February 07, 2025, 15:40:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823717
On the cobntrary, it is vanishingly unlikely that the 60 crew even glanced at their baro alt. They were flying HEIGHT - that is AGL, on radalt and radalt alone. No helo
ever
flies at that sort of height by reference, even fleetingly, to bar-alt. That instrument is totally redundant in such a case (except for mode C reporting)
OTOH, the CRJ is not flying a BARO ALT, it is descending on a visual glide slope that would approximate something near 3 degree, 5.2%, from whatever aiming point they had chosen, +/- the vertical error from that ideal glide slope. They stuck each other with the UH60 striking from below. John D and LW50 can suggest the static system error that is in the -1 for the UH60L, I don't have the FM for that type. The static pressure ports are on the 2 pitot static heads that are above the cockpit area, just behind the rear edge on the pilots doors. For the UH60A,
the static sources for the two systems are interconnected and provide static pressure to both pilot's airspeed indicators, altimeters and, vertical velocity indicators. In addition to standard cockpit instrumentation, ram and static pressures are converted into electronic airspeed signals by an airspeed transducer and an air data transducer to be utilized by the Automatic Flight Control System (AFCS) and Command Instrument System
(CIS) USAAEFA PROJECT NO. 77-17 AIRWORTHINESS CHARACTERISTICS UH-60A (BLACK AND FLIGHT EVALUATION HAWK) HELICOPTER SEPTEMBER 1981 FINAL REPORT
...so for the A model, the drivers get raw static for their ALT displays. Later models with EFIS systems would take the same data and process that from analog to digital, and that would normally be done by an ADC system, which can remove the errors that arise from direct static sources with some rat cunning. For our jets, the ADC data does not correct all static errors, that is why we generally see a negative transient of altitude and VS rate at rotate, the flow conditions around the static ports are changing. The helicopter has the static ports in the wake of the rotor, which alters with CT, and with J so pretty much is a mess for getting nice n' tidy accurate pressure altitude displayed. The RADALT is better, it is subject to errors as well due to attitude changes but they are generally tolerable by the choice of the fan shape of the transmitter. Bottom line is, assuming that the aircraft should have missed by a hair vertically given the wide range of errors that would apply to the helicopter instruments is immaterial to the fact that they were otherwise going to be in a grossly unacceptable vertical separation in any circumstance. That they arrived at the same place in space and time is a consequence of a very straight forward error of identification of a single target when confronted with multiple targets, which we have known to be an issue for about a century. Hard to blame the PF in getting caught out doing a practice that is known to be hazardous but which is institutionally tolerated as "business as usual".
Last edited by fdr; 7th February 2025 at 15:55 .
Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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February 07, 2025, 21:23:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11823937
The guiding document in the US is the controller handbook, FAA order 7110.65AA. There, it is clear that visual separation is an approved form of separation in Class B airspace. Not defending the application of it specific to this crash, just pointing it out so the discussion revolves around existing FAA separation standards and not what folks in the thread wish it to be, believe it to be or what it is in their country.
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf
As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.
Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded ‘not visual yet, looking’ or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great —maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.
This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.
However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it’s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace— helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.
Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.
Last edited by Stagformation; 7th February 2025 at 22:06 .
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
FAA
IFR
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 07, 2025, 22:59:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11824002
To be specific, para 7.9.4b of the handbook, here:
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf
As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.
Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.
This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.
However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.
Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf
As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.
Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.
This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.
However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.
Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 08, 2025, 06:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11824114
To be specific, para 7.9.4b of the handbook, here:
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf
As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.
Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.
This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.
However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.
Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf
As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.
Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded \x91not visual yet, looking\x92 or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great \x97maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.
This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.
However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it\x92s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace\x97 helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.
Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.
He is not radar qualified- so no headings or radar measurment distances applicable.
