Posts about: "Blackhawk (H-60)" [Posts: 170 Page: 7 of 9]¶

I wasn't insinuating that -- or really trying to be clever, either. I should have said this more directly, but the legal defenses that might be available with respect to the FAA's actions almost certainly won't apply to the Blackhawk crew. And the Government won't pay twice for the same accident in any event. So if the Blackhawk crew was negligent, which I have to say seems likely, the FAA's possible defenses are pretty much irrelevant.

An interesting point. But, consider first how frequently on this forum posters have observed that the FAA (and Congress) have favored higher capacity of operations over stricter safety-related operational procedures. It has been noted on many threads about many incidents. So - while admitting there could be legal reasoning that has eldued me - the presence of policy judgments in the FAA situation looks pretty strong, and very likely preclusive.

But, you're asserting that the Army can be sued - it's covered by the Federal Tort Claims Act, as far as I know. Which is to say it will be claimed that the Army as an organization, and perhaps the pilots, were negligent. There isn't a separate exception to the FTCA's immunity waiver for the military in general although there is an exception for combatant activities in time of war (not applicable, right?).

But not so fast. The operation of training and/or check rides for VIP transport- especially as related to continuity of government operations - carries lots of policy judgments. It could be a more intense legal fight than scoring the FAA for favoring traffic capacity over stricter safety rules. For one thing, the continuity of government stuff probably is largely meant to be kept out of the public record, making litigation involving it more challenging.

If you put bad data into the best computer in the world, you will get bad data coming out of it. I would rather set the blame to the procedure designers and those who approved these Heliroutes.
It's way to easy to blame the pilots, over the years there have been incidents due to incorrect QNH settings, were both pilots and ATC have failed to catch the error, in a busy airspace with overworked ATC, late change of runway for airlines, and military helicopters using Night Vision Goggles, altimeter equipment failure/error.

Even the Max 200 ft altitude under the approach to a major US airport is an accident waiting to happen, and whoever approved this to be used during normal operations should be investigated. The CRJ was at around 325 ft on a visual/circling approach when it crashed, does anyone really think it's great airmanship to have a Black Hawk helicopter at 200 ft passing under you?

That's what made the Swiss Cheese model line up perfectly, a planned approved separation of 125 ft was the "best case" scenario.

Thanks for clarifying that, makes more sense when you spelled it out more fully.

Very interesting discussion with a former Blackhawk pilot who's often flown that route.


Interesting that he was often asked to hold at Hains Point.

not only did this pilot fly the routes but also knew the crew chief and instructor pilot, and debunked various of the \x93too few hours/Biden aide/desk job\x94 theories about the pilot getting the check ride. Speaks to the navigation challenges including that Army procedures require pilots to operate at the upper ceiling of the helicopter routes. Well worth the time to listen to.

Extremely interesting . thanks for posting that .2 points worth mentioning , the LEDs versus "normal" lighting visibility on IR ( minute 3 ) , a very interesting fact that got overlooked when introducing them , also hardly visible when you are not directly looking ta them ,. A real issue when using cameras in ATC Remote tower operations .I do not know if that CRJ was using LEDs, many GA manufacturers are installing , and operators retrofit due savings in both consumption and reliability.

The second point of interest for me is the discussion on the previous incident with the RA the day before ( min 34 ) where the Helo crew only learned of this when it was raised on the media a few days after the accident ,as the Heli crew was on a different frequency and did not heard the RA and the go around as a consequences., raising the issue that there might have been far more such incidents as they were all not reported to the helicopters operators.

Interesting and quite shocking, coming from a former standards/instructor pilot, re— normalisation of deviance.
eg. If you don’t catch all of a radio call meant for you, just reply with what you think the controller wants to hear you say and then comply with that — not, ‘Say again…’ and confirm your clearance. Also (implicitly while discussing LED lights) confirmed that the helicopter crew would not have been able to visually identify the correct conflicting traffic, yet made the habitual call, ‘Traffic’s visual, request visual separation’ and ok to proceed, with ATC complicit in the arrangement. Also don’t beat yourself up too much if you bust your altitude restriction right under where your route intersects with landing jets, while confirming this as the most safety critical part of the route.

Sure.

At 8:46:01 ATC called the helicopter with information about the CRJ, 1200’ over Wilson Bridge, circling to runway 33. The information about ‘…circling to…’ was not on the CVR of the helicopter. Inference is that part was missed (but not explicit). No requirement to read back traffic info, just acknowledge it.

At 8:47:42 the helicopter pilot stepped on the latter part of ATC’s transmission to the Blackhawk which was an instruction to ‘…pass behind the…’ The helicopter crew could not possibly have heard that instruction because they stepped on it themselves. Read back is required to an en-route clearance. Afterwards there was an intercom discussion between the helicopter pilots about whether they were to move further east.

