April 01, 2025, 10:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11858507
........... But , back to DCA , I would be interested to know if previous instructions to circle 33 while on finals 01 was a commonly used procedure , and if it was occasionally refused by some pilots in the past and what was then the reaction of ATC .. divert to Dulles ?
I raised the airline responsibility bit more as "idle thoughts" to illustrate that everyone can play their part in making things safer in cases such as this - including airlines. However, it does need (a) identification of the issue, (b) then good analysis to scope it all and, finally, if there is a "real" potential issue after that analysis, (c) to work out a formal policy (here with AA and DCA) so everyone knows what's what and, importantly, appreciates any knock-on issues that such a policy may generate - such as maybe cutting down on ATC's flexibility on occasion.
So, for eg, it could have been a joint AA/DCA policy that AA would not be placed on the sidestep, or accepted on the sidestep, while something was on Route 4. Irrelevant here now as Route 4 has gone ..... but the above concept can be applied to other potential issues at other airfields.
Anyway, just some thoughts. I'll revert to lurking! Cheers, H 'n' H
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
Route 4
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April 01, 2025, 13:18:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11858613
I've no insider knowledge but, given how the first AA accepted it and the following AA asked for it specifically, it may have been common practice within AA. Not all line pilots may fully appreciate the potential issues linked with, say, that particular sidestep.
I raised the airline responsibility bit more as "idle thoughts" to illustrate that everyone can play their part in making things safer in cases such as this - including airlines. However, it does need (a) identification of the issue, (b) then good analysis to scope it all and, finally, if there is a "real" potential issue after that analysis, (c) to work out a formal policy (here with AA and DCA) so everyone knows what's what and, importantly, appreciates any knock-on issues that such a policy may generate - such as maybe cutting down on ATC's flexibility on occasion.
So, for eg, it could have been a joint AA/DCA policy that AA would not be placed on the sidestep, or accepted on the sidestep, while something was on Route 4. Irrelevant here now as Route 4 has gone ..... but the above concept can be applied to other potential issues at other airfields.
Anyway, just some thoughts. I'll revert to lurking! Cheers, H 'n' H
I raised the airline responsibility bit more as "idle thoughts" to illustrate that everyone can play their part in making things safer in cases such as this - including airlines. However, it does need (a) identification of the issue, (b) then good analysis to scope it all and, finally, if there is a "real" potential issue after that analysis, (c) to work out a formal policy (here with AA and DCA) so everyone knows what's what and, importantly, appreciates any knock-on issues that such a policy may generate - such as maybe cutting down on ATC's flexibility on occasion.
So, for eg, it could have been a joint AA/DCA policy that AA would not be placed on the sidestep, or accepted on the sidestep, while something was on Route 4. Irrelevant here now as Route 4 has gone ..... but the above concept can be applied to other potential issues at other airfields.
Anyway, just some thoughts. I'll revert to lurking! Cheers, H 'n' H
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
Route 4
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April 01, 2025, 22:33:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11858934
The NTSB preliminary report states that about 4% of DCA\x92s arrivals use runway 33. With 25,000 monthly flights, you can do the math. 33 used more frequently than average in the winter due to the typical strong NW winds seen in the DC area. That was the case on 1/29.
While it may be a wishful narrative that pilots get sent to ATC jail if \x93unable,\x94 doubt that\x92s anywhere close to the truth. I think the reality is if a pilot states \x93unable,\x94 ATC makes the necessary adjustments, which may involve an aircraft being resequenced in the queue. Don\x92t really think ATC has the authority to deny an aircraft a landing clearance out of spite if flight planned for DCA.
And just as the collision was occurring, JIA5347 was checking in on the Mount Vernon Visual specifically requesting 33 . Luck of the draw\x85
Subjects
ATC
DCA
NTSB
Preliminary Report
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April 07, 2025, 22:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11862426
Website of Chicago law firm with very significant practice representing families of victims of aviation accidents has information that preliminary procedural claim was filed on February 18, on behalf of one of the DCA accident victims for $250 million. The filing relates to the procedural requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act which must be fulfilled prior to filing a lawsuit in federal district court.
