Posts about: "DCA" [Posts: 332 Page: 15 of 17]¶

As I posted on here before I had that exact same scenario happen to me on runway 33 in DCA. Traffic closing on a collision course on TCAS. Tower reported the traffic had us in sight. When the traffic closed to \xbd mile with no vector change apparent We went around from 400 feet. We never saw the traffic. Tower chewed my butt saying the traffic had us in sight. I didn\x92t care.

not intending to be cynical, but it makes the helos blend in nicely with the background, sort of out of the way for rwy 01/19 traffic (=95% of total)
I wonder how many pilots on rwy 01/19 really perceived this section of the routing as unsafe (when flown correctly = hugging the shoreline at max 200ft).
A nuisance, undoubtedly. And the whole helicopter traffic surrounding DCA, pretty unsafe, I can understand.
And then we have nighttime...



taking the nearby airport out of the equation, I wonder if any of the professional operators on this route 4 section, ever felt that this low-level flying was (unnecessarily) unsafe

Actually, it's not the exact same scenario.

In the case you quote, Tower reported the traffic had you in sight. In the case in question, AA5342 was not provided traffic by the DCA LC.
In the case you quote, did Tower say that the traffic was going to maintain own separation? Did Tower provide a bearing/direction and distance to this traffic? Did Tower provide the height of the traffic?

For a while I was flying schedules which were often conducted SVFR as they were very short legs . I'd often get from Twr on joining the circuit at my various destinations, and having confirmed I'd got traffic XYZ in sight, a clearance "Roger, C/S, keeping that traffic in sight, report Final XX. You are No 2 to the XYZ.". From that point on, my positioning was determined by me based on visual separation with the other traffic - so not totally identical to the DCA accident but the principle was the same - I was responsible for remaining clear of XYZ and positioning appropriately behind them (including accounting for wake/runway occupancy effects etc). Occasionally I'd then get "C/S, new clearance - report ready for L/R base." usually with a reason if there was time - often it was App not leaving TWR a big enough gap to sneak me in between 2 IFR arrivals.

In other words, Twr would delegate separation to me with the initial clearance but, if for whatever reason, they became unhappy - I got issued with a revised, more restrictive, clearance. Similarly, if I lost sight of the traffic at any point after the initial "Report Final" clearance, it was my responsibility to advise ATC that I was no longer visual with XYZ (ie I could no longer comply with the clearance ATC had given me) and ATC would then update my clearance on that basis - "..... report ready for base" or similar until they could visually assure themselves of separation. Indeed, on those occasions, it was not unknown for ATC to say "C/S, I have you both in sight - that traffic is well ahead of you, report Final XX, No 2". I was thus relieved of my responsibility to self-position.

What ATC giveth away in their airspace ATC can taketh back again in their airspace!

Now, "normalised deviation" may skew such a way of working such as PAT routinely expecting to get what they ask for and ATC routinely giving them what they want......... Not saying that happened at DCA but............ Also, I've lost track in the Thread if PAT were visual but with another a/c or the intended one but simply "lost it" at some point........... And whether visual separation at night in such busy airspace was wise ............

Absolutely, but he does have the benefit of his own experience and common sense. Yes I accept that his experience may well have deviated to the \x91new normal\x92 at DCA over time, but common sense would still cast serious doubt on a report of visual on traffic that\x92s seven miles away at night, even using NVGs. The evidence suggests the LC did subsequently have his doubts, because he asked PAT again if he had the CRJ visual, since he wasn\x92t manoeuvring to maintain separation. Really a proactive revised clearance would have been more appropriate.

Hiya Capt B , true but I sort of see 2 related issues - (a) airspace design and (b) how things are conducted within that airspace.

If the airspace design had been used with positive control (ie holding traffic off R4 while 33 was in use or even holding R4 traffic at bridges or somewhere clear of 33 while it was in use) that would work.

Using that same airspace design with "see and avoid" was far less safe and, as reported, led to quite a few incidents of TA's before this fateful day.

But, as the "see and avoid" system was seen by the users at the coal face at least to work, despite the TA's, the operational use of the design became "normalised" to use "see and avoid".

Sadly, no-one (such as DCA management) seems to have studied the extra issues so this more dangerous way of using the design has became "normalised", particularly where ATC is busy.

That's just my take on it.

