Everyone seems to have missed this earlier post. Please take this into consideration before bashing the controller.

AS the FAA says:


You are allowed to do formation, that's in the rules, it just requres all participants to be have agreed to be part of the formation and a few other pesky things, like...



Given how unusual the airspace is around DC, at least there would be good guidance and x'lent safety priorities related to that, which would come up in 14CFRPart 93, SATR.


hmmm,

Quote:

Originally Posted by SWBKCB

Surely the question should be "why is the route ceiling 200ft?" - to my simple PPL mind that seems unbelievably low.

Noise abatement. MACs are quite noisy.

The Federal Aviation Administration has indefinitely shut down the low-altitude helicopter corridor that was in use at the time of Wednesday night’s fatal midair collision near Reagan National Airport, an FAA official tells CNN.

https://www.cnn.com/us/live-news/pla...-25/index.html

Firmly closing the stable door years after the horse left the state...

( My bolding )

HEAR, HEAR.

In the hands of bureaucrats, SMS has drifted far from its purpose, and become another unwieldy, overly complex, set of box-ticking processes. There are some civil aviation service providers -- i.e. airports, airlines, and ANSPs -- that have functional, effective SMS's. Somewhat ironically, those are usually the smaller, more efficient organizations. The larger and more bureaucratic the entity (the FAA for example) the more likely that any collected data is not adequately assessed for risk, and acted upon.

It's SO damned sad and frustrating that, as you said, this accident was as predictable as a sunrise.

Look at SMS in private jet aviation. We have IS-BAO, Wyvern, ARG/US all doing audits, issuing pretty certificates, gold labels and then the operators have hideously stupid and predictable accidents. My rumor mill told me years ago, much of the FAA views SMS has some ICAO idea they don’t need. Is it any wonder their SMS is dead?

As Chesty said, they shut the barn door long after the horse was gone.

The most important function of an aviation Safety Management System (SMS) is to prevent accidents by identifying hazards, assess them for associated risk, and then act to mitigate those risks, before the known hazard or incident becomes an accident. Looking at the list posted above by NIBEX2A, it is crystal clear that the hazards were well known, and reported, but no appropriate mitigations were implemented -- until 67 lives were lost.

Sadly, this accident will no doubt be used as an example in the future, of how Reason's famous cheese holes can, and will, line up -- and what can happen if those holes aren't closed.

I tend to think ATC and, likely, the FAA will be shown as primary at fault with this:

1. The CRJ was on approach to 1 and then was asked to divert to 33. They complied, which added to their workload. From what I understand, that runway is rarely used for commercial aircraft. So, ATC added to the CRJ's workload while introducing and "unusual event." The CRJ crew appears to have acted professionally in changing their approach.
2. ATC didn't hold the helo short of the runway path, instead relied on them to correctly identify an aircraft, at night, over an urban area. That introduced a "single point of failure" to an already complex situation.
3. There was no way for the helo to pass safely under the CRJ at the altitude of impact.
3. I don't recall hearing ATC asking the CRJ if they could see the helo, though they already overtasked them. At that point, I don't think they could do anything at that point to prevent the collision.

Other factors may come into play, such as if ATC was properly staffed that night. I've read that DCA had two incidents that week where an aircraft had to perform a "go around" because of helo traffic. Also, was the CRJ's TCAS system operational?

This was completely preventable if things work they way they're supposed to.

I shall remind you all again, as Pilot DAR has already reminded you all: keep the politics out of this.
If you can't post professionally on the aviation matters to hand, then don't post.

Whether or not the FAA has, or has not, fulfilled it's role is a functional, not political, matter if you can be bothered to constrain yourselves to the functional aspects of regulation.

You will not be warned again.

EDITED this post due to a link problem:
AA5342 Down DCA

Carry on.

You mean, like an aircraft (who themselves requested visual separation) assigned responsibility for separating itself from another, to actually seperate itself from the other and not fly into it?!?

Everything else is moot, really...

Helo Route 4 itself is not inherently unsafe; operations of route 4 AND arrivals on RWY33, DEP 15 are high risk, and always have been. (04-22 is also a potential issue). There are sound reasons to have helicopter operations that are predominately over waterways. It is improbable that the activity rate of helicopters will diminish, the potential to cause another crack to open up in the system is ever present. The cross runways at Reagan are unlikely to be extended, and they add risk to the types that are operating off them. They have existing RESA issues and limited lengths.