The preliminary claim process ostensibly or superficially provides a vehicle for dispute resolution and monetary settlement prior to litigation. (I am not expressing or implying any view with regard to the likelihood of any such resolution and settlement being reached for the claim of this specific plaintiff or any larger set of plaintiffs' claims, or with regard to the prospects of "negotiations" starting, progressing, or producing results.)
The preliminary claim process ostensibly or superficially provides a vehicle for dispute resolution and monetary settlement prior to litigation. (I am not expressing or implying any view with regard to the likelihood of any such resolution and settlement being reached for the claim of this specific plaintiff or any larger set of plaintiffs' claims, or with regard to the prospects of "negotiations" starting, progressing, or producing results.)
Subjects
DCA
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April 08, 2025, 18:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11862879
Website of Chicago law firm with very significant practice representing families of victims of aviation accidents has information that preliminary procedural claim was filed on February 18, on behalf of one of the DCA accident victims for $250 million. The filing relates to the procedural requirements of the Federal Tort Claims Act which must be fulfilled prior to filing a lawsuit in federal district court.
The preliminary claim process ostensibly or superficially provides a vehicle for dispute resolution and monetary settlement prior to litigation. (I am not expressing or implying any view with regard to the likelihood of any such resolution and settlement being reached for the claim of this specific plaintiff or any larger set of plaintiffs' claims, or with regard to the prospects of "negotiations" starting, progressing, or producing results.)
The preliminary claim process ostensibly or superficially provides a vehicle for dispute resolution and monetary settlement prior to litigation. (I am not expressing or implying any view with regard to the likelihood of any such resolution and settlement being reached for the claim of this specific plaintiff or any larger set of plaintiffs' claims, or with regard to the prospects of "negotiations" starting, progressing, or producing results.)
From your perspective then, could you clarify :
Controlled Airspace, See and Avoid re same, duty of care re ATCre controlled Airspace, specifically short finals, etc?
May as well add split or proportional liability??
I am trying to get even a basic understanding of how a large helicopter flew in visual flight rules into a jetliner on short final, which was on an IMC approach, on slope. Both were “legal”. The helicopter busted altitude by 125 feet vertically, and just exactly enough horizontally. Que?
Last edited by BugBear; 8th April 2025 at 22:34 .
Subjects
Accountability/Liability
DCA
See and Avoid
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April 15, 2025, 20:35:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11867556
Previous comments about runway 33 at DCA being used only for RJ or smaller. Today with winds howling out of the northwest, 33 is being used for all types (runway 1 also in use). Watched a SWA B737 and AAL A21N land on 33.
If you want to see the standard visual flight path into 33 at DCA, today is a good day to observe. IAD also operating single crosswind runway for arrivals.
If you want to see the standard visual flight path into 33 at DCA, today is a good day to observe. IAD also operating single crosswind runway for arrivals.
Subjects
DCA
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April 16, 2025, 14:25:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11868036
Previous comments about runway 33 at DCA being used only for RJ or smaller. Today with winds howling out of the northwest, 33 is being used for all types (runway 1 also in use). Watched a SWA B737 and AAL A21N land on 33.
If you want to see the standard visual flight path into 33 at DCA, today is a good day to observe. IAD also operating single crosswind runway for arrivals.
If you want to see the standard visual flight path into 33 at DCA, today is a good day to observe. IAD also operating single crosswind runway for arrivals.
There is one point not mentioned in the thread. The two people with probably the best overall situational awareness of what was developing would have been the RJ crew. They received a traffic alert 18 seconds before the collision and the TCAS should have displayed the threat all the way to impact. I never allowed a threat inside a half a mile on a collision course even if they claimed they had me in sight unless I could visually see the threat. I got scolded by tower at DCA for going around once when we could not see VFR traffic tower said had us in sight. I didn\x92t care even though it was daylight. With a threat bearing down on TCAS you need to take action to mitigate the threat. Hoping they really have you in sight is not a good strategy.
Subjects
DCA
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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April 20, 2025, 04:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11870326
I landed many times on 33 in a 727. It was not even considered difficult with a reasonable headwind which is why you would take 33 in the first place. Today with the children of the magenta line flying I suspect it might be considered a bit more challenging even though more modern aircraft with autothrust and excellent mapping it should make it even easier.
