end up having to repeat yourself. Others have mentioned about using the clock code. The Tower controller may not have the endorsement to use radar procedures and may have been forced to use geographical points. From what I have heard and yes lets wait for the report, it seems that the phraseology used was sub optimal.

Duty of Care - Some of here have spoken about the transfer of responsibility onto the helicopter operator. This is a pet hate of mine, of people hiding behind the rules to abrogate responsibility. Everyone in the system has a duty of care and Air Traffic Controllers, regardless of type of service, have an accountability to do what they can to prevent collisions. That is written into the highest levels of ICAO Annex 11

My condolences to all involved and my thoughts are also with those under investigation, who I feel may have been let down by the system.

The world is not that black and white.
DCA, and others nornalize collision alerts in the background of a significant % of ATC transmssions.

TCAS RA heights show mandatory Day, VMC go arounds the day prior- but how close was the helicopter to the 737 not going around 2 minutes earlier the day prior, so low TCAS TA only height below 900' allows continuing?

You think the CRJ crew, below 500', rolling out of a left turn to 33 sees the helicopter to their right or even notices the TCAS TA display? Maybe it gets a glance IF the short final is wired. Problem is the Traffic aural is already expected in the airspace, same as hearing the ATC collision alarms in their transmission background.

There will be line of sight recreations in the reports. The CRJ will not have but a scant chance to have seen the PAT25, with caveats- the CVR has to be heard.

Pat25 likely had a 500 hour pic getting a checkride in the right, distant seat and the radio PM/1000 hour pilot in left seat, seeing only AAL3130 and trying to figure out how to pass behind, cognitive dissonance with what is seen..

3 seconds later, all ends.

James Reason, Diane Vaughan, NASA, et al...

From the NY Times:

https://archive.ph/tvAQ0 (Avoids paywall)

Well said and reasoned.

The losses so far in this case are almost defined, except that the unfortunate ATC officer is a victim of nothing more than being human and working within the constraints of a system that he did not design or have responsibility of. He has the most powerful pumpkin in the world defaming him from the normalised position of gross ignorance to such an extent that even Fox news and CNN push back. I would suggest that a suicide watch be placed on this poor individual to protect him from the hurtful comments that exude from the incumbent of the WH. This guy is going through hell, as much or more so than any other person suffering the loss in this mishap.


PS:

Humans may be the frail part of the system but they are also the most resilient parts. We will have moments in the following months to doubt that, history highlights failures not successes.




You need to go further back in the ATC playbacks. The helicopter crew had previously reported visual contact with the CRJ and requested (yes - requested) and been given responsibility for visual separation. The exchange you are referring to is the one which followed the collision alert and the controller's subsequent questioning of the helicopter crew as to whether they really did have the CRJ in sight.

Agreed and their ability to use the radio with clarity and stick to ICAO language is worth underlining.Speed of delivery in ATC communication adds nothing to safety.

Canadian ATC is even more of a "whoa this really is a different country" than a flashing green light.

Where else does 200ft vertical get classed as separation on top of which the CRJ was obviously descending as well .as it was on final approach . On the radar shots both aircraft are head to head for several seconds again with decreasing 200ft separation but the stressed out controller either doesnt see it or as many people have pointed out asks the helo pilot if he can see something -at night! instead of ordering an immediate left turn . One of the more avoidable accidents and especially sad because of it . God knows what the tower controller is going thru at the moment both from massive regret and no doubt a degree of he will get the blame cos its going to be him or the helo pilot not anyone involved with the absurd planning of having aircraft on head on converging courses both below 500ft with one in a descending turn a mile from touchdown

It will be interesting to see how the balance of fact-finding and fault-finding works out in this new regime. The one thing that people will do with complete reliability is make mistakes.