Posts about: "DCA" [Posts: 332 Page: 3 of 17]¶

uh your 'no' is to what - explain are you contradicting me - when/where did I say MWAA or either facility was owned by the state of Va?
I've had SIDA badges at both (and my cred is current for IAD with the all MWAA blah blah on the reverse - bonus: 10% off overpriced airport food!!!) and i've have sat through every one of MWAA's horrible annual training videos, etc., so I'd like to think I know how the airport auth works pretty well by now after I've been in every crappy admin corner of both facilities in the last 14 years .
Thanks for going through all the hard work to c/p wikipedia, but no, unless the people of N. Va (who have most if the votes in Va.) want to close DCA, it's never happening. It's a local decision. This evening, the local news station asked a bunch of people at the DCA "does this change anything for you flying out of here" and every one of them said "nope, not a bit" - they were not members of congress, they were a very cross section of the very diverse local pop
Last I heard, DC doesn't have a vote in congress, and to my knowledge, all the changes at DCA in the past 60 years have been the result of a line item change in the 5-year FAA reauth, not from the board. The board MWAA minutes are online, go see for yourself all the power they're throwing down, making their will known /s

I don't think any armchair airspace designer on this forum is going to have any impact on this. I can't remember seeing any of them when I worked at MITRE, but I guess they're the experts now . I'm hearing a lot of uninformed people saying 'this was an accident waiting to happen' - well, no it wasn't. Not unless you think all the other helo corridors like Hudson River are. It's a hectic place but no deathtrap. a lot of non-PP nonsense here.

You said that the operation of DCA is a matter for Virginians to decide. And you're wrong.

I've seen plenty of mention of VHF / UHF mix in the thread. Does DCA have the ability to cross couple their frequencies? This helps immensely in maintaining situational awareness for the crews, and also helps preventing two transmissions at once.

yes yes, of course, you are right! - some mysterious powerful force other than the state that the airport is actually located in (Va); the state in which the overwhelming majority of the population consider it useful and convenient; and safe (other than an Army helo (evidently) running into a CRJ cleared to land); and overwhelmingly want to keep it open; which has operated well for a lifetime, etc. etc. - despite all of this, there will somehow be an external force from ( perhaps inspired by these fine well-reasoned non-pp posters) which will decide to close this "deathtrap" of an airport real soon. Hmm, ok.

You seem to be pretty sure of that! Well, you know what's so great about the internet gambling boom? , you can get someone to escrow any wager with full faith of both parties ensured? The agreement completely transparent, bonded, and binding. Since your clear that the will of the people of Virginia will be overridden and this is this is going to be shut down as a deathtrap in the next few years, how much do you want to bet that KDCA will remain open in 5 years and operating at the essentially the same capacity ? does US$50k work for you? You're pretty confident that someone is going to ignore what the people who live there want, but just to sweeten it, I'll give you 2:1 odds. Seems like easy money!

No one checks in as a student pilot when already rated and doing some kind of checkride or currency ride DCA just wants to know if they have a guy with 15 hours on their hands, not that that would happen post 9/11 anyway.

About 90% of my flights into DCA have been VFR. Being VFR and being free to do whatever are VERY different things. I was always under positive control VFR or IFR, going where I was sent and the altitude and heading ATC wanted me to use. I'll admit to having about an hour of helicopter time, so I can't say if the helipcopters get the same treatment or just get told to stick to their routes or ???

I agree. Having learned the concept, responsibility and geometry of these procedures, approaches and airways in DCA the biggest mystery that remains to me is: Why didn't it happen before?!

I'm afraid that will indeed be the conclusion of this sad story.

Interesting viewpoint.
My take is, in order.
5) No, I don't think he was overwhelmed. He was shot through with adrenaline and shocked as anyone would be having just witnessed two aircraft he was talking to seconds before vanish in a fireball, realising his career, reputation, life and future sanity was irrevocably blown to pieces no matter the cause.
No, no and thrice no. Assuming the tapes are in real time there are considerable gaps between transmissions so he most certainly did not 'have' to speak so quickly. He had plenty of time to speak clearly and coherently instead of spouting those eruptions of incoherent, almost incomprehensible babble.
Sadly - reprehensibly, this style of unnecessarily theatrical auctioneer-style unpunctuated babble seems all too frequent in the States. Tower frequencies are usually if not almost invariably much less time-pressurised as they handle fewer aircraft in a well spaced sequence than in a termnal control area.

6) Concur 100%. And they failed miserably to achieve this. I've been flying for several decades and struggle to hear one word in three (and only assume much of the rest because I know what to expect - a human factors disaster) of that controller's outbursts, and the shoddy partial readbacks are shocking to European ears.

