Posts about: "FAA" [Posts: 266 Page: 4 of 14]¶

They do not have to cancel the helicopters routes altogether, just not design one that crosses below the short final to a runway or cancel delegation of separation between VFR and IFR in class B airspace. Relatively simple.

I didn’t deny there’s problems with the safety mgt, just stating the facts as I’ve seen them. Before retiring last year, I was working on an SMS for a corporate flight dept including FOQA. GE Digital has quarterly reviews for those on the contract. One the most interesting displays was ALL TCAS RAs world-wide using their data and FAA ASIAS data. Just a “heat map” of dots—at a guess, 90% of the world’s TCAS events are in the US. Add up military, GA, and airline flights, half of all daily flights in the world are in US, probably half of all mid-airs, too.

Again, not excusing things, not saying it can’t improve, but the size of the problem is huge. Ultimately, the solution is less aviation. I’ve flown all over the world, nowhere has the traffic the US has. ATL, for example has a mix of traffic unheard of in Europe. I’ve been in the bizjets, airliners, I’ve seen jet fighters parked there and a Piper Cherokee on the GA ramp. Same in LAX, DFW, LGA, BOS. We do not expect the restrictions on aviation acceptable elsewhere and we have plenty of it.

Our GA safety record is pretty awful, but at glance it’s probably 75% of the world’s total GA flying. It’s also no accident to see FAA-registered GA planes in the EU. Guess why?

IFR separation is not appropriate for VFR traffic. Class B airspace has specific rules for separation of VFR/VFR and VFR/IFR aircraft. The helicopter routes do not appear designed to provide the required separation for VFR helicopters, at least where Route 4 and RWY 33 final approach cross each other. Was the design at fault OR was the daily application at fault? If the design was at fault, it\x92s an FAA DOD problem. I find it hard to believe the FAA didn\x92t address the correct separation distances in the design phase\x97it\x92s pretty clear. The FAA may have planned crossing traffic wouldn\x92t happen or there\x92s a FAA LOA defining how crossing traffic would be controlled, but the FAA didn\x92t say \x93okay, let\x92s go with 150\x92 vertically\x94.

Did the FAA or the Army assume they would always be able to apply visual (NOT VFR) separation. Visual separation does not necessarily mean 500\x92 vertically and 1.5 nm or radar target separation; it means \x93I see you, I miss you\x94. Did the operating plan always direct crews to use visual separation as the default plan? I hope not, but it is only I see it being written.

The guiding document in the US is the controller handbook, FAA order 7110.65AA. There, it is clear that visual separation is an approved form of separation in Class B airspace. Not defending the application of it specific to this crash, just pointing it out so the discussion revolves around existing FAA separation standards and not what folks in the thread wish it to be, believe it to be or what it is in their country.

To be specific, para 7.9.4b of the handbook, here:
https://www.faa.gov/documentLibrary/...5-24_READY.pdf

As mentioned upthread, if not visually separated then either 500ft or 1.5mi applies.

Correct if this is all wrong, but in the accident sequence if the helo had responded ‘not visual yet, looking’ or words to that effect, then presumably a controller could allow the two to get a bit closer and then advise the conflicting traffic info to the helo again, say at 2.5mi. If helo visual, great —maintain visual separation, responsibly passes to helo.

This is what happened, although the very busy controller failed to re-state the position of the CRJ to direct the eyes of the helo crew onto the CRJ in order that they could actually see and avoid it.

However if not visual at say 2.5mi, well it’s a bit late, but the controller does still retain responsibility for separation and must apply the 500ft/1.5mi standard. Presumably instant vectors away while simultaneously climb to min vectoring altitude. Or the CRJ has to go around. Can of worms in busy airspace— helos and /or jets being dispersed all over the sky.

Much better to do a rules based system and mutually exclude intersecting IFR app/deps and Helo Visual Routes.

Yes. My point is that if visual is deemed not acceptable, the next step appears to be several Nm. If you are telling the controller to keep them clear, they can't be just missed ; they need to actually be properly radar separated.