Seems that two consecutive radio calls to the helicopter got corrupted which led to a breakdown in SA onboard the helicopter. Probably they had no idea that they needed to look left over the city lights to see the CRJ and were convinced their traffic was in the line up of jets on 01 extended centreline and therefore no factor.

So in the accident in question the LC issued an en-route clearance to the Blackhawk to which there was no read back at all, because the helicopter crew never heard it. Subsequently I don’t think we see the LC chasing up for one, let alone correcting any errors as he ought — he was just too busy doing the work of two people. The purpose of the system broke down.

Yeah, if you want a halfass job, get someone with just one ass to do two jobs

IMO the fact that the helo crew didn't readback/acknowledge "pass behind" is irrelevant. Twice before, they told the LC that they had the CRJ in sight and requested visual sep, which was granted. Surely you don't specifically need to be told to not hit the CRJ after you've reported it in sight?

I think the LC saw what was unfolding and said that because he had concerns that the chopper didn't actually have the CRJ. He was right.

H & H:
". . . was the strategy to use Route 4 while 33 was active something ATCers at DCA, over time, started in an effort to cut down radio traffic and speed things up? If so, had it been assessed and then monitored for adverse safety? While anecdotally, it seemed people were aware of "close calls", had any analysis taken place looking at the Databases?"

To start, no apology whatsoever needed with regard to this dialogue. I try to respect the decorum required on this forum generally (meaning as SLF/attorney something has to be pretty severe or awful to warrant apologizing to me). And although I might not explain my sense of this with enough clarity - the FAA is conducting a review (according to Secretary Duffy) of airspace management and usage rules at other airports. The explanations in your posts, including very particularly the procedures when crossing approach corridors for London City, should be read and studied by the presumably well-informed professional ATO (Air Traffic Organization) staff assigned to conduct the review. (If it seems way presumptuous for an SLF/attorney to assert what resources ATO should be considering for the review noted by Sec. Duffy, I would suggest that ATO's reputation at the moment for upholding the much-touted "gold standard" set by FAA and United States aviation in general for the rest of the world ... well, like we used to say in trial practice, it takes the other side only about three minutes in court to stain the draperies, but it will take us all afternoon even to try to clean them. Reputation lost, same deal getting it back.)

On ASIAS, actually I entirely agree with your description of where it fits into the so-called "aviation safety ecosystem" (there simply has got to be a better term). The point I'm stuck on is one that (apologies, once more) comes from litigating in U.S. courts (especially federal District Courts around the country) employment law cases. Specifically, at the start, the main task for defense counsel is to construct the "chronology". Who did and said what to whom, when, and for what reason(s). I've asserted in an earlier post that in what I see as the inevitable litigation arising from this accident, there will be teams of significant lawyers constructing, or attempting to construct, such a chronology, although it won't be about an individual employee's hiring, performance reviews, promotion grants or denials and so on. It will be how it happened that the situation which obtained in the DCA airspace, in the cockpits of the Blackhawk helicopter and the CRJ, and ATC, came to exist.

(And I say "significant lawyers" because the attorneys who handle the big and significant aviation crash lawsuits for the families of victims are kind of the polar opposite of the stereotype ambulance chaser; to the contrary, their work is opposed by big-time big-law firm skyhigh hourly rate legally privileged sharks. The lawyers suing on behalf of these crash victims - if they are the same as the legal specialists I have met and discussed stuff with in various settings - are vindicating the need to bring the truth to light. "Aviation is the safest form of transportation": it is incanted over and over to the point of making anyone who utters it now sound quite seriously performative. Yet if it is so safe, how and why did those 67 people die over and in the Potomac? So with a kind of intense ruthlessness, the lawyers who will represent the families and other loved ones of the crash victims will unearth every little sequential act and omission which led to the situation which obtained on the fateful night of Wednesday, 29 January 2025. Exactly as the quoted language above from your post asks, what indeed was the strategy, if there even was one, as opposed to little incremental changes, accelerated of course by increasing airline flight lengths under the perimeter rule.)

On this basis, I would not concur with the idea that whether immunity is available for the defendants (both the Army and FAA/DoT) depends on whether the ATCO's specific conduct on Jan. 29 was "ordered" from on-high. The "on-high" is the development, over time, of the situation that obtained that night at DCA, despite safety imperatives in the NAS and aviation sector in general - and not a specific order or instruction given on that night.

