Posts about: "Blackhawk (H-60)" [Posts: 176 Page: 9 of 9]ΒΆ

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Easy Street
October 21, 2025, 16:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11973744
Originally Posted by BFSGrad
The interview transcripts indicated that the 12th AB Blackhawk pilots used barometric altitude as the reference for flying the DC routes.
Thank you, I'd missed that. And on re-reading the preliminary report, I see that the NTSB described the routes using amsl. So I stand corrected on the route definition. That brings altimetry errors into play for erosion of the "designed" separation margin, which makes the design even more unsafe. But the point remains that PAT25's 78 foot deviation above the route maximum altitude is within the FAA's tolerance for commercial and instrument flying accuracy by helicopter pilots.

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  FAA  NTSB  Preliminary Report  Separation (ALL)

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ignorantAndroid
October 23, 2025, 06:05:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11974764
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
Which safety assessment was made and validated ( and by who) which allowed visual separation for an helicopter at 200ft to pass below the approach path of an aircraft at 3 or 400 feet ?, resulting in a 100-200ft separation ?
None. That would obviously be unsafe, so the helicopter would be expected to use lateral separation. (e.g. "Pass behind the CRJ.")

The 200 ft altitude restriction seems to have given some the impression that helicopters were routinely passing directly below the approach traffic, but that's not the case. And even if it was, it wouldn't really be relevant to this accident. The Blackhawk pilots weren't trying to duck underneath the plane, they never even saw it.

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  Pass Behind  Pass Behind (All)  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Easy Street
October 23, 2025, 08:11:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11974792
Originally Posted by ignorantAndroid
The 200 ft altitude restriction seems to have given some the impression that helicopters were routinely passing directly below the approach traffic, but that's not the case. And even if it was, it wouldn't really be relevant to this accident. The Blackhawk pilots weren't trying to duck underneath the plane, they never even saw it.
The reason I brought this up was the contention by some earlier posters that there was an obvious case for negligence on the part of the Army pilots. I took that to be based on their 78ft breach of the route maximum altitude, which would obviously be an easy thing to prove (notwithstanding my point that the FAA only requires pilots to fly to an accuracy of 100ft). However if, as you say, the altitude restriction wasn't relevant to the accident then a case for Army pilot negligence would have to be based on their failure to see the CRJ, and that would be much harder to make out. It was argued much earlier in the thread that they probably saw the AAL aircraft on final to 1 and misidentified it as the CRJ. I think that would be difficult to argue as negligent.

I agree with you, by the way - my point being that the case for Army pilot negligence isn't as obvious as it might first appear.
Last edited by Easy Street; 23rd October 2025 at 08:56 .

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  FAA

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ignorantAndroid
October 23, 2025, 21:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11975262
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
You mean no SA was made because this scenario was not even considered ? That makes things worse for the FAA if this local "visual " procedure was written down somewhere or even just tolerated , because as I understood, it was standard practice .I am not sure if you know how safety assessments are made , but you must consider every possible scenario when designing procedures.
Visual Flight Rules aren't a local procedure.

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
From a European / EASA perspective :
Re the "Lateral separation" you mention : in that scenario so close to the Runway threshold it would mean only a left turn is possible, i.e. away from the thresholds of both runways , it would mean flying over build up areas , and doing so at 200ft above buildings with possible antennas on top , etc.. ,not really safe , and definitively not at night . As to \x93pass behind\x94 , the standard wake turbulence separation criteria would not be met , especially passing behind/below and I would not even try that at 200ft under a large jet..
I agree. The prudent thing to do would be to not call traffic in sight and let the controller give you a hold. But first you'd have to know the plane is there.

Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
During the interviews, one Heli pilot from that same group ,mentioned that asking for visual separation was a routine request , even if you did not see the traffic at time of the request . That fact alone, if really proven to be systematically the case , would also add to the normalization of deviance case and put full responsibility on the regulator, not the pilots
If that was/is happening, that's a huge problem. But I don't understand how the FAA would be responsible. Visual separation is initiated by the pilot, when they say "traffic in sight." Controllers sometimes prompt it (e.g. "Do you have that traffic in sight?"), but that didn't happen in this case. A pilot should never call traffic in sight unless they truly have it in sight and are completely confident that they can maintain safe separation. I do get the impression that the Blackhawk pilots may not have fully understood that. Both from the NTSB hearings and the ATC recordings (the way they don't even wait for the controller to finish speaking before shouting "traffic in sight request visual separation!")

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  FAA  NTSB  Normalization of Deviance  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Winemaker
December 11, 2025, 01:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12003392
NTSB Chairwoman speaks out about legislation to again allow uncontrolled military helicopter flights through Washington D.C. From the New York Times https://archive.ph/7YCHK

The chair of the National Transportation Safety Board and the bipartisan leaders of the Senate committee overseeing aviation warned on Wednesday that a section in a new defense bill would weaken safety measures around Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport and worsen the risk of midair collisions between military and commercial aircraft.