It does.. About the flawed published procedures , I do not know what standard they use in the US, . Maybe someone here does, because establishing a route a 200ft inside a CTR crossing a runway approach path would not be possible in Europe, First we have SERA ( Standardized European rules of the air ) which mandates a minimum of 500ft , above highest obstacle Then the design : . If I take the Paris TMA as example where heavily helicopters routes exists between the 3 airports and the heliport , the minimum altitude on those routes is 700 ft .and none the routes conflict with any runway approach path .
Then 3rd , if you have to be designing a conflicting route system , it would be procedurally clear that the 2 could not be used simultaneously . In other word , here in DCA, when runway 33 is in use for landing . Route 4 would be closed, and vice versa, when you have an Heli on route 4 you can't use runway 33 for landing.
But it is not only DCA, I have been flying regularly VFR in Vegas a few years back , and what the tourist helicopters companies were allowed to do there was. let's say " amazing " compared to what we are allowed to do in Europe.

75 feet separation between the heli route and the 33 glide path, if I remember the preliminary report correctly.
"Visual separation" is the procedure that's supposed to make this safe, i.e. ensure that the actual separation is never that low.

Did DCA actually schedule conflicting flights without visual separation procedures?

A link to the first day's testimony. Note the exchange starting at 5:56:23.
I don't know how to answer your question. FAA said that there was no "procedural separation" plan in place. Army stated that when 33/15 was in use, the protocol/procedure was for Army to automatically hold at one of two points (depending on direction of travel) to await clearance past the extended runway center-line, or to request clearance past the same. So the 75-foot topic in theory maybe is relevant if considering wake/rotor-related turbulence, but not for physical separation of aircraft.

I cannot imagine that airlines take military helo flights into account while scheduling flights. What is important is the maximum commercial operations/flight density that can be accommodated (e.g. per hour). So when FAA allows commercial traffic to really get dense, this makes conflicts with random helo traffic more likely.

Only the PSA CRJ was scheduled. The PAT flight was an ad hoc VFR Class B transition.

Note that the apparently informal procedure of holding helicopters at Hains Pt or golf balls was an effective method of deconflicting Route 4 and 15/33 traffic. However it appears that the use of this \x93procedure\x94 was left to the discretion of the individual controller.

I recall this testimony (and had been avoiding trying to find it in the videotaped record).

If I understand the way the q&a progressed, and especially the definition provided by the examiner during the q&a of the Army pilot, "procedurally separate" means the airspace design is such that if both aircraft adhere to their assigned routes, the Route 4 helicopter operation can safely cross the approach path to 3-3 (and, though it should be obvious, please correct this if I've said it incorrectly or without enough precision). But as the Army pilot as well as the med evacuation group chief testified, they took steps to avoid operating across the approach path if there was DCA traffic - which the examiner referred to as "mitigations".

(The wash machine of my mind is cycling through some further thoughts on how the facts emerging from the hearings and certain items in the (voluminous) docket are likely to interact with the relevant legal issues and, in turn, how that appears likely to impact the looming NAS, FAA, and "new ATC system" reforms.)

In my ( European) world Procedures are written down and yes they can be altered with a pilot request and controller approval. but it is adherence first .
Taking a road procedure similarity : . at a crossroad you can have a stop sign or a triangle giving priority , or nothing
The written procedures are : at a stop sign you must stop even if there is no traffic.

:Transposing this to DCA route 4 map l the procedure should have been in Europe at least ;
1) hold ay golf balls until you get a clearance to proceed . (so that in case of loss of comms , blocked freq, etc.. you can't proceed ).
2) pilot or controller can request visual separation if all t he following conditions re met : typically VMC, and in daylight and traffic is in sight and maintained in sight and both aircrfat pilots are informed. of each other position
3) lateral deviations by the helicopters to fly over built up areas of the city at 200ft will; not be permitted.

Big differences .

Now a pilot can request visual separation at any time but Controller can refuse at any time to .. To my knowledge requesting visual a night using NVG is not covered in the definition of " visual acquisition " in ICAO, so legally it could be challenged I guess . Same as when a pilot reports "visual" on his TCAS display . It is not valid , and for good reasons .
But KDCA is not in Europe, and ICAO SARPs do not apply to military aircrfat , so the outcome of all this is quite uncertain .In fact i would not be surprised if nothing dramatic changes as far as procedures are concerned, Route 4 will be permanently removed I guess, but other than that ? business a usual with visual separations at night ? .