There is one point not mentioned in the thread. The two people with probably the best overall situational awareness of what was developing would have been the RJ crew. They received a traffic alert 18 seconds before the collision and the TCAS should have displayed the threat all the way to impact. I never allowed a threat inside a half a mile on a collision course even if they claimed they had me in sight unless I could visually see the threat. I got scolded by tower at DCA for going around once when we could not see VFR traffic tower said had us in sight. I didn\x92t care even though it was daylight. With a threat bearing down on TCAS you need to take action to mitigate the threat. Hoping they really have you in sight is not a good strategy.
There is one point not mentioned in the thread. The two people with probably the best overall situational awareness of what was developing would have been the RJ crew. They received a traffic alert 18 seconds before the collision and the TCAS should have displayed the threat all the way to impact. I never allowed a threat inside a half a mile on a collision course even if they claimed they had me in sight unless I could visually see the threat. I got scolded by tower at DCA for going around once when we could not see VFR traffic tower said had us in sight. I didn\x92t care even though it was daylight. With a threat bearing down on TCAS you need to take action to mitigate the threat. Hoping they really have you in sight is not a good strategy.
After waiting a few days to find out whether replies would be posted by other knowledgeable aviators besides Sailvi767, and despite status as just SLF/attorney, I've got to ask: Is it a reasonable inference to draw from the quoted post, especially the part underlined, that the RJ crew perhaps was not completely without responsibility for the collision? I do not lightly (this has been batted about previously) even so much as imply responsibility for accidents on the part of pilots. Yet the quoted post seems to suggest that in this specific instance for the specific reasons stated, the RJ crew might have had a share of the responsibiity.
I admit I had thought of the RJ crew as having been not aware of any information suggesting or indicating immiment danger (despite having written an academic paper about Uberlingen a few years ago). And, the facts which potentially lead to assigning a share of responsibility to the RJ crew also would then change the contours and progression of the litigation, quite dramatically, and not only in terms of impact on familly members. Bringing in the airline as a defendant would direct the complaint drafter's mind to questions of the most effective style, organization and content to make the case for punitive damages. Forum readers following the legal aspects of the accident on the thread may recall that punitive damages are not recoverable in a tort claim brought against the United States Federal Government The airline company or companies here have no such protection.
Subjects
DCA
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
VFR
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April 20, 2025, 12:17:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11870505
To briefly reiterate what has been said before, in such a complex airspace environment TA's (which is a step down from an RA, which requires mandatory action on the part of a crew, but RA's are inhibited by TCAS at that low level) can happen fairly frequently due to the proximity of adjacent aircraft which are not necessarily a threat - such as when helo traffic is close but is due to be avoiding you. You could get a TA and yet the helo will pass, say, just behind/below you - and all is well. If you recall, the number of TA's noted in the various Safety Databases has also been discussed and points to issues with 33 and R4 being fairly frequent - the warning bells re the 33/R4 airspace configuration had been ringing in the months/years leading up to this sad event - even if it had always ended OK ......... until this time.
The problem really comes when you regularly get such warnings; they become almost "normal". Normally, if you execute a go-around (not mandatory) against such traffic which ATC has specifically organised to miss you, ATC would rightly ask why plus, if you can't see it, you could go-around into it. Here the RJ crew were involved in the execution of the side-step on to 33 and were fully concentrating on rolling out on quite a short Final and would be expecting ATC to keep traffic away from them. So they would likely have noted the TA (I only use "likely" as I can't recall any facts on that) but now you have a highly split focus; flying the last bit of the approach where you have to monitor the PF/aircraft on the approach, ensure you remain stable to touchdown, keep a check that the a/c on 01 was not moving...... etc, etc and trying to see TA traffic - at low-level against a sea of lights. High workload, a belief/trust that ATC has you covered, and a rubbish environment to pick up the helo which is also not an uncommon event at DCA.................... Not a good hand of cards to hold at all.................. That's a polite way to put it!
So, this was definitely not a case of "Well, they had the traffic info so they should have avoided it!" - it's wayyyyyy more subtle and complex than that. That last bit of the cheese, if not having an actual hole in it, was so thin as to effectively be useless......... On your "legal culpability" point (where I have absolutely no quals!!!) I did mention, during discussions of the reports on the Safety Databases, that airlines and airports have a duty of care and so they could (should?) have been conducting Safety Audits which may have highlighted this Risk. Maybe they did and people picked the Risk up but continued to assess it as being "safe". Who knows..........................