Where is prescribed what point is 1,5 Nm away from visual app for rwy 33? ( Note : Atco must achive required separation before that point)
or
At what point should be givem climb instruction for He to be 500' above arriving a/c before compromising 1,5Nm. If rate of climb is 1000 ft/min Helicopet need to climb for 40-50 seconds with the speed 180km/h it is 2 Nm or so - it means that instruction to climb should be given no latter than 4Nm from crossing point.
What is possibikity to spot particular aircraft for visual separation at distances more than 4Nm from crosssing points, duting the night and in bussy traffic enviroment?
Yes , I know it is Burund....
Subjects
ATC
ATCO
CRJ
IFR
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 10, 2025, 08:22:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825313
The Black Hawk crew had lost totally their situational awareness. If you are instructed to pass behind a traffic which is landing on rwy 33 how can you be on final rwy 33 before the traffic has passed you? Perhaps they noticed that they were approaching the final of rwy 33 and started a right hand climbing turn, but too late.
CRJ was possible behind the windsield frames in the first sight but anyway it was not conflicting traffic while it was on the base for rwy 33. Final turn at below 500ft doesn’t make it any easier for the helicopter to realize/react to the changing situation.
One thing came to my mind: was the PAT 25 avoiding the traffic by flying ahead of the CRJ instead behind it in first place? ”Pass behind” was told only 18 seconds before the impact.
CRJ was possible behind the windsield frames in the first sight but anyway it was not conflicting traffic while it was on the base for rwy 33. Final turn at below 500ft doesn’t make it any easier for the helicopter to realize/react to the changing situation.
One thing came to my mind: was the PAT 25 avoiding the traffic by flying ahead of the CRJ instead behind it in first place? ”Pass behind” was told only 18 seconds before the impact.
Last edited by 21600HRS; 10th February 2025 at 12:44 .
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Situational Awareness
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February 10, 2025, 17:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825626
Not meaning to pick on you individually, it’s just that you have a great line to quote!
I think the point may be that in those 50yrs you may actually have made a mistake identifying an aircraft, but we don’t have the data. Just because you didn’t have a collision or Airmiss you can’t say for certain that everything worked perfectly.
If you mistakenly identify the wrong aircraft, but don’t realise and don’t actually hit anything and the other party also don’t notice/report, then the error is never recognised, nor recorded. Are we suggesting that this scenario has never happened in the history of aviation?
A flight that doesn’t end in a crash does not mean it was perfect.
I think the point may be that in those 50yrs you may actually have made a mistake identifying an aircraft, but we don’t have the data. Just because you didn’t have a collision or Airmiss you can’t say for certain that everything worked perfectly.
If you mistakenly identify the wrong aircraft, but don’t realise and don’t actually hit anything and the other party also don’t notice/report, then the error is never recognised, nor recorded. Are we suggesting that this scenario has never happened in the history of aviation?
A flight that doesn’t end in a crash does not mean it was perfect.
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?
NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture
from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 10th February 2025 at 21:20 . Reason: Image source
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
New York Times
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February 10, 2025, 18:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825666
+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?
NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture
from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.
At the same time the accident aircraft peels off to the right to swing around and line up to 33, thus taking his (smaller) lights out of the helicopter's direct line of vision and leaving 3130's (brighter) lights still heading to 01 to decoy the pilot. The reflexive nature of the helicopter's responses suggest to me that the full implication of 'circling to 33' in the tower's first call was missed, and also sort of implies that the helicopter could not conceive that following (nearly) the published heliroute could lead him into conflict with an aircraft on final. Me neither.
NOTAM 5/1069 for DCA, valid from 07 Feb 0200 UTC until 31 March 2359 UTC
Last edited by Senior Pilot; 10th February 2025 at 21:22 . Reason: Quote
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
DCA
New York Times
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 10, 2025, 20:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11825695
I suspect the NYTimes simulation did not adjust the helicopter heading for crosswind drift correction + the wind aloft could easily be double the DCA reported wind.
The CRJ FDR should allow the NTSB to determine the wind aloft at time of collision.
The CRJ FDR should allow the NTSB to determine the wind aloft at time of collision.
