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| nojwod
February 01, 2025, 11:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 11818951 |
According to CNN, the crash was waiting to happen.
https://edition.cnn.com/2025/01/30/u...nvs/index.html
Captain Steeve has a good analyis and probably quite close to what actually happened. I agree with the comment on the video that
at the point which PAT25 initially requests visual separation and confirms traffic in sight, it looks like the AA5324 CRJ had already commenced right turn for circling approach at which point the brightest landing lights would be the aircraft behind as AA5324s would no longer be pointing directly at the helicopter. The brightest landing light is now the No.2 traffic which PAT25 identifies as their traffic and will probably now be fixated on due to confirmation bias. Terribly tragic and could happen to any pilot at night.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hfgllf1L9_4 If they were using NVG as speculated, the failure to see the landing lights of the approaching aircraft might be explained by a scenario where : Crew mistakenly identified the following aircraft, either with NVG on or temporarily off. Happy with the separation, the NGV gear goes back on and with the limited field of view from the goggles, focused ahead and down as visual flight demands, the landing lights, so bright in the videos, were just never seen, but without the goggles the peripheral vision of the crew might have had some warning. Subjects
CNN
CRJ
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
PAT25
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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| rattle
February 01, 2025, 13:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819031 |
Apologies if this has already been asked, but why wasn't the helo told to do a 360 if there was the
slightest
chance of a conflict with the CRJ. Relying on it seeing the CRJ, with absolute certainty, apparently side on so probably at its most 'invisible', makes no sense at all to this non-flyer.
Subjects
CRJ
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| MarkD
February 01, 2025, 14:03:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819042 |
It may be a military discipline of responding quickly and pushing your needs forward, but it gives an impression of \x93if we give ATC time to decide, they may tell us to orbit rather than be the ones who assume the risk\x94
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Lascaille
February 01, 2025, 14:16:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819056 |
Many of the liveatc.net feeds do in fact monitor more than one frequency. So there are overlaps and missed traffic.
That’s why using their recordings leads to comments on pprune that the controller was cut off or didn’t say something or the aircraft didn’t acknowledge. It can be just the scanner not picking it up, because it focuses on one transmission at a time. That’s not to comment on whether they had VHF or not. The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| YRP
February 01, 2025, 14:37:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819062 |
Talk of it being difficult to pick out aircraft nav lights is a red herring. The heli was, initially, several hundred feet below the CRJ and should have been able to easily see the lights against the night sky.
Blaming the airspace design is also a non starter. Are we really going to say that just because the airspace is poorly designed then I'm just going to fly in to that regional jet over there? First rule of airmanship anyone? Keep a good lookout. Seems like the helicopter crew failed to do so having been given their requested visual separation. Should have had eyes on stalks. No the airspace does not take the blame. Apparently the hello pilots missed the lookout. And the controller could have been clearer, instead of \x93still in sight?\x94 perhaps \x93the RJ is now 1/2 mile 10 o\x92clock, confirm you have him?\x94. (not criticizing him, guessing that he saw them closer than expected, was concerned, and made a very quick call) But the airspace & procedure seems to not tolerate mistakes. There ought to be some safety margin. While not the primary fault, it could be improved. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| YRP
February 01, 2025, 14:56:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819074 |
I guess - as the culprit here - I should clarify that I was wrong; both the VASAviation youtube video and the LiveATC recordings were two different radio channels spliced together, the helo was transmitting on a separate frequency.
The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. It is not always understood on pprune (and again not you, mostly casual posters) that liveatc.net is just hobbyist / enthusiast stuff. It\x92s not reliable. The antenna placement is often poor, so some transmission sounds bad. Same with using ads-b data from various sources and plotting tracks. Sometimes it is meaningful and sometimes the position is way too undersampled. And don\x92t get me started on taking derivatives / differences on noisy undersampled signals to get things like wow look at that vertical speed here. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| arc698
February 01, 2025, 15:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819099 |
A red collision alert was flashing at this point on the controllers screen, the instruction should\x92ve been for the CRJ to go around, not wasting time on the helicopter pilots.
Secondly, why shouldn\x92t we criticise the controller? Imho his actions need to be criticised. Not the individual but the environment, procedures and training he operated in. The mission of ATC is to prevent exactly this from happening and they failed in their mission.
Absolutely on the lookout.