“This is shameful,” Jennifer Homendy, the N.T.S.B. chair, told reporters, arguing that the provision “essentially gives the military unfettered access” to fly through Washington’s airspace without broadcasting their aircraft’s location to other pilots.

N.T.S.B. investigators examining the Jan. 29 midair collision between an Army Black Hawk helicopter and a commercial jet near the airport that killed 67 people are focusing on the fact that the helicopter was not using enhanced tracking technology.

Ms. Homendy, visibly angry, said that if the helicopter safety provision in the defense bill became law, she would be concerned about the safety of flying in the crowded airspace near the nation’s capital.
“It is a step backward,” she added. “In fact, I would say it’s a safety whitewash.”






Last edited by Winemaker; 11th December 2025 at 03:30 . Reason: language usage correction

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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WillowRun 6-3
December 18, 2025, 01:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12007222
Whoa! Feds accept liability, WSJ reporting
Wall Street Journal,
quoting in full (claiming fair use):

The U.S. government accepted fault for a midair collision earlier this year that killed 67 people near Washington, D.C., saying it is willing to pay damages to the families in connection with the incident.

The Justice Department\x92s filing in federal court Wednesday said the pilots of an Army Black Hawk helicopter \x93failed to maintain vigilance so as to see and avoid\x94 an American Airlines regional jet.

\x93Their failure was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident,\x94 the department\x92s lawyers wrote.

The filing said that an air-traffic controller didn\x92t comply with a federal order to tell aircraft on converging courses to separate. The government also said the American Airlines pilots should have been alerted to the location of the Black Hawk helicopter by a collision alert system and that the pilots \x93failed to maintain vigilance\x94 to avoid the aircraft.

The American regional jet had been flying from Wichita, Kan., when it collided with the Army helicopter on approach to Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport on Jan. 29. The military helicopter was conducting a training exercise along the Potomac River, one of the most congested airspaces in the U.S.
_________
Edit: The court filing in which liability is admitted is the Answer by the United States to the Complaint. It's 209 pages, not a surprise, as the Complaint includes quite detailed allegations, most all of which needed to be addressed point by point.
Notably, the airline is still a defendant and in fact lead counsel for the plaintiffs already has issued a statement to that effect.
I'm not indulging any further law prof mode for now.
Last edited by WillowRun 6-3; 18th December 2025 at 02:30 .

Subjects ATC  Accountability/Liability  Blackhawk (H-60)  Wall Street Journal

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ATC Watcher
December 18, 2025, 16:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12007556
Originally Posted by Chu Chu
It looks like the Answer admits that the controllers failed to give a required notification, but not that this was a cause of the accident. I\x92m not sure there was any other realistic choice.
Yes , there was a choice : recognizing the procedures were flawed , the Helo i routes map was unsafe , the local training and local way of working were not following the "order" for decades and for the FAA to take the blame for all this , not singling out the operators of those local procedures. It is a systemic failure , not an individual controller error.
Then :
The government also said the American Airlines pilots should have been alerted to the location of the Black Hawk helicopter by a collision alert system and that the pilots \x93failed to maintain vigilance\x94 to avoid the aircraft.
At 300 ft on short final ??? same BS. I will not be surprised if they will also be carrying part of the blame in the end for accepting a non previously briefed visual APP as per their SOPs. How many hundred times this side step procedure was made to avoid delays will likely bear zero bearing in the end. .

Subjects ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  FAA

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Ver5pen
January 27, 2026, 23:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028277
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
Probable Cause Statement:
weird that they don\x92t even mention the Blackhawk PF\x92s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn\x92t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)

Additionally this would\x92ve been sapping the IP/PM\x92s capacity to an extent no doubt as he had to monitor her deviations

wasn\x92t this a currency flight for her and she\x92s already blown a segment of it? Clearly her recency/skill level is at least a factor?

ditto they don\x92t mention the limitations of VFR separation under night vision

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  Probable Cause  Separation (ALL)  VFR

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DaveReidUK
January 27, 2026, 23:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028289
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don\x92t even mention the Blackhawk PF\x92s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn\x92t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)

Additionally this would\x92ve been sapping the IP/PM\x92s capacity to an extent no doubt as he had to monitor her deviations

wasn\x92t this a currency flight for her and she\x92s already blown a segment of it? Clearly her recency/skill level is at least a factor?

ditto they don\x92t mention the limitations of VFR separation under night vision





Those are addressed in some of the 75-odd Findings statements.

