The NYT link should work. It shows the helicopter v. Airplane traffic for the week (!) prior. There’s is no way in heck, that much helicopter traffic needs to be integrated with air carrier traffic. The govt hasn’t been in danger of continuity challenges in decades.

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...ane-crash.html

Interesting and fairly well researched NY Times article (the failing kind...)

My thoughts:
I continue to see this as:

• a failure of imagination by command;
• a system failure by command to monitor performance against expected system behaviour;
• an information system failure, the evidence has been in front of those that are charged with having safe systems such as the govt, regulator, DOD, airlines;
• The crew and the the ATC controller, and certainly the passengers are not high in the systemic failures that occur here, I would contend that the crew and the ATC officer are victims of the systemic failures.

________________________

Criss-Crossing Routes in D.C. Airspace Leave Little Room for Error

By Elena Shao , Leanne Abraham , Eli Murray and Lazaro Gamio


The pictures are out of order, the tracks are for "1-Week" of data. The latest NOTAM is a good start, the helo fleet operators may want to revisit the concept of the flyways.

A deadly midair collision between an American Airlines passenger jet and a U.S. Army helicopter near Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington highlights the complexity of navigating an airspace with many civilian and military aircraft.

The airport has three runways that intersect, but only one is used for nearly all of its hundreds of daily flights. With the routes of aircraft routinely criss-crossing one another, there is little room for error as planes descend onto the runways. To stay out of the way of commercial jets, helicopters in this area are supposed to fly along a route designated by the Federal Aviation Administration at an altitude no higher than 200 feet.

Air traffic data from the past week shows that helicopters flying along the Potomac River must navigate amid the takeoffs and landings of hundreds of planes daily. While they are advised by the F.A.A. to stick to a tight air corridor above the eastern bank of the river, data shows that in reality, helicopters can be spotted across the width of the river.

One week of air traffic at Reagan National

Dots show positions of planes during their takeoffs and landings at Reagan National Airport, as well as the positions of helicopters as they traversed the area from Jan. 23 to Jan. 30.
The American Airlines flight was cleared to land on Runway 1 before being instructed by an air traffic controller shortly before the collision to pivot its landing route to the intersecting Runway 33.

The last-minute request to switch runways at Reagan National is “very common,” said Shawn Pruchnicki, a former airline pilot and an assistant professor at the Center for Aviation Studies at Ohio State University, who said he has piloted aircraft into the airport more than a hundred times.

Skies were clear on Wednesday night when the two aircraft collided. But, in case of low visibility, like in poor weather, the F.A.A. has designed “instrument approaches,” or descents that involve a series of steps pilots must follow to maneuver down to the runway safely.

The instrument approach for Runway 1 calls for a descending plane to cross over the helicopter corridor while the plane is at a much higher altitude, somewhere from 620 to 1,700 feet and more than a minute from landing. The approach for Runway 33, however, calls for a plane to cross over the helicopter corridor at a much lower altitude, because a plane is seconds from landing. The clearance between a helicopter in the corridor and a descending plane may be from 100 to 300 feet, which can result in close calls if there are severe fluctuations in the altitude of either aircraft.

Sources: Helicopter route and instrument approach data from the Federal Aviation Administration

Note: An instrument approach is a descent that involves a series of scripted flight maneuvers, with pilots using navigation aids and instruments to reach the runway safely when visibility is low, such as in poor weather.

The [failing] New York Times
Given the clear nighttime weather, the plane’s pilots would not have been expected to initiate an instrument approach to aid their landing, Mr. Pruchnicki said, and instead could have used their vision to guide their descent to the runway. Data on the aircraft’s positions indicates that the pilots’ route was very similar to the one outlined in an instrument approach. For example, the plane maintained roughly the recommended altitude when it made a leftward turn toward Runway 33.

In this case, the Army Black Hawk requested permission to use the route designated for helicopters, meaning that it would keep to the eastern bank of the Potomac and stay under 200 feet in altitude. But the helicopter was at least a half-mile off of the approved route when it collided with the jet, according to four people briefed on the matter but not authorized to speak publicly. The helicopter was also flying above 300 feet, not below 200, the people said.

The crash also renewed questions about the safety of intersecting runways, which the F.A.A. has sought to eliminate or close in recent years in places like Chicago and Dallas because of concerns over congestion on the ground. The setup can increase the workload of the air traffic controller, especially if the two runways are getting used simultaneously for takeoff and landing, said Cyriel Kronenburg, a former air traffic controller and pilot.

An internal preliminary report from the F.A.A., which was reviewed by The New York Times , said that a supervisor allowed an air traffic controller to leave early, sometime before the crash. This left one air traffic controller to manage the dual roles of handling helicopters in the airport’s vicinity and also instructing planes that were landing and departing from runways, according to a person briefed on the matter. While it is within the supervisor’s discretion to combine the duties, that staffing configuration “was not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic,” the F.A.A. report said.

A Times investigation in 2023 found that the nation’s air traffic control facilities are chronically understaffed , contributing to an alarming number of close calls in the skies and on the runways across the country. Before the plane crash on Wednesday night, there were at least 10 close calls at Reagan National in the last three years that were documented in government records reviewed by The Times.
Additional research by Riley Mellen.
See more on: Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.)

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...smid=url-share

NYT has attempted a reconstruction of the visual picture from the Blackhawk at the time of the first traffic alert, with the CRJ just south of Wilson Bridge.
They could only later identify the correct light spot by following its trajectory according to their mental image of the approach to 33.

https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/06/u...-tracking.html

The original NYT article thanks to the Internet Archive (archive.org) .

+1
I think many pilots would have made a mistake indentifying : seen from the helo, there are 3 aircraft in final, plus 1 on take-off, at the same bearing, how can you tell for sure which is the one "just south of Wilson Bridge" ?

This simulation, if correct, is harrowing. The accident aircraft is actually almost superimposed over the following aircraft AA3130 at exactly the time of the tower's first notification of traffic to the helicopter. The helicopter's response is so quick, so reflexive. Then when the second notification is received, even though PAT25 knows he has just asked for visual separation and been granted he asks again, further suggestion that this is reflexive behavior.

At the same time the accident aircraft peels off to the right to swing around and line up to 33, thus taking his (smaller) lights out of the helicopter's direct line of vision and leaving 3130's (brighter) lights still heading to 01 to decoy the pilot. The reflexive nature of the helicopter's responses suggest to me that the full implication of 'circling to 33' in the tower's first call was missed, and also sort of implies that the helicopter could not conceive that following (nearly) the published heliroute could lead him into conflict with an aircraft on final. Me neither.

I'd push the expiry date of that one out a little.

Missteps, Equipment Problems and a Common but Risky Practice Led to a Fatal Crash

New details revealed by The Times show that the failures on Jan. 29 before an Army helicopter crashed into a jet near Reagan National Airport were far more complex than previously known.


https://www.nytimes.com/2025/04/27/b...smid=url-share

NTSB Chairwoman speaks out about legislation to again allow uncontrolled military helicopter flights through Washington D.C. From the New York Times https://archive.ph/7YCHK