Posts about: "DCA" [Posts: 332 Page: 9 of 17]¶

I agree that the DC controllers should not be scapegoated. At the same time, the concept of professionalism must be addressed. The concept that professionals in a field must alone (without management, without lawyers, without the public) maintain the best practices of the given professional discipline.

In the US, physicians who work for "Health Maintenance Organizations" are asked to practice medicine, at times, in a "basically unsafe" manner...to keep patients moving. On occasion, such practices will bite a patient (and sometimes the physician). As a whole, HMO physicians do not enjoy the best reputation.

From my perspective, there is practically no difference between the plight of an American air traffic controller and an American HMO physician. Both are expected to "squeeze one more in." Both fields are staffed by above-average capable individuals who thrive on challenges. Both are managed in such a manner that they cannot say "no" and also keep their job. In this regard, at least physicians have job portability.

But the take home point is that one cannot admit to knowing a practice is fundamentally unsafe, yet do it anyway. The public, rightfully, should not accept this. I have no solution except more staff and/or more airports (and not some next-gen whizzbang computer system).

The point is that PAT25 could have been tightly hugging the eastern bank at precisely 200 feet, and yet everyone would still have died if the CRJ had been slightly below its proper approach path (as it might easily have been). Yes, you can say that *this* accident wouldn't have happened if the helo had been at 200 feet, but that gets us precisely nowhere in preventing recurrence.

Systems that rely on human perfection are 100% guaranteed to fail. The only question is how often. The system in place at DCA required helo pilots to assume responsibility for visual (*not vertical*) avoidance of collisions in order to fulfil their ordered missions. Given what we know about human visual performance at night, that would eventually end badly, and sure enough it did. There is a strong element of the pilots having been set up to fail, which is why no-one here is going hard on them.

Altimetry and height keeping would be important matters for investigators if the collision had occurred due to a breakdown in vertical separation, which as a minimum would involve 500 feet (and more often 1000 feet) of planned spacing to account for instrument and height keeping errors. FAA instrument rating standards require pilots to be able to maintain altitude plus or minus 100 feet. This helicopter was being flown VFR at very low height, which means that looking outside takes primacy over monitoring instruments. I'm sure helo pilots could fly along at 175ft plus or minus 25ft if they really tried, but you can be certain they wouldn't be looking out for traffic (as is required when holding responsibility for visual separation).

However, as there was no vertical separation built into this procedure, all of this is at best a distraction. The more important questions are why procedural barriers were not in place to stop the route being used during landings on runway 33, and whether visual separation at night is an adequate barrier to collision when airliners and their human cargo are involved.

Easy Street:
"However, as there was no vertical separation built into this procedure, all of this is at best a distraction. The more important questions are why procedural barriers were not in place to stop the route being used during landings on runway 33, and whether visual separation at night is an adequate barrier to collision when airliners and their human cargo are involved."

Aircraft accidents bring lawsuits - like it or not.

I'm not a member now, nor have I been a member, of the part of the profession which specializes in suing usually anybody plausible as a defendant. That doesn't mean, as an attorney first and SLF second, I don't see big problems looming ahead. (A prior post on legal factors was junked by the mods, but that was then, this is. . . .)

The FAA and the U.S. Army are privileged with sovereign immunity, as a general rule. A federal statute - the Federal Tort Claims Act - enacted a waiver of sovereign immunity BUT with an important exception. If the allegedly negligent act (or omission) was taken (or failed to be taken) as part of a "discretionary function", immunity still exists. The basic explanation is that discretionary functions involve policy judgments which, in the view of Congress, cannot be "second-guessed" in lawsuits over alleged federal agency negligence. The other half of the equation is that immunity is waived for "ministerial" actions, sort of (to over-simplify) plug-and-chug activities.

Is the construction and operation of the airspace around DCA a matter of policy judgment? I can almost hear the lawyers planning to file suit arguing that airspace rules which make simple, obvious sense are not derived from policy judgments. I can almost hear them issuing subpoenas (through the necessary international process) of Network Manager or MUAC senior managers to gain testimony that in European airspace, as others have observed about Heathrow, the airspace rules are more like "plug-and-chug" than the sometimes esoteric, and usually vague and/or ambiguous, factors which inform the choices made in - offensive phrase coming - "the policy world."

And will our fine feathered legal eagles sue American too, just to go after the deep pocket, and try to force the airline to take a position on the federal immunity questions?