But all of those deficiencies arguably added up to the stated Probable Cause: "the lack of effective pilot applied visual separation by the helicopter crew, which resulted in a mid-air collision"

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  Findings  Probable Cause  Separation (ALL)  VFR  Visual Separation

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Undertow
January 27, 2026, 23:41:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12028291
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don\x92t even mention the Blackhawk PF\x92s straying from altitude constraints
They did say this
Also causal was the Army's failure to ensure pilots were aware of the effects of air tolerances on barometric altimeter in their helicopters, which resulted in the crew flying above the maximum published helicopter route altitude.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  Route Altitude

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Musician
January 29, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12029155
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don’t even mention the Blackhawk PF’s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn’t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
It's in the findings.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
31. Due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter’s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter’s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.
.
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
that recreation is incredible, kudos to NTSB I don’t know why they chose to create it from the IP’s (RHS)’s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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Lonewolf_50
February 17, 2026, 14:38:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12038660
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
...when I read that they were preparing a case against PSA.
The company or their pilots? Deep Pockets attempts at litigation are commonplace in the US, not sure how it is across the pond.
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
I suspect there are very few reading this thread who are not appalled at the suggestion of negligence on the part of the CRJ pilots.
Yes indeed.
A simple "left 360 at Haynes Point for spacing" would have prevented the accident - note that this was mentioned in the original thread as a common instruction, to helicopters on that route, by an Army Blackhawk pilot who used to fly for that unit.

Subjects Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ

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Lonewolf_50
February 18, 2026, 17:39:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039290
For Chiefttp:
The question of currency, proficiency, and recency fairly leap off of the page, yes.
Originally Posted by DaveReidUK
At the height the collision occurred, there would never have been a TCAS RA.
Inconvenient facts never stopped a lawyer from bringing a case to court, though.
Originally Posted by Musician
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
No, it does not.
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.
Wrong. Visual lookout is a responsibility for all members of the crew. That's a shared responsibility, and briefed before every flight. Note that in a Blackhawk, there are a variety of zones where the pilots are effectively blind (starting at about the four o'clock position and reaching to about 8 o'clock position) but the forward quarter isn't usually one of those. (Won't comment on the goggle issue here...)
Originally Posted by Musician
You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
Not just pre-flight checks.
I am not sure how much low level, over water, at night flying that you have done, but I have done quite a bit of that. If you are flying in such a regime, and there is a substantial mismatch between your radalt, and your baralt, and you have a hard altitude limit, you don't ignore your radalt.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Blackhawk (H-60)  Final Report  Radio Altimeter  Separation (ALL)  TCAS (All)  TCAS RA  Visual Separation

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Ver5pen
February 19, 2026, 14:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039724
Originally Posted by Musician
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
.
Altimeter testing showed that the 100-ft pressure altitude discrepancy seen in the FDR data for the accident flight was observed on three other UH-60L helicopters operated by the 12th Aviation Battalion. These altimeter testing results also showed that the pressure altitude data recorded by the helicopters\x92 FDRs, when corrected for local conditions, was representative of what was indicated on the right side altimeter. Therefore, the FDR pressure altitude data for the accident helicopter, when corrected for local conditions, was likely representative of what was indicated on the IP\x92s barometric altimeter during the accident flight.

[...]. The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.

For the northern segment of Route 4, which included the area of the collision, of the 523 flights analyzed, 260 flights (49%) were identified as exceeding route altitude limitations at some point during the flight. Had the error tolerances of barometric altimeters been considered during design of the helicopter route maximum altitudes, the incompatibility of a 200-ft ceiling and barometric altimeter errors may have been identified.
repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance

the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I\x92ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would\x92ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would\x92ve been even more taxing for the instructor

I don\x92t know how anyone can pretend these things didn\x92t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ\x92s flatboats occurred within the PF\x92s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CVR  Final Report  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Route Altitude

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Musician
February 19, 2026, 18:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039831
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance
Once only, not repeatedly. She's following the river when they come out of the side arm, but in the wrong direction. My understanding is that the PNF is supposed to be navigating, though.
the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I’ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would’ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would’ve been even more taxing for the instructor
The landing at the helipad where she abandoned because the wind made the helicopter hard to control, and she lost sight of the landing zone? and then the instructor calls "go around", possibly because of some deer?
I don’t know how anyone can pretend these things didn’t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ’s flatboats occurred within the PF’s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably
I don't think the handling played a part at all.

What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well.

There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this:
20:00:11.0 APR-P PAT two five if you hear Potomac acknowledge with an IDENT. traffic at your nine to ten o'clock in two miles eastbound one thousand eight hundred indicated its a helicopter.

INT-2 [trainee] do you see him?
INT-1 [instructor] nope.

INT-2 do you see him?
INT-1 no. nine to ten o'clock. *.

20:00:22.7 RDO-2 * * traffic

INT-1 yeah. I got it. tally. coming left.
INT-1 alright you want me to keep chasing this number one needle or-
INT-2 yeah. just avoid traffic at this point.
INT-1 yup. I got the traffic out the right door
.
and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'.

For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading.

I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat.

With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did).
There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me.
Last edited by Musician; 19th February 2026 at 18:47 .

Subjects AA5342  ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  CVR  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

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WillowRun 6-3
February 19, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT
permalink Post: 12039941
Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4

Subjects ALERT Act of 2026  Blackhawk (H-60)  DCA  Final Report  Findings  NTSB  Probable Cause  Safety Recommendations  Separation (ALL)

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