This is following on from #960-964, discussing what would happen if the PAT flight(s) refused visual separation. It seems like it would throw a spanner in ATC's arrivals and they would probably get a response similar to that Lufthansa A380: Buzz off somewhere else.

Not implying any form of responsibility to anyone, the "book" says that in the case of a visual separation, if the 2 traffics converge, the controller should advise the other pilot. Perhaps the same controller on both frequencies was too busy to do so, and a second controller would have helped.

cf FAA Order JO 7110.65AA 7.2.1.a.2 Pilot-applied visual separation

Yes ,you are right regarding the federal rules book , I would however like to see what the local procedures addendum says````` ,and what were the standard operating best practices being used to train people in DC TWR , Because assuming the Heli position was opened in the TWR , from the R/T exchange, it looks like asking for visual separation was kind of standard , and would in that case the info be passed to the TWR controller who will then advise the aircrfat on final APP , as both were then on different frequencies ? sounds improbable to me . But speculating of course. .
​​​​​​​Absolutely .

I think the collision was closer to 1250m (4100') from the PAPI. I base that upon the NTSB statement " At 8:47:58, the crew had a verbal reaction, and FDR (flight data recorder) data showed the airplane beginning to increase its pitch. Sounds of impact were audible about one second later," That puts the collision at about 8:47:59 (01:47:59Z). ADS-B Exchange data at that time puts the ground distance to the PAPI between 1200-1280m (3900-4200'). My assumptions are that the NTSB statement is correct and that the ADS-B Exchange data is accurate (which in my experience, the times are generally less than 0.2 seconds later than the timestamps on data collected by the FAA, and the reported NACp (position accuracy) was estimated at < 10m). Here is the graphical representation I generated of my estimated collision position vs. PAPI.


Collision Altitude vs PAPI

If my depiction is accurate, it's hard to see why they would pitch up as normal input to approach path. I think their inputs would have been focused on getting down.

My understanding is that the FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig...2-complete.pdf . It specifies that on a fully printed chart the route should be 0.1 inches wide regardless of chart scale. The chart I pulled from was 1:125,000 scale (full chart size is 51x33 inch poster), which would mean the routes "appear" to be 125,000 * 0.1 / 12 = 1,042 ft wide. In the same FAA chart package https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/12-26...-Wash_Heli.pdf , the third page is a "Washington Inset" with a scale of 1:62,500. In that inset the routes "appear" to be 62,500 * 0.1 /12 = 521 ft wide. Also, if you look at the centerlines of the routes depicted on those two pages (which I "drew in" below), they do not exactly match. For example, look at how the full chart shows the route going east of Hains Point while the inset shows it very close to Hains Point.


DCA Helicopter Routes

Given these chart differences, I wonder how far a helicopter can stray from the various depictions of a route before it is considered a pilot deviation? Perhaps the NTSB will give us some insight with their accident report.

"...FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/iac/media/IAC15/IAC-15-22AUG2022-complete.pdf "

I think that the "width" that you are referring is for the chart maker but not the actual width of a helicopter route.

I can't find in any FAA document a definition of the lateral extent of a helicopter route. Is there one?

There are inconsistencies between the "DESCRIPTION OF ROUTES AND ALTITUDES" and the charts themselves. The Merriam-Webster's 11th Collegiate Dictionary definition of "BANK 2 : the rising ground bordering a lake, river, or sea or forming the edge of a cut or hollow."
for example "RT. 4: ... VIA EAST BANK OF POTOMAC RIVER..." while the chart depicts RT. 4 over the POTOMAC RIVER not over the ground bordering the river.
while "RT. 15: ... ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND PATAPSCO RIVER..." and the chart depicts RT. 15 over water.

Hi Bill , understood, I was a bit too harsh maybe, but I get upset to continuously read what the controller should have done. Remember he was trained like this , to follow procedures that were basically unsafe in order to move the traffic . I can say unsafe because they were removed immediately after the accident , not waiting for the NTSB to recommend it . No everyone is stupid in the FAA , they knew this route was in conflict with 33 Visual arrivals. And did not pass any safety case, but the procedure was kept , most probably due political or military pressures , relying on controllers and pilots to mitigate the risks.

