Posts about: "FAA" [Posts: 266 Page: 6 of 14]¶

You've misunderstood. I'm not saying that visual separation was appropriate for this situation. I'm merely saying that so far as the FAA is presently concerned, it constitutes ATC-applied separation and is therefore compatible with the requirements of Class B. I posed the question of whether it is appropriate for it to be so freely applicable. FWIW, I am fairly relaxed about it for daytime parallel approaches. Where to draw the line between that and opposite-direction same-height at night?

Where have I suggested that?

WMF # 1207,
"… don't think there's anything to be gained from going down the ICAO route. The NTSB has it's own charter and that's what dictates what happens in the USA."

If so then the NTSB (FAA, USA) attitude raises safety concerns.

From systems theory, all systems (i.e. aviation) will change with time, tending towards greater disorder (increasing entropy), often referred to as complexity.
To date, the industry has managed this change and simultaneously improved the level of safety, and with economic benefit.
A contribution to this is the use of world standards (ICAO, UN charter) enabling, aiding, inter-country operations, and refection on one's own, home standards and assumptions

Independent, fixed attitudes may encounter more safety issues as the overall system changes.
Safety minds, thinking, has to change just to keep up with the changes in aviation - what has been done safely before may not apply today or in the future.

WMF,
… well having searched the usual places and the NTSB, you will have to help with directions and text for reference.

There is a NTSB Charter for data, but nothing which explains the link between ICAO and the USA, and thence to the NTSB and investigation, or the required statement of any USA deviation from the ICAO guidance (Annex 13).
Notwithstanding https://www.ntsb.gov/about/organizat...office_as.aspx
" fulfill U.S. obligations under International Civil Aviation Organization agreements"
"to examine specific aviation safety problems from a broader perspective. "

But back to the thread. Are there any reasons why NTSB might not comment on the wider organisational aspects as indicated in the discussion. Also noting that the NTSB have no powers of enforcement, relying on the FAA; thus if the FAA process were to be identified as deficient, who mandates change.
,,

From what I understand the delegation of separation used in the US is based on the "see and avoid ", It is basically delegating the positive control (ATC separation instructions ) from the controller to the pilot , who has to acquire the traffic visually and maintain visual contact and maneuvers to avoid it . = traffic info from ATC + See and avoid. . I do not think the ICAO forefathers designing the airspace classifications had this in mind when defining class B.
Listening to the NTSB , the only ATC instruction given : to " pass behind " was not received , and therefore not acknowledged by the crew , so we are here 100% in the good old "see and avoid" scenario I would say

There you go. A bit of work with google is never time wasted. I offered an opinion about the extent to which the NTSB might be incentivised to explore issues of the mission of the FAA, and like all opinions, it resides in the domain of politics. That's a possible reason why the NTSB might not choose to go there. However an ex-Inspector General of the Dept of Transportation had strong views on the subject, and I give a lot of weight to her opinion, supported as it is by her personal experiences of dealing with the FAA.

"Visual separation" is different from "see and avoid" in that the controller must confirm that the pilot has the factor traffic in sight before approving visual separation. The controller is only delegating the "avoid" part of the task, not the "see", which must be confirmed before the separation minima are removed. That, at least in my understanding, is how the FAA argues it to be compliant with Class B requirements. It's obviously vulnerable to misidentification of the factor traffic; don't think I'm defending it!

When genuine "see and avoid" applies (Class C VFR/VFR, Class D VFR/Any) the controller does not need to confirm that VFR pilots have visual contact before allowing separation to reduce, because there *are no* separation minima. At least, not according to ICAO.

As I mentioned earlier, European and especially UK ATC tends to apply more stringent separation than ICAO requires. The 'ATC duty of care' argument in the UK results in its Class D being operated in a similar way to US Class B, in my experience.

I'm fairly certain that, because Annex 13 and all else pursuant to the Chicago Convention of 1944 applies to international civil aviation, the statutory as well as practical jurisdiction and responsibility of NTSB are matters dealt with by federal statute and regulations. This is not to say that the Board will or should ignore Annex 13 or declare it irrelevant - but it is to say -
first, the NTSB's authorization and processes are set by federal law and not by Annex 13 (although as the excerpt you quoted also says, Ann. 13 does apply where the case is international civil av.); and
second, the DCA midair is not within international civil aviation (sorry to find it necessary to state the obvious).

I cannot cite anything specific to support it but I'm strongly inclined to think Chair Homendy, at this point in her public service career, will insist on a report and supporting analysis that leaves, if you will, political niceties on the bottom of the Potomac shy of the Rny 3-3 threshold -- where they belong. We will see, time will tell.

