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| Easy Street
February 02, 2025, 10:30:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819666 |
Apply EASA aviation standards and the US network would grind to halt or create huge gaps in service ... Our economy would suffer greatly and passengers revolt at what would required.
... The politics of DCA are going to drive a band-aid fix is my prediction. Visual separation won\x92t go away. FAA will get crucified over manning. DCA may lose some significant service, if we closed 33 permanently. [I think of the Austin investigation, which did not even mention, let alone question the practice of issuing runway clearances to multiple aircraft at the same time, which IMHO is the root cause of most of the recent near misses.] Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd February 2025 at 10:50 . Subjects
ATC
Close Calls
DCA
FAA
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Easy Street
February 02, 2025, 11:55:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819724 |
I earnestly (perhaps naively) hope that the NTSB has and continues to have the corporate competence and the corporate integrity to investigate the circumstances of this tragedy, comprehensively, and to make frank and fearless findings and recommendations based on the objective facts and objective risks.
Regrettably, I suspect we will see the NTSB take the same approach to the question of visual separation at night. It can't so much as mention the resulting risks without putting the FAA (and as you rightly infer, politicians) in the position of having to admit that safety is not always king. On the evidence of Austin, they won't do that. Last edited by Easy Street; 2nd February 2025 at 13:05 . Subjects
FAA
Findings
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| island_airphoto
February 02, 2025, 13:57:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819813 |
and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra . Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance. I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this . 1.The bat-s### crazy way they run helicopters around DCA. 2. The usual practice of visual approaches and spacing in good weather. It has been that way for as long as I have been flying and I am having a hard time even visualizing all IFR spacing to the pavement on a clear day. Maybe asking an American about this is like asking a fish if water is wet? The OTHER unrelated (?) issue of sorting out ground traffic. I was one on the same trip cleared to take off with an aircraft on short final and then cleared to land with an airplane just pulling out onto the active. To make that one better, I knew the person flying that plane and couldn't resist being snarky: "Ah XYZ tower, we'll be going around, Bob says not to wreck his airplane by landing on it". Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
IFR
Land and Hold Short
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| galaxy flyer
February 02, 2025, 14:29:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819828 |
Mere SLF here - I work in risk management (in a different industry) and so have an interest here, along with a lifelong interest in aviation - fully ready to be modded if I'm talking out of turn!
I accept the point regarding the likely economic impact. However I think its worth making the point that in the context of that '16 years without a fatality' record. there have been a number of potentially serious near-misses on the ground (JBU at BOS, AAL/DAL at JFK, SWA/FDX at AUS, etc etc) that are indicative of a system operating beyond its capacity and implementing procedures that are deemed to be of an acceptable risk profile in order to stretch that capacity. It was fortunate that those previous incidents were narrowly avoided. Wednesday night was where that luck, sadly, ran out. Subjects
DCA
FAA
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| NIBEX2A
February 02, 2025, 15:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11819865 |
Once again, looking at the safety reports below. How many of these may have been caused by the helicopter having the wrong aircraft in sight when applying visual separation?
Safety reports, if assessed and promulgated correctly, act as another line of defence. They identify any deficiencies in procedures which may have been overlooked (or underestimated) in the original procedure safety assessment. Hopefully the crash investigation will delve into these aspects to identify what action was taken on receipt of the reports below by the respective organisations. I found it chilling to read how many factors associated with this accident had repeatedly occurred and been reported over the previous 20+ years. I’ve condensed the reports [see spoiler- mods] and highlighted in bold many of these deficiencies, identified by pilots. Common Themes
Spoiler
Last edited by Saab Dastard; 2nd February 2025 at 17:15 . Reason: Make it legible Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
Circle to Land (Deviate to RWY 33)
DCA
FAA
Frequency 119.1
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
TCAS RA
Visual Separation
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| makobob
February 02, 2025, 19:39:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820037 |
DCA Mishap
Hello fellow flyers, I am a 65 y/o retired pilot. I served 20 years in the Navy flying P-3C and trainers then served another 20 years flying for Southwest Airlines, nine of those years as Captain. Also, I am a graduate of the Naval Post Graduate Aviation Safety School with extensive hands on experience in military mishap investigation.