Now on the Conflict alert on the BRITE display . I have no first hand info on the SOPs in DCA on how a TWR controller uses the BRITE and if STCA are even displayed . `, but if they are, seen the charts and the routes , I guess STCA alerts are very common .especially when you delegate separation and you then play with a couple of hundred feet, vertical separation Too many unnecessary alerts equals normalization of deviance, . Look at the Haneda preliminary report , same ..

Finally since you mention TCAS RAs , there is a major difference with STCA , it is not the same as a TCAS RA . With an RA , as a pilot you have to react and follow , it is mandatory , for a controller a STCA is just an alert , just like a TCAS TA , if in your judgement it will pass you will not do anything , and if you have already issued a correcting instruction ( heading, level , etc,,) or here delegate visual separation , the STCA just becomes a nuisance. .

I sincerely hope the DC Controller will not be made the scapegoat of this accident . Not so sure it will not.

Concur. Scapegoating stochastically guarantees a repeat incident/accident of the same kind under "rhyming" circumstances.

Rarely does the "bad apple" theory of accident causation survive the scrutiny of a robust, honest investigation.

Long version of Wall Street Journal article about changing DCA airspace use rules, from WSJ website (summary in print edition Feb. 12):
__________

Federal air-safety officials want to permanently keep helicopters away from commercial jets taking off and landing at a busy Washington, D.C., airport after the deadliest U.S. aviation accident in more than two decades.

The move, under consideration by senior Federal Aviation Administration officials, would be part of a long-term plan to improve safety at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, according to people familiar with the discussions.

Helicopters have been temporarily barred from flying in a corridor used by the U.S. Army Black Hawk that collided on Jan. 29 with an American Airlines regional jet, killing 67 people. The chopper routes have been used to ferry senior military officials around the region and to train for a \x93continuity of government\x94 mission in the event American political leaders need rapid evacuation from Washington. Other government agencies have also used the routes.

Federal officials have said they would revisit the helicopter restrictions once the National Transportation Safety Board issues a preliminary report on the accident in the coming weeks. Preliminary indications from the probe point to multiple factors potentially contributing to the crash, including the design of the airspace, as well as actions by the helicopter pilot and air-traffic controller, according to people familiar with the investigation.

The NTSB said it would examine how far apart planes and helicopters are supposed to be while flying in the airspace.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy has criticized the Pentagon\x92s operation of helicopters near the airport. \x93If we have generals who are flying in helicopters for convenience through this airspace, that\x92s unacceptable,\x94 he said last week. \x93Get in a damn Suburban and drive. You don\x92t need to take a helicopter.\x94

The Army said it would continue to comply with FAA requirements and restrictions to enhance flight safety. The service said it was reassessing its aircraft operations near the airport and that it gave priority to the safety of the public and military personnel. The current restrictions allow certain critical flights.

Duffy also suggested certain military missions can be done at a different time of night. The Jan. 29 crash occurred around 9 p.m. Eastern time.

Defense officials have assumed that the helicopter routes would be closed in the coming months amid several ongoing investigations, but have privately said that the routes should be reopened. Adjustments under consideration if routes are reopened include limiting hours for training and test missions.

Reagan\x92s convenient location, a few miles from Capitol Hill, has made the nearly 84-year-old airport a favorite among politicians, business executives and tourists.

Space is tight at the airport. Reagan\x92s longest runway, Runway 1, is the nation\x92s busiest, airport officials have said, and it has two smaller runways. Routes into and out of the airport are constrained by no-fly zones around sensitive government buildings.

The FAA has said it is also reviewing airspace around airports aside from Reagan that also have high volumes of helicopter and airplane traffic.

Discussions about Reagan airport have also focused on a small runway known as Runway 33, people familiar with the matter said. The American Airlines regional jet was attempting to land there when it collided with the Army helicopter. Some government and industry aviation officials believe that there isn\x92t a problem with planes using the runway if helicopters aren\x92t near the traffic lanes.

Warning signs existed for years about risks facing commercial passengers, with planes sharing the skies closely with helicopters zipping up and down the Potomac River.