Very informative video thanks to Austin Roth.

The chart for route 4 shows a single line above 200 ft indicating its the maximum permissible altitude. Also the wording on the chart is "at or below". IF, as the video suggests, 200 ft was the only recommended altitude then I would expect it to have a line above and below it with the appropriate wording "at" only. Route 6 has a 1500 ft altitude with a line above and below and with "at" only in the wording.

From the FAA chart I believe altitudes below 200 ft are permissable and expected along route 4.

FAA; Do not go above 200 feet.
Army: Do not go below 200 feet.
Flying at 200 feet is the only way not to have one of the two annoyed with you

Even a non-pilot, non-engineer (and worse, an SLF/attorney) is able to understand the difficulties created by relying on visual separation at night, and more specifically, relying on it given the facts of runways in use on the night of the accident (i.e., that the clearance to the helicopter did not make it clear that the traffic advisory was meant to refer to an aircraft "circling" for approach and landing to Runway 33).

Reading this thread since the night of the accident, many have noted the "wrong-thinking" (for lack of a better term) underpinning the way traffic was managed by FAA and ATC.

I'm not enthused about the litigation that almost certainly will be intense once it commences. But reading the thread I've started to wonder.....

What would a chronological reconstruction of each incremental decision by FAA about the operation of DCA look like, a chronology that would (of course) include each Congressional enactment requiring or allowing further intensity of operations? The airport did not go from a nominal operational environment, with typically safe procedures and airspace usage rules very similar to or the same as any other major urban airport in the country, to the situation which obtained on January 29, overnight - or so it would seem.

(Yes, reconstructing the facts to build such a chronology would involve quite a lot of discovery activities in the presumably forthcoming lawsuits, but I'm not veering off into any further comment about why that would matter or which party or parties it would help or hurt..... other than to say, very often, cases are won and lost in discovery.)

Some years ago, on a trip to Capitol Hill hoping to find gainful employment on a Congressional staff somewhere, on the return flight from what then was Washington National, the aircraft's cockpit door was open as the boarding process was being completed (it was 1987). I recall being seated close enough to the flight deck - leaning a little into the aisle (a Midway Airlines DC-9 iirc) - to be able to see the pilot in the LHS and part of the D.C. skyline through the cockpit's front windows. Maybe that is why my mind somehow can't quite comprehend the recollections from kidhood of reading about the midair collision over New York City which is featured prominently in the book Collision Course , together with the events of the night of January 29.

Added: Wall Street Journal, March 6: "Air-Traffic Staff Rules Tightened After Crash." Also reports previous "close call" incident. Highly recommended reading (and I didn't see anything to contradict the above post, WR 6-3).

200 ft per the chart

Without question. With it the helo would never have turned to starboard. Never. Also "No, you cannot leave the tower...." From ATC supervisor
By the time the H60 realized the lights on the CRJ were too high too fast and too bright to be on final for #1, it was a half second too late... does the tail on the helo seem to drop just before impact, ?? Think they wanted to climb?

Congressional perks in this case make me "see" red. All of Congress should be made to Uber from DCA for a full year or until changes are made. By FAA, not by Congress.

...selfish dolts.

They should be required to take an uber to IAD, and all the added flights out of DCA beyond the perimeter should be cancelled.

DCA Perimeter Rule:

The Perimeter Rule is a federal regulation established in 1966 when jet aircraft began operating at Reagan National. The initial Perimeter Rule limited non-stop service to/from Reagan National to 650 statute miles, with some exceptions for previously existing service. By the mid-1980s, Congress had expanded Reagan National non-stop service to 1,250 statute miles ( 49 U.S. Code \xa7 49109 ). Ultimately, Reagan National serves primarily as a "short-haul" airport while Washington Dulles International Airport serves as the region's "long-haul" growth airport.

Congress must propose and approve federal legislation to allow the U.S. Department of Transportation to issue "beyond-perimeter" exemptions which allows an airline to operate non-stop service to cities outside the perimeter. As a result of recent federal exemptions, non-stop service is now offered between Reagan National and the following cities: Austin, Denver, Las Vegas, Los Angeles, Phoenix, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, San Juan, Seattle and Portland, Ore.

My posting history in this thread shows that I agree with you 100% on irrelevance of the altitude discussion. I was simply correcting a false statement which, left unchallenged, was undermining a good point that the Army had issued orders which were incompatible with the FAA's. That's indicative of organisational failings, which are really what this is all about.

