Posts about: "FAA" [Posts: 266 Page: 9 of 14]¶

"The helicopter \x97 also a Black Hawk \x97 \x93 took a scenic route around the Pentagon versus proceeding directly from the west to the heliport,\x94 [the] FAA assistant administrator for government and industry affairs [...] wrote in an email obtained by POLITICO." (emphasis added)

The FAA official's choice of words was either meant as a sarcastic comment criticizing the flight path operated by the helicopter - or if taken literally did he intend to communicate that the helicopter crew knowingly flew a route with better visuals of the city as if sightseeing? The fact that even after the accident there still are issues like this is bad enough; if he intended to be understood literally....

And is there a factual, basis for believing this particular helicopter flight was a training mission as opposed to the VIP transport about which Sec. Duffy's remarks were pretty strident? If information about it having been a training mission was included in prior posts, I missed it.

Excerpts from various news sources:

Air traffic control \x91hotline\x92 between Pentagon and Reagan Washington National Airport has been broken since 2022

A bit more detail on that (Source is Washington Post)

Pentagon lost contact with Army helo that caused DC jet diversions

action is taking place with changes on the routes : (source Ops group Briefing ).

Watched most of the hearing today.
Aviation community and espeically professionals (and others in cheap seats like mine) owe TAC a big Kudos! for the live updates.

I'm not going to restate in depth one of the fundamental legal issues looming in the litigation in which this accident will be dissected; just a cursory summary, for context.

The main defendants, from a liability standpoint, are the two federal government entities and not the airline - quite obviously because as someone upthread observed, the Bluestreak 5342 pilots "owned" the last segment of airspace to be traversed to the runway. Pulling the airline in for deep pockets and insurers is not the issue for liability analysis.

But the federal government in all its actors and agents is protected by sovereign immunity. But -- it also has waived, in other words legally discontinued, its sovereign immunity (by the Federal Tort Claims Act) for many types of alleged wrongful acts. BUT -- there is an exception to its opening itself up to lawsuits - if the action or omission being challenged is a matter of "discretionary functions", in other words the making of policy, immunity is still in place. Only if the act or omission is a "ministerial function" is Uncle open to suit (Uncle Sam, that is). Generally, alleged failure to follow established rules and policies.

Well, if I were in this case, I first would have hit the 7-11 for a six-pack of Giant Size energy drinks, because I would be awake for a week gathering cases and writing preliminary briefs about the glaring nature of the FAA's action - actually an omission - in not adding something on the order of "hot spot" or its equivalent to the pertinent charts. I mean, "policy factors" in that slippery bit of bureaucratic box-checking? (I wasn't tuned in for the exchange in which the FAA witness indicated - according to the TAC live update, that LAX had requested a similar notation relative to helicopter traffic, which FAA did add, but FAA did not suggest anything for DCA because DCA had only requested "hot spot" which, of course, is for surface congestion points not airspace. But FAA let the situation continue unabated, unaddressed? No wonder the cool-as-ice Chair is said to have lost it, her cool that is, over this FAA testimony.)

Forecasting how legal issues will run and play out can be foolish indeed. Perhaps watching the NTSB "animation" - including actual video footage of the two aircraft colliding in mid-air - has wrenched my senses so as to yield a sense of blood in the water. Lawyer, sharks, their similiarities, all that trip.
WillowRun 6-3

And Salute! to the Officer of the United States Army who expressed condolences to the families in attendance, before he started to answer a question that had been addressed to him. A class act, sir.

A must read/listen . The holes in the cheese layers were quite big
just a few :
-UH60-L Heli altimeters accuracy .80 -130 ft systemic error due position of the static sensors affected by rotor blades in cruise
-80 ft error deemed within acceptable tolerance by Army pilots
-flying at 300ft targeting 200ft is "acceptable" by the Army
-200ft restriction on the chart is a only a "recommended target" in VFR not a hard restriction i unless instructed by ATC ..
-Lack of regulatory oversight by FAA despite many previous incidents .
-FAA (bureaucratic) refusal to put a 'Hot spot" symbol on routes crossings.
-Lack of ADS-B compliance on Army helis, due maintenance documentation errors during installation
-lack of experience of heli pilots on specific areas due frequent rotation of staff and lack of training hours in general.
-Lack of continuity in of DCA ATC operations supervision , 10 managers in 12 years and 5 in last 5 years.

In fact on some of the Reason's layers there were more holes than cheese.

I\x92ve been listening to the NTSB hearings while doing other things last couple of days. All I can say is the FAA testimony is wild .

