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| MechEngr
December 13, 2025, 05:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 12004479 |
NTSB:
​What We Recommended
​​​​​As a result of this investigation, we issued 2 urgent new recommendations. ​We issued recommendations to: ​To the Federal Aviation Administration: ​Prohibit operations on Helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA). (Urgent) Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (Urgent) The CRJ was equipped with TCAS, which may or may not have been applicable at this low altitude as it is suppressed at 400 ft. The preliminary report does not indicate the helicopter having a TCAS or having an operating one. It did have the ability to produce ADS-B Out. Neither aircraft is reported to have had ADS-B In. Since many operators seem to loath spending money on ADS-B In, the recommendation from the NTSB was to (1) stop simultaneous flight path use and (2) go elsewhere when the approaches were in use. The FAA agreed. Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-001 the FAA did what was recommended about simultaneous use. Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-002 the FAA made a satisfactory response concerning planning the alternate route(s) This legislation is the exact opposite of that recommendation. No doubt the anger isn't just that the NTSB has yet again been ignored, it's that the FAA agreements to safety measures are targeted for destruction in a way that recreates the circumstance of the tragic event. I said at first, on seeing this collision a few hours after the event, that I felt rage that so many safety measures are available and yet none of them was actually used. This section, 373, is what I consider an intentional sabotage of the safe operations around DCA. The FAA literally had advertising videos showing the use of ADS-B In on helicopters for this exact purpose, to give situational awareness to the pilots long before there would be a need to deconflict with other traffic (see end) . No sudden swerves as TCAS attempts to make a last moment save of a terrible situation. TCAS alone cannot be the solution as TCAS gets shut off to avoid nuisance complaints about the terrain the plane is intentionally going to run into or other proximate planes waiting for takeoff. ADS-B In is for noting where everyone else is in the neighborhood of the aircraft. Had the helicopter been equipped with ADS-B In they would have known the speed and direction of the CRJ and seen it was on a collision course. As usual it appears there is no name attached nor meeting notes about who submitted what became Section 373. There is certainly no justification paper that will see the light of day. If those exist, please, someone, prove me wrong. I cannot find it on YouTube. An actual user who avoided a mid-air using ADS-B In (Trent Palmer, if anyone wants to avoid him; not everyone is liked): Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB In
ADSB Out
CRJ
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Preliminary Report
Route 4
Section 373 of the FY26 NDAA
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
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| scard08
December 20, 2025, 04:24:00 GMT permalink Post: 12008323 |
An independent US view focussed on safety:- "The night everything at DCA finally went wrong"
https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...pecial-report/ Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB In
ADSB Out
CRJ
DCA
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| Ver5pen
January 27, 2026, 23:08:00 GMT permalink Post: 12028271 |
I don't see a livestream on youtube, but they have some supporting animations.
The caption/transcript is at https://transcript.verbit.co/?transc...WidthMode=true The docket has had more than 60 items added. https://data.ntsb.gov/Docket/?NTSBNumber=DCA25MA108 Boardmeeting Overview Animation https://youtu.be/2H_A6mHsHk0 Aircraft Visibility Study https://youtu.be/LJ10ZOcWuC4 Control Tower Visibility Study https://youtu.be/IpcPaBbvwnM I don\x92t know why they chose to create it from the IP\x92s (RHS)\x92s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time IP seemed like he had his hands full with the RT (they were blocked a few times) and monitoring the PF\x92s flying (she busted the altitude constraint multiple times) definitely an absurd environment and accident waiting to happen (plenty of near misses have been reported subsequently in the same airspace). Americans have all the gear and money but somehow their cowboy side comes out all too often and aviation seems to be one of the biggest candidates. They are lucky they didn\x92t have the obnoxious clown JFK Steve screaming in their ears Subjects
Accident Waiting to Happen
CRJ
Close Calls
NTSB
NTSB Docket
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| Musician
January 29, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT permalink Post: 12029155 |
weird that they don’t even mention the Blackhawk PF’s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn’t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
31. Due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter’s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter’s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.
.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.
