ATC Page: 9 of 31

RAFEngO74to09
January 31, 2025, 19:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818522

Ward Carroll video on the mid-air - with input from USCG helo pilot familiar with the area. Again, helo too high (300ft shown on ATC plot) + probably sighted wrong aircraft)

Subjects ATC

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Bratchewurst
January 31, 2025, 20:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818524

Quote:

Originally Posted by Easy Street

You need to go further back in the ATC playbacks. The helicopter crew had previously reported visual contact with the CRJ and requested (yes - requested) and been given responsibility for visual separation. The exchange you are referring to is the one which followed the collision alert and the controller's subsequent questioning of the helicopter crew as to whether they really did have the CRJ in sight.

From the audio of the previous night\x92s incident, it seems that accepting responsibility for visual separation from DCA traffic may well be standard operating procedure for military helos transiting DCA airspace. I\x92m sure there are very reasonable (or at least reasonable-sounding) reasons that might be.

Subjects ATC CRJ DCA Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

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D Bru
January 31, 2025, 21:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818547

SAR Bloke Easy Street Nicd

Comments appreciated of course. Indeed, I was referring to the second LC comms with the helo (coinciding with CA alerts). Class B mandates ATC to ensure separation , no matter VFR (indeed twice requested and twice accepted) or IFR (on the question whether AA by/when accepting 33 canceled IFR or not). This IMO implies much more on ATC than re-requesting whether A/C in sight, in particular in case of CA alert, less than one good/bad minute apart.

Last edited by D Bru; 31st January 2025 at 21:41 . Reason: clarity :)

Subjects ATC IFR Separation (ALL) VFR

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MissChief
January 31, 2025, 22:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818564

Quote:

Originally Posted by Bratchewurst

Many years ago, shortly after I got my instrument rating, I flew a friend from St. Paul to St. Louis in a rented C172. Of course I filed IFR, being anxious to get more practice in the system. We were maybe 10-20 miles SW of MSP in level flight when I heard the controller tell a Northwest flight of Cessna traffic somewhere in our direction; there was another Cessna in the area as well. NW called \x93traffic in sight.\x94 Maybe 10 seconds later my passenger pointed very excitedly behind us and to our left. There was a NW 727, maybe 200-300 yards behind us and climbing through our altitude from left to right. Very fast.

I\x92ve always wondered if they really saw us or the other Cessna. It was probably the closest I\x92ve ever been to another aircraft not in the pattern. It felt way too close.

\x93See and avoid\x94 is really not the basis for safe separation of traffic in the air. Depending on it at night in airspace as busy as DC is choosing poorly.

TCAS has mostly solved the separation problem for every phase of flight except very close to the airport or on the ground. If the industry is going to short-staff ATC and keep cramming more traffic into the same airspace, the industry needs to develop and equivalent solution for those phases of flight as well.

TCAS has definitely not mostly solved separation. Your example cites that, unless you were not IFR, in contrary to what you wrote. I experienced pop-up traffic at 5200 feet, north of Daytona, which passed 100-150 yards to our left at the same altitude. RA was extremely late for us. ATC had given no indication of conflicting traffic. Nor was it on frequency. I was operating an A330 with 325 pax and 12 crew. .

Subjects ATC IFR Separation (ALL) TCAS (All)

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PPRuNeUser134364
January 31, 2025, 22:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818566

Quote:

Originally Posted by D Bru

I am not a USA airspace expert, and I'm sure there are many rules that I don't know about, but having just read the FAR AIM section on 'pilot-applied visual separation' it reads to me, as an interested foreigner, that the LC can pass responsibility for separation to a pilot if they are visual. The class B separation criteria states:

VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:

1 \xbd miles separation, or
500 feet vertical separation, or
Visual separation, as specified in paragraph 7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph 7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.

The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:

If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.

Whilst I agree giving avoidance instructions would possibly be a sensible thing to do, I can't see that explicitly written in the FAR AIM if pilot-applied visual separation has been approved. There may be other sections (or other regulations) that go into more detail that I am not aware of.

Subjects ATC IFR Radar Separation (ALL) VFR Vertical Separation Visual Separation

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Bratchewurst
January 31, 2025, 22:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818579

Quote:

Originally Posted by MissChief

My incident was long before TCAS. I was definitely IFR. I accept that my conclusion that TCAS has \x93solved separation\x94 in most cases is based on the absence of news reporting of such incidents - in marked contrast to the reporting of all the runway incursions and close calls in situations where TCAS is inhibited. Admittedly that\x92s more anecdote than data.