No the airspace does not take the blame. Apparently the hello pilots missed the lookout. And the controller could have been clearer, instead of \x93still in sight?\x94 perhaps \x93the RJ is now 1/2 mile 10 o\x92clock, confirm you have him?\x94. (not criticizing him, guessing that he saw them closer than expected, was concerned, and made a very quick call) But the airspace & procedure seems to not tolerate mistakes. There ought to be some safety margin. While not the primary fault, it could be improved. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
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| jimtx
February 01, 2025, 17:04:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819170 |
A red collision alert was flashing at this point on the controllers screen, the instruction should\x92ve been for the CRJ to go around, not wasting time on the helicopter pilots.
Secondly, why shouldn\x92t we criticise the controller? Imho his actions need to be criticised. Not the individual but the environment, procedures and training he operated in. The mission of ATC is to prevent exactly this from happening and they failed in their mission. Subjects
ATC
CRJ
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| fdr
February 01, 2025, 17:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819178 |
There
IS NO ILS
for runway 33 at KDCA. The only ILS at KDCA is for runway 1.
There is a curving RNAV approach, that is not in line with the runway until 490 feet/1.4nm, where one makes the last-minute ~50\xb0 left turn for visual runway alignment. In light of that fact, maybe you can reframe your question. AirNav: KDCA - Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport https://aeronav.faa.gov/d-tpp/2501/00443R33.PDF
RTFQ here folks....slow down and actually read the question.
Quote:
​​​​ ​​​ Now a test question for him.... . were you flying the incident airplane doing a Visual Approach to RWY33....would you have tuned up the IAP for that RWY as an additional reference for your approach ? SOP's usually instruct Crews to use ILS data when doing Visual Approaches to runways with that kind of IAP so would that kind of thinking apply in this incident? Would that have been of any benefit considering the existing weather and terrain? Or, would that have been a distraction? Pattern, perhaps you might review your comment. It really is not a difficult concept or question. Seems easy enough to understand if the post is actually read for comprehension sakes. About 80% of all IATA operators would be discomforted by such changes, outside of the USA visual approaches at night have a litany of requirements to adhere to for the purposes of terrain separation, vs Texas big sky rules that do work in the US. In the end, taht didn't cause the accident, it is one of those things that goes with the freedom of flight in the USA. ...
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
KDCA
Separation (ALL)
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| canigida
February 01, 2025, 18:13:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819206 |
landing 33
Having coffee this morning with my friend (my old CFI) who's a FO for one of the other American Eagle providers based at DCA, his opinion was that since that 5,200 ft on RWY33 is sufficient for an RJ, the primary reason he gets sidestepped to 33 about half the time is that it ends very close to the American's regional jet terminal and that using RWY33 saves wasting a couple hundred bucks to taxi for no reason which adds up with their large amount of activity. I don't fly there but as pax I on an RJ, with those winds in VFR, in my experience we landed 33 maybe 40% of the time. My friend doesn't speak for all the RJ pilots obviously, but he didn't consider this sidestep to 31 to be at all unexpected or in his mind adding any significant risk and mentioned it was part of his localization checkout (his company has specific ground and line training required for the airfield). Most tellingly, he literally said it was not on his Top Ten gripes about DCA (he likes to complain a bit 😀
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
VFR
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| jumpseater
February 01, 2025, 19:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819244 |
I guess - as the culprit here - I should clarify that I was wrong; both the VASAviation youtube video and the LiveATC recordings were two different radio channels spliced together, the helo was transmitting on a separate frequency.
The tower was transmitting on both frequencies - I believe - simultaneously. So the CRJ would have heard only the tower's transmissions to the helo ('visual separation approved' x 2) and not the helo's transmissions. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| RatherBeFlying
February 01, 2025, 20:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819292 |
Subjects
ADSB (All)
ATC
CRJ
DCA
Radar
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| PPRuNeUser134364
February 01, 2025, 21:00:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819297 |
Subjects
ADSB (All)
CRJ
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| RatherBeFlying
February 01, 2025, 21:17:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819306 |
Are you sure that they didn't have the traffic on their display?
I have received warnings and an alarm for Flarm traffic. When I have seen ADS-B traffic I have been able to stay far enough away that I haven't been able to verify whether warnings and alarms are provided for ADS-B traffic if it becomes a threat. Subjects
ADSB (All)
CRJ
NTSB
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| Chesty Morgan
February 01, 2025, 21:23:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819308 |
We have to wait for the NTSB to let us know what, if any, traffic appeared where on the CRJ panel, how prominent it appeared, or if there were aural warnings.