7) Once again, NO! Even if super-busy (and I'd argue especially if super busy) it is essential to keep r/t steady, clear and comprehensible; gabbling that fast might save half a second on an exchange, but no frequency is so busy it requires that, least of all a Tower. He only had three or four aircraft to deal with for simple go-arounds, all well spaced out on approach. He pretty much had time to recite half the Lord's Prayer to each.

This crazy r/t seems to be a cultural thing and needs to be changed, as do some fundamental procedures like having helo lanes crossing final approach tracks at essentially the same height instead of with decent vertical separation. Why wasn't the helilane at 800ft or 1000ft as a Heathrow? No aircraft is up there one mile out from finals while every single one is at 300ft. Madness. Just madness. It's like a figure 8 banger race dodging cars at the intersection. If there was a flyover - vertical separation too accidents would be all but eliminated.

And this buisness of "...pass behind the CRJ on finals" when no none can determine whether the lights in sight are a CRJ, a Cessna or the Space Shuttle or in what sequence they are landing. It might work in daylight but imho it assumes unreasonable levels of instant almost head-on aircraft recognition - a disastrous human factors trap quite aside from the additional one of assumption.

I'm not having a go at the poor controller who imho is compleely blameless, he did his job as well as the flawed system that indoctrinated him allowed.

As for 'stopping' helicopters in a free- air hover. This is (in my experience) never ever requested, done or attempted as a traffic avoidance method. I can only assume people suggesting this have absolutely zero knowlege of flying helos and the litany of pitfalls and hazards it would generate, helos simply do not 'stop' in midair unless they have to for SAR, load-lfting ot maybe surveillance. If necessary, as in holding at 'dual taxiways' between the Heathrow runways at 1000ft you'd slow to a sensible speed, maybe 50-60Kts in a tight orbit and even that is 'interesting' in 40Kts of wind. "Are you visual with landing traffic 2 mile final" identifies the traffic far, far better than "the CRJ on finals" when there might be three in a row, not to mention assuming superhuman powers of head-on distant aircraft recognition even in daylight - and impossible at night!!! Crossing clearance is then "cross over the threshold after the landing traffic" where no aeroplane ever is at 1000ft. (bar a g/a when there is enough time to skedaddle and avoid) With any significant wind a hover would have to be into wind, ie more or less tail -on to the conflicting traffic, an utterly absurd concept. Bin this one people, please.

As for the appalling behaviour of the 'president' to instantly apportion blame with no understanding of either the situation or accident investigation in general whatsoever - which anyway is not his job and none of his business, thereby prejudicing any enquiry (what pressure does this put on the investigators and report writers, federal employees, when they are all but directed by their deranged and vindictive boss what they are expected to report? This is a very, very dangerous precedent that smacks more of a shonky third world dictatorship than a western democracy.

The problem isn't YOU (the flight landing at DCA), it is the other guy in the helicopter that says he sees you. You would have to say something like "I don't trust them, I am going around". It beats dying, but sure would get some odd comments from the tower.

Probably lining up on 33. Remember they diverged off the RWY 01 CL to the right/East, to then turn slightly left for 33.

Yes. Listen to the VAS aviation YT video in post #350.

​​​​​​​That's got Yankee Class E airspace all over it.

I posted earlier in this thread that I’d been based in DCA for a few years, albeit about 15 years ago. The ground track we used at the time skirted the east bank of the river and had you turning final at about 450-500’ over the east bank of the Potomac. From what I’ve seen, the ground track the aircraft in question took, was further east and therefore would’ve been lined up with 33, earlier and at a higher altitude. At 220’-270, you’re on short final and mid-river.

I had issues with the approach at the time, as it simply didn’t meet our stabilised approach criteria and could be challenging for a new or below average FO.

That's what I'm also wondering. And assuming a standard 3\xb0 glideslope the vertical separation at that point would be even rather less than 100ft. I can't really fathom crossing 50-100ft above the whirly bits of a Blackhawk being a regularly executed standard procedure !? What is the 'normal' way of doing this in DCA?

The right question is how can lessons be applied to prevent it from happening again?

Interestingly, if the SMS works in the US the same as everywhere else in the world, procedures should be audited on a regular basis, with a focus on any changes which may have invalidated the original assumptions made about the frequency of hazards and associated risks. These procedure reviews would also take place after receipt of any safety reports where the procedure could have been a contributing factor.