Subjects ATC Close Calls IFR Separation (ALL) TCAS (All)

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cyrano_de_bergerac
January 31, 2025, 22:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818580

Quote:

Originally Posted by MickG0105

To provide some context,

more than half (26) of the 48 reported incidents occurred in the 1990s.
there were ten incidents reported between 2000 and 2014, inclusive.
there were nine incidents reported between 2015 and 2020 inclusive.
there were three incidents reported from 2021 to present; two incidents in 2022, and one in 2024.

The submission dates for the 16 incidents referenced in your post are as follows:
1. April 2024
2. January 2022
3. July 2018
4. July 2015
5. May 2015
6. March 2015
7. June 2013
8. May 2013
9. April 1999
10. February 1997
11. September 1993
12. August 1993
13. July 1993
14. June 1993
15. August 1992
16. April 1991

Interpretation of this statistical summary may vary widely depending on the point being argued. It is only a breakdown of one pprune'rs result's on a search for 'helicopter' in one database, so it is likely not a good representation of official safety incident data. There seems to be growing colloquial reports of past close calls on approach to 33, and general consensus that this was an accident waiting to happen wrt a 'normalization of deviance' in the design of the route 1 & 4 on this chart specifically, and some aspects of the US ATC safety culture generally. Thus if incident reporting of heli/aircraft conflicts have dropped that much, I would personally suspect some aspects of the reporting process (or social or systemic factors) are inhibiting the reporting.

Subjects ATC Accident Waiting to Happen Close Calls

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my_call
January 31, 2025, 22:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818585

"2. Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge"

I don't think this was done and implies controller is not absolved of responsibility even after visual separation approved.

Subjects ATC Radar Separation (ALL) Visual Separation

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GoWest
January 31, 2025, 23:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818607

Rubbish

Listen to the audio at 1.10 to 1.13

Controller asks PAT25 if CRJ in sight NO ANSWER

Controller asks PAT25 to pass behind. NO ANSWER

Dealt with.

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Pass Behind (PAT25)

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fly-by-wife
January 31, 2025, 23:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818608

C ommercial aviation demand outstripping capacity
O ver reliance on "see and avoid" in ATC
M ixture of military and civil traffic in terminal areas
P olitical interference at Federal level
L essons not learned from previous incidents
A TC shortages and chronic understaffing
C omplexity of airspace around major cities
E quipment and technology outdated or inadequate
N ormalisation of deviance
C onvenience chosen over safety
Y our luck runs out

Subjects ATC See and Avoid

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jonas64
January 31, 2025, 23:21:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818613

Quote:

Originally Posted by GoWest

Rubbish

Listen to the audio at 1.10 to 1.13

Controller asks PAT25 if CRJ in sight NO ANSWER

Controller asks PAT25 to pass behind. NO ANSWER

Dealt with.

Don't assume the audio the public has access to is the same as what the controller was hearing. The ATC audio archives from LiveATC are taken from ground stations, mostly operated by members of the public. It is far inferior in quality and reception to what the controllers are actually hearing.

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Pass Behind (PAT25)

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D Bru
January 31, 2025, 23:31:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818616

Quote:

Originally Posted by SAR Bloke

1 \xbd miles separation, or
500 feet vertical separation, or
Visual separation, as specified in paragraph 7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph 7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.

The rules for pilot-applied visual separation state:

If the aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.
Advise the pilots if the radar targets appear likely to merge.

Thanks, indeed from the ATC transcripts published online so far, it doesn\x92t transpire that LC, after the helo (re-) confirmed being visible with the CRJ, complied with the following:\x93NOTE-

If aircraft are on converging courses, inform the other aircraft of the traffic and that visual separation is being applied.

PHRASEOLOGY-

(ACID), TRAFFIC, (clock position and distance), (direction) BOUND, (type of aircraft), HAS YOU IN SIGHT AND WILL MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION.

Advise the pilots if the targets appear likely to merge.