As for "do not cross final 33 before CRJ"... that'd still have given too much responsibility to the helo crew, in my opinion. They'd have suffered a crushing breakdown of their mental model as it became clear the lights ahead of them weren't going to land on 33 before they crossed the approach. Would that dawning reality have caused then to widen their search and see the CRJ? Possibly. But I doubt it. Human nature in high pressure situations, like NVG flying over a dark river in a city, is to keep pressing on with a flawed mental model.

"Hold at Hains Point", from a second controller with capacity to keep watch over two converging tracks, was what was needed to save the day here - and to cover up the underlying organisational failings for a while longer.

From NTSB interim report on DCA aircraft / helicopter collision.

"Near Midair Collision Events at DCA
Review of information gathered from voluntary safety reporting programs along with FAA data regarding encounters between helicopters and commercial aircraft near DCA from 2011 through 2024 indicated that a vast majority of the reported events occurred on approach to landing. Initial analysis found that at least one TCAS resolution advisory (RA) was triggered per month due to proximity to a helicopter. In over half of these instances, the helicopter may have been above the route altitude restriction. Two-thirds of the events occurred at night.

A review of commercial operations (instrument flight rules departures or arrivals) at DCA between October 2021 and December 2024 indicated a total of 944,179 operations. During that time, there were 15,214 occurrences between commercial airplanes and helicopters in which there was a lateral separation distance of less than 1 nm and vertical separation of less than 400 ft. There were 85 recorded events that involved a lateral separation less than 1,500 ft and vertical separation less than 200 ft."



What is seen - reported; and what is dismissed … diminishes the value of reporting.
A system broken: a broken safety management system at the national level.

Normalization of deviance?

It won't be the last time I'll think it compulsory to say this about this accident - I'm not trying to provoke the inevitable lawsuits into higher intensity (despite status as simple SLF/attorney).

Almost invariably lawyers as well as law students and professors, when asked to comment about what is taught in law school, recite the truism that "law school teaches you how to think like a lawyer." Problem is, even quite modest experience in and with the realities and pressures of representing clients - i.e., practicing law - dulls the thinking part and intensifies the hustler mentalities, of which there are many variations. I'm noting this because law school actually trains you how to spot the issues. It sometimes is the case that the standard things lawyers think about a given set of issues are not the most relevant and meaningful things.

With that hopefully not grossly pedantic context out of the way..... in previous comments on this thread I've noted that the federal defendants would be expected to assert sovereign immunity.... more technically, that although the Federal Tort Claims Act waives sovereign immunity in general terms, the statute also contains various exceptions - in other words, the exceptions where they apply keep sovereign immunity in place. The exception relevant here is the "discretionary function" exception, which (pardon the attempt at over-simplifying it) keeps the immunity in place if the allegedly negligent act (or omission) resulted from a federal entity's policy decision or choice.

I previously viewed the discretionary function exception is likely imposing a pretty strong barrier against liability of the (probable) federal defendants. However.

However. However, as I write this somewhere in an aviation law practice a mid-level or even junior associate is pounding their computer keyboard, amassing BASED ON THE ISSUES NOW REVEALED an analysis of how the discretionary function exception has never, never ever ever, been imposed to bar liability for alleged negligence roughly and/or reasonably comparable to the record of "encounters" now documented by NTSB Prelim Report. And that record goes back several years . . . but presumably discovery in United States District Court under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure could easily reach back to even more past years.

Of course, it will be said that ignoring these many encounters was indeed a policy choice, and so the exception does apply, a forum post like this notwithstanding. But that's just the point. The ISSUE here is that there never was a conscious policy directive which the alleged negligence stemmed from. Or stated another way, if I were in the aviation practice imagined above, I'd be running associates ragged to amass the above-mentioned analysis which establishes, among other things, that GROSS NEGLIGENCE by the FAA can never be, and is not as a matter of law, a predicate for applying the discretionary function exception. (For lawyers out there, somewhat akin to prima facie tort.)

By the way, for all the discovery sports fans out there, just think how much fun it will be to run discovery to amass the facts of what actions - meaning by the aircraft in which the RAs were annunciated - were taken as a result of all the RAs as noted by NTSB's Prelim Report.

i believe it’s run by the MITRE Corp for the FAA. When I ran a corporate flight department, our FOQA data went in monthly, anonymously. I’ve gone into the ASIAS website for “meat” for safety briefings, etc. There’s a good pile of data including FOQA, unstable approaches, TCAS, CFIT near misses. Now who and how is the data used, I cannot say.

One example, after the KBED G IV accident, the NTSB went to the NBAA asking for help in better use of FOQA data increase compliance with flight control checks. Remember, this the G IV crew who tried to take-off with locked controls. ASIAS has tens of thousands of flight control checks and compliance data. Focused on that, measure it, problem mostly solved.