Subjects
Altimeter (All)
Barometric Altimeter
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
Findings
NTSB
PAT25
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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| Musician
January 30, 2026, 12:48:00 GMT permalink Post: 12029671 |
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:
28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target. The question was why the NTSB chose the right seat of the helicopter, and that was because the instructor assumed responsibility for the visual separation. There is no cockpit communication about the identification, so the PF wasn't involved in that. One problem the helicopter had was that the CRJ was flying a turn. Flying straight, you know you're going to collide with something (even if it is just a dot of light) if it doesn't move visually. The CRJ's lights were moving left, so that would've looked like it was safely passing the helicopter by. The crew needed the situational awareness that the CRJ was going to turn towards them as it lined up for runway 33, but they didn't have it. ATC did, but didn't share, for reasons also addressed in the findings. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Findings
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Visual Separation
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| DaveReidUK
February 17, 2026, 09:34:00 GMT permalink Post: 12038498 |
There is one lawsuit pending in federal district court in Washington, D.C. - although I am fairly certain that it is a consolidation of claims arising from the accident brought by some different groupings of plaintiffs represented, in each instance, by different attorneys. This imprecision of my knowledge of the actual litigation at present, for which I am making no excuses, is another reason why I will have to shift some attention away from other pursuits and spend some time reading court filings on the Pacer U.S. court systems web portal. More on the first reason, later. (And among my other pursuits is actual legal work, and it happens to be in the aerospace domain - transactional, not litigation, however.)
I want to draw three distinctions about the lawsuit arising from the accident. First, insofar as deriding (and mocking, and disliking or worse) the legal profession in general and particular individual lawyers is concerned, I will say in advance that I will shake my head in disbelief if anyone in this forum community believes that litigation against the U.S. federal government relating to this accident is improper or just about lawyers enriching themselves. Essentially every single post here, or at the very least every line of inquiry or analysis or interpretation of the facts as they have emerged, points a very straight finger of blame at the FAA's way of doing things. Related to that, secondly, in my reference to the advocacy by the parents of Bluestreak 5342's F/O I was not trying to highlight their grief or the grieving process. The point was - and in my mind (capable of being derided because it sometimes is a legal mind to some extent) still is - that although obviously connected to their grief, these survivors also appear to be on a quest to exonerate the F/O's conduct on the final approach in question. I suppose I could hope to have learned more aviation history and be able to recite some, maybe most, of the significant previous accidents in which survivors of aviators, when those aviators were blamed for accidents in which they were killed, sought to clear their names. I don't think the instance of 5342's F/O's parents is unique. I do think it is very relevant to the impact, the implications, of the lawsuit and the Board's report. (More on this also later.) Soon after the accident, I read about two young attorneys who were passengers on Bluestreak 5342. From memory, they were mid-level associates (maybe four or five years in practice, not yet partners in the firm) in a comparatively small law firm. They were returning to D.C. from taking depositions. I realize no one (or probably no one) on this forum who qualifies for the first Papa letter in the forum title will care much about the travails of young lawyers doing the equivalent of building hours. I will just say that it is hard work, and often far more thankless than digs at the legal profession would have a reasonable person conclude. And ..... I mention these two particular victims of the accident because I could - when I read that news report soon after 29 January - largely relate to where they were in their careers. Say what you will, and say it with as much vitriol as forum rules will allow - their deaths in the accident deserve their day in court, despite digs at lawyers and the profession. Discussion of what is wrong with the court system and the legal process in the United States - well, this isn't Scotus blog or something; that's all another subject. But: I maintain strongly that the attorneys who represent accident victims' families and other survivors of those victims have as much right to attack the responsible parties in court as attorney-bashers do to make fun of their profit motive. I haven't done that kind of legal work. I have met very fine, very excellent attorneys who do, and I think it behooves aviation professionals to recognize that bringing their clients' claims forward to that ultimate day in court is honorable, and necessary work. (This is not to defend jackpot justice awards, or bad-attorney behavior, as if I need to make that clear.) Third, and the "first reason" I'll need to start eating more time on Pacer, is that I continue to believe that the