NOTE-

Issue this advisory in conjunction with the instruction to maintain visual separation, the advisory to the other aircraft of the converging course, or thereafter if the controller subsequently becomes aware that the targets are merging.\x94

Subjects ATC CRJ Radar Separation (ALL) VFR Vertical Separation Visual Separation

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AirScotia
January 31, 2025, 23:42:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818626

Quote:

Originally Posted by GoWest

Rubbish

Listen to the audio at 1.10 to 1.13

Controller asks PAT25 if CRJ in sight NO ANSWER

Controller asks PAT25 to pass behind. NO ANSWER

Dealt with.

There are several recordings - not all of them capture the helicopter frequency.

This shows exactly the communications. The heli was told about the CRJ at 1200ft, going for 33. The heli said explicitly they had the plane in sight.

7:20 onwards.

Subjects ATC CRJ PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Pass Behind (PAT25)

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A0283
January 31, 2025, 23:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818633

NTSB briefing 31st January 2025

Helicopter single box combing CVR+DFDR has been recovered and looked good. No exterior damage.

Aircraft CVR had already been recovered, showed water ingress, was soaked in ionised water, then into oven for getting water out, still checking connectors \x85 but high confidence to get audio out.

Aircraft FDR already recovered, no water ingress, soaked in alcohol, looked good, ref 2,000 datapoints, high confidence to get data out.

NTSB investigation runs parallel to DoD investigation (I assume that will be the usual double), but independent, so NTSB got its own heli on-type licensed pilot in the team.

Investigation has a closely matching config CRJ available to match recovery of items and seating and cockpit config with items being recovered (which are refd on grid coordinates).

Main lift starts tomorrow and may take days. Prio 1 is still recovering all the victims. After that heavy lift of the big chunks starts on Sunday. This will take days.

ATCO interview(s) has already started. The history of the wider ATC team of controllers will look back for 24-72 hrs probably. But also at level of hiring and training.

PoB manifest are, by law, never published by NTSB and are excluded from FOIA.

Last edited by A0283; 1st February 2025 at 00:17 .

Subjects ATC ATCO CRJ NTSB

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LapSap
February 01, 2025, 00:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818637

Quote:

Originally Posted by Flyhighfirst

How is visual separation allowed in the US so close to the threshold?

Because it\x92s sometimes the best place to cross helicopter traffic through the final approach path.
Note I say \x91through\x92 and not \x91under\x92.

I\x92m sure it is done at many airports around the World and we have a similar procedure at a large international airport in East Asia.

HOWEVER, the idea that the 200ft ceiling on the heli route is designed to provide vertical separation from the approach is ludicrous.

I suspect that limit is imposed to allow clearance from the Take-off climb surface if using the opposite direction runways. That would indeed be possible from a flight procedure design point of view (TERPS or PANS-OPS).

The only safe way is to cross behind traffic on final laterally . In some ways it would be better for the heli to be at a higher altitude if on 33 but for simplicity of procedure they may have just made it a blanket 200ft regardless.

Our procedure has laterally separated holding points either side of final which is the clearance limit where the heli can orbit or delay as necessary until confirming the aircraft to pass behind is in sight. The heli is also advised where the next aircraft in the sequence is to further verify the correct aircraft is in sight and what margin they need to leave behind the one crossing behind. Again, being higher is better as they can avoid wake turbulence by remaining well an above the glide path and pass closer behind, well ahead of the following.
There is no doubt night time makes this a far more critical operation and requires full attention. In our operation the heli is also on the same frequency as the approach aircraft, so having separate positions to control fixed wing and helis wouldn\x92t have any benefit.
This controller was hugely busy however, handling departures as well. I can\x92t believe the speed of his transmissions - even as a controller for over 30 years I have trouble with all the abbreviated phrases- of course local pilots would be used to it and expecting clipped frequencies etc\x85

The trouble with a lot of these types of procedures is a lot is carried out as a box ticking exercise - heli calls requesting to cross the final ✅, LC provides the position of the aircraft to pass behind ✅, heli reports sighting and requests own visual separation ✅, approved ✅.
LC is no doubt expected to monitor compliance visually although hugely busy with other traffic on the runway. It does sound like he was doing so, especially when the CA goes off in the background audio and puts doubt in his mind the heli is passing clear of the CRJ. He asks again immediately.
The heli confirms, so difficult to further challenge the pilot.

In my view a poorly designed procedure which was guaranteed to place the 2 aircraft in the same position if an error was made.