I have received warnings and an alarm for Flarm traffic. When I have seen ADS-B traffic I have been able to stay far enough away that I haven't been able to verify whether warnings and alarms are provided for ADS-B traffic if it becomes a threat. Also depending on the range selected on the TCAS or ND display you might get a load of garbled nonesense. Subjects
ADSB (All)
CRJ
NTSB
TCAS (All)
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| galaxy flyer
February 01, 2025, 21:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819313 |
However, there is a case where, due to visual illusions, the crew took “evasive” actions that created a mid-air collision. EAL and TWA over the Carmel VOR in 1965. The cloud deck was angled in a fashion that created the illusion they were head-on co-altitude, when in fact, they were separated. EAL FO pulled up to avoid and collided. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Aviat...-air_collision Subjects
CRJ
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| CayleysCoachman
February 01, 2025, 21:50:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819327 |
From experience, I’m pretty convinced the Army crew never saw the CRJ and vice versa. IF they did, there was no time t9 take evasive action to miss—it’s just too late. In my mid-air,the investigation showed that, once visual, any action would only change in the impact angles.
However, there is a case where, due to visual illusions, the crew took “evasive” actions that created a mid-air collision. EAL and TWA over the Carmel VOR in 1965. The cloud deck was angled in a fashion that created the illusion they were head-on co-altitude, when in fact, they were separated. EAL FO pulled up to avoid and collided. https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Aviat...-air_collision https://assets.publishing.service.go...-KAY_02-09.pdf Page 61 lays out the possibility that in manoeuvring to avoid a perceived risk of collision, a pilot may have unwittingly flown into a different collision. Subjects
CRJ
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| DIBO
February 01, 2025, 21:52:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819330 |
4. The CRJ crew was left out of the information loop. I have a dedicated traffic display on the top of my glider panel which shows ADS-B and Flarm traffic. A similar display would have enabled the CRJ crew to monitor traffic and get the hell out of the way when necessary.
From the 'Mil' thread:
Subjects
ADSB (All)
CRJ
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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| CaptainDrCook
February 02, 2025, 00:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819397 |
What should have been the vertical separation? I'm just a lowly PPL holder, but I imagine if the CRJ was at 325 feet, even a ceiling of 200 feet is too high for the helicopter.
Not just from a collision perspective, but a wake turbulance issue. And maybe more importantly, what should have been the horizontal separation? Surely it should have been at least 500 feet after the passing CRJ (not based on air law, just common sense). Clearly there was no horizontal or vertical separation in the end, but just how far off minimums was the helicopter? Seems nearly impossible to be that far off the expected flight path. Subjects
CRJ
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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| Denflnt
February 02, 2025, 00:07:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819398 |
The CRJ were asked by ATC if they were able to accept an approach onto R33, they replied they could. They were well within their rights to refuse it, apparently one of the previous aircraft ahead of them had refused a request to to switch to R33.
If they had held the Helo short of the runway approach until enough radar separation to cross the approach path was available the Helo would have been orbiting for hours. When the helicopter crew confirmed they had the aircraft in sight they accepted responsibility they had identified the correct aircraft and could remain visual with it as they they crossed the approach path. If they had any doubt to this they should have stated so. ATC intended for the helicopter to pass behind that CRJ not below it. Actually ATC asked the Helicopter twice if they had the CRJ visual about 40 seconds apart, both times the helicopter replied yes, and the helicopter crew, not ATC, asked to maintain visual separation. Yes, the CRJ could have not accepted ATC's request to divert to 33. They would have then been set to go around to set up again for Runway 1, the usual runway. ATC put the CRJ on an intersecting runway, which added complexity to the pattern picture. The helo would have only had to hold for a short time to wait for the CRJ that was diverted to a runway not normally used for commercial air carriers. Knowing that, they asked the helo to maintain visual separation, placing everything on that crew to see and avoid the CRJ. I have read that they didn't even tell them where to actually look to see the traffic, no bearing, no altitude. The helo likely saw traffic, just not where they were supposed to look. There were plenty incoming and departing Runway 1, which is why the CRJ was asked to divert. Add to that, both aircraft were low and operating over an urban area at night where it is difficult to see other aircraft. Worse even if the helo crew was using NVG. ATC should have held the helo short, waiting for an unusual approach to a runway not used normally, so to let the CRJ pass. The CRJ crew was already saturated in tasks at the time I have not hear ATC asking them to look out for the helo. IMO, ATC created a "single point of failure" relying on the helo to see and avoid the CRJ. Had they held the helo, and helos can hover, for even a minute, this doesn't happen. ATC's main purpose is to keep aircraft from occupying the same place at the same time. In this case, they didn't. I am sure that the helo pilots made]mistakes. But, this appears to be a massive failure of ATC. Last edited by Denflnt; 2nd February 2025 at 00:46 . Subjects
ATC
CRJ
Hover
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Radar
See and Avoid
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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