I have mostly enjoyed my latest years of not sitting at the front end of a jet. During my 40 years of flying people, I never really felt the stresses of being responsible for the well being of so many. Now that I spend most of my days on my boat fishing or growing tomatoes in my garden, life's pressures are minimal. This has opened my eyes to the gravity of the enormous responsibility I held on my shoulders, for the safety and well being of so many. I have always had the mindset not to "arm-chair" quarterback any aviation mishap, regardless of how tempting it may be. But the aviation mishap that occurred at DCA on the evening of Wednesday, January 29 has compelled me to speak out. Was it preventable? Sadly, It was entirely preventable. How did it happen you may ask. After all both aircraft were clearly operating normally up until impact. First lets clear up one detail both the President and our news media has consistently made error. Elevation refers to the height above sea level of the ground. These two aircraft were flying altitudes, not elevations. Aircraft fly altitudes and above 18,000 feet they are called flight levels. Example, flight level 180 is 18,000 feet. The ill-fated regional jet was at approximately 325 feet when it was impacted by the Army UH-60 helicopter. I have flown into Washington National since the first days Southwest began operations at DCA. I was already a Captain at this point, and I can tell you this airport is one of the most technically challenging of any I have flown. However, that is not why this disaster happened. I would be very surprised if the RJ black box revealed either of the two young PSA pilots were aware up until the moment of impact. Why you may ask? Because when you are flying a jet on short final, at 325 feet, you are focused on the flare and touch-down point on the runway. Perhaps the young First Officer may have seen the UH-60 just with enough warning to make a call-out, just prior to impact. From the angle of impact, very unlikely the more seasoned Captain would have even been able to see anything at all. If the First Officer was making the landing, it is most certain that neither of them saw it coming and there was nothing said on the microphone. I have no doubt, the pilots on the regional jet will be completely vindicated. In any aviation mishap, there is a chain of events that lead up to the accident. If any one of the links in the chain are broken, the accident will not happen. In this case, there are two remaining main causal factors. DCA control tower: Tower controller made a fatal error in communicating with the Army UH-60. Time was clearly critical and was wasted by asking the H-60 if they had jet traffic in site. Clearly, they did not. What should have been said in a very assertive voice, "PAT25 (UH-60's callsign), IMMEDIATE TURN TO XXX HEADING, CLIMB AND MAINTAIN XXX ALTITUDE TO AVOID COLLISION. Tower was no help at all. First they cleared the RJ for a last minute change to 33, and then failed to ensure their approach corridor was clear of traffic. In my view, the tower controller could have easily prevented this fatal collision. Army UH-60 crew: In military aviation training, we have always have preached the importance for pilots to maintain situational awareness. That philosophy by the way is also a cornerstone to commercial aviation safety. Were the pilots tuned up to tower when the controller gave the RJ clearance to land runway 33? Had they been aware the commuter jet was going to track over the ground through their intended flight direction, something should have been said. Request vector, due to traffic! One H-60 pilot responded, yes we have traffic in site, we will maintain VFR (visual flight rules) which means "see and avoid" yes even at night. Clearly he was looking at the wrong traffic which by the way is a very common occurrence, especially at night. No doubt the Army crew was engaged in training, which may have been a distractor to situational awareness. In the end, the chain of events were allowed to happen as did this horrible accident that took the lives of sixty-seven beautiful souls. The President is totally correct in that we need to hire pilots and air-traffic controllers based on merit and experience, nothing else! I have witnessed first hand, the failed attempts to ensure diversity while training pilots, at the expense of safety. That practice, both military and commercial aviation, needs to stop! The current administration has their hands full but I have complete confidence they will make significant headway. Clearly we need to train and educate more air traffic controllers! The shortage and perhaps poor training standards are likely the primary cause of this mishap. I have no doubt our new Transportation Secretary is on it with both feet running. We need to maintain pilot standards also. The pilot shortage resulted in the FAA reducing the flight hours required to be hired to fly commercially. Why didn't they allow experienced pilots age 65-67 to work? In this country, we have effectively dumbed down just about everything, in the name of getting everyone through. Just like on the operating table, you want the most experienced individuals in the most demanding jobs! Last edited by T28B; 3rd February 2025 at 02:17 . Reason: formatting and paragraph breaks Subjects
ATC
DCA
FAA
PAT25
President Donald Trump
See and Avoid
Situational Awareness
VFR
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| Peristatos
February 02, 2025, 19:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820039 |
What is US Congress' role in the DCA chaos?
Since 1966, DCA has operated under a federally mandated **"perimeter rule"** (enacted by Congress) that limits most nonstop flights to destinations within 1,250 miles of the airport. This was designed to reduce congestion and prioritize short-haul travel.