aviators of Bluestreak 5342 are being taken advantage of by an otherwise respectable legal process. If one believes that they did nothing wrong, then why is it that their estates are not represented in the courtroom in order to defend them? Aren't they implied or implicit defendants, though obviously not named as such? And as I said in an earlier post, one could argue, 'well, the Army pilots aren't there to defend themselves, and they're getting pretty seriously wrung out as having primary responsibility - in addition to the systemic factors of course - and these three deceased U.S. Army aviators, they don't have an active defense in the courtroom either, do they? So why should the airline pilots have one?" Pretty simple answer: the U.S. federal government admitted liability, so the Army pilots - admittedly indirectly - have had their possible defense as pilots waived out from under them. But since I haven't been delving into all the various court filings which by now presumably have piled up during pre-trial discovery, it is possible that the Bluestreak 5342 aviators' estates have retained their own counsel and are seeking to intervene in the case. I'll find out. Though I should apologize for repeating myself, and while admitting that intense study of intracacies of federal procedure was something I left behind when I picked up the J.D. (after all, reading Advisory Committee Notes about amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence, it's fascinating stuff, amiright?), the gross unfairness of alleging negligence against the pilots who do not have their own legal representation in the case strikes me as an error and an injustice. And I am not a stranger to dealing with insurance carriers who want to settle, while the client wants to fight on - if the pilots' estates had separate representation, their lawyers would need to make sure their cowboy or hiking boots are on snuggly - the stuff to be thrown at them by the airline's corporate types and the insurance carrier attorneys who mostly call the shots, would seem likely to be intense. Almost last, with mega-billions coming out of Congress for a totally new ATC system, it continues to seem obvious to yours truly that in designing it, and then doing all the many steps of implementing it, the lessons learned from the Board report will have a window of opportunity not usually present in the U.S. NAS. It should not go to the same fate of being ignored or shrugged off as so many Board reports have suffered. If the litigation - though of course separate from the Board work - creates leverage for such a beneficial outcome, I would say "Who wants it?" (with apologies to WSJ sportswriter extraordinaire, Jason Gay - about the U.S. Women's Hockey Team and the Wisconsin Badgers Women's Hockey Team as well). Or in less cryptic terms, Go fo It. Last, Uberlingen. One of the Skyguide officials who was deeply involved with the aftermath of the accident delivered several presentations about it, most all of which went into some depth, during my academic residence at that certain Air and Space Law graduate law degree program located in Montreal, Quebec. Those presentations, as the old saying goes, "left a mark." Subjects
ATC
Accountability/Liability
CRJ
FAA
Grief
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| Lonewolf_50
February 17, 2026, 14:38:00 GMT permalink Post: 12038660 |
The company or their pilots? Deep Pockets attempts at litigation are commonplace in the US, not sure how it is across the pond.
A simple "left 360 at Haynes Point for spacing" would have prevented the accident - note that this was mentioned in the original thread as a common instruction, to helicopters on that route, by an Army Blackhawk pilot who used to fly for that unit. Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
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| Musician
February 19, 2026, 18:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 12039831 |
the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I’ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would’ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would’ve been even more taxing for the instructor
I don’t know how anyone can pretend these things didn’t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.
if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ’s flatboats occurred within the PF’s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly. the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well. There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this:
20:00:11.0
APR-P
PAT two five if you hear Potomac acknowledge with an IDENT. traffic at your nine to ten o'clock in two miles eastbound one thousand eight hundred indicated its a helicopter.
.
INT-2 [trainee] do you see him? INT-1 [instructor] nope. INT-2 do you see him? INT-1 no. nine to ten o'clock. *. 20:00:22.7 RDO-2 * * traffic INT-1 yeah. I got it. tally. coming left. INT-1 alright you want me to keep chasing this number one needle or- INT-2 yeah. just avoid traffic at this point. INT-1 yup. I got the traffic out the right door and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'. For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading. I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat. With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did). There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me. Last edited by Musician; 19th February 2026 at 18:47 . Subjects
AA5342
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
CVR
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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