Normalisation of deviance doesn\x92t even come close.

- Airspace design. The heli route stepping down to 200ft max lead some army pilots to believe it gave clearance from DCA traffic. Spoiler. It did not.
- Controller workload \x93Just make it work\x94 was a common attitude at DCA
- FAA not actively tracking TCAS RA \x93incidents\x94 as it could skew data.. maybe it was correctly applied visual separation etc. Need to look at the background etc. Yeah. But it generated an RA 🤬
- FAA refusing requests for traffic \x93hot spots\x94 on low level VFR charts as \x93hot spots\x94 are on ground charts only.
- PAT25 wanted visual separation from the CRJ. ATC was required to inform the CRJ crew another aircraft was applying visual separation to them. They didn\x92t.

Honestly from a European perspective. It\x92s quite bone chilling.

I feel this was a systemic failure. Airspace design and Risk Normalisation.

And my heartfelt condolences for the pilots, of both aircraft, and everyone else involved including the ATCOs. Not that there weren\x92t issues\x85 but in the Swiss cheese model, the FAA bought the cheese, drilled holes in it, and invited everyone to take a look inside.

Slightly surprised by some NTSB comments as well\x85 they were presented that the heli was straight ahead on the CRJ TCAS simulation presentation. But in actual fact the CRJ was circling in a left turn for runway 33. It was stable at 500ft but in a left turn to line up with the runway\x85 wings level at 300ft. It was challenged by the airline/ALPA but I would hope the NTSB would have picked up on that.

Low point of the whole hearing was Jennifer Homendy halting proceedings and moving witnesses to different seats, as one of the FAA managers elbowed a colleague while she was giving testimony - at which point she went quiet. Infernce being she was being reminded to stop talking.

"Low point of the whole hearing....." (Downwind_Left)

Also a high point - let me explain. ..... First, it was one of a goodly number of instances when Chairwoman Homendy proved all over again why she is an outstanding servant of the public interest.

But most observers of how the Board has operated over the past several years already would have agreed with that (imo).

Personally I didn't observe the elbowing on livestream but when the Chair noted it and that witnesses would be moved, it made sense. Together with the now widely derided rationale (on Wednesday) for not adding a notation on the helicopter route charts - in some terminology or nomenclature if "hot spots" was unavailable - the FAA witnesses in question, as I assessed their statements until that point, had been working mightily to give this accident an air of "excused inevitably." I need to point out this slam on their apparently questionable sincerity-plus-candor explicitly does not include the ATCT supervisor who testified at length and, in my view, honorably.

I don't want to comment yet on whether the accident victims' families will have a valid legal argument about the issue of "in trail" spacing, with regard to which one of the FAA witnesses in question described the matter in quite divergent terms from the way in which the Potomac Tracon official described it. But even reserving further comment, still it appears that if the answer for why the "in trail" memo was not acted upon favorably is that Runway 3-3 was going to be used more frequently, doesn't that answer: (a) mean that the pace of approaching and landing aircraft, in and of itself and also when combined with departures, would remain intense for DCA, and (b) the continued high tempo would also continue to complicate the proper - which is to say safe - control of helicopter flights most especially in the glaring light of the fact that Route 4 intersects the approach path to 3-3? As raw material for the legal argumentation that the FAA's actions and omissions were ministerial, and not matters of policy, this could be another call of, blood in the water.

(Of course all concerned know that the "unwritten policy" choice was to move traffic and hope for safe outcomes only. Maybe that often-criticized approach taken in the United States would prove out in an actual courtroom battle as a regrettable but nevertheless sufficient "policy decision" so as to allow sovereign immunity. But does the United States FAA really want to litigate this issue? Against some of the strongest and most experienced advocates ever to enunciate "Approach" in a courtroom? My understanding is the families, or some of them at least, are rep'd by attorneys and counselors who .... aren't finding time to sit in Starbux and post here.)

There were two other, at least, pieces of FAA testimony that, in my deposition-taking days, would have gone on for some hours more. No one could say what the Assistant LC was doing at the critical times. How could this not have been nailed down in the interviews? Also, what in the world is "debriefing" after training? How and why was that more important than keeping the helicopter position staffed?

I wish not to cast aspersions on any DCA ATCOs whatsoever. The testimony about why FAA did not get both alcohol and drug testing done in accordance with established rules was just another piece of shattered credibility - but as Board Member Inman stated, there is no basis to believe or think those kinds of problems were factors, and so that's not the point here. I mean, it wasn't clear fatalities had occurred very, very soon after the event? Good grief.