GE Digital’s FOQA programs also have a tremendous data bank. For example, KTEB has an easily the highest rate of TCAS encounters for corporate operators. How it compares to KDCA, I again cannot say. The airlines have the KDCA data for their operations. They know how many and where TCAS events occur. More evidence of normalization, I suppose.

I don't recall seeing this specific Blancolirio segment previously - and thank you AirScotia for putting it up here.

SLF/attorney as I am, I've looked up some information about ASIAS. Not to bury the lede, the legal issues about whether or not the entities within the federal government which are likely to become defendants in the inevitable litigation will be able to defend successfully on the basis of sovereign immunity will draw, and perhaps draw heavily, on information about ASIAS. This just is my view as (for lack of a better label) an observer, and I'm not part of any legal group or practice currently involved with the matters arising from the accident.

1) Juan overstated one point which could become significant in what I think is the impending legal wrangle over sovereign immunity. The Executive Board of the ASIAS isn't comprised of all the stakeholders shown in one of the slides in the video. The Exec. Board "has representation" from all or substantially all of the stakeholder groups. (Source: portal.asias.aero) Didn't find (or invest more time in looking for) the actual roster of members of that board.

2) skybrary.aero has an interesting page about ASIAS. It notes the involvement of Eurocontrol, ICAO, and Flight Safety Foundation and includes further information about the ASIAS purpose and functions.

3) Most of the slides Juan included in the video appear to have been taken from (or at least those slides appear identical to slides in) a 2007 deck on the Voluntary Information Sharing System Working Group. I won't include the individual's name (just being cautious) but the deck is attributed to the Director, FAA Aviation Safety Analytical Services Division AVP-200. (The slides are marked (in fine print - no irony intended) as "ASIAS Proprietary". Yes, and 67 people were killed in a midair collision in the airspace of our Nation's Capital, so, I'll keep my "fair use" arguments ready if necessary.)

The slides in this deck include a chronological look-back at the genesis and iterations of efforts leading up to ASIAS, from 1995-96 through 2007.

The slide displayed in the video which grabbed my attention was the one indicating that ASIAS is governed by formal principles. Why this is so interesting (imho) is that the legal issue of whether sovereign immunity does or does not apply to FAA and (though it is more complicated) to the Army depends on whether the "discretionary function exception" applies. (That is, a federal statute removes sovereign immunity for negligence in general, but it also includes exceptions where sovereign immunity remains in place as a defense . . . or an affirmative defense, but this isn't law school or actual representation). I'm not drilling into the potential arguments and counters at this time. That being said, I'm quite inclined to think that it will be difficult to prevail on an argument defending the way FAA continued to run DCA because that way was based on policy choices or judgments instead of defined rules - in other words, that FAA exercised discretion in a matter of judgment about policy issues. To reduce this to some absurdity, "show me the policy decision memo that was written about a choice between tolerating the risk, now revealed as obvious - and didn't Board Chair Homendy say it was "intolerable" - of midair collisions, instead of applying all the safety principles embedded in the very existence of ASIAS itself." I'm not waiting for such a memo to surface, but if it exists, surely it will be found in discovery.

4) Not least, Juan walks through some specific reports of previous aircraft-helicopter encounters at DCA. At about 8:50, no. 1458911, he relates an incident with chilling parallels to the fateful night of January 29. I mean, if our court and legal system in the United States still has any meaningful relationship to "the interests of justice" . . . this will be (imho) powerful and effective evidence. And it's not from a distant past - just 2015. If my notes are accurate, the incidents just after this one (a Captain who calls DCA the most dangerous airport he's familiar with or words to that effect), and the previous incident also (a TCAS RA, complied with, but then a GPWS from the tower was triggered, incident 1558721 at about 8:15) - when was a specific policy judgment made to shrug off incidents such as these, and what were the alternatives then considered? Or was it "system drift, this is the way we've always done things, National is close to the Hill you know" .... these explanations do not constitute policy, in my view, but rather negligence that can and should be held to adjudicated responsibility and accountability in the United States District Court.

One last point is that Juan's calling attention to the swift and unequivocal actions taken by the Secretary of Transportation is something everyone involved with aviation safety and operations ought to concur with. Not even a month in the role yet - and this tragic calamity occurs. Salute!, Mr. Secretary!