Subjects
CRJ
DCA
NTSB
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February 14, 2025, 20:29:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828183
deltafox44
Not at all. The briefing indicated there may be a possibility that the altimeter in the BlackHawk displayed an inaccurate altitude reading and that the discrepency was in the order of approx 100' given the height at which the collision is known to have occurred.
Briefing the RT comms, NTSB stated that a portion of the ATC instruction to the BlackHawk to 'pass behind the CRJ' was received in the Blackhawk (according to the CVR), truncated due to the BlackHawk keying the mic at the same time. Apparently, the words 'pass behind the' were missing from the BlackHawk CVR.
Not at all. The briefing indicated there may be a possibility that the altimeter in the BlackHawk displayed an inaccurate altitude reading and that the discrepency was in the order of approx 100' given the height at which the collision is known to have occurred.
Briefing the RT comms, NTSB stated that a portion of the ATC instruction to the BlackHawk to 'pass behind the CRJ' was received in the Blackhawk (according to the CVR), truncated due to the BlackHawk keying the mic at the same time. Apparently, the words 'pass behind the' were missing from the BlackHawk CVR.
Last edited by parabatix; 14th February 2025 at 20:35 . Reason: 'in rely to'
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
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February 14, 2025, 21:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828208
For a couple of days now, was thinking about posting something on an "extra noise" I keep hearing in the R/T comms, when TWR gives the ' pass behind ' instruction. Was wondering whether TWR's Tx wasn't stepped over by someone.
My first impression was that the extra noise came from an radio call from a turbine helicopter (given the typical background noise often heard in radio calls from turbine helicopters). And was wondering if it wasn't PAT25 that started replying to TWR's first ' in sight? ' call, effectively blocking part of TWR's second call, the ' pass behind ' part of the instruction.
In attached mp3 (in .zip per forum attachment requirements) around 00:05 I hear this 'extra noise'.
Edit:
well, this seems to confirm my initial impression:
Briefing the RT comms, NTSB stated that a portion of the ATC instruction to the BlackHawk to 'pass behind the CRJ' was received in the Blackhawk (according to the CVR), truncated due to the BlackHawk keying the mic at the same time. Apparently, the words 'pass behind the' were missing from the BlackHawk CVR.
Last edited by DIBO; 14th February 2025 at 21:07 . Reason: last posts with NTSB info seem to confirm my suspicion
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
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February 14, 2025, 21:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828220
deltafox44
Not at all. The briefing indicated there may be a possibility that the altimeter in the BlackHawk displayed an inaccurate altitude reading and that the discrepency was in the order of approx 100' given the height at which the collision is known to have occurred.
Briefing the RT comms, NTSB stated that a portion of the ATC instruction to the BlackHawk to 'pass behind the CRJ' was received in the Blackhawk (according to the CVR), truncated due to the BlackHawk keying the mic at the same time. Apparently, the words 'pass behind the' were missing from the BlackHawk CVR.
Not at all. The briefing indicated there may be a possibility that the altimeter in the BlackHawk displayed an inaccurate altitude reading and that the discrepency was in the order of approx 100' given the height at which the collision is known to have occurred.
Briefing the RT comms, NTSB stated that a portion of the ATC instruction to the BlackHawk to 'pass behind the CRJ' was received in the Blackhawk (according to the CVR), truncated due to the BlackHawk keying the mic at the same time. Apparently, the words 'pass behind the' were missing from the BlackHawk CVR.
Subjects
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
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February 14, 2025, 22:44:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828270
No, hence the tower telling the Blackhawk to pass behind.
Seems to me like a reaction to seeing the Blackhawk right before impact and a reflex/reaction with intent to avoid.
The subtext for me is that the Blackhawk crew never saw them...but there's more for the NTSB to sort out, as the lady was VERY CLEAR about.
Seems to me like a reaction to seeing the Blackhawk right before impact and a reflex/reaction with intent to avoid.
The subtext for me is that the Blackhawk crew never saw them...but there's more for the NTSB to sort out, as the lady was VERY CLEAR about.