The path the American Airlines regional jet took toward Runway 33 required it to turn toward the right and then bank left to line up for its landing. That route crosses over a lane for helicopters at a relatively low altitude.

There have been at least 35 events involving conflicts between helicopters and flights into and out of the airport that have been flagged since the 1980s, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis of anonymous reports to a system overseen by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

In one instance, in July 2018, a helicopter and small plane came within roughly 580 feet of each other while the plane was approaching Runway 33. The helicopter pilot had to maneuver to avoid the plane and questioned the air-traffic controller about it after, according to an internal FAA report on the incident viewed by the Journal.

Neither aircraft had received traffic advisories or safety alerts, the report said. The helicopter pilot reported the incident as a near midair collision. \x93I\x92m sorry for the confusion,\x94 the controller told the helicopter pilot, according to an audio recording of air-traffic-control communications following the incident.

Nearly two weeks after the deadly crash over the Potomac, the FAA has lifted some of the constraints put on Reagan airport in the wake of the accident.

The FAA on Tuesday boosted the airport\x92s arrival rate from 26 to 28 aircraft an hour, after temporarily reducing it to ease the strain on controllers still dealing with the aftermath of the crash, according to an email viewed by the Journal and earlier reported by other news outlets. The current rate is still lower than the airport\x92s typical maximum of 32 arrivals an hour.

Reagan\x92s two smaller runways, which had been closed due to search and recovery efforts, have been reopened.
________

I just can\x92t help compare the general situation to London, where it\x92s again very busy airspace, and the helicopter routes generally follow the river. You have Heathrow at western end and London City at the eastern end.

ATC do a fantastic job of managing the flow, basically by issuing helicopter traffic clearance limits based on the VRPs - usually based on Thames bridges. The Eastbound clearance limit is usually the Isle of Dogs\x85. Before London City Tower take over to manage traffic closer to the airport. At the Western end the heli routes go nowhere near the LHR approaches due or traffic density.

ATC will not in my experience clear any helicopter traffic to visually proceed behind airline traffic based on the helicopters visual perception. Day or night. They do a great job of keeping both airline and rotary traffic advised about each other, and prioritise air ambulance and police helicopters as required. But, they keep control over the overall traffic flow and it works.

I just fail to see why the FAA couldn\x92t employ a similar system, where helicopter traffic is issued a clearance limit - pending a gap in traffic - either a natural one or an ATC created gap. Before being cleared to continue.

I have also been in the situation having started engines at London City and police helicopter then was tasked to something going on off the departure end of the runway. All departures and arrivals suspend. Indefinite delays. It\x92s part of the bigger picture. CAVOK day but no possibility of visual separation. So the London system gives priority to helicopters where appropriate. But seems infinitely safer for both airline and helicopter traffic.

Today's briefer said: "On this chart, you'll see the routes they were generally following Helicopter Route 1 to Helicopter Route 4. These routes are designated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), and - although you see blue lines - there are no defined boundaries to these routes."

From the Baltimore-Washington Helicopter Route Chart:

"RT. 4: FORT WASHINGTON OVER POTOMAC RIVER TO WILSON BRIDGE. THEN VIA EAST BANK
OF POTOMAC RIVER TO ANACOSTIA RIVER. INTERCEPT ROUTE 1 AT ANACOSTIA RIVER.

ALTITUDES: AT OR BELOW 1000 FEET MSL AT FORT WASHINGTON, DESCEND TO 600 FEET
MSL ABEAM BROAD CREEK INLET, BEGIN DESCENT FROM 600 FEET MSL TO
ARRIVE AT 300 FEET MSL OVER WILSON BRIDGE, THEN AT OR BELOW 200 FEET MSL NORTH
OF WILSON BRIDGE.

It would seem to me that "OVER POTOMAC RIVER" and "VIA EAST BANK OF POTOMAC RIVER" would indicate some sort of "boundary."

I think that this Helicopter Route Chart is poorly done and would like to know how the FAA designates helicopter routes and who designs these charts.

In my opinion the New York Special Flight Rules Area charting and text On the New York Terminal Area Chart is done much better.

I hadn't intended to go all the way along the causal chain in my post. But since you ask, I think your answer only goes one step further. There are more steps to take.