Perhaps the contretemps afoot in the investigations - and surrounding public relations affairs - in Korea and India have led me to some misunderstandings, but has it become time to think about whether the U.S. should have an AAIB? and not combine aviation into the general category of Transportation? For now, Member Inman said it well and succinctly: "Do better."

She was really not happy with the FAA more than once.

Was was hoping to rewatch this weekend but for some reason day 1 isn't on YouTube (but day 2 is).

I do have links for the live transcripts but they can be hard to follow.

Day 1
https://transcript.verbit.co/?transcriptJobId=c8273991-7823-4761-8ab1-95618f517981

Day 2
https://transcript.verbit.co/?transcriptJobId=02727bab-a1a2-4efd-95cb-de7991bdce87

Day 3
https://transcript.verbit.co/?transcriptJobId=42394932-5289-4aa9-b9ea-4a5d3ee725f6

I completely understand. I work on the operational side. I meant low for the FAA

They managed to sink lower when questioned about SMS and just culture. They said they\x92d heard of it. But struggled to describe it\x85 especially when the NTSB questioned why so many people were reassigned to new jobs straight after the accident. Many questioned said, \x93I\x92ve only been in this job a month, so I can\x92t comment\x94.

Again the formidable Jennifer called it out. The NTSB has seen this before\x85Radom job replacement, deniability etc

Try PBS. That\x92s where I listened.

To be candid I "cut class" and missed Panel 5, so thanks for noting all that.

As Panel 5 was getting set, there were follow-up questions about the post-accident testing. At least two witnesses weren't familiar with previous revisions of the relevant FAA written rules (iirc they're referred to as "orders" but I wouldn't swear to that). FAA testified that the agency is revising that order, in light of things not having been done properly at DCA on the night ofJanuary 29 into January 30. Member Inman hit a towering home run, I thought. He noted that he was with DoT when FAA set to work on revising a previous iteration of the pertinent order ..... many years ago. Deja vu, all over again.

After having completed three days of its formal proceedings - which I'll predict will long be remembered for the Board Chair ordering witnesses from FAA to turn off their cellular devices and to relocate because one had been seen elbowing another during the latter's testimony - the Board may be about to enter a new kind of Washington ball game.

Twelve billion dollars here, eighteen billion dollars additional there, pretty soon you're talking real money (with apologies to anyone who recalls the originator, Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen). With all that federal largesse provided by the American taxpayer destined to be spent on the so-called "new ATC system", I have a question. Isn't it necessary to know what conclusions the Board reaches in this investigatory process before committing to - and I'm going to use my own phrase - the "new National Airspace Architecture"?

The United States needs a new FAA organization, on two fronts at least. One, separate the ANSP from the regulator (as probably hundreds of real-life aviation industry worthies have long advocated). Second, a new organizational structure, ethos, culture, set of career pathways, and everything else that is not fit for purpose for the immient and dramatic changes dead-ahead (such as automation, Advanced Air Mobility, environmental pressures, and oh yeah, increased traffic correlated with increased demands from the traveling public for the precise kind of bag of peanuts to which they believe they're entitled). Is it not the case that FAA has failed in its fundamental mission, because under no ConOps should it have been possible for this accident to take place? (Of course, there will never be a guarantee against one or more persons conducting relevant activities with gross negligence - but if that harsh judgment is levied against the Black Hawk, nonetheless the system should have provided stronger procedural separation.)

And all this is before decisions are made about what technologies to build into the new Nat'l Airspace Arch., what vendors, what geographic arrangement, and what connectivity the entire system will have with ATM in Europe and globally (and European ATM especially is moving rapidly into the future).

But the Board final report is what, 12 months away? 18 months perhaps?

And as the new National Airspace Architecture is supposed to be undergoing definition and development, what assurance is there that the upcoming 42nd Triennial Assembly of ICAO in Montreal will not take action which will seriously impact the U.S. process? Or set ICAO on further intitiatives which would constrain U.S. plans, and not necessarily for the better? Recall that the United States has not had a designated Permanent Representative to ICAO since Capt. Sully abruptly resigned (July 2022), and while the career Foreign Service officials heading up the U.S. Mission undoubtedly are fine and excellent public servants, they are not ( afaik ) aviation industry professionals.

None of this is to say that the NTSB should speed up its process and deliberations. But at the same time, if during this Assembly the Secretary of Transportation shows up - as happened during the previous Assembly - to speak on behalf of the United States, I hope the Secretary has very, very good speechwriters because it will be hard to say anything meaningful when the state of affairs is in such disarray.