The NASA ASRS database contains safety reports raised over the US. A quick search with the term “helicopter” produced 40+ reports with the highlights shown below.. (apologies, to save time these are all copy and pasted) There are more, but I appreciate that most of us have annual eye examinations to pass so didn’t want to overdo it!

1. While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a “monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the “clear of conflict” the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.

2. ATC delayed switch from Approach to Tower led to TA and resulting altitude deviation causing a GPWS Caution. Tower then issued a low altitude alert. Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. By the time Tower responded we had a RA to descend which led to a GPWS and low altitude alert from Tower. We confirmed traffic in sight and maneuvered back on coarse to correct the deviation, in judgement the safety of flight was not compromised as such we continued the approach to landing on Runway 19. As I believe a go-around would have exacerbated the situation and led to further problems.

3. I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].

I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.

Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.

Note. My standard practice for helicopter s flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopter s pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.

Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopter s over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.

Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopter s off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.

Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.

I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.

4

Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.

This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter . Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopter s.

5

I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.

6

We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.

when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopter s operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopter s to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter , and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.

Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.

7

It was the end of a long day and the events were happening very quickly during a high workload portion of the flight. As all pilots know, the River Visual is a very demanding approach during the best of circumstances. It is very labor intensive when done at night during periods of high traffic volume. The advertised approach in use at DCA was the LDA 19 with VASI being out of service. During the initial approach, Potomac asked if we would accept the charted River Visual approach (VASI back working) and we did. At approximately the 7 DME point we were in the end process of configuring the airplane for landing and the First Officer was accomplishing the Landing Checklist. The radio chatter was considerable and the Tower at some point advised us of helicopter traffic ahead and to the left (I believe he said 10 to 11 o'clock) and he was going to pass from left to right, below us and he "HAS US IN SIGHT." It has to be noted that these traffic calls and helicopter s have unfortunately become background noise. There are always numerous military and government helicopter s running up and down that river at all times of the day and night. Because of this, what would normally be alarming at any other airport in the country has become commonplace at DCA. The FAA allows these aircraft to operate in this environment and we have no choice, but to accept it and deal with it. Therefore, the helicopter s being very close are not out of the norm. As you can imagine, I was concentrating on the approach and doing the required gyrations to stay over the river and not violate the White House prohibited airspace, and to keep the aircraft on the proper vertical profile. The Runway 19 visual was loaded in the FMGC and I was using it as a backup to my eyes. I was 'dead on' the donut and everything looked normal. I was at or very slightly above the recommended altitudes at each DME point. As I was approaching 4 DME, I caught a glimpse of the helicopter out of my left window and he did look higher than I expected to see him. I asked the First Officer to confirm if he was going to cross from north to south. He confirmed, however I directed him to ask the Tower and confirm it with them because it did not look right. The First Officer could not get a word in with the Tower. It was at that point, we got a TCAS "TRAFFIC" call. Again, this is not out of the 'norm' for DCA. I was getting ready to take possible evasive action because it was getting uncomfortable; all this while trying to fly the demanding profile. Within seconds, we got a TCAS alert, "MONITOR VERTICAL SPEED." I complied with the TCAS alert and was thinking of going around but it all happened so very quickly that the point was moot. The helicopter passed 200 FT (MAX) below us. We were at 900 FT, slightly above the path. The Tower never called out the traffic beyond the first notification. The landing was uneventful. Due to the workload, we asked the Ground Controller for the Tower number and I called when I got to my vehicle. I called the Tower and spoke with the Controller in charge. At first it was it was obvious he was somewhat on the defensive and I had to press the point and ask very specific questions about the standard helicopter operations in the area. After some prodding, he admitted that it was a military helicopter flying from/to Ft. Meade and that he was at 700 FT and was "a little higher than normal." I asked what altitude was he supposed to be at and he replied, "three to four hundred feet." In addition, he did admit that the Tower version of collision avoidance did go to alarm but before they had a chance to react, the event was over. I cannot imagine what business is so pressing that these helicopter s are allowed to cross the path of airliners carrying hundreds of people! I do not understand why they are not crossed IN-BETWEEN arrivals. They have at least 4 miles between these arriving aircraft and it seems that would be more prudent.

8

We were on the Mount Vernon Visual Approach to Washington National Airport, and the Tower instructed us to circle to land on Runway 33. While we made our approach to Runway 33, Tower advised a helicopter was maneuvering at our 12 o'clock position. As we continued our approach, Tower instructed the helicopter to "make a right 360 for a jet on a 2 mile final for Runway 33, and to report him in sight" (referring to our aircraft.)

