You mean, like an aircraft (who themselves requested visual separation) assigned responsibility for separating itself from another, to actually seperate itself from the other and not fly into it?!?

Everything else is moot, really...

As I\x92ve wrote earlier, Army Helo was on UHF freq. CT communicates on that freq as noted on the Washington sectional

RT


No, I don't think he was overwhelmed. He was shot through with adrenaline and shocked as anyone would be having just witnessed two aircraft he was talking to seconds before vanish in a fireball, realising his career, reputation, life and future sanity was irrevocably blown to pieces no matter the cause.
No, no and thrice no. Assuming the tapes are in real time there are considerable gaps between transmissions so he most certainly did not 'have' to speak so quickly. He had plenty of time to speak clearly and coherently instead of spouting those eruptions of incoherent, almost incomprehensible babble.
Sadly - reprehensibly, this style of unnecessarily theatrical auctioneer-style unpunctuated babble seems all too frequent in the States. Tower frequencies are usually if not almost invariably much less time-pressurised as they handle fewer aircraft in a well spaced sequence than in a termnal control area.

6) Concur 100%. And they failed miserably to achieve this. I've been flying for several decades and struggle to hear one word in three (and only assume much of the rest because I know what to expect - a human factors disaster) of that controller's outbursts, and the shoddy partial readbacks are shocking to European ears.

hear hear - spot on

on our rare jollies to the states reading back clearances , to avoid going to the sin bin , was always a challenge.

as I can’t see anything changing soon

SUGGEST as a training aid ATC tapes in various countries are provided and studied PRE FLIGHT so at least you have a chance of understanding some local eccentricities/ accents.

It does seem that the government can afford multi-billion dollar helicopter fleets to shuttle Washington bureaucrats around, but not fund a different branch of government to provide two controller positions to keep watch during a peak time of airline arrivals, departures, and adjacent helicopter traffic.

Regardless of the VHF/UHF issue, it is completely normal in the US and at LHR (and I assume many other places) that the helicopter (and other SVFR operations) underneath and around the approaches to an airport are managed on a different frequency than the tower frequency used by landing and departing aircraft. So if two controllers were on, the arriving jet and transiting helicopter would hear none of the RT directed to the other aircraft. They rely on the controller passing traffic information. In this case each aircraft at least knew about the other aircraft's clearances.

SLF. The only people with a full picture of this event as it developed were ATC. They didn't intervene effectively as the hazard sequence unfolded.

Some folks here need to read back through the thread before posting.

The helicopter crew is said to have had NVG's but at this point no information has been provided re their use of NVG's.

The height issue is not the primary issue as the intent of the procedures and ATC instructions was to separate the two aircraft.

Had that separation effort worked there would have been no conflict thus no collision.

It is the failure of the separation and the meeting over the river the two aircraft in the same bit of air that height mattered.

No where in the standard procedure was it intended to have helicopter traffic fly below landing aircraft on RWY 33.

Poll the Pilots here folks....ask them if they would routinely fly 100-200 feet below a crossing aircraft? What do you think the answer would be?

I thank 212 Man for his input reminding me why he was the Teacher's Pet. I depend upon his ability to get into the books to keep me straight.

Now a test question for him.....were you flying the incident airplane doing a Visual Approach to RWY33....would you have tuned up the IAP for that RWY as an additional reference for your approach?

SOP's usually instruct Crews to use ILS data when doing Visual Approaches to runways with that kind of IAP so would that kind of thinking apply in this incident? Would that have been of any benefit considering the existing weather and terrain? Or, would that have been a distraction?

This was not a "Circling Approach" but it was very similar.

It may be a military discipline of responding quickly and pushing your needs forward, but it gives an impression of \x93if we give ATC time to decide, they may tell us to orbit rather than be the ones who assume the risk\x94

Many of the liveatc.net feeds do in fact monitor more than one frequency. So there are overlaps and missed traffic.

That\x92s why using their recordings leads to comments on pprune that the controller was cut off or didn\x92t say something or the aircraft didn\x92t acknowledge. It can be just the scanner not picking it up, because it focuses on one transmission at a time.

That\x92s not to comment on whether they had VHF or not.

The only instrument approach to runway 33 is an RNAV GPS - there is no ILS for that runway. From the final fix IDTEK pilots are to descent visually.

I guess - as the culprit here - I should clarify that I was wrong; both the VASAviation youtube video and the LiveATC recordings were two different radio channels spliced together, the helo was transmitting on a separate frequency.

The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously.

So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions.

Absolutely on the lookout.

No the airspace does not take the blame. Apparently the hello pilots missed the lookout. And the controller could have been clearer, instead of \x93still in sight?\x94 perhaps \x93the RJ is now 1/2 mile 10 o\x92clock, confirm you have him?\x94.

(not criticizing him, guessing that he saw them closer than expected, was concerned, and made a very quick call)

But the airspace & procedure seems to not tolerate mistakes. There ought to be some safety margin. While not the primary fault, it could be improved.

I was going to ask if cross-coupling is done in the US.

It\x92s pretty common in Canada, both at Tower and enroute IFR sectors.