) if there had been any discussion in the black hawk cockpit about the CRJ (where it was, whether the PF did see it or not) when PM requested visual separation
Last edited by deltafox44; 14th February 2025 at 23:19 .
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 14, 2025, 23:34:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828293
NTSB didn\x92t mention much in the way of cross cockpit intercom chatter. Must be a lot more that could have been said about the SA on both aircraft, eg altimeter checks, visual lookout, intentions, perceptions, checklists\x85etc.
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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February 14, 2025, 23:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828303
Jennifer Homendy (NTSB Chair delivering the press conference) stated that the CVR of the Blackhawk had no discussion
relating to seeing the CRJ in the last seconds before impact. The crew didn't see it coming.
relating to seeing the CRJ in the last seconds before impact. The crew didn't see it coming.
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
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February 15, 2025, 00:27:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828318
They stated the crew was likely wearing NVG, this would explain that
Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
NTSB
NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
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February 15, 2025, 04:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828354
It appears from the NTSB's most recent press conference that the instruction "pass behind the CRJ" was not heard in the helo's CVR and, therefore by inference, not heard by the crew. Am I correct in assuming that there is no requirement to readback an instruction like that in the USA? ATC appeared not to expect one.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
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February 15, 2025, 05:36:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828365
It appears from the NTSB's most recent press conference that the instruction "pass behind the CRJ" was not heard in the helo's CVR and, therefore by inference, not heard by the crew. Am I correct in assuming that there is no requirement to readback an instruction like that in the USA? ATC appeared not to expect one.
Last edited by Commando Cody; 15th February 2025 at 07:45 . Reason: precision
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
PAT25
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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February 15, 2025, 09:00:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828431
I think we're flogging a dead horse with this altitude thing, we already know that the aircraft collided from the video.
The most reliable information from the helicopter indicates they were at 278ft above the water. Likewise we're told that the CRJ was at 313ft 2 seconds before impact. The CRJ is 20ft tall, more with landing gear extended. The UH60 is 16ft tall. There is no more information to be gleaned from this.
The CRJ was a passenger jet on finals to land and there is no way on earth anything else should be on a collision track. The helicopter should never have been allowed to be that close to landing traffic, no matter what the legal and procedural niceties of ATC communication were.
And the fact that there were numerous reports of similar close calls of this kind over the previous decade or so is a damning (some might say criminal) indictment of the safety management systems of the authorities involved.
The most reliable information from the helicopter indicates they were at 278ft above the water. Likewise we're told that the CRJ was at 313ft 2 seconds before impact. The CRJ is 20ft tall, more with landing gear extended. The UH60 is 16ft tall. There is no more information to be gleaned from this.
The CRJ was a passenger jet on finals to land and there is no way on earth anything else should be on a collision track. The helicopter should never have been allowed to be that close to landing traffic, no matter what the legal and procedural niceties of ATC communication were.
And the fact that there were numerous reports of similar close calls of this kind over the previous decade or so is a damning (some might say criminal) indictment of the safety management systems of the authorities involved.
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Close Calls
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February 15, 2025, 09:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828441
The helicopter should never have been allowed to be that close to landing traffic,
In any case the procedure us currently withdrawn until end of March and I sincerely doubt they will re-install it before the final report is out. ..
A couple of new info points the NTSB clarified : Both aircraft were on VHF , so we can drop this UHF discussion , the Blackhawk had ADS-B equipped but was not transmitting , it was check ride with NVG, and they most probably all had them on .and there was a last second evasive action attempt by the CRJ crew, which go a TA previously . On the TWR, the CAs are displayed in the BRITE even with audio on ..
For the rest we have to wait until the next NTSB briefing
Subjects
ADSB (All)
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Final Report
NTSB
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
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February 15, 2025, 10:07:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828476
One could also argue that a CRJ overflying a helicopter by 50-100 ft is going to throw a pretty bad wake turbulence into the helicopter, and the helicopter losing control and crashing seems pretty likely. Save the CRJ, sure.
Subjects
CRJ
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