Yeah, "scheduled" was probably the wrong word. I meant that DCA ATC "instructed to fly that segment of the route", with ATC responsible for separation.
It occurs to me that this procedure creates extra work for air traffic control. DCA organisation accounted for it by having a controller position dedicated to controlling helicopters, but they did not have the staffing level to fill that seat at all times when it was needed. A process that may have been safe with adequate staffing stopped being safe when staffing levels fell. At that time, management needed to recognize this (the data was there!) and restructure the airspace to require less work, possibly at the cost of reducing the capacity of the airport/airspace.

This incident was discussed in posts #1506-1527 of this thread.

NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N879RW (RPA), UH-60 (PAT23)

Tower stated helo traffic was transiting the river at 200 feet and had us in sight. When he closed to less than 3000 feet on a constant bearing on TCAS we went around. Probably would have been fine 999 out of 1000 times. Not odds I accept.

In video, Clifford claims 110-page lawsuit is publicly available. No luck in locating. Clifford makes following points regarding liability:

American Airlines
- Knowingly operated and expanded operations into an airport (DCA) with \x93massive congestion\x94
- Operated in airspace subject to numerous near-miss reports

AA/PSA Pilots
- Failed to respond to traffic alert 19 sec before collision
- Accepted visual approach to runway 33

Website of the Clifford Law Office in connection with the press event today has posted the Complaint. Notably, the Kreindler & Kreindler law firm also is on the Complaint (these two firms are massive heavy hitters - nobody asked for my view I realize - I'm not familiar with a third firm also listed).

Perhaps this SLF/attorney should "do the reading" ...... I am quite curious whether, and if so how, these preeminent aviation accident litigators have dealt with the discretionary function exception to the statutory waiver of federal government sovereign immunity.

Edit: case number is 1:25 -cv-03382 (United States District Court for the District of Columbia)

HNH, I can't agree with any of that. The ONLY reason federal regs are written is to set a standard that anybody can operate to/in/with and be safe. This idea that a major US carrier shouldn't have operated into DCA because it might be dangerous, depending on how the airline assesses it, and is therefore sue-able, when the FAA itself allows it, doesn't gel IMO. The sole job of the regulator is to ensure the airspace and it's procedures will allow a safe operation. In any case, I think what you are suggesting, that AA have worked out, by itself, that operating into DCA is unsafe, won't happen these day because the almighty dollar rules. The minimum standard, set by the FAA, will more often that not, be complied-with. Most company restrictions of the type you mention don't involve simply not doing it, which is what is being suggested here.

H 'n' H.
Ordinarily I have no objection to lawyer bashing (and I've been known (in non-anonymous mode) to tell one or more good lawyer jokes).

Before stating why I object to the aspersion you've cast on legal types in the context of the DCA mid-air collision and the litigation arising from it, I'll suggest that probably most all forum posters (and readers), if not literally all, have heard either an ex-husband or ex-wife relate their unrequited frustration and anger at how the other spouse "got everything", "ripped me off", "took me to the cleaners" and so on. And then someone else will say, "yeah, and the lawyers are the only ones who profit in a divorce." The contradiction is rarely called out, but it is no less a contradiction.

But as to this case. The passenger manifest of the PSA flight isn't necessary to make this point, but I'm sure the estimable Mr. Clifford would consume hours of argument and pages of supporting documents making it clear that 64 lives were cut short, and many were people in the prime of their adult lives - not that one life should be worth more than any other life in compensation in court proceedings, but taking for example the relatively early career attorneys who perished in the accident, their earnings potential over the course of their careers is less speculative than, say, projections about one of the youthful skaters (although I'm pretty sure there are standards which have been worked out in the mine run of personal injury and wrongful death cases). My point is, this case will yield quite significant damage awards in the end. Yes, I realize that issues of immunity of federal agencies will have to be surmounted; having posted a lot about theses issues I realize they exist. Yet the citations of FAA orders, procedures, and rules in the Complaint does suggest that plaintiffs are ready to overcome the immunity argument. And I'm leaving for another day and place the consideration, how do you think it would affect the FAA in the long run to argue that "na na you can't get me" because of "legal technicalities" when it is pretty predictable at this point that NTSB in its final report will be, shall we say, either unkind or unsparing to FAA, or both, in assessing causes and effects.