Last edited by Hot 'n' High; 20th April 2025 at 12:35 .
Subjects
ATC
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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April 20, 2025, 21:30:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11870704
....... Regrets: in my post trying to comment on Sailvi767's observation regarding the RJ crew having the best situational awareness, in retrospect I should have emphasized and explained what I meant by using the the word "imminent". The thread previously did clearly reference factors such as the inhibition of TAs and RAs at specified heights, and the TA alert. What seemed different in the post about the RJ crew's SA was what I, as only SLF/attorney, understood as the suggestion that a different crew with different mindset might have realized before the last second prior to impact that "erring on the side of caution" was the correct action to take. ...........
The baseline is that a TA on it's own is not enough and can even lead to issues if reacted to without knowing exactly where that contact is and what it is doing. You should, if you have the time (hence my comment re workload for the RJ crew at that point), try and get visual on the traffic but, tbh, it's very difficult to do, especially at low level at night against backlighting. You don't even really have time to "debate" a "shall we react (against SOP) to (yet another?) TCAS alert at DCA?" with all else that is going on at that point of a flight. SOP/Training says "fly on"! You need compelling evidence to go against that. I fact, IIR, the NTSB noted that the CRJ had full "up" elevator at the time of impact - that implies the crew finally saw the helo and reacted ..... but with no time to change their flight path.
If you want to "do" the airline - I feel a much better case could be made based on the fact the evidence of issues for that approach at DCA was sat in the Safety Databases for anyone who went looking, that maybe even crews had raised the issue themselves through internal reporting in the Airline, and/or there was no process in place within the Airline to review operations into DCA - or any other airport. This is promoted by the FAA who state that "The [airline] SMS promotes a defined structure and a \x93learning culture\x94 within an aviation organization that continually seeks and analyzes information, then turns that information into action that eliminates or mitigates safety risks, before they become unwanted events.". The full ref is here. And that also applies equally to the Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority who I believe operate DCA as an independent organisation. How the MWAA fit in to US Government - I'm not sure!
Anyway, hope this helps. Cheers, H 'n' H
Subjects
CRJ
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Situational Awareness
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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April 21, 2025, 16:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11871078
As earlier mentioned, TAs (Tower and TCAS) may among other incidents and excursions find their way into databases including ASIAS. Once the NTSB dug into the databases, it came up with a long history of losses of separation at a frequency that makes one wonder that such an accident hadn't happened earlier. I suspect that this is not solely a DCA problem.
But who should be watching the data for trends - individual regionals, individual majors, local military, local ATC, individual airport authorities, FAA, NTSB?
But who should be watching the data for trends - individual regionals, individual majors, local military, local ATC, individual airport authorities, FAA, NTSB?
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
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April 22, 2025, 22:03:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11871844
....... You can as a pilot use your emergency authority to deviate from any clearance. Responding to a RA is mandatory. Responding to a traffic alert is up to the pilot flying. Yes they don\x92t want pilots routinely violating clearances for initial Traffic alerts. They want you to respond to the RA if it occurs. Many pilots do take action within their clearance to prevent a TA from becoming a RA. .........
I guess that dampens the urge to figure out what's going on with a TA, especially when on a relatively short Final where workload is high/time is in short supply/city lighting makes it very difficult. We don't know re this specific crew but it seems the Company regularly used 33 so that could be a factor - "Here we go again...... another TA........". As someone said, the "boiled frog" scenario.
I still think that, while it's a valid thought of "what if they did......", I think it masks the more important aspect in that the overall design of that bit of airspace was rubbish - as was so eloquently put by the NTSB.
Basically, the design stitched up the CRJ crew, the helo crew, the ATCO and the poor pax. Where else are there similarly wilting frogs? Thats the big question.
Subjects
ATCO
CRJ
DCA
NTSB
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April 23, 2025, 00:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11871879
Good points
Sailvi767
. What's your thoughts on if somewhere has a reputation for being a "TA Mecca" where, due to the airspace design, it leads to a high number of TAs from safely (but proximate!) crossing traffic as seems to be the case with DCA going back in this Thread?
... Where else are there similarly wilting frogs? Thats the big question.
