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| Ver5pen
February 19, 2026, 14:18:00 GMT permalink Post: 12039724 |
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
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Altimeter testing showed that the 100-ft pressure altitude discrepancy seen in the FDR data for the accident flight was observed on three other UH-60L helicopters operated by the 12th Aviation Battalion. These altimeter testing results also showed that the pressure altitude data recorded by the helicopters\x92 FDRs, when corrected for local conditions, was representative of what was indicated on the right side altimeter. Therefore, the FDR pressure altitude data for the accident helicopter, when corrected for local conditions, was likely representative of what was indicated on the IP\x92s barometric altimeter during the accident flight.
[...]. The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4. For the northern segment of Route 4, which included the area of the collision, of the 523 flights analyzed, 260 flights (49%) were identified as exceeding route altitude limitations at some point during the flight. Had the error tolerances of barometric altimeters been considered during design of the helicopter route maximum altitudes, the incompatibility of a 200-ft ceiling and barometric altimeter errors may have been identified. the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I\x92ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would\x92ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would\x92ve been even more taxing for the instructor I don\x92t know how anyone can pretend these things didn\x92t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese. if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ\x92s flatboats occurred within the PF\x92s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly. the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably Subjects
Altimeter (All)
Barometric Altimeter
Blackhawk (H-60)
CVR
Final Report
NTSB
PAT25
Route 4
Route Altitude
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| Musician
February 19, 2026, 18:33:00 GMT permalink Post: 12039831 |
the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I’ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would’ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would’ve been even more taxing for the instructor
I don’t know how anyone can pretend these things didn’t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.
if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ’s flatboats occurred within the PF’s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly. the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably What I do see is that when the instructor is flying, he's having some altitude excursions as well. There's also a visual separation while the instructor is flying, and it plays out like this:
20:00:11.0
APR-P
PAT two five if you hear Potomac acknowledge with an IDENT. traffic at your nine to ten o'clock in two miles eastbound one thousand eight hundred indicated its a helicopter.
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INT-2 [trainee] do you see him? INT-1 [instructor] nope. INT-2 do you see him? INT-1 no. nine to ten o'clock. *. 20:00:22.7 RDO-2 * * traffic INT-1 yeah. I got it. tally. coming left. INT-1 alright you want me to keep chasing this number one needle or- INT-2 yeah. just avoid traffic at this point. INT-1 yup. I got the traffic out the right door and only then does she call 'traffic in sight maintaining visual separation'. For the CRJ, the instructor calls 'traffic in sight' without ascertaining that the PF sees it. When the tower cautions them again, the CRJ still hasn't turned, so while it's visible, it doesn't appear a threat. I think both pilots expect the CRJ to be to their right, because that's where the bridge is when ATC tells them where the CRJ is initially, and because the instructor thinks that ATC wants them to move left. They don't understand that the CRJ is on their left and will be turning onto the runway heading. I imagine, based on that, that the PF believed the instructor has the CRJ in sight on his side. If she did see the CRJ, it would've been well above and on a diverging course, except for the final 6 seconds or so; it wouldn't have appeared to be a threat. With his radio call, the instructor put himself in the position of being responsible for avoiding AA5342, but he didn't actually know where it was (maybe he thought he did). There are a lot of factors contributing to that, but that's the big hole here for me. Last edited by Musician; 19th February 2026 at 18:47 . Subjects
AA5342
ATC
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
CVR
Separation (ALL)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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