The question behind the discretionary function exception is whether the act or omission by the defendant either (1) was negligent because it failed to follow a specific rule or statutory provision (if so, no immunity), or (2) was negligent in the usual sense of the word but will nevertheless still be protected by immunity because the act or omission was based on a decision about a policy matter or question. The decision on the policy matter or question is "discretionary" on the part of the government and hence the name of the exception protecting it. The courts are reluctant, and sometimes loath, to second-guess policy decisions made by the Executive Branch (I know, irony neither intended or not intended, given certain prominent flight- and aircraft-related matters in federal court at the moment). Under the first variety of negligence, there was no policy matter being decided, just failure to do something there was a legal duty to do (basic definition of negligence). Under the second variety, there would be a valid case to be made that there was negligence - but the immunity provided by the exception for discretionary functions prevents the case going forward.

So back to January 29, the assertion I've been making here is that no, there was not a specific rule or procedure that said to do things much like you describe the procedure - de facto (unwritten, informal) though it was - for transiting across the approach path. But there certainly were higher-order rules by which FAA and its ATC functions were required to observe in consistent performance, and not merely in repeated incantation that "aviation is the safest form of transportation." In fact, I wonder if clever lawyers might take that slogan and deploy it as a bludgeon. "You're at greater risk driving your car to the airport", they always say. Oh, really? Then let's talk about the equivalent scenario on the streets of Chicago with intersecting traffic lanes (obviously not at different altitudes), similarly difficult visibility conditions at night, compounded by NVGs. possibly compounded by a training or check ride in the vehicle, and then make the case that the Chicago PD cop directing traffic, and the motorist without the right-of-way, were acting on the basis of interpreting policies about driving on public roadways. No, there is no policy matter involved - there are strict rules of the road and over-riding principles for safe driving, and the failure to observe these is negligence.

It's simplistic but it might be sufficiently illustrative. Is "see and avoid" a procedure which involves making decisions on matters of policy? or is it a higher-order safety rule which must be observed at all times?

(Not meaning to slight the point about ANSP and regulatory functions needing to be separate - entirely agree, and yet, this will be an extraordinarily heavy lift to get done in the United States. That being said, I might know some lawyer-types who are fired up about efforts to make it happen this time around.)
WillowRun 6-3

Dumbo Question 1.

How would the successful transmission of ADSB Out information by the Blackhawk have changed the outcome on January 29?

After watching the US Congress “grill” the military, FAA and NTSB how could they participate in a conspiracy of silence…

The NTSB will be seen as either very dumb or deceitful or both.

Now what was the number of the Q ANON Pizza shop, I feel like some truth tonight.

Send it to me via Signal. What a joke! The relatives of the crash victims were there to watch the farce.

The small elephant in the room…

Dumbo Question 2

Given the extraordinary level of interest in the US Army Blackhawk carriage, activation and transmission of ADSB Out information in the US Congress in the last couple of days, do you think the NTSB could have confirmed (facts) how that information would have been displayed in the cockpit of the CRJ and the ATC TWR cab at Washington DC Reagan?

The small elephant in the room.

ATCDumbo
I'm all ears, excellent point. This focus on ADSB-OUT, and ADSB-IN is really a furphy in terms of this investigation to determine the facts, the whole facts and nothing but the facts.

If 5342 had ADSB-IN then PAT25 not having or not displaying ADSB-OUT could be relevant depending on 5342's cockpit display, the training of the pilots and their scanning.
5342 didn't have ADSB-IN so move along, move along, nothing to see, these aren't the droids you're looking for.

**Caveat. If the TWR display were using ADS-B for their updates and to generate Collision Alerts then the absence of PAT25 ADSB-OUT could be relevant.
But would the TWR ATC even know (or care) whether PAT-25 was ADSB-OUT capable. TWR ATC involves looking out the windows and judging the relative positions of aircraft.

Note: ATC display systems are not referenced in the NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report. This seems to be a glaring omission. So perhaps the NTSB are either very dumb or deceitful or both.

To further illustrate the focus on ADSB. Figure 1 Google Earth image with preliminary ADS-B data for flight 5342 and radar data for PAT25.
The ADS-B plots are 1 seconds intervals, the radar data are 4 second interval (as stated during US Congress Q&A).
So the focus is on the whizz bang ADS-B kit rather than what the ATC saw on their display.

There is reference to ATC radios, and 5342 was on frequency 119.1 MHZ and PAT25 was on frequency 134.35 MHZ. The ATC could've had them on the same frequency (changed PAT25 to 119.1 MHZ) but this would be abnormal. ATC Voice Switch systems like Frequentis, SITTI and Rohde & Schwarz typically have a frequency coupling, whereby controller broadcasts on multiple frequencies (2 or more) and voice communications on one frequency are heard on the other. In this case, ATC would broadcast on 119.1 MHZ and 134.55 MHZ and 5342 would hear instructions for aircraft on 134.55 MHZ, and PAT25 would hear instructions for aircraft on 119.1 MHZ.