Subjects ATC CRJ Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Separation (ALL) Vertical Separation Visual Separation

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Lead Balloon
February 01, 2025, 00:06:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818639

Quote:

Originally Posted by Chesty Morgan

Perhaps not, but it was. That they maybe shouldn't have been given that responsibility doesn't abrogate them from such.

It's akin to blaming someone else when you fly in to a hill under your own terrain separation.

I find that logic to be circular and the analogy to be a false equivalence.

To take the analogy first, when a PIC takes responsibility for separation from terrain, that PIC is putting only one aircraft and its POB at risk: The aircraft that the PIC is flying. In the case of the current tragedy, the system seems effectively to have put responsibility for the safety of two aircraft (at least) and all their POB into the lap of the PIC of one of them, on the basis of the (demonstrably dangerous) assumption that the PIC could reliably sight and follow a specific aircraft, at night, without any risk of misidentification.

Speaking of assumptions, I'm confident that the passengers on the CRJ would have assumed - reasonably I'd suggest - that the ATC system would always 'have their back'. I'm also confident that there will be a lot of grieving people at the moment, simply unable to grapple with the enormity of the realisation that the assumption was dangerously na\xefve. (Presumably, similar airspace arrangements continue in place at other locations, where the system continues to allocate responsibility similarly?)

Note that I do not presume to allocate responsibility for the tragedy to any individual/s. If I were pressed, I would allocate responsibility to whomever 'signed off' on arrangements in Class B airspace that entailed such a durr-obvious risk of precisely what happened.

Last edited by Lead Balloon; 1st February 2025 at 00:24 .

Subjects ATC CRJ Separation (ALL)

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FullyFullyReady
February 01, 2025, 00:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818645

Quote:

Originally Posted by GoWest

Rubbish

Listen to the audio at 1.10 to 1.13

Controller asks PAT25 if CRJ in sight NO ANSWER

Controller asks PAT25 to pass behind. NO ANSWER

Dealt with.

I believe the controller was working two frequencies (duplexed?), probably 119.1 and 134.35, so raw LiveATC recordings would only pick up one side of the conversation.
The two traffic items probably didn't hear each other.

Subjects ATC CRJ Frequency 119.1 Frequency 134.35 PAT25 Pass Behind Pass Behind (All) Pass Behind (PAT25)

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joe_bloggs
February 01, 2025, 00:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818670

Quote:

My understanding is the controller communicated on multiple frequencies. One for PAT25 on UHF which was not able to be heard by the CRJ. The second of the “VAS videos” edited the multiple frequency streams together in which you hear the PAT25 responses. This was not as heard by the CRJ crew. They were deprived of that awareness.

Edit: here’s vid.

Last edited by joe_bloggs; 1st February 2025 at 04:33 . Reason: Added vid link

Subjects ATC CRJ Frequency 119.1 Frequency 134.35 PAT25

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MarkD
February 01, 2025, 02:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818703

Vasaviation has posted a different PAT helicopter being involved in a TCAS RA and go-around for a different passenger aircraft the previous day. The video indicates it coming close to two others and there was a Tower controller change (at least to the extent that there is a different voice in the audio) just about the time the RA occurred

Subjects ATC TCAS (All) TCAS RA

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Denflnt
February 01, 2025, 03:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11818724

I tend to think ATC and, likely, the FAA will be shown as primary at fault with this:

1. The CRJ was on approach to 1 and then was asked to divert to 33. They complied, which added to their workload. From what I understand, that runway is rarely used for commercial aircraft. So, ATC added to the CRJ's workload while introducing and "unusual event." The CRJ crew appears to have acted professionally in changing their approach.
2. ATC didn't hold the helo short of the runway path, instead relied on them to correctly identify an aircraft, at night, over an urban area. That introduced a "single point of failure" to an already complex situation.
3. There was no way for the helo to pass safely under the CRJ at the altitude of impact.
3. I don't recall hearing ATC asking the CRJ if they could see the helo, though they already overtasked them. At that point, I don't think they could do anything at that point to prevent the collision.

Other factors may come into play, such as if ATC was properly staffed that night. I've read that DCA had two incidents that week where an aircraft had to perform a "go around" because of helo traffic. Also, was the CRJ's TCAS system operational?

This was completely preventable if things work they way they're supposed to.

Subjects ATC CRJ DCA FAA TCAS (All)

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