So the case is likely, if not certain, to pay out big. The lawyers will get - unless legal counsel are using very different formulas than are typical in cases of this type - about one-third.

How is it then that only the lawyers do well? The argument is not about whether big-ticket damage awards can replace a lost loved one. The argument is about whether only the lawyers do well. "Grief" begins with the same four letters as "Grievance" and the crash victims' families certainly are individuals aggrieved by the negligence of some or all of the defendants. Maybe we can split semantic fibers over whether having their grievance abated by significant financial compensation is within the meaning of "doing well" - but under the facts of this case and their tragic losses, I think they will be at least "doing better". And so not only the lawyers.

This all having been said, apologies accepted, naturally.
WR 6-3

I can see exactly where you are coming from Capn Blogs so I don't blame you at all for your comment above! After all, you can say exactly the same for Aircraft Certification too....... This is my take on it which I put out there...............

This is where a SMS needs to look again at things and then decide what else, if anything, needs to be done. Part of my background is from Safety Engineering (where I was put through a SE MSc in the 1990's by my then employer) and processes such as Hazard Analysis takes into account both material failure as well as operational failure - and here we have "airspace design" and then the "operation of that airspace". When designing a bit of kit you apply the Regs as part of the design hazard analysis. But that is the minimum (tick VG) - after that we then ask "And is it actually safe?". Regs generally provide for a "minimum safe standard" which, all being well, will see us through - 100%. If not, we'd have aircraft falling out the sky with regular abandon! But that's assuming that those who write the Regs have got it right (or, in this case "designed the airspace" and then created the "operational rules" for that design). They can make mistakes as much as anyone else. One would hope for rigorous QA checks and so on ......... but this is where even organisations such as the FAA can, over time, become institutionalized with poor practices/cost cutting/etc/etc.

On an operational side of things, I've often, as an Engineer, reduced servicing intervals to less than those recommended where I've had issues with a bit of kit on a particular airframe*. I've released the aircraft back into service with an Engineering Limitation which has called for more frequent inspections than the Rules ask for while we try and ascertain what the issue is and if there really is a trend starting. If as an operator you believe something to be unsafe, you must address it. How did I know to reduce the servicing intervals? Sometimes it was a Maintenance Engineer calling me over and saying "Hey, Boss, have you seen this? What do you think?". Other times it's because trawling through Stats, a trend has started to show which, in the noise of day-to-day operations, was invisible - but look back over 6 months in a Spreadsheet and, hey, what have we here? We used to get regular print-outs from our Maintenance databases for just this reason - in the 1980's!

The FAA, in the wake of this accident I suspect, has issued this on the considerable extension of SMS's - but only in Apr 2024. But this is not new stuff - SMS's have been around for years. My first brush with it all was way back in 1980 - we called it something different then but that's what it was! Here in the UK, the CAA published CAP 795 - Safety Management Systems - Guidance to Organizations back in 2015, the purpose of which " .......... is to provide guidance on the implementation of Safety Management Systems (SMS). It has been developed to give sufficient understanding of SMS concepts and the development of management policies and processes to implement and maintain an effective SMS. It applies to Air Operator\x92s Certificate (AOC) holders, continuing airworthiness management organisations, maintenance organisations, air navigation service providers, aerodromes and approved training organisations. ".

Now, this is where you are absolutely spot on and is also what I said in my previous post - such additional "safety nets" will almost inevitably cost more so the Finance Director is none to keen. The usual "Operations/Engineering vs Finance" standoff.......! The long-debated issues at Boeing is also being blamed on exactly this over in "Rumours & News". What's that saying? "If you think safety is expensive, wait till you have an accident!".

Anyway, that's my take FWIW and hopefully it explains why I said what I did! Cheers, H 'n' H

WR 6-3 , again, my apologies and please rest assured my comment was very tongue-in-cheek hence my initial apology! That those who suffered from this tragic accident receive recompense as a very poor substitute to not still having their loved ones with them is absolutely essential! My comment was more along the lines that it looks like determining culpability will be quite convoluted...... hence the "lawyer" quip. If it came across as otherwise I, again, unreservedly apologise!

* Re increased servicing, even that has to be approached with care. In the late 1970's, we lost a helo when someone applied more grease then they should have as "....... well, a bit more will be even better!". Murphy's Law can be a right bu&&er!