... Where else are there similarly wilting frogs? Thats the big question.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/defaul...01%20Final.pdf
Subjects
DCA
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April 27, 2025, 17:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11874462
This type of reporting does not serve aviation safety well. Apparently the editors at the NYT decided that, since nothing new had been reported about the DCA accident, it would be a good time to sweep together some of the facts currently known, add some informed speculation by \x93experts,\x94 and than \x93humanize\x94 the accident by adding photos and personal information about the people involved in the accident. Add in a bit of fact twisting and you have an article that will generate lots of clicks.
One example:
The article states, \x93the controller made a request that was permissible but atypical, according to the N.T.S.B. [5342 change from 1 to 33]. That last phrase \x93according to the NTSB\x94 is hyperlinked, with the linked document being the NTSB\x92s AIR-25-01 report.
Does the NTSB report describe anything \x93atypical\x94 about changing to land on 33? No. In fact, the report makes this contrary statement:
\x93Conducting northbound operations with simultaneous operations to runways 1 and 33 is a routine ATC procedure in compliance with FAA Order 7110.65BB.\x94
Even changing from 1 to 33 relatively late in the approach (which the NYT calls a \x93divert\x94), is routine for DCA. The evening of the accident, several aircraft operating both before and after 5342 were presented with this decision. One declined the switch to 33 and another specifically requeste d a change to 33. These decisions occurred after the aircraft had been handed off from PCT to the DCA LC and the aircraft were established inbound to runway 1.
Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
NTSB
New York Times
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April 28, 2025, 09:48:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11874753
The IP radioed "traffic in sight" which clearly showed that they had the wrong plane, if any in sight and lost both situational awareness. If have no idea why the helicopter had not its ADSB turned on. Training for real sneaking at night through DCA is idiotic as we know now with 20/20 hindsight. Visual separation with several planes in the area is challenging in daylight, let alone at night. You easy miss one.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
DCA
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
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April 28, 2025, 17:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11874923
"Incompetence" at many levels
Both crews were set up to fail. Considering the near monthly DCA conflicts between helos and fixed wing over a number of years, the surprise is that a midair didn't happen sooner. The data was accumulating, but nobody caught on in time. Not transmitting ADS-B Out in busy airspace and flying in that airspace with night vision goggles restricting view is a major factor. The lack of ADS-B In in the cockpits is another. Then there's the FAA approval of a helo route with inadequate vertical separation from the 33 approach slope along with a lack of ATC procedure to ensure positive separation between helos and aircraft on approach to 33.
Somehow I doubt that all those responsible for those lapses in oversight were female - quite possibly they were all male.
Somehow I doubt that all those responsible for those lapses in oversight were female - quite possibly they were all male.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB In
ADSB Out
ATC
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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April 29, 2025, 03:55:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11875184
Both crews were set up to fail. Considering the near monthly DCA conflicts between helos and fixed wing over a number of years, the surprise is that a midair didn't happen sooner. The data was accumulating, but nobody caught on in time. Not transmitting ADS-B Out in busy airspace and flying in that airspace with night vision goggles restricting view is a major factor. The lack of ADS-B In in the cockpits is another. Then there's the FAA approval of a helo route with inadequate vertical separation from the 33 approach slope along with a lack of ATC procedure to ensure positive separation between helos and aircraft on approach to 33.
Somehow I doubt that all those responsible for those lapses in oversight were female - quite possibly they were all male.
Somehow I doubt that all those responsible for those lapses in oversight were female - quite possibly they were all male.
The CRJ didn't have ADS-B IN, and the ATC Surveillance system (radar) doesn't process the data.
DM as required to convince me otherwise.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB In
ADSB Out
ATC
CRJ
DCA
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Vertical Separation
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April 29, 2025, 17:04:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11875527
If Route 5 is not being used (and Route 4 is shutdown), how are military helicopters accessing JPN?
Prior to the DCA accident, I don\x92t know that I\x92d ever seen a UH-60 out my way on Route 9 in nearly 3 decades. Now PAT UH-60s are almost a daily occurrence on Route 9 (saw/heard 4 yesterday). The ADW-based UH-1Ns are also flying Route 9 more frequently.
I maintain the the DC helicopter routes (including Route 4) interior to the Beltway are not inherently unsafe if used with appropriate restrictions and ATC-applied separation.