- Congress has repeatedly **modified exemptions** to this rule, allowing select long-haul flights (e.g., to Los Angeles, Seattle) through legislation, often driven by lobbying from airlines and lawmakers seeking direct routes to their districts. Congress has the power to **mandate changes to flight caps** at DCA. For example: - In 2023, lawmakers proposed adding 28 more daily flights despite FAA warnings about safety risks. - The 2024 FAA reauthorization bill included provisions to add 10 new round-trip flights, overriding objections from aviation experts. - These decisions are often politically motivated, as DCA\x92s proximity to Capitol Hill makes it a convenient travel hub for lawmakers. Congress *does* decide flight allocations at DCA through statutory mandates and political pressure, often sidelining technical safety guidance. This dynamic underscores a broader issue: when lawmakers act as both regulators and users of a system, public safety can become secondary to political expediency. Subjects
DCA
FAA
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| patrickal
February 02, 2025, 23:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820185 |
Regarding the collision of American Eagle JIA342 and Army Blackhawk PAT25, I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of both the FAA and the United States Army Aviation Branch. If the NTSB in any way blame the pilots in the incident, they are not doing their job. Let’s look at all of the holes in this swiss cheese:
1. In an effort to maximize commercial air traffic in and out of DCA, the FAA has created the “deviate to RWY 33 procedure” for air traffic in-bound to RWY 01. This requires a right-hand turn from the RWY 01 approach followed by an immediate hard left-hand turn to line up on RWY 33. FAA criteria for a stabilized approach states that you have to be stable at 500 feet AGL on final in VMC or perform an immediate go-around. But on this particular approach, you will be at or below 400 feet AGL as you come out of the left turn to final. So the FAA has granted an exception to the “stabilized requirements” at DCA to allow for this maneuver. This allows ATC to shorten the distance between arriving and departing aircraft that are utilizing conflicting RWYs. The FAA in essence violates its own safety standards on stabilized approaches for the sake of expediency. 2. The FAA creates the Route 1/4 helicopter route through the DCA airspace as a VFR route with constantly changing altitude requirements. The lowest limit is at 200 ft MSL through the area east of DCA. Any pilot will tell you that flying that low over water at night is a best a tense experience. Try not to break that limit flying at night while also trying to communicate with ATC and simultaneously searching for possible conflicting aircraft. 3. The United States Army Aviation Branch deems it acceptable to allow training missions for Army Reserve pilots with limited flying experience to fly these helicopter routes through this complex and extremely active airspace. Compounding this, training flights at night using night-vision goggles are deemed “safe” in spite of the fact that using said goggles severely limits peripheral vision and makes it difficult if not impossible to perceive any color other than green and white. Picking out particular lights against the background of urban lighting is challenging, as is depth perception. Scanning key cockpit instruments is also made more difficult, making it challenging to accurately maintain altitude. Add to that workload the need to be in constant communication with ATC as well as monitoring all other comms traffic not directed to you but necessary in order to maintain good situational awareness. Given the density of commercial air traffic on this route, common sense would dictate that this route be flown by only the most experienced pilots and only when absolutely necessary. Reasonable logic would understand that conducting training missions should not be using final approach areas with heavy commercial traffic. 4. The Army crew on PAT25 are flying a mission they have been ordered to fly, at night and using night vision goggles. Although they may feel it is difficult and may be anxious about it, their command structure has determined that it is an appropriate training procedure and as such must meet minimum safety requirements. They do not have the authority to question the mission or the orders to fly it. 5. JIA342 is on approach for RWY 01, but is asked at the last minute by ATC to deviate to RWY 33, requiring the “circle to land” maneuver. Therefore, they are now on approach different from what they briefed for. 6. Any aircraft following the “circle to land” approach to RWY 33 will most likely have both pilots focused on RWY 33 as they come out of the left turn to final, especially if it was a last-minute request by ATC. In this case they will be looking to make sure that AA1630, which has just been given clearance to depart from RWY 01, is clear of the intersection with RWY 33 as they complete their final approach, and be ready for a go-around if it is not. In addition, this left bank makes it extremely difficult for the first officer to see any conflicting traffic coming towards them from the 1 to 2 o’clock position, as that traffic will probably be below the right window level. For the pilot, who is on the left side of the cockpit, visibility of such conflicting traffic will be nearly impossible. 