The Tower then asked the helicopter if he had us in sight. He replied "yes", and the Tower told him to maintain visual separation. As we began our turn from base to final, the helicopter made what looked like a right turn directly into our flight path. The Captain, the pilot flying, made a hard right turn and executed a missed approach to avoid a collision. I'm not sure how close we came to the helicopter since it was on the left side of the aircraft, but I would guess it was only a few hundred feet.

9

WE WERE EXECUTING AN ILS IN IMC. AS MY FO ANNOUNCED 'APCHING MINIMUMS, RWY IN SIGHT,' I BEGAN MY TRANSITION FROM FLT DIRECTOR REF TO VISUAL REF FOR A HAND FLOWN LNDG. MY AIRSPD WAS PROBABLY AROUND 130-135 KIAS. AS I WAS TRANSITIONING I SUDDENLY SAW A DARK COLORED MIL HELI ON MY APCH PATH. HE BLENDED IN VISUALLY WITH THE DISMAL WX CONDITIONS. I DID NOT NOTICE ANY ACFT LIGHTING. AS I SAW HIM, SO DID THE DCA TWR CTLR. THE CTLR ISSUED AN IMMEDIATE AND FORCEFUL ATC INSTRUCTION TO THE HELI. THE HELI EXECUTED AN ABRUPT EVASIVE MANEUVER AND DISAPPEARED INTO THE FOG. I LANDED SAFELY. THIS ENTIRE EVENT LASTED ABOUT 3-4 SECONDS. MY ACFT (BOEING 757) CONFIGN WAS GEAR DOWN, FULL 30 DEG FLAPS, ON SPD, ON COURSE, ON GLIDE PATH. EVASIVE MANEUVERING CAPABILITY IS LIMITED UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES. MY ALT WAS ABOUT 300-400 FT ABOVE THE POTOMAC RIVER. ARPT TERMINALS AND CTL TWR WERE TO MY L, PROHIBITED AREA P-56 WAS TO MY R, AND THE HELI IN QUESTION WAS IN THE WX IN FRONT OF ME SOMEWHERE. I DIDN'T FEEL I COULD EXECUTE A MISSED APCH WITH THAT ACFT IN THE FOG IN FRONT OF ME. WE WERE STILL ON LNDG PROFILE AND I DECIDED LNDG WAS THE SAFEST COURSE AVAILABLE. WE MADE A NORMAL EXIT FROM THE RWY TO THE L WITH MUCH LNDG ROOM LEFT ON RWY 36. TAXIED TO THE GATE AND PARKED. MADE AN IMMEDIATE PHONE CALL TO THE TWR SUPVR AND RPTED THE INCIDENT. THEN CALLED MY AIRLINE FLT MGMNT SUPVRS AND RPTED THE INCIDENT AND MADE A WRITTEN RPT TO THE AIRLINE SAFETY DEPT UPON ARR AT MY BASE THAT NIGHT. I AM GLAD THE VISIBILITY WAS GOOD ENOUGH FOR THE CTLR TO SEE THE HELI IN TIME TO TAKE ACTION. IF THE VISIBILITY HAD BEEN ANY LESS HE WOULDN'T HAVE. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR STATES THAT DURING HIS SPEAKING WITH THE TWR FACILITY AT DCA, A CTLR IN TRAINING WAS HANDLING THE MIL TFC AT THE N END OF THE ARPT UNDER THE JURISDICTION OF ANOTHER, MORE EXPERIENCED, CTLR. THE SECOND CTLR IS THE ONE THAT TOOK OVER THE MIKE AND ORDERED THE HELI TO LEAVE THE APCH ENVIRONMENT OF THE LNDG TFC. THE RPTR STATES THAT HIS TRAINING WOULD NORMALLY CAUSE HIM TO EXECUTE A MISSED APCH BUT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER ENCOUNTER WITH THE SAME ACFT SEEMED LIKE A GOOD POSSIBILITY AND SO DECIDED THAT LNDG WAS THE SAFEST PATH TO FOLLOW. HE SAID THAT THE PHONE CONVERSATION REVEALED THAT EXTENSIVE TRAINING FOR A MIL EXERCISE OR OP WAS IN PROGRESS AND WAS BEING STAGED FROM THE N PART OF THE DCA COMPLEX. THE RPTR DOESN'T KNOW WHETHER THE HELI PLT MISUNDERSTOOD HIS INSTRUCTIONS OR WHETHER THE CTLR ISSUED SUCH INSTRUCTIONS IN THE FIRST PLACE.