Helicopters in busy airspace are not a problem if a safe system exists for separating them from airline traffic.

There is no evidence yet of the controller having made a mistake. He was undoubtedly busy, but that was not his fault. What could be done about it? The answers to that question take us another step along the causal chain:

1. The FAA could have provided more controllers. We know the helicopter controller position was unoccupied, and it's likely that closer monitoring and earlier intervention could have changed the outcome (notwithstanding point 3).
2. Controller workload could have been reduced by implementing effective procedural separation . If the DCA ATC rulebook allowed this segment of Route 4 to be in simultaneous use with Runway 33 landings, then procedural separation did not exist , however much anyone thought it did. At least 1.5nm or 500ft between flight paths would be needed to meet the least restrictive FAA separation standards, and this would have forced constraints to be applied to Route 4 or Runway 33 utilisation.
3. Regulations allowed the helo pilots to assume responsibility for separation. This is what happened, with the consequences which flow from the inherent difficulty of identifying and separating visually at night (especially while wearing NVG).

The authorities (by which I mean FAA and DoD) have questions to answer on all three points. Why was the helicopter controller position vacant? Did the ATC rulebook or staffing requirements rely on a false assumption that procedural separation existed? How did any such assumption remain in place after previous near misses? Is visual separation between helicopters and airline traffic a reasonable thing for regulations to permit, at night and using NVG? Ultimately it seems to have routinely been used as a release valve for the pressure building in the system due to the failure to address points 1 and 2.

Hopefully the investigation will be bold enough to ask these questions, which expand the potential scope of responsibility well beyond the individual controller and pilots.

I agree that the DC controllers should not be scapegoated. At the same time, the concept of professionalism must be addressed. The concept that professionals in a field must alone (without management, without lawyers, without the public) maintain the best practices of the given professional discipline.

In the US, physicians who work for "Health Maintenance Organizations" are asked to practice medicine, at times, in a "basically unsafe" manner...to keep patients moving. On occasion, such practices will bite a patient (and sometimes the physician). As a whole, HMO physicians do not enjoy the best reputation.

From my perspective, there is practically no difference between the plight of an American air traffic controller and an American HMO physician. Both are expected to "squeeze one more in." Both fields are staffed by above-average capable individuals who thrive on challenges. Both are managed in such a manner that they cannot say "no" and also keep their job. In this regard, at least physicians have job portability.

But the take home point is that one cannot admit to knowing a practice is fundamentally unsafe, yet do it anyway. The public, rightfully, should not accept this. I have no solution except more staff and/or more airports (and not some next-gen whizzbang computer system).

The point is that PAT25 could have been tightly hugging the eastern bank at precisely 200 feet, and yet everyone would still have died if the CRJ had been slightly below its proper approach path (as it might easily have been). Yes, you can say that *this* accident wouldn't have happened if the helo had been at 200 feet, but that gets us precisely nowhere in preventing recurrence.

Systems that rely on human perfection are 100% guaranteed to fail. The only question is how often. The system in place at DCA required helo pilots to assume responsibility for visual (*not vertical*) avoidance of collisions in order to fulfil their ordered missions. Given what we know about human visual performance at night, that would eventually end badly, and sure enough it did. There is a strong element of the pilots having been set up to fail, which is why no-one here is going hard on them.

Altimetry and height keeping would be important matters for investigators if the collision had occurred due to a breakdown in vertical separation, which as a minimum would involve 500 feet (and more often 1000 feet) of planned spacing to account for instrument and height keeping errors. FAA instrument rating standards require pilots to be able to maintain altitude plus or minus 100 feet. This helicopter was being flown VFR at very low height, which means that looking outside takes primacy over monitoring instruments. I'm sure helo pilots could fly along at 175ft plus or minus 25ft if they really tried, but you can be certain they wouldn't be looking out for traffic (as is required when holding responsibility for visual separation).

However, as there was no vertical separation built into this procedure, all of this is at best a distraction. The more important questions are why procedural barriers were not in place to stop the route being used during landings on runway 33, and whether visual separation at night is an adequate barrier to collision when airliners and their human cargo are involved.