7. For whatever reason, ATC is working with “split frequencies while controlling this airspace, so that although the controller hears both the aircraft on approach and the helo traffic south-bound on “Route 1”, the pilots of those respective aircraft only hear information directed at them. Thus they are not aware of all that is going on around them, and as such their situational awareness is limited by factors outside of their control. 8. ATC informs PAT25 of the conflicting aircraft on approach for RWY 33 at 1200 feet MSL, but at the time, PAT25 is heading almost due east towards the Jefferson Memorial on Helo Route 4 while JIA342 (the CRJ) is executing its right turn departing from the RWY 01 approach and is now heading in a northeast direction as it prepares to make a hard left onto the RWY 33 short final approach. From their respective positions, PAT25 in all likelihood sees the landing lights of AA3130 which is trailing JIA342 and whose landing lights are pointed almost directly in his direction, and mistakenly identifies it as the aircraft approaching RWY 33. At no time does it appear that ATC notifies JIA342 of the conflicting helo traffic. They are most likely focused on their approach to RWY 33, which was just handed to them. 9. As JIA342 rolls out of its left hand turn to final on RWY 33, completing the deviation they were just handed and had not briefed for, it is now approaching the 9-11 o’clock position of PAT25. Since the pilot of PAT25 is on the right-hand side of the Blackhawk, visibility of the CRJ may be limited. Both pilots of PAT25 are now most likely visibly fixated on passing to the rear of AA3130, which is in their 1-3 O’clock position, and which is the conflicting aircraft they perceive as the one ATC initially warned them about. 10. ATC, now receiving a conflicting aircraft warning, asks PAT25 if they have JIA342 in sight. In the absence of any obvious difference from the first mid-identification of the conflicting traffic, confirmation bias raises its ugly head. The voice response from the training pilot is calm and confident in stating that they do have it in sight and claim visual separation, probably proving once again that he mistakenly has AA3130 in sight slightly to his right directly in front of him and more than a mile away. Both pilots are totally unaware of JIA342 which is now arriving in front of them from their left. 11. The collision occurs. In my humble opinion, the crews of both aircraft involved were set up by both the FAA and the Army Department of Aviation through a series of poorly based decisions which focused on expediency and departed from any appropriate utilization of a rational use of risk assessment. Consider the following: 1. Approval of the circling to RWY 33 maneuver which violates normal stabilized approach standards. 2. The establishment of a series of complex VFR helicopter track complex and heavily restricted air space as well as through final approach paths. 3. A 200 foot maximum altitude requirement over water and required even at night, which may result in a less than 200 foot vertical separation between aircraft on approach to RWY 33 and those traveling on Helo Route 1/4. 4. The decision to conduct military training missions in this complex and busy airspace with an abundance of commercial passenger traffic either arriving to or departing from DCA. 5. The use of split frequencies by the FAA which negatively impacts the situational awareness of all of the pilots in the airspace. 6. The use of night vision goggles to place even more limitations on the pilots. Granted, all pilots involved may not have had the thousands of hours senior commercial and military pilot possess. But even the most senior individuals when placed in the task saturated environments these two crews faced would have at the very least felt their “pucker factor” increase through this. And there is probably an equal chance that the lack of common sense and appropriate safety design exhibited by the controlling entities would have resulted in a similar outcome. The odds were significantly stacked against these two flight crews, and unfortunately, against the passengers and flight attendants as well. If ever there were an example of an accident waiting to happen, this is it. Subjects
ATC
Accident Waiting to Happen
Blackhawk (H-60)
CRJ
DCA
FAA
NTSB
PAT25
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Situational Awareness
VFR
Vertical Separation
Visual Separation
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| aox
February 02, 2025, 23:20:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820191 |
In the end, the chain of events were allowed to happen as did this horrible accident that took the lives of sixty-seven beautiful souls. The President is totally correct in that we need to hire pilots and air-traffic controllers based on merit and experience, nothing else!