It's too bad so much attention is focused on the dumb shows and noise currently meant to entertain the grandstands (if you get my meaning). There should be a way to compensate the families of the people who perished in this awful, tragic, and ultimately senseless midair collision. Is the United States civil justice system really going back to 1960 and pretending that what we are dealing with is the December 16 1960 DC-8 - L-1049 Super Constellation midair?

As another poster way, way upthread said, I feel rage.

Let's see if I have understood "plug and chug" correctly!

If we took the FAA to be undertaking "plug and chug" regulatory and procedural activities, unburdened by political considerations and at risk of having EASA or UK CAA regulations and procedures held up as comparators in negligence cases against it, then I think it is highly unlikely that FAA regulations would be as permissive as they are in respect of visual separation and runway occupancy (the two most obvious and frequently cited points of difference, at least where airline operations are concerned), or that DCA\x92s helicopter routes would have existed. So why such a difference in approach? Economic factors are usually held up as the reason, and I fear this takes us away from "plug and chug" regulation into policy territory where immunity would seemingly apply.

I very much doubt that any politician, corporate lobbyist or general would explicitly advance the argument that occasional accidents are a tolerable price for the traffic capacity enhancements enabled by visual separation. It'll be interesting to see whether the NTSB forces that argument into the open, or enables it to be avoided by distracting itself with altimetry and other such matters.

You should feel rage. Managing control of airspace is not a matter of political interest any more than the rules of the road for driving cars is. And in my previous tirade I forgot the earliest parts of this ****show which was an aircraft on a stabilised approach asked to circle to a lesser equipped runway in order to expedite traffic. The next time I hear someone in authority say that safety is our number one concern, I think I'll probably choke on my own vomit.

KDCA 01 visual to 33 (note: not circle, 121 carriers are not circling authorized in the US) has been a standard procedure for, at least 45, that I flew there. Expediting, moving more planes is always one of the goals. Sure, we can make it safer, only one plane flies on each side of the Mississippi. After that, it’s a negotiation.

I’m very much opposed to the helicopter routes, both in planning and execution. The routes shouldn’t exist, if DCA is to remain open. But, to say safety trumps (excuse me) everything is unrealistic. As soon as the wheels leave the runway, there’s risks. This case someone is government accepted too much risk; crews accepted too much risk and normalized that risk. Maneuvering to a different is generally very acceptable, putting a helicopter on final is way too much risk. The system failed to see it for what it was.

So how else are we supposed to interpret 'safety is our number one priority' ?

The diagram shows the route up the east ~half of the river, solidly over water. The inset seems to show it within perhaps the east quarter, but still 100% over water. Asking crews to follow the riverbank therefore seems to be a direct contradiction.

You could reasonably define the bank as the water's edge, and therefore expect crews to fly along an infinitesimally narrow path. Or as the space between the water's edge and the [edge of the flood plain | first flat area | something else], which would imply that the western boundary changes with the water level. Both imply the route is substantially above land.

Neither are useful for precise navigation, but the map and the description are probably 'close enough' if they are only needed for general route guidance and knowing that structures on the east bank need to be NOTAMed for helicopters, but probably not the west bank.

A good reminder that measurements/specifications without tolerance are often worse than useless.

If it quacks like a duck... this kind of "It can't be an X because we can't do it, so we'll call it a Y" leads to a culture that gets used to massaging the truth for convenience. Did we hear more on the Alaska door plug that was an 'opening' not a 'removal'?

This just a catchy phrase to make passengers comfortable, just like the : " Staff are the most important asset of our company " on can see in the reception hall of many companies nowadays . The shareholders must be smiling a bit when passing thought those banners...

As many and I said before, discussion about Altimeters or width of VFR routes are just distractions to deflect from the real cause , which for me can be resumed into the lack of a safety assessment and safety case of existing procedures. We all had to do this when SMS was widely introduced in the late 90s It was not that easy , but we discovered a few holes that were closed.
Here in DCA we see a couple of procedures that would not have passed a safety case : e.g Route 4, Circling to RWY 33 with that route active, visual separation at night , use of NVG on that route ..etc,,

Flying in itself always bares a risk,, our job is to minimize the risk , not to eliminate it , but here the Regulatory ( i.e FAA) failed to minimize the risks.
As in the US the FAA is both the service provider and the Regulator , and is in addition dependent of political will and pressure for its funding , the willingness to implement unpopular measures, may be limited. A Judge might look into this differently but for those part of the discussion I hand over the floor to .Willow run 6-3 .