10
WE WERE ON THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA. THERE WAS A MIL HELI OPERATING A TRAINING FLT FLYING N TO S OVER THE RIVER AT 500 FT MSL. WE APPEARED TO BE AT LEAST 80 KTS FASTER (WHILE IN OUR LNDG CONFIGN) THAN THE HELI. TWR ADVISED US OF THE HELI AND THAT HE HAD US IN SIGHT AND HE WOULD MAINTAIN VISUAL SEPARATION WITH US. WE OVERTOOK ALMOST DIRECTLY ABOVE THE HELI AT ABOUT 3.5 DME AND 1100 FT MSL, RIGHT AT THE TURN IN THE RIVER THAT IS REQUIRED ON THE APCH. WE RECEIVED AN RA FROM OUR TCASII AT 1100 FT. WE FLEW AS FAR TO THE E SIDE OF THE RIVER AS WE COULD TO MAINTAIN VISUAL ON THE HELI ON THE W SIDE OF THE RIVER. WINDS WERE OUT OF THE SW AT 15-20 KTS. THE TCASII INDICATED CLR OF CONFLICT. WE STARTED TO DSND AGAIN AND AT 900 FT AGL, RECEIVED ANOTHER RA FROM OUR TCASII. AT THAT POINT IN THE APCH, THE RIVER TURNED BACK TO THE SSW. AS WE MADE OUR R TURN WE REGAINED VISUAL WITH THE HELI AND CONTINUED TO DSND. TCASII GAVE US 'CLR OF CONFLICT' AND WE FINISHED THE APCH AND LANDED. AFTER LNDG, I CALLED THE TWR SUPVR AND HE LISTENED AND SAID THIS WAS NORMAL. I HAVE FLOWN THIS APCH AT LEAST 15 TIMES AND I AM VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. HOWEVER, I CONSIDERED THIS APCH PUSHING THE ENVELOPE FOR SAFETY, WITH THE AMOUNT OF ATTN I HAD TO GIVE TO THE HELI WHILE FOLLOWING THE RIVER AND DSNDING IN A XWIND AND AT A HIGH LNDG WT. THE TWR NEVER MADE IT CLR TO US WHERE THE HELI WAS GOING. ON THE PHONE THE SUPVR SAID THEY TRAIN FLYING N TO S AND BACK AT 500 FT. APPARENTLY, THEY DO THIS FROM 2 DME N TO 10 DME, BASICALLY UNDER THE WHOLE APCH. WHY CAN'T THEY DO THIS AFTER 10 O'CLOCK PM OR DURING LOW TFC FLOW PERIODS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE ACFT SHOULD BE SPACED BETTER SO AS NOT TO FLY SO CLOSE TO THE HELI WHILE ON THE APCH. I HAVE ENCOUNTERED HELIS PREVIOUSLY WHILE SHOOTING THIS APCH, HOWEVER, THEY WERE ALWAYS CLOSER IN SPD TO US AND THEREFORE WE WOULD NOT OVERTAKE THEM AS FAST, OR WE WERE SPACED BETTER. ALSO, THEY ALWAYS HAD A DEST THAT WE WERE ADVISED OF. I'M SENDING IN THIS RPT BECAUSE I WAS NOT COMFORTABLE WITH THE LEVEL OF SAFETY INVOLVED WITH FLYING WITHIN 400 FT VERTLY OF A HELI AND THAT IS CONSIDERED A NORMAL OP.
11
DURING ILS APCH, SBOUND, HELI COMING DOWN POTOMAC RIVER ABOUT 500 FT MSL, TFC CALLED BY TWR, WE DIDN'T SEE IT. WE GOT AN RA ON TCASII -- HAD TO FOLLOW RA INSTRUCTIONS. THEN WE WERE HIGH ABOVE GS, HAD TO DSND MORE RAPIDLY THAN WE WANTED TO IN ORDER TO LAND. THIS HELI CONFLICT AROUND DCA IS A DAILY PROB! GOING TO TA ONLY ON TCASII WOULD DEFEAT PURPOSE OF TCASII. LNDG ACFT SHOULD NOT HAVE TO ACCOMMODATE HELI'S. THIS IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.