Edit:
On July 17 the White House nominated former Delta Airlines Capt. and U.S. Navy aviator Jeffrey Anderson to the position of Permanent Representative to ICAO with the rank of Ambassador. Timing of Senate confirmation hearing is presently unknown.

No , of course not, they can start the work right now.if they got the political will and budget .BUT :

And that is they key , that must come first in my view, first the new structure then the road map to your "new" airspace infrastructure and governance , with new guys and fresh ideas, and yes, some can be copied on what Europe is trying to do .

Good news that the chair will not be empty but I am not sure an airline guy is the best choice for the job , I do not know the guy but as an airline Capt he might be OPS orientated so he will, just like Sully did , become extremely frustrated on discovering how ICAO works. It is by consensus , the best ideas can be rejected by a few States and then discussions and negotiations must start again , even obvious solutions will; take years to be implemented , not weeks. In ICAO the USA has the same voice as a small State with no airline.
​​​​​​​A diplomat with civilian airline background fits better the post. A Military's background is of absolute zero use in ICAO.

On the relationship between the in-progress NTSB investigation and the "new ATC system" (or, new National Airspace Architecture), my previous assertion of "necessity" was over-stated, and work not only can be started (as you noted) but it has started, i.e., the funds authorized and appropriated in the recent U.S. federal government budget legislation. Although I haven't read the line items in detail, my understanding is that the funds are assigned for specific projects and activities.

But, that having been said, the Board's investigation appears primed to result in recommendations, supported by factual findings and analysis, for arguably significant changes in certain basic aspects of the ATM architecture. I'm relying here on the fact that the Board issued, very soon after January 29, an emergency directive to FAA with regard to the design of the DCA airspace and specifically the use of the helicopter routes. While I would not wish to assert familiarity with the actual world of ATC, the tenor and content of the Board's actions to date as well as of the three days of hearings strongly suggest that the Board will make recommendations for significant change in at least certain areas. Among these are the structure of airspace in which helicopters (civil, law enforcement, and military) interact with commerical traffic - it should be noted that a review of these airspace structures was ordered after the accident. Also, the way in which military aviation is conducted in Class B airspace especially adjacent to airports (of a certain size, presumably) appears likely to be covered by recommendations. None of this is to say that the new ATC system cannot be undertaken unless and until the Board report is issued (again, "necessary" was imprecise) but to the degree that recommendations for particular substantial reconfigurations of the NAS design are coming, the architects of the new ATC system certainly will not want to have to backtrack and redo their work.

On the drive to bring "FAA 2.0" into being, I would not associate myself with any claim that the United States ATM should "copy" European activities. I think the Memorandum of Cooperation between the SESAR authorities on one hand, and the FAA on the other, is the correct framework. And under that framework, "harmonization" appears to be the principal objective. It happens to be the case that although three formal joint reports on the status of harmonization have been completed and published over the past couple of decades, the most recent one was published several years ago. It is not as if nothing much has changed or advanced in the intervening years, but no further report is anywhere to be found.

When one takes into account the many and varied data-gathering and reporting functions of EUROCONTROL, the activities of the FABs, the ATM Master Plan, and informed expert groups such as the Wise Persons Group, at least from the cheap seats from which I see these it appears clear that European ATM is advancing quickly into the future. Whereas, in the United States, despite good people in certain technical roles in agencies and supporting organizations, the sorry state of the overall system speaks for itself. So to learn from our European allies and partners (and I do continue to view those States as allies and partners despite the view being out of vague in certain ignoramus precincts here) is not just wise, but necessary. But not to copy, rather to learn and adapt what will work best on this side of the transatlantic air-bridge.

On ICAO and the nomination of Mr. Anderson - and I do not know the gent either. Perhaps frustration with ICAO's immutable process of seeking consensus is what drove Sullenberger from Montreal, but I have my doubts. An experienced and by-then famous airline captain would be expected to have enough sophistication to realize, in advance, the unsurprising fact that ICAO is part of the UN. It should not have been any surprise, and that is without wondering whether the lucrative guest-speaker circuit was also a major factor.

I don't agree (respectfully) that each and every Member State, even small States lacking an airline, have equal voice. In Assembly votes, yes, they do. But not in the Council, given its three levels of membership and the process by which States gain membership on Council. And, though I am not an ATC professional (as you know), my understanding is that in the Air Navigation Commission, there are States with the experience and credibility to understand evolving state-of-the-art, even though they may disagree on how to proceed with it. And not every Member State has that level of experience and credibility. It's impolitic perhaps to say this out loud but that does not negate its validity or truth.