Yes, visual separation is typically used close to an aerodrome where the ATC is applying visual separation to reduce the standard from 3NM to something less, 2NM, 1NM, or even less, depending on the circumstance which includes weather (included visibility), day / night, workload to monitor the separation, plus other considerations such as equipment.

I just wonder how many of the January Route 4 Helicopter plots crossing RWY 33 Approach (post 1346) were the result of ATC issuing a control instruction to change the track to closer to the shoreline or further over water.

Use of Route 4 during RWY 33 Approaches or RWY 15 Departures is possible providing a clearance limit is imposed prior to assigning relevant traffic, positive control instruction(s) and in the case of 5342, advising them of the relative position of PAT25 and that PAT25 would be maintaining separation from them.

Example for Route 4 southbound would be a clearance limit of Hains Point. Helicopter would be released past this point when there is no conflict (nil traffic) or assigned separation to avoid (pass behind). If there is a in-line stream of arriving traffic then Route 4 may not be available.

Sydney KSA has something similar for one of their helicopter routes - BONDI 5 (yep, named after the beach), delays may occur when RWY 07 is in use for DEP, or RWY 25 is in use for ARR. Further, the route is not available when RWY 16 PRM approaches are being conducted. Sydney KSA helicopter routes are in text form - TRACK TO..., TRACK VIA..., EAST OF..., and the INBOUND routes to Sydney KSA have a clearance limit in the clearance. A map display is very useful however it should be based on route descriptions. Perhaps the committee of 17 knows the history of the helicopter routes in and around DCA.

I tend to agree with ATC Watchers take on this.
Some people are making out that if the Helicopter had ADSB-out switched on/ activated, then this would never have happened.
Someone correct me if I am wrong but if the Blackhawk has ADSB-out switched on then nothing changes for the CRJ on that night. The TCAS behaves the same, there is no display of the Blackhawk on the CRJ\x92s Nav display\x85..nothing changes. The CRJ crew are still conducting an approach that requires a lot of fast mental processing close to the ground, at night onto a short runway while ensuring checklists/configuration etc is correct. ie they have a high workload. During this high workload phase, \x91the system\x92 has seen fit to allow a single Human ( the helicopter Captain) to be responsible for the separation of the two aircraft visually, at night, in a busy environment while conducting a check, on NVG\x92s.
Is it likey that a single Human, with the sole responsibility, will make a mistake? It\x92s not just likely, it\x92s inevitable, regardless of how sharp and well trained they are, if you run the program long enough their vision, or their SA will fail them and we get what we got here.
The system should never have devolved to the point where one person accepted the responsibility for visual sep 6nm away, at night, in a busy traffic environment while dealing with their own high workload.
The Blackhawk crew had a high workload, the CRJ crew had a high workload, the ATC had a high workload, there was no fat left in the system. Humans make mistakes and any good system will be tolerant of those mistakes.
The system was not tolerant of a mistake, ergo, the system is at fault.

Is your compulsion to \x93call out the incompetence of this young female pilot\x94 driven by something in the linked NYT article or something else?

I\x92ll make an assumption that this is the paragraph in the NYT article that you find compelling:

How did the NYT reach such a conclusion? The only authoritative source of what was said between the Blackhawk pilot and IP is (at this point) the NTSB preliminary report, and that was a summary, not a transcription. Here\x92s what that report stated:

From that NTSB statement is it reasonable to conclude that the IP issued a \x93directive\x94 to change course and that the pilot did not comply with said directive (which may or may not have been issued) to change course?

This is the danger of this type of sloppy media reporting.

NTSB Newsroom:
"NTSB investigating Thursday's incidents at Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) in which a Delta Air Lines Airbus A319 and a Republic Airways Embraer E170 were instructed by air traffic control to perform go-arounds due to a U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter inbound to the Pentagon."

[Credit: post on X by NTSB Newsroom, seen as reply to post by @STATter911 (cited by LowObs); verified from NTSB webpage]

"The helicopter \x97 also a Black Hawk \x97 \x93 took a scenic route around the Pentagon versus proceeding directly from the west to the heliport,\x94 [the] FAA assistant administrator for government and industry affairs [...] wrote in an email obtained by POLITICO." (emphasis added)

The FAA official's choice of words was either meant as a sarcastic comment criticizing the flight path operated by the helicopter - or if taken literally did he intend to communicate that the helicopter crew knowingly flew a route with better visuals of the city as if sightseeing? The fact that even after the accident there still are issues like this is bad enough; if he intended to be understood literally....

And is there a factual, basis for believing this particular helicopter flight was a training mission as opposed to the VIP transport about which Sec. Duffy's remarks were pretty strident? If information about it having been a training mission was included in prior posts, I missed it.