It\x92s not just for situational awareness, also to prevent overlapping transmissions from aircraft on the two frequencies. So you don\x92t have to try to listen to both as the controller.

Even without that the controllers here almost always transmit on all their frequencies rather than just the one the aircraft is on.

A red collision alert was flashing at this point on the controllers screen, the instruction should\x92ve been for the CRJ to go around, not wasting time on the helicopter pilots.

Secondly, why shouldn\x92t we criticise the controller? Imho his actions need to be criticised. Not the individual but the environment, procedures and training he operated in. The mission of ATC is to prevent exactly this from happening and they failed in their mission.

You are lined up for one on a crystal clear night with everything in perfect view. Going over to 33 is a turn to the right and a turn to the left, look at the 4-light PAPI to see if you are high or low, and then land. That close to the water in clear air I cannot imagine anyone should be playing with entering anything in the nav, eyes outside. (one night I got *3* runway changes at DCA, kind of annoying but no helicopters involved). The PAPI is set at 3 degrees, so following it down is not hard compared to the ILS, which 33 doesn't have anyway.

It hasn't necessarily climbed 100 feet. sinc display resolution is only 100ft it could be that it climbed from 240 to 260ft between these two screens. Besides this it also shows how ludicrous this 100ft vertical separation in this case was. Even the ATC screens resolution do not really support this level of separation. 245ft would still have shown as 002 and if in the middle of the Potomac the 3\xb0 G/S would be already lower than this.

That was my first thought, issue a go around. But not knowing the trajectories I might actually have the go around put the airliner in the path of the helicopter. Hindsight says no and I bet the controller wishes he did but I don't think a go around should have been issued.

The CRJ was undertaking a CVP to RWY01, and was asked to take RWY 33 by ATC. That is kind of messy at that point, the aircraft is changed by inference from the CVP to a visual approach. There is a GPS approach that effectively overlays the CVP, and gives a reasonable intercept of the center-line of RWY33. The crew flew a track that is not far away from this, but it was not required to be followed, then again, there's a fair amount of incentive to not busting airspace in DC. Not required, helpful, but also puts a pilot head down in terminal airspace that the guys have fair landmarks to nav by visually. Whatever they did, they got to finals accurately (a dct to or by visual nav) and on a descent path that is as reqd.

About 80% of all IATA operators would be discomforted by such changes, outside of the USA visual approaches at night have a litany of requirements to adhere to for the purposes of terrain separation, vs Texas big sky rules that do work in the US. In the end, taht didn't cause the accident, it is one of those things that goes with the freedom of flight in the USA.







...

there's no non-local civil traffic within the FRZ per 93.341 without a TSA waiver but the DoD has can fly who they deem fit. I find it hard to believe that at least the IP was not very familiar with the landmarks and route. It appears that CWO Eaves was the IP overseeing the currency check for Pilot2. I assume IP knew that area very well to conduct that assessment. From a couple weeks earlier, it seems there's a training route loop https://www.flightaware.com/live/flight/map/PAT25 for a previous PAT25 . I would think it reasonable that this is the training card (or some similar route) that they briefed and were meant to be following. IMO there's a reasonable chance CWO Eaves was also IP on that prior .

I fly in the DC FRZ and you hear the helo folks on freq all day, ( a lot of Coast Guard, various DoD, various fed LEO, some medivac and lifeguard) and they all know every inch of the area . Also surprising to listen to is that helo pilots through the FRZ are pretty much self-directed and entrusted with self sufficiency that fixed wing traffic is not . They've all been vetted, fingerprinted, have their own squawks etc and so ATC gives them a lot of respect. They announce intentions to 'fly route X' or 'request direct Andrews', and ATC is able to understand their intentions and clears a path and approves - and then you don't hear a peep from them until they reach the endpoint - then they announce next intention like "Field in sight'" -> "contact Andrews tower on..., Freq change approved" -> "good day" and the whole 20 minutes had a total of three radio calls. .

They seem to all know what they're doing and it's nobody's giving off the vibe that it's any kind of initial training for anything - you don't hear ATC having to telling them to 'say altitude' or 'turn left 10 degrees' or really anything, and you don't hear the pilots giving half arsed requests. [This level of trust might have had consequences, but I'll defer my judgement]

For all helo pilots local knowledge is a survival. Lots of civi helos in DC are based out of KFME, and the ones I know every inch of territory, every local landmark, overpass, bridge, body of water within the DC beltway like the back of their hand - one guy knows off the top of his head if every single road is asphalt or concrete, light or unlight, etc. Similar experience when I met news chopper folks based in the Valley - they knew hundreds of places in greater Los Angeles that I never even heard of.

Landmarks in DC are hard to miss, basically every one knows where the WW bridge, Hanes Point, the route of the Potomac, etc.. DCA is strangely popular for plane watching (there's rec areas to view at each end) so an absurdly large number of non-av people in the area are familiar with how the traffic flow works. I kayak right below the crash area and when wind is out of North, you can see landing lights of 7+ sequenced arrivals coming up the Potomac, it's basically impossible to miss the incoming landing parade and even non-av people get the concept. The WW bridge would seem to me a good point of reference for a callout, everybody knows where to immediately look. It's hard to think that the IP didn't understand local reference of the ATC traffic advisory.