As for Mr. Anderson, the profile he has up on LinkedIn indicates that he has had quite significant labor relations experience. And governement relations responsibilities for the pilots' labor organization as well. His military career was, it appears, where he learned to aviate, and is not the approach the White House expects him to apply at ICAO. (In my view, sovereignty of every Member State's airspace is so fundamental, not only as reality of international flying but also under the Chicago Convention that a military career actually is fabulously relevant background for ICAO Permenent Rep, but reasonable minds can differ.) The labor relations experience could well turn out to be just what the doctor ordered for dealing with - as you say - the sometimes infintesimal pace of ICAO efforts to actually do something.

Of course, with ALPA having promptly denounced the nomination, because Mr. Anderson split from the labor organization over raising the age limit, perhaps the Senate confirmation process will not be accelerated before the Assembly convenes in third week of September. Whether the U.S. will be represented by a proper Permanent Representative, even one without Senate confirmation as Ambassador, is just not clear on the scope yet.
[...apologies for thread drift, but right now the NTSB DCA midair investigation is "the only game in town" in U.S. aviation policy - town as in Washington that is, not Montreal, QC, CA. ]

Repeated for emphasis, but further comment I won't make as it may cross too far into politics. How to manage the air space around National/Reagan will certainly get the FAA's attention, but it is worth recalling that no matter what the NTSB recommends after a given investigation, the FAA will assess each recommendation as regards implementation, or not.
(I am sure that you are aware of that, but some of our participants need to have that spelled out).

From the Seattle Times today https://archive.ph/7td29

.....@Winemaker - thanks for posting the archived article. Which prompts some further comments and "general overviews on the investigation" as Annex 13 continues to provoke concerns in other ICAO Member States.

1. Producing documents just a short time before a scheduled deposition or, in this instance, a scheduled session before an investigatory board at which witnesses from the producing party or entity will testify under oath, is a classic sign of intentional failure to cooperate. Perhaps there were valid reasons for the last-minute production of documents the Board had requested; there is no way I could know whether valid reasons existed or not. But absent an articulable basis in fact, the late disclosure of requested documents means that the FAA officials responsible intended to delay, deflect, or otherwise interfere with the Board's processes. It is not obstruction of justice as such - but having had a litigation practice which involved many instances of needing to produce, or conversely wanting to receive, significant document disclosures with enough time to evaluate them prior to taking (or defending) depositions, if there were legit reasons for FAA's timing....well, they would need to be pretty good ones, given the appearance of intent to delay and so on.

2. As to retaliation, it is understandable that FAA would have moved people from DCA in the aftermath of the accident, and not necessarily for retaliatory motives. Or, not necessarily only for retaliatory motives. That particular set of personnel changes in the immediate aftermath of the accident, however, does not actually address the larger issue of the existence of a retaliatory mindset within the agency, or at least the perception of such a mindset, which also would inhibit or discourage speaking up about changes needed for safety's sake.

3. Is there an investigation process by the Army which will be (or already is) publicly available, in whole or in part?

4. The perhaps unusual or even surprising extent to which the hearings appeared to approach an adversarial context suggested it was time to check on the status of the preliminary litigation activities. (Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which is pertinent to claims against the FAA and the U.S. Army, a preliminary type of claim must first be filed with the federal entities, who have some defined time period in which to respond, or not. This was filed in mid-February.) One of the prominent attorneys specializing in representing families of accident victims, in a video segment on the firm's website, described the status of the matter. What I had not (perhaps inexcusably) anticipated was a description of likely, or at least possible, claims against the airline, and Sikorsky. About the airline, the attorney asserted that it appears the airline knew that flight operations into DCA were especially risky, that there had been several instances of cause for heightened alarm or concern, and that in the past what he called special training had been required for flying into DCA but which had been discontinued - all in the context of proximity of helicopter flight operations.

I get it. Under the FTCA, claims against the federal entities may well be challenged on the basis of the exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for (so-called) discretionary functions (a case involving Varig Airlines is a well-known example). And even if the claims go forward, there are no punitive damages allowed by the FTCA. And FTCA claims are tried to the court (judge) only, not to a jury. But claims against the airline and manufacturer, as implausible as they may appear, would allow recovery of punitive damages, and would be tried to a jury. So it isn't just a case of deeper pockets and insurers, it's also leverage given the different avenues of legal redress.

It will get . . . intense. And if the Board report ultimately follows suit to the main take-aways from the hearings, well.