"The helicopter was going straight at the airplane for an extended period of time. It is a CLEAR NIGHT, the lights on the plane were blazing, why didn\x92t the helicopter go up or down, or turn," As for recruitment of new people, decode this and following remarks As part of the hiring freeze, no federal civilian position that was vacant at noon on January 20 would be filled, and no new positions would be created unless required by law or under the president's orders. Trump's order does not apply to military personnel or positions related to immigration enforcement, national security, or public safety. It is unclear whether the freeze prevents the FAA from hiring new air traffic controllers or if these roles fall under public safety professionals. https://www.newsweek.com/donald-trum...-crash-2023348 Other articles say that air traffic controllers were amongst FAA staff who received offers to resign with 8 months pay Subsequently there may have been some later official sourced remarks that they are not eligible for the offer, but not necessarily also clarification whether they have been told this https://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory/air-traffic-controllers-initially-offered-buyouts-told-leaving-118330627 Last edited by aox; 2nd February 2025 at 23:40 . Subjects
FAA
President Donald Trump
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| vegassun
February 03, 2025, 01:06:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820211 |
and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra . Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance. I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this . The \x93single point of failure\x94 thing has been around forever. Reminds me of when ATC decided it was OK to start using land and hold short procedures at major air carrier airports. My airline immediately put out ALL CAPS memo that we were not to accept LAHSO clearance under any circumstances. It wasn\x92t long after that I was operating into BOS landing 27, when controller says \x93______ 123 you are cleared to land 27, ________ XYZ will be landing 22L and holding short of your runway.\x94 I politely said we can\x92t accept that clearance. Controller got PO\x92ed a bit and wanted to debate it, but in the end he removed the LAHSO clearance from the other aircraft/cancelled our landing clearance/told us to continue then subsequently cleared us to land after the other aircraft landed. The gist of all that is that ATC was miffed because everybody else was going along with their questionable tactics until I came along. In my mind it was clear: technically we would not have been accepting a land and hold short clearance, but we would all be cemetery dead if the other guy screwed up. We would be \x93dead right.\x94 Over the course of the next few weeks/months I queried every check airman/chief pilot I came across and got differing opinions from nearly every one. The majority of them leaned towards the \x93 it\x92s ok you are not landing/holding short,\x94 idea. When I would point out the \x93dead right\x94 concept they would just look at me like I was speaking Mandarin Chinese. It seems like most pilots (myself included) have a can do attitude and are willing to help ATC out whenever they can so long as it\x92s \x93legal.\x94 There was an old captain I flew with years ago that said \x93We get paid the big bucks to say no.\x94 Subjects
ATC
FAA
IFR
Land and Hold Short
NTSB
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| visibility3miles
February 03, 2025, 12:44:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820506 |
https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...ues-point-dei/
Plane extraction from Potomac River set to begin on Monday…
Crews are set to begin lifting a catastrophically damaged American Airlines regional jet from the bottom of the Potomac River in Washington on Monday, five days after the plane and an Army helicopter collided in a fiery crash that left no survivors . What’s left of the plane will be carefully brought to the surface with the help of Navy salvage experts and specialized dive teams who have been rehearsing the effort, according to Col. Francis Pera, the Baltimore district commander for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is helping oversee the work. The Army Corps said the process could take three days to complete. The aircraft will be hoisted out of the water with a crane and onto a barge, then covered by a large tent, providing “full discretion” for human remains that may still be on board, Pera said.
Work to pull out wreckage of the Black Hawk helicopter would follow, with completion of “large lifts” expected around Feb. 8, according to an estimated timeline. Crews will then work to clear other large crash-related debris elsewhere in the river, with a goal of “demobilizing” the salvage equipment authorities have rushed to the site by Feb. 12, according to the Army Corps.
The FAA also
said Sunday
that a system for sending safety alerts to pilots was operational after an outage that began Saturday evening. The FAA said a backup plan was in place while the alert system, known as NOTAM, was temporarily out. It is investigating the cause of the outage.
Last edited by visibility3miles; 3rd February 2025 at 13:00 . Reason: Adding quote about NOTAM Subjects
Blackhawk (H-60)
DCA
FAA
NTSB
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| ATC Watcher
February 03, 2025, 15:42:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820640 |
the controller does not have enough information to use a heading
flight recorder show the collision occurred at an altitude of about 325 feet, plus or minus 25 feet.
(*) I mean control input to maintain visual separation . not last second collision avoidance maneuver. Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| West Coast
February 03, 2025, 16:26:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820681 |
Not 100% sure about the US FAA situation where everything seems to be possible , at least in DC, but in ICAO land Tower controllers cannot give headings,
Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
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| island_airphoto
February 03, 2025, 16:32:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820688 |
Not 100% sure about the US FAA situation where everything seems to be possible , at least in DC, but in ICAO land Tower controllers cannot give headings, while they might have a copy of the Approach radar picture on a TV monitor somewhere , it is to verify actual positions not to issue vectors.. In addition some TWR controllers are just TWR rated, not Approach radar rated.