The more posts I've read on this thread, the more I'm anticipating that court actions seeking compensation for the families of the people killed in this accident will encounter very tough barriers.

This is an excerpt from a website of an actually well-known, very accomplished, and respected group of lawyers who specialize in (among other things) aviation matters. I'm not using their name and I don't have any approval, express or implied, to use information from their website - but if justice is to be sought for the victims' families, public discussion is - or should be - encouraged.

"A discretionary function is an action of a governmental nature exercised by a federal employee, but in order for that action to be considered a discretionary function, it must pass a two-part test:

There must be an element of judgment or choice. That is, if a federal statute or regulation prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, there is no discretion.
That judgment or choice must be susceptible to policy analysis.
The Federal Tort Claims Act contains a discretionary function exception that says the U.S. cannot be held liable for any employee\x92s failure to exercise or perform a discretionary duty.

Within the legal field of aviation accidents, discretionary duties for which the U.S. is not liable include the following:

Aircraft \x93spot check\x94 certifications
Weather forecasting
Failure to install equipment
The FAA\x92s design of flight procedures
The types of actions that are considered not discretionary, and therefore, open the U.S. government to litigation are:

The failure to issue air traffic control manual warnings
If air traffic control fails to warn of weather dangers
The failure to maintain equipment
Relaying incorrect instructions to pilots."
END OF EXCERPT [not intended as legal advice here or on its original internet page]

So to return to ATC Watcher's point...... the more posts I read about this midair collision (plus other information such as NTSB briefings) the more I am anticipating that it will require an act of Congress to provide for compensation for the families of the victims. Isn't it the obvious fact that convenience for people who work in Washington and travel "back home" generally speaking on weekends and when Congress isn't convened, is a prime and central reason for the way DCA airspace has been constructed and managed? Is it really going to be the case that because the lawsuits will - in all likelihood - fail to overcome the "discretionary function" exception, that the 67 families will be without a remedy? Is that how it works, then?

In case anyone thinks my sense of being horrified at this accident is clouding reason or logic, consider this - the book Collision Course discusses the PATCO union's genesis, the strike, and so on. PATCO's earliest stirrings resulted in large part from the 1960 midair over New York. Is the United States aviation sector willing to accept an outcome of this accident that in effect travels back over six decades? The point is, given the long-term shortage of ATCOs in this country . . . I don't think a court is capable of ruling that the situation, allowed and in fact enabled by Congress and successive White House presidential administrations, is subject to "negligence" analysis in the currently applicable legal sense. All this being said, this is how I arrive at thinking that in the interests of justice, some other means of providing for the loved ones of 67 souls who were on board needs to be determined and implemented.

Absolutely . Lack of Wake turbulence separation is something that immediately came to my mind when discovering the procedure . That should have been another red flag in the Safety assessment , but I assume initially the H routes were designed with RWY 1 OPS in mind and 33 only for departures. Combining 33 Arrivals with route 4 is the initial issue .
Indeed , and there is a precedent : the 1986 Cerritos collision : the NTSB found no responsibility to ATC as the pilot of the PA28 that hit the DC9 had entered Los Angeles Terminal Control Area airspace without the required clearance. However a judge found the FAA partly responsible to make sure the families of the pax , mostly Mexicans , would be compensated , as the responsible private pilot's wealth would not have been able to cover those.
Here if you want to learn or just refresh your memory ; https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-...%20government.

As an aside , the NTSB conclusions of that collision are interesting compared to our DCA accident : ( exactly 40 years ago !)

Yes history often repeats itself . just like the PATCO history...

Yes I agree. But it's also possible that the maintenance of such 'procedures' in the face of the growing body of evidence of their unsafety is actually part of a policy stance of expediting traffic, particularly given the highly political nature of the helicopter operator.

I've asked a question over on Rotorheads to see if anyone knows the actual clearance and service given to helicopters entering the DCA Class Bravo on the 'routes', and I'm happy to repeat it here. In London it's Radar Control ie. separation provided by ATC supported by radar. That's one part of the picture. The other is this startling revelation from Jennifer Homendy that there are no lateral limits to the 'routes', so in one sense they are not really 'routes' at all just guidelines with defined altitude limits. I can't find even altitude limits on the NY and Boston charts.