Interesting and fairly well researched NY Times article (the failing kind...)

My thoughts:
I continue to see this as:

• a failure of imagination by command;
• a system failure by command to monitor performance against expected system behaviour;
• an information system failure, the evidence has been in front of those that are charged with having safe systems such as the govt, regulator, DOD, airlines;
• The crew and the the ATC controller, and certainly the passengers are not high in the systemic failures that occur here, I would contend that the crew and the ATC officer are victims of the systemic failures.

________________________

Criss-Crossing Routes in D.C. Airspace Leave Little Room for Error

By Elena Shao , Leanne Abraham , Eli Murray and Lazaro Gamio


The pictures are out of order, the tracks are for "1-Week" of data. The latest NOTAM is a good start, the helo fleet operators may want to revisit the concept of the flyways.

A deadly midair collision between an American Airlines passenger jet and a U.S. Army helicopter near Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington highlights the complexity of navigating an airspace with many civilian and military aircraft.

The airport has three runways that intersect, but only one is used for nearly all of its hundreds of daily flights. With the routes of aircraft routinely criss-crossing one another, there is little room for error as planes descend onto the runways. To stay out of the way of commercial jets, helicopters in this area are supposed to fly along a route designated by the Federal Aviation Administration at an altitude no higher than 200 feet.

Air traffic data from the past week shows that helicopters flying along the Potomac River must navigate amid the takeoffs and landings of hundreds of planes daily. While they are advised by the F.A.A. to stick to a tight air corridor above the eastern bank of the river, data shows that in reality, helicopters can be spotted across the width of the river.

One week of air traffic at Reagan National

Dots show positions of planes during their takeoffs and landings at Reagan National Airport, as well as the positions of helicopters as they traversed the area from Jan. 23 to Jan. 30.
The American Airlines flight was cleared to land on Runway 1 before being instructed by an air traffic controller shortly before the collision to pivot its landing route to the intersecting Runway 33.

The last-minute request to switch runways at Reagan National is “very common,” said Shawn Pruchnicki, a former airline pilot and an assistant professor at the Center for Aviation Studies at Ohio State University, who said he has piloted aircraft into the airport more than a hundred times.

Skies were clear on Wednesday night when the two aircraft collided. But, in case of low visibility, like in poor weather, the F.A.A. has designed “instrument approaches,” or descents that involve a series of steps pilots must follow to maneuver down to the runway safely.

The instrument approach for Runway 1 calls for a descending plane to cross over the helicopter corridor while the plane is at a much higher altitude, somewhere from 620 to 1,700 feet and more than a minute from landing. The approach for Runway 33, however, calls for a plane to cross over the helicopter corridor at a much lower altitude, because a plane is seconds from landing. The clearance between a helicopter in the corridor and a descending plane may be from 100 to 300 feet, which can result in close calls if there are severe fluctuations in the altitude of either aircraft.

Sources: Helicopter route and instrument approach data from the Federal Aviation Administration

Note: An instrument approach is a descent that involves a series of scripted flight maneuvers, with pilots using navigation aids and instruments to reach the runway safely when visibility is low, such as in poor weather.

The [failing] New York Times
Given the clear nighttime weather, the plane’s pilots would not have been expected to initiate an instrument approach to aid their landing, Mr. Pruchnicki said, and instead could have used their vision to guide their descent to the runway. Data on the aircraft’s positions indicates that the pilots’ route was very similar to the one outlined in an instrument approach. For example, the plane maintained roughly the recommended altitude when it made a leftward turn toward Runway 33.

In this case, the Army Black Hawk requested permission to use the route designated for helicopters, meaning that it would keep to the eastern bank of the Potomac and stay under 200 feet in altitude. But the helicopter was at least a half-mile off of the approved route when it collided with the jet, according to four people briefed on the matter but not authorized to speak publicly. The helicopter was also flying above 300 feet, not below 200, the people said.

The crash also renewed questions about the safety of intersecting runways, which the F.A.A. has sought to eliminate or close in recent years in places like Chicago and Dallas because of concerns over congestion on the ground. The setup can increase the workload of the air traffic controller, especially if the two runways are getting used simultaneously for takeoff and landing, said Cyriel Kronenburg, a former air traffic controller and pilot.

An internal preliminary report from the F.A.A., which was reviewed by The New York Times , said that a supervisor allowed an air traffic controller to leave early, sometime before the crash. This left one air traffic controller to manage the dual roles of handling helicopters in the airport’s vicinity and also instructing planes that were landing and departing from runways, according to a person briefed on the matter. While it is within the supervisor’s discretion to combine the duties, that staffing configuration “was not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic,” the F.A.A. report said.

A Times investigation in 2023 found that the nation’s air traffic control facilities are chronically understaffed , contributing to an alarming number of close calls in the skies and on the runways across the country. Before the plane crash on Wednesday night, there were at least 10 close calls at Reagan National in the last three years that were documented in government records reviewed by The Times.
Additional research by Riley Mellen.
See more on: Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.)

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...smid=url-share