12

I WAS TURNING FINAL FOR STOL LNDG RWY 21 DCA. I SAW A HELI APCHING ON CONFLICTING FLT PATH. IT WAS APPROX 400 FT BELOW US, BUT WE WERE DSNDING FOR LNDG. I ADVISED DCA TWR OF TFC. HE SAID 'TFC LOW LEVEL, 200 FT.' JUST AS I WAS GOING TO MANEUVER TO AVOID, THE CHOPPER MADE A STEEP TURN AWAY FROM US. AT THIS POINT WE WERE WITHIN 100 FT VERTICALLY AND 1000 FT HORIZLY. BECAUSE OF THE LIMITATIONS ON PERFORMING A STOL LNDG AT DCA, MY TURN TO AVOID HIM WOULD ALSO CAUSE A GAR. TWR HAD PUT US ON RWY 21 WHILE THE ARPT WAS IN A 'N' OP (ALL OTHER TFC LNDG ON RWY 36). I RECEIVED NO WARNING FROM TWR OF HELI TFC AND I HAD NO WAY OF KNOWING IF CHOPPER PLT HAD US IN SIGHT (UNTIL HE MADE THE EVASIVE TURN). THIS IS BY NO MEANS THE FIRST TIME OF SUCH AN OCCURRENCE AT DCA. I HAVE HAD MANY CONFLICTS WITH CHOPPERS, BOTH ON LNDG AND TKOF AT DCA. I HAVE TALKED TO TWR SEVERAL TIMES (INCLUDING THIS TIME) AND HAVE RECEIVED APOLOGIES AND ADMITTING OF ERRORS BUT THE PROB CONTINUES. THE HELI IS A VERY MANEUVERABLE ACFT. IF THE CHOPPER PLTS WOULD JUST GIVE US MORE SEPARATION, THE PROB WOULD BE SOLVED. WHEN THEY SEE US THEY COULD SLOW OR HOVER, TURN, ETC. CONFLICTS OCCUR WHEN TWR FORGETS TO ADVISE ME THAT CHOPPER HAS ME IN SIGHT AND THE CHOPPER MAINTAINS HIS 'TRAJECTORY' WHICH CONFLICTS WITH MY LIMITED ARR OR DEP AIRSPACE.

13

DURING RIVER VISUAL APCH DCA (LNDG RWY 18), 3 HELIS CROSSED OUR FLT PATH. THE FIRST CAUSED AN RA ON TCASII WITH A 0-300 FT CLB (WHICH WE FOLLOWED). THE HELI WENT DIRECTLY UNDER OUR ACFT WITH LESS THAN 300 FT SEPARATION. THE NEXT 2 HELIS CAUSED MONITOR VERT DSCNT ON THE TCASII. ALL 3 HELIS WERE ENCOUNTERED IN A DISTANCE OF LESS THAN 1 MI. THE TWR NEVER CALLED ANY TFC, UNTIL WE CALLED THE FIRST HELI IN SIGHT. THEN HE SAID 3 HELIS WERE XING THE RIVER. WITHOUT THE RA WE WOULD HAVE COME EVEN CLOSER THAN 300 FT TO THE FIRST HELI.

14

WASHINGTON APCH CTL CLRED ACR X FOR THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH. AT THE WILSON BRIDGE THE TWR CLRED US TO LAND STOL ON RWY 33. I TURNED OFF THE MT. VERNON 36 APCH ONTO A L BASE LEG FOR RWY 33. THE PATTERN FLOWN WAS SQUARE. I TURNED FINAL ABOUT 1/2 MI S OF THE E BANK OF THE POTOMAC RIVER. AT NO TIME WERE WE ADVISED OF A HELI IN OUR AREA AND WE DID NOT HEAR THE TWR TALKING TO A HELI ON 119.1 (1-WAY OR 2-WAY COM). WE DID NOT SEE A HELI DURING OUR APCH. THE SKY WAS HAZY AND THE SUN WAS OFF THE L SIDE. IT WAS DAYLIGHT. LINED UP ON FINAL AND STABILIZED FOR A STOL LNDG, I SUDDENLY CAUGHT SIGHT OF A PRESIDENTIAL TYPE HELI XING OUR FLT PATH, APPROX 50-100 FT BELOW AND 100 FT IN FRONT OF US AT OUR 11:30 POS, AS WE PASSED THROUGH 600 FT MSL. THE HELI WAS MOVING L TO R AT A GOOD SPD, BUT I DETERMINED A COLLISION WAS POSSIBLE AND IMMEDIATELY APPLIED PWR, PULLED UP AND CALLED 'GAR' TO THE FO. AS WE PULLED UP I CALLED OUT THE HELI TO THE FO WHO THEN SAW IT CLOSE AND BELOW AS IT PASSED OFF THE R SIDE. THE GAR WAS UNEVENTFUL AND COMPLIED WITH TWR INSTRUCTIONS WHICH WERE GIVEN AFTER WE CALLED WITH GAR AND NEAR MISS. THE TWR'S RESPONSE WAS 'ROGER AND UNDERSTAND' ONLY. THE HELI IN QUESTION DID NOT APPEAR TO ALTER COURSE OR FLT PATH UNTIL DSNDING AND LNDG AT ANACOSTRA. ON THE GND I ATTEMPTED TO CALL THE TWR ON LANDLINE BUT KEPT GETTING A BUSY SIGNAL (3 ATTEMPTS). SINCE I WAS DUE BACK OUT IN 10 MINS FOR MY NEXT FLT, I RETURNED TO MY ACFT AND CONTINUED ON MY SCHEDULE. I WAS NEVER ABLE TO DETERMINE IF THE TWR KNEW OF OR HAD TALKED TO THE HELI IN QUESTION. MANY TIMES THE TWR TALKS TO HELIS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ, BUT YOU CAN HEAR THE TWR'S COM TO THEM ON 119.1. THEY WILL USUALLY POINT OUT HELI TFC TO US AND COMMENT THAT THE HELI IS AT SUCH AND SUCH AN ALT, DIRECTION AND THAT THEY (THE HELI) HAVE US IN SIGHT. THIS INCIDENT WAS 'VERY' CLOSE AND FAR FROM THE NORM I'VE EXPERIENCED IN 15 YRS OF FLYING INTO AND OUT OF DCA.