In other words, the way the 'routes' are used is quite possibly defined locally by custom and practice rather than designed with safety baked in by the authority, and that may be the way the authority intended things to be. In the UK every towered field has its own safety management system, as does the CAA. If these exist here at DCA and the FAA it would be instructive to have those examined as part of the investigation, because either they are not being used, or they're being ignored. Nobody could maintain that the risks on this 'route' were As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).

as active ATCO I can say only this (to addition to what I've already said) - I will never, ever allow any flying object to cross path of another flying object, especially when one of them is landing. This practice of my US colleagues to frequently offload separation duties to the pilots is just not acceptable. As if there is not enough incident contributing factors, they tend to add some of their own. I said (to disbelief of the attendees) at IFATCA conference just after Uberlingen - let's be honest, at the end of the day, it was ATCO who cleared both airplanes to the same level...
It may sound harsh, but after years of struggle for non-punitive environment, some have deduced this as non-punitive environment for any kind of incident (or even accident).
Back to case in DCA - to expect self separation of night VFR and IFR conducting visual approach agreed hasty and under pressure in the area where none of them is capable of sudden change of trajectory is just pouring gasoline to the fire already raging.

The glide path for London City is 5\xbd\xb0 and obviously requires some bespoke training and approvals. I am not suggesting that you would do the same at DCA, but a 4\xb0 slope should be achievable for R33, which would add a margin that would take out many of the 'incursions' shown in airplancrazy's excellent diagram. If you don't have the training to fly a 4\xb0 slope, you simply refuse the request to circle.

I can think of one: you apply IFR separation standards (the minimum in the US is 1.5nm/500\x92?), at least for night operations. If two routes come closer to each other than that in either dimension, e.g. DCA RW33 approach and helicopter route 1, then traffic must be actively kept apart.

If two aircraft are converging on the same runway or look like they are going to occupy it simultaneously, then one of them has to give way. Why should it be any different for a small volume of sky?

Which, put another way, means no visual separation, and I think that's the right answer. I would commend the DCA authorities also to a scheme we had in London where regular users of the routes such as PAT are given a number to call before planned movements to see if it was likely to come off. Another trick that I've seen is to add a suffix to the callsign for aircraft on a priority shout (eg. helimed).

1.5 nm or 500\x92 is separation for IFR/VFR traffic, not IFR separation. So, an IFR aircraft in VMC might only have those separation distances with a VFR, not IFR aircraft.

# 1194 Caley,
"… and yet that is precisely how ICAO stipulates that accident investigation should work. The consequent focus on such things as ‘proximate cause’ and the inherent unwillingness to deal with underlying aetiology work against holistic approaches and generate exactly the outcomes you warn against. "

In part yes, I agree.
However, as you might know, ICAO does not 'stipulate', it provides recommendations and standards of practice (SARPS), e.g. Annex 13, on which nations can base their investigation and reporting.
As such it is the interpretation of by individual nations and their investigators which direct investigation, findings, and recommendations.

Some nations interpret SARPS better than others.

There is an interesting example (amongst many others) of wider investigation and reporting in the Fukushima accident report: Pprune Safety Forum Fukushima Nuclear Accident Investigation

Reforming the regulators
The Commission has concluded that the safety … cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformation process. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in a substantial way. … regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring international safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity .

P.S. Re the investigation above, also noting 'Cosmetic Solutions'; if the findings from this DCA investigation warrant it, would the NTSB conclude 'This was a manmade accident, made in the USA'
.ii

My apologies, I tend to regard the conversation here as being reflective of the lounge bar rather than the witness box. You're right, 'recommends' is a better word and I will try to be more pedantic.

Regarding Fukushima, the problem lies not with regulators, but with regulation and its evil twin, compliance. And on your last line, I might add, 'by politics'. The process of sharing draft reports with interested parties is harmful enough to the investigative process, as we have seen with crystal clarity over the Clutha case for example, but is even more damaging in its influence to the jobbing investigator sitting at a word processor, thinking not only of that process, but all the petty politics which are exercised by managers in SIAs. Sometimes the investigator feels charged with writing a benign account of a series of improbable, unfortunate, and unforeseeable coincidences, which aligned with previously unknown holes in otherwise-solid cheese, despite being fully aware that there is much more to it than that.

Indeed , as reminder this is the official ICAO definition of class B airspace :
My bold. so in essence not by one of the pilots. But this is ICAO, not FAA .