Hi WR 6-3 , I've been following discussion about immunity etc - I'll steer clear of that legal discussion if I may. I have no idea \x96 I\x92ll leave it to you bright legal folks!!! However, with a humble background in Safety Engineering, and having been on a few Flight Safety Committees, and even run a large UK Database used by Equipment Engineers (I just ran the system \x96 a very important point as you\x92ll see later!) to identify Engineering issues with their kit, my thoughts. I\x92ve no idea how things (a) should have worked at DCA and, (b) actually worked there. But what follows is how I\x92ve seen it working countless times when I\x92ve been part of that process at different levels in the UK. Just some thoughts really\x85\x85 and you\x92ll see why I\x92ve underlined the bit above shortly.

Personally, the reference to ASIAS and it forming a key player here is, IMHO, a bit of a "red herring". It's not how Flight Safety should work in my experience of over some 40 years. Flight Safety ethos comes from the top and works down. Flight Safety activity starts at the bottom works up. In other words, it is the guys and gals on the Line, in the Tower, in the Hangar, in the Cockpit day-to-day who should actively spot and flag up issues relevant to where they are working - encouraged and supported all the way by the ethos from on high. After all, they (and only they) know exactly what is happening in their airspace, on their flight deck, in their hangar.

So the \x93DCA Flight Safety Organisation\x94 (we had Flight Safety Committees as Sqdn and Stn level to manage this \x96 similar in Industry \x96 so does DCA have a similar group? Please tell me it does!) should have been alerted to, possibly, initially unquantified issues with near misses along Route 4 by ATC staff. Local DCA Safety Management and ATC staff would then quantify the issue using the data available directly from such sources as the FAA AIDS and the NASA ASRS databases, all freely available via the ASIAS site. A good overview of ASIAS can be found here and an example of a search screen is the AIDS search form. This is all driven \x93bottom up\x94 . I personally used AIDS and ASRS during my MSc when writing a research paper many years ago \x96 sat at my PC in the UK so it\x92s really easy to use if I could master it! Juan probably got his stuff from there too.

Once the \x93DCA Flight Safety Organisation\x94 has looked at the data sources, either you have no issue or it needs wider investigation. In this case, clearly it was an issue, so (a) Route 4 should have had temporary mitigation put in place by DCA and (b) the "corporate" FAA (for want of a way to describe it) should have been requested to carry out a full "independent" Safety Review. Finally, (c), the ASIAS organisation could have been asked to flag this up to other Airfield Safety Organisations in their \x93Communication\x94 role in case they had similar issues to DCA. Again, local Safety Management at those fields would then investigate.

The FAA Safety Review should decide, with justification , what the next steps are - the justification being called the revised Safety Case (\x93revised\x94 as there should already be an initial \x93Safety Case\x94 supporting the operation of Route 4! Mmmm, an initial Safety Case? Was that a pig I\x92ve just seen fly past here???????!!!!!!!!). The outcome could be (as in this case) to close Route 4 down. If it were to be kept open, the revised Safety Case must support that by adding further mitigation and, vitally, the situation should be then be formally reviewed at defined intervals to ensure such mitigation is actually working before it becomes \x93normal business\x94. The FAA could also order a much wider formal review to see if other airfields are similarly affected and, if so, similar Safety Case reviews should be conducted at such locations if required.

So, from my point of view, I think that ASIAS (and as per the ASIAS overview link earlier) is not in itself responsible for initially identifying issues - it is simply (a) a conduit across users once issues have been identified by a user and (b) it manages some tools for users to use. I managed the RN\x92s Fleet Air Arm Engineering Database with a staff of 3. What we would do is, for example, at the request of Equipment Desk Officers , run additional reports requested by them if they thought, say, there was an increase in issues with a particular type of hydraulic pump or whatever it was. It was not my role in that Post to look for problems - my role was to ensure such data was accessible and ensure the database remained accurate and up to date. As I said earlier, the activity to raise problems and initially scope them is bottom-up as only the worker-bees (in my example, the Desk Officer) see the specific issues where they happen to work. The ethos to ensure that the organisation is in place at each airfield (and the wider FAA) to support the Safety activity should be top-down.

Clearly, it requires suitably qualified/experienced people on the coal face with a mind to safety to actively recognise and flag up such issues, encouraged from the very top by the ethos . That is an important point. If the ethos \x93encourages\x94 the watching of a \x93near miss\x94, sucking one\x92s teeth and saying \x93Sheesh! That was bleep-bleep close!!!!\x94 and moving swiftly on, that is NOT a safety management ethos !!! That is a recipe for disaster! If the ethos exists only in name and the worker-bees are not positively encouraged to raise issues which are then transparently acted on, but is an ethos which is totally subservient to commercial or political pressures then you'll get little or no Safety activity which will lead to\x85\x85\x85.... I\x92m sure you can all fill that ending in\x85\x85\x85!

Just my thoughts FWIW\x85\x85.. and sorry it\x92s so long! Cheers H 'n' H