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HOT, HAZY AFTERNOON IN WASHINGTON (HAZE DID RESTRICT VISIBILITY) FLYING THE RIVER VISUAL APCH TO RWY 18 AT DCA, CREW IS DCA BASED SO WE ARE VERY FAMILIAR WITH THIS APCH. AT ABOUT 4-5 DME, TWR ASKED US IF WE COULD LAND ON RWY 15, I DECLINED AND SAID THAT I'D LIKE TO CONTINUE FOR RWY 18. TWR THEN ADVISED US THERE WOULD BE 2 HELIS COMING OUT OF THE TIDAL BASIN AREA. (IT IS NOT AT ALL UNCOMMON TO SEE HELIS XING OUR FLT PATH WHEN WE ARE TAKING OFF TO THE N AND CLBING). I COULD SEE A CONTACT ON OUR TCASII SCREEN -- JUST ONE TARGET -- AND BTWN 600 AND 500 FT ON FINAL, WE GOT AN RA THAT COMMANDED CLB. I HAD THE FO LEVEL OFF AT 500 FT, THE TARGET SHOWED 200 FT BELOW ON THE TCASII AND VERY CLOSE ABEAM ME (ON 5 NM SCALE) AND I NEVER DID SEE EITHER HELI. WE STARTED BACK DOWN WHEN THE TCASII SHOWED WE WERE PASSED THEM, WE WERE HIGH AS WE ROLLED WINGS LEVEL ON FINAL BUT, WE WERE STILL ABLE TO SAFELY COMPLETE THE APCH. I HAVE BEEN FLYING THIS APCH AT DCA FOR 7 1/2 YRS, AND THIS ONE REALLY GOT MY ATTN. TWR IS NOT CTLING THE HELIS, I CAN'T BE SURE THE HELIS HAVE ME IN SIGHT, I KNOW THE SECOND HELI IS LOOKING AT HIS LEAD -- THEREFORE, I KNOW HE IS NOT LOOKING AT ME, AND I AM DSNDING INTO HIM WHILE ON FINAL ON A CHALLENGING APCH. THIS HAD THE POTENTIAL TO BE A MIDAIR, AND UNFORTUNATELY, PROBABLY IS CONSIDERED ROUTINE OPS BY DCA TWR.

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MANEUVERING IN GOOD VMC FOR LNDG ON RWY 21 AT DCA (CLRED FOR VIS APCH, MONITORING TWR FREQ FOR LNDG CLRNC). TWR ADVISED OF HELI TFC BELOW AND AHEAD. THIS TFC WAS SPOTTED FLYING SW WHERE ANACOSTIA RIVER MEETS POTOMAC. NO CONFLICT, INITIALLY. THE HELI, A MIL TYPE, THEN TURNED NW UP THE POTOMAC RIVER. THIS NOW BECAME AN IMMEDIATELY INCREASING TFC CONFLICT. CONVERGING FLT PATHS. I ASKED TWR TO PROVIDE SEP, HOPING HE WOULD STOP, SLOW OR TURN THE HELI. HE RESPONDED WITH, "MAINTAIN VIS SEP." MANEUVERING IN CLOSE FOR A STOL LNDG ALLOWS FOR VERY LITTLE LEEWAY FROM THE DESIRED FLT PATH. A GAR FROM THIS POS IS ALSO DANGEROUS. THERE WAS NO TIME TO COMMUNICATE THIS TO TWR AND THE HELI WAS ON A DIFFERENT FREQ. I CONTINUED AND LANDED VERY CAUTIOUSLY WHEN I REALIZED WE WOULD MISS TFC. HOWEVER, WE ONLY MISSED BY APPROX 300'. I FEEL THAT ATC (TWR) IGNORED ITS BASIC OBLIGATION OF PROVIDING SEP. THE HELI COULD HAVE EASILY BEEN SLOWED, STOPPED OR TURNED AS A MEANS OF AVOIDING AN IMPENDING COLLISION. TWR CERTAINLY WOULD HAVE BEEN AWARE OF BOTH ACFT'S FLT PATHS. I HOPE THEY (TWR) DO NOT THINK 200-300' IS A SAFE AMOUNT OF TFC SEP. THIS HELI CONFLICT, AND POOR ATC SEP OF IT, AT DCA IS AN ONGOING PROB. HERE IS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN.