Would suspending all operations of the cross runways not simplify the flow control and traffic management, while achieving the needs of the DOD and the unique needs of DC, without setting up new risks over densely populated areas? The primary runway is fit for purpose, the cross runways do not meaningfully increase operational capacity any more than a well set up series of taxiways at either end of the main runway.

The FAA's response is laudable as an immediate response, but it may not be the best risk mitigation in this case.

Thank you! Well said by the Beast driver.

Interesting and fairly well researched NY Times article (the failing kind...)

My thoughts:
I continue to see this as:

• a failure of imagination by command;
• a system failure by command to monitor performance against expected system behaviour;
• an information system failure, the evidence has been in front of those that are charged with having safe systems such as the govt, regulator, DOD, airlines;
• The crew and the the ATC controller, and certainly the passengers are not high in the systemic failures that occur here, I would contend that the crew and the ATC officer are victims of the systemic failures.

________________________

Criss-Crossing Routes in D.C. Airspace Leave Little Room for Error

By Elena Shao , Leanne Abraham , Eli Murray and Lazaro Gamio


The pictures are out of order, the tracks are for "1-Week" of data. The latest NOTAM is a good start, the helo fleet operators may want to revisit the concept of the flyways.

A deadly midair collision between an American Airlines passenger jet and a U.S. Army helicopter near Ronald Reagan National Airport in Washington highlights the complexity of navigating an airspace with many civilian and military aircraft.

The airport has three runways that intersect, but only one is used for nearly all of its hundreds of daily flights. With the routes of aircraft routinely criss-crossing one another, there is little room for error as planes descend onto the runways. To stay out of the way of commercial jets, helicopters in this area are supposed to fly along a route designated by the Federal Aviation Administration at an altitude no higher than 200 feet.

Air traffic data from the past week shows that helicopters flying along the Potomac River must navigate amid the takeoffs and landings of hundreds of planes daily. While they are advised by the F.A.A. to stick to a tight air corridor above the eastern bank of the river, data shows that in reality, helicopters can be spotted across the width of the river.

One week of air traffic at Reagan National

Dots show positions of planes during their takeoffs and landings at Reagan National Airport, as well as the positions of helicopters as they traversed the area from Jan. 23 to Jan. 30.
The American Airlines flight was cleared to land on Runway 1 before being instructed by an air traffic controller shortly before the collision to pivot its landing route to the intersecting Runway 33.

The last-minute request to switch runways at Reagan National is “very common,” said Shawn Pruchnicki, a former airline pilot and an assistant professor at the Center for Aviation Studies at Ohio State University, who said he has piloted aircraft into the airport more than a hundred times.

Skies were clear on Wednesday night when the two aircraft collided. But, in case of low visibility, like in poor weather, the F.A.A. has designed “instrument approaches,” or descents that involve a series of steps pilots must follow to maneuver down to the runway safely.

The instrument approach for Runway 1 calls for a descending plane to cross over the helicopter corridor while the plane is at a much higher altitude, somewhere from 620 to 1,700 feet and more than a minute from landing. The approach for Runway 33, however, calls for a plane to cross over the helicopter corridor at a much lower altitude, because a plane is seconds from landing. The clearance between a helicopter in the corridor and a descending plane may be from 100 to 300 feet, which can result in close calls if there are severe fluctuations in the altitude of either aircraft.

Sources: Helicopter route and instrument approach data from the Federal Aviation Administration

Note: An instrument approach is a descent that involves a series of scripted flight maneuvers, with pilots using navigation aids and instruments to reach the runway safely when visibility is low, such as in poor weather.

The [failing] New York Times
Given the clear nighttime weather, the plane’s pilots would not have been expected to initiate an instrument approach to aid their landing, Mr. Pruchnicki said, and instead could have used their vision to guide their descent to the runway. Data on the aircraft’s positions indicates that the pilots’ route was very similar to the one outlined in an instrument approach. For example, the plane maintained roughly the recommended altitude when it made a leftward turn toward Runway 33.

In this case, the Army Black Hawk requested permission to use the route designated for helicopters, meaning that it would keep to the eastern bank of the Potomac and stay under 200 feet in altitude. But the helicopter was at least a half-mile off of the approved route when it collided with the jet, according to four people briefed on the matter but not authorized to speak publicly. The helicopter was also flying above 300 feet, not below 200, the people said.

