Posts about: "Findings" [Posts: 24 Page: 2 of 2]ΒΆ

Musician
January 29, 2026, 13:55:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 12029155
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
weird that they don’t even mention the Blackhawk PF’s straying from altitude constraints, the IP repeatedly tells her about her deviations multiple times as per the transcript, baro altitude limitations or not they were both aware she wasn’t meeting the limits of the corridor (that the margins are so fine in that airspace is absurd of course)
It's in the findings.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx
31. Due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter’s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter’s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.
.
Originally Posted by Ver5pen
that recreation is incredible, kudos to NTSB I don’t know why they chose to create it from the IP’s (RHS)’s point of view though, the PF was LHS and arguably had a better view of the CRJ the entire time
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

No recorded likes for this post (could be before pprune supported 'likes').

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Easy Street
January 30, 2026, 09:27:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 12029574
Originally Posted by Musician
I'm guessing because the IP reported the aircraft in sight, the PF didn't.
27. The PAT25 instructor pilot did not positively identify flight 5342 at the time of the initial traffic advisory despite his statement that he had the traffic in sight and his request for visual separation.
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:

28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target.

Subjects ATC  Findings  PAT25  Separation (ALL)  Traffic in Sight  Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

2 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

Musician
January 30, 2026, 12:48:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 12029671
Originally Posted by Easy Street
As some won't follow the link and read all of the findings, I think it's only fair to the IP to quote the next finding as well, which speaks to concerns over the inherent (un)safety of visual separation at night in dynamic traffic environments:

28. With several other targets located directly in front of the helicopter represented by points of light with no other features by which to identify aircraft type, and without additional position information from the controller, the instructor pilot likely identified the wrong target.
Yes. That is also apparent from the NTSB visibility study that we've been commenting on in this exchange.
The question was why the NTSB chose the right seat of the helicopter, and that was because the instructor assumed responsibility for the visual separation. There is no cockpit communication about the identification, so the PF wasn't involved in that.

One problem the helicopter had was that the CRJ was flying a turn. Flying straight, you know you're going to collide with something (even if it is just a dot of light) if it doesn't move visually. The CRJ's lights were moving left, so that would've looked like it was safely passing the helicopter by. The crew needed the situational awareness that the CRJ was going to turn towards them as it lined up for runway 33, but they didn't have it. ATC did, but didn't share, for reasons also addressed in the findings.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  Findings  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Situational Awareness  Visual Separation

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

3 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.

WillowRun 6-3
February 19, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT
permalink
Post: 12039941
Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4


Subjects ALERT Act of 2026  Blackhawk (H-60)  DCA  Final Report  Findings  NTSB  Probable Cause  Safety Recommendations  Separation (ALL)

Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.

1 recorded likes for this post.

Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.