Actually, IF the plane was cleared for an approach that’s true, however IF on visual as the CRJ was, you cannot rejoin the IAP missed approach because you weren’t cleared for an IAP. At DCA, they use visual to 33 is used because airlines do not have circling in their OpsSpecs, so it’s a visual to 33. DC, like Teterboro and DuPage (Chicago) use this weird approach to a visual because the controller cannot protect the MAP due to airspace. Teterboro gives an ILS 6 circle to 01 but begin the circling well outside the circling airspace. DuPage will give you an approach but you have to cancel IFR to visually line up with the NW runway. Both of these “workarounds” have resulted in accidents.

JFK’s Canarsie in the old days was straight in that wasn’t to get around the rules. There’s a lot of normalization of deviance in FAAland.

As a survivor of an A-10 mid-air with similar geometry and height, it easy to imagine the event.

Still it is going to be very difficult to not have this become political as the causes will have to be distributed between the Army and the FAA.

How open is the Army going to be about their procedures? Are they going to try to pull the 'We cannot share that information due to national security' card?

How willing is the NTSB going to be to say out loud that the FAA's procedures have left no margin for error and need to be changed?

How willing is the FAA (among others) to increase costs and/or reduce capacity to increase safety? And not just at DCA, but also a lot of other US airports.

Note/apologies to moderators: As a private pilot who doesn’t even fly anymore, I normally wouldn’t contribute to a thread like this, but I live in the great Washington, DC, area, so I know what the weather was like (very clear, visibility 26 miles, low wind, warming up after a very cold cold snap, the ice on the river was breaking up..) I’ve been to Hains point and the park across the river due south of the airport, as well as flying in and out of DCA as a pax, etc., etc.

BTW, the Potomac River is subject to sea tides by the airport, so that can’t help in the recovery, plus it was carrying a lot of melted snow at the time, adding to the cold and volume.

It’s been on the news 24/7 around here.

Anyway, there are a few stories in the Washington Post that might be of interest, or completely irrelevant​​​​​​:

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...eagan-airport/

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...potomac-river/

P.S., Apparently the helicopter controller had to leave early that evening, but it was considered a slow time, so was allowed without someone else being called in.

This endless discussion about UHF/VHF frequencies is a bit disturbing.
Please read the helicopter route chart.
https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/09-05...-Wash_Heli.pdf
There is a DCA tower frequency dedicated to helicopters: "134.35 (HELI)".
And it looks VHF to me.

Edit: Sorry, didn't see that skwdenyer had already answered

The world is not that black and white.
DCA, and others nornalize collision alerts in the background of a significant % of ATC transmssions.

TCAS RA heights show mandatory Day, VMC go arounds the day prior- but how close was the helicopter to the 737 not going around 2 minutes earlier the day prior, so low TCAS TA only height below 900' allows continuing?

You think the CRJ crew, below 500', rolling out of a left turn to 33 sees the helicopter to their right or even notices the TCAS TA display? Maybe it gets a glance IF the short final is wired. Problem is the Traffic aural is already expected in the airspace, same as hearing the ATC collision alarms in their transmission background.

There will be line of sight recreations in the reports. The CRJ will not have but a scant chance to have seen the PAT25, with caveats- the CVR has to be heard.

Pat25 likely had a 500 hour pic getting a checkride in the right, distant seat and the radio PM/1000 hour pilot in left seat, seeing only AAL3130 and trying to figure out how to pass behind, cognitive dissonance with what is seen..

3 seconds later, all ends.

James Reason, Diane Vaughan, NASA, et al...