The crash also renewed questions about the safety of intersecting runways, which the F.A.A. has sought to eliminate or close in recent years in places like Chicago and Dallas because of concerns over congestion on the ground. The setup can increase the workload of the air traffic controller, especially if the two runways are getting used simultaneously for takeoff and landing, said Cyriel Kronenburg, a former air traffic controller and pilot.

An internal preliminary report from the F.A.A., which was reviewed by The New York Times , said that a supervisor allowed an air traffic controller to leave early, sometime before the crash. This left one air traffic controller to manage the dual roles of handling helicopters in the airport’s vicinity and also instructing planes that were landing and departing from runways, according to a person briefed on the matter. While it is within the supervisor’s discretion to combine the duties, that staffing configuration “was not normal for the time of day and volume of traffic,” the F.A.A. report said.

A Times investigation in 2023 found that the nation’s air traffic control facilities are chronically understaffed , contributing to an alarming number of close calls in the skies and on the runways across the country. Before the plane crash on Wednesday night, there were at least 10 close calls at Reagan National in the last three years that were documented in government records reviewed by The Times.
Additional research by Riley Mellen.
See more on: Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.)

https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/...smid=url-share

The PATCO strike was in 1981 and with one or two generations of new controllers and management over those 43 years, is irrelevant to the accident. Any controllers were invited back to the FAA during the Clinton administration. I know several. Is short staffing released, of course, it’s a systemic problem and was in 1981.

125'? God no.

The helo should have been told to hold some half mile away and wait for crossing traffic to clear.

The NTSB is going to have a field day with the FAA on this.

I\x92m not in job of defending the US system, but there needs to be some perspective. The US airspace operates about 40%-50% of all global aviation. Only half of daily flights are air carrier. For lot of reasons outside this discussion, air carriers are the default transport, trains and buses are a tiny fraction of long distance transport. Apply EASA aviation standards and the US network would grind to halt or create huge gaps in service. We\x92ve gone 16 years without a fatal US carrier major accident, which isn\x92t different than the rest of the world, especially when the US has a 50% share. Our economy would suffer greatly and passengers revolt at what would required.

All that said, the plan for DCA, particularly the helicopter ops, were hazardous in the extreme. The Route 4/33 operations is just plain dangerous, nothing less. The politics of DCA are going to drive a band-aid fix is my prediction. Visual separation won\x92t go away. FAA will get crucified over manning. DCA may lose some significant service, if we closed 33 permanently. If I read the NOTAM correctly, closing 4 and 33, the pain will become known, interestingly, I read elsewhere that the helicopter altitudes were raised to 200\x92 in 2023 due to noise complaints.

FAA Order JO 7110.65AA - Air Traffic Control

7.9.4 SEPARATION
a. Standard IFR services to IFR aircraft.
b. VFR aircraft must be separated from VFR/IFR aircraft/ helicopter/rotorcraft that weigh more than 19,000 pounds and turbojets by no less than:
1. 1 \xbd miles separation, or
2. 500 feet vertical separation, or
3. Visual separation, as specified in paragraph  7-2-1 , Visual Separation, paragraph  7-4-2 , Vectors for Visual Approach, and paragraph 7-6-7 , Sequencing.

7.2.1 VISUAL SEPARATION
a.2. Pilot-applied visual separation.
(a) Maintain communication with at least one of the aircraft involved and ensure there is an ability to communicate with the other aircraft.
(b) The pilot sees another aircraft and is instructed to maintain visual separation from the aircraft as follows
(1) Tell the pilot about the other aircraft. Include position, direction, type, and, unless it is obvious, the other aircraft's intention.
(2) Obtain acknowledgment from the pilot that the other aircraft is in sight.
(3) Instruct the pilot to maintain visual separation from that aircraft.

The area is extraordinarily sensitive to noise complaints. I muffed a landing at KVKX just a few miles away after the takeoff curfew and someone called the cops on me for going around and I got a bit annoyed with them and told them they weren't the air police.
And yes, trying to do EU IFR for everything all the time would create some epic traffic jams.
* IMHO they need the dedicated helicopter controller on at ALL times the helicopters are flying and they need to be held for crossing traffic. They also all need ADS-B, no private pilot that wasn't totally skint would be running around with the lack of situational awareness the helos seem to have in an area like that.

Absolutely, and it will be very interesting to see what the NTSB has to say about the "rules" and if the FAA does anything to change those rules. Pilot-applied visual separation is common at airports all over the US, day and night. Frankly, it was only a matter of time before a tragedy occurred, for the reasons you mentioned.

and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra .

Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance.

I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this .