25 ft is the accuracy of mode S, transmit data so let's take 300 ft , Heli was apparently 100 ft higher than its altitude restriction , doing a separation maneuver ? (*) question to my US friends , : when delegating separation VFR to an aircraft does that automatically cancels its previous altitude restrictions ? (*) I mean control input to maintain visual separation . not last second collision avoidance maneuver. Subjects
ATC
FAA
ICAO
Radar
Separation (ALL)
VFR
Visual Separation
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| JohnDixson
February 03, 2025, 19:05:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820804 |
From the FAA website:\x93When Radar Came to Town
On January 7, 1952, after five years of testing and modifications to a radar system used by the Army and Navy in World War II, the Civil Aeronautics Administration inaugurated radar departure control procedures at its Washington National Airport. Six months later it began radar approach control procedures at the airport.\x94 How do we connect the dots from 1952 to the tragedy described in this thread? 72 years later we have devolved to visual separation. Subjects
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| Suzeman
February 03, 2025, 19:31:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820823 |
There have been a couple of posts up thread about 15/33 and 04/22 being temporarily closed after this tragic accident - until 9th Feb IIRC. No one seems to have commented on this. So a couple of questions.
Has the FAA or MWAA given any official reason for these closures? As 01/19 is currently the only runway available at DCA, has there been any reduction in flow, and if so, has this caused any increased delays, or forced airlines to cancel services? Subjects
DCA
FAA
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| island_airphoto
February 03, 2025, 19:38:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820830 |
There have been a couple of posts up thread about 15/33 and 04/22 being temporarily closed after this tragic accident - until 9th Feb IIRC. No one seems to have commented on this. So a couple of questions.
Has the FAA or MWAA given any official reason for these closures? As 01/19 is currently the only runway available at DCA, has there been any reduction in flow, and if so, has this caused any increased delays, or forced airlines to cancel services? Subjects
DCA
FAA
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| radlettrejoin
February 03, 2025, 19:41:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820835 |
There have been a couple of posts up thread about 15/33 and 04/22 being temporarily closed after this tragic accident - until 9th Feb IIRC. No one seems to have commented on this. So a couple of questions.
Has the FAA or MWAA given any official reason for these closures? As 01/19 is currently the only runway available at DCA, has there been any reduction in flow, and if so, has this caused any increased delays, or forced airlines to cancel services? Updated Monday, February 3, at 1 p.m. All airport roads and terminals are open, and concessions are operating their published hours. Runways 15-33 and 4-22 are expected to remain closed for the duration of the salvage operation. All flights will operate on the airport's main Runway 1-19. While airfield capacity is reduced, airline schedules may be impacted. Passengers are encouraged to check directly with their airline to confirm the status of their flight. Subjects
DCA
FAA
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| ATC Watcher
February 03, 2025, 20:19:00 GMT permalink Post: 11820865 |
From the FAA website:“When Radar Came to Town
On January 7, 1952, after five years of testing and modifications to a radar system used by the Army and Navy in World War II, the Civil Aeronautics Administration inaugurated radar departure control procedures at its Washington National Airport. Six months later it began radar approach control procedures at the airport.” How do we connect the dots from 1952 to the tragedy described in this thread? 72 years later we have devolved to visual separation. But remember , here the APP radar controllers with the proper ratings and radar tools ( including Conflict alerts) are not in the TWR cab in DC, , they are located in Potomac TRACON , another town , in Warrenton , Virginia , .
Jumseater
A UK Tower/LC can’t give headings unless they are radar qualified and current, and have the appropriate equipment. Last edited by ATC Watcher; 3rd February 2025 at 20:24 . Reason: adding comment to jumpseater post Subjects
FAA
Radar
Separation (ALL)
Visual Separation
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| triadic
February 05, 2025, 07:14:00 GMT permalink Post: 11821938 |
I suggest it is now the time for the FAA to review the PROCEDURES that allowed this collision to occur.
As a previous poster has said, they are using third world procedures at what is a very busy and high-density traffic area. I doubt if this collision would have occurred in many other countries as positive separation and/or significant restrictions are provided to ALL aircraft, be they IFR or VFR, and certainly not at night. I suspect however that the DoD would not be too happy with not being able to operate VFR. Whatever the outcome, an independent risk analysis would need to tick all the boxes and the procedures changed to match. Subjects
FAA
IFR
Separation (ALL)
VFR
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