Subjects
DCA
FAA
Route 4
Route 5
Route 9
Separation (ALL)
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May 02, 2025, 18:47:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11877325
Back in my post #1385, I briefly mentioned some new info that the NTSB provided at the 3/27 Senate hearing regarding the NTSB’s investigation of the functionality of the 12th AB UH-60 fleet ADS-B systems. Below is the full transcript of the NTSB’s relevant testimony:
Since the DCA accident, the flight tracking apps have shown DC military helicopter flights (PAT, MUSL) to be using ADS-B on a regular basis. However, I can also report that, a couple nights ago, a pair of UH-60s flying Route 9 passed by my house, the second about 5 miles in trail of the first. On ADS-B Exchange the first UH-60 was shown by only a generic aircraft icon with MLAT data. The second UH-60 was displaying ADS-B data. Since it was dark, no idea if these were Mike or Lima UH-60s.
NTSB: One thing I can say on ADS-B Out OFF that’s policy of the Army. We are still looking at installation, programming and potential for equipment malfunction, and the reason that I mention this is because, for this accident helicopter, no ADS-B data had been received from an FAA ground station for 730 days prior to the accident and that was abnormal.
NTSB: So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion [12th AB]. The battalion had 25 helicopters that includes this particular helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned ON because we have to verify that it’s working. There were 16 Limas including the accident helicopter, which we’re still looking at. Seven were transmitting when ADS-B Out was turned ON; eight were not and stopped doing so something between May and November 2023. We don’t know why. Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the reason. So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out ON but you have to also make sure that it’s working.
Sen. Moran: You indicated working with the Army, but there’s other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing it to the Army? Is there something necessarily wrong there or is there a problem more broadly in receiving the information?
NTSB: For the ADS-B Out we wanted to look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion to see whether ADS-B Out, when turned ON, was actually transmitting data because we did think it was abnormal that, for the helicopter involved in the accident, wasn’t transmitting data for so long.
NTSB: So we began looking at the fleet for the battalion [12th AB]. The battalion had 25 helicopters that includes this particular helicopter. Nine of them were Mike models and all were transmitting ADS-B Out when they were turned ON because we have to verify that it’s working. There were 16 Limas including the accident helicopter, which we’re still looking at. Seven were transmitting when ADS-B Out was turned ON; eight were not and stopped doing so something between May and November 2023. We don’t know why. Five of those started transmitting since the NTSB identified the issue and began working with the Army to try to isolate the reason. So I just want to let you know that you can have ADS-B Out ON but you have to also make sure that it’s working.
Sen. Moran: You indicated working with the Army, but there’s other participants in this arena. Were you narrowing it to the Army? Is there something necessarily wrong there or is there a problem more broadly in receiving the information?
NTSB: For the ADS-B Out we wanted to look at the helicopter fleet for the battalion to see whether ADS-B Out, when turned ON, was actually transmitting data because we did think it was abnormal that, for the helicopter involved in the accident, wasn’t transmitting data for so long.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
ADSB Out
DCA
FAA
NTSB
Route 9
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May 03, 2025, 04:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11877511
DCA LC helicopter and fixed wing positions were combined (Bueller? Bueller?)
PAT23 was a Gold Top (Mike) UH-60
PAT23 was issued two holds along Route 5: (1st) 3 mi W of DCA, and (2nd) at \x93Glebe\x94
LC then cleared PAT23 from \x93Glebe\x94 along Route 5 to the Pentagon
LC made multiple requests to PAT23 to report landing assured. It seemed to take an unusually long time for PAT23 to get to the JPN landing pad. Unclear why PAT23 (and apparently other helicopters) fly counter-clockwise; i.e., continue to follow 395 S of Pentagon (past south parking), then turn N to follow 110 (past the Metro entrance) to the JPN landing pad. Why not use the charted transition route along 27/Washington Blvd?
LC seemed unclear of PAT23\x92s position. At one point directed PAT23 to fly westbound while PAT23 appeared to be landing.
Both DAL1671 and RPA5825 go-arounds were LC directed. No pilot reports of TCAS RA heard. After checking in with departure/approach, PCT didn\x92t request reason for go-around and pilots made no comment about go-around.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
DCA
PAT23
Route 5
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
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