Posts about: "ICAO" [Posts: 41 Page: 1 of 3]¶

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I am a long retired aviator but with strong views that have been inflamed by today\x92s tragedy. I am writing this post for non professionals so for you guys, please tolerate my carefully chosen words.
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US air traffic controlling has been awful since Ronald Reagan sacked all the ATCs in the mid 80\x92s. Their replacements were amateur (-ish) from the start and the previous highly regarded professionals\x92 ethos was not replicated. I stopped flying in 2010 so maybe it has improved since then.🙏🙏🙏🙏🙏
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I know we have to wait for the formal investigation. But I have first impressions.
The crash today is an example that I can associate with.
The TV clips are very revealing to me.
The ATC (air traffic controller) asks the helicopter if he has the \x93CRJ insight?). The CRJ is the type of aeroplane. If the pilot replies \x93yes\x94 then the ATC is absolved from responsibility to deconflict them.
The problem with this issue is that it is difficult or impossible to see what type of plane it is in the dark. All we can see is the plane\x92s navigation and anti-collision lights. So when the helicopter replied \x93yes\x94 this morning in Washington, he clearly was not referring to the plane he collided with a few seconds later!!!!!! He must have seen a different plane (and there are many planes at any busy airport!!).
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I had one memorable experience of this myself when leaving Los Angeles as a copilot in the mid 90\x92s. It was nighttime. \x85.The ATC asked me if I had \x93the DC9 ahead visual?\x94 I said \x93I have no idea if it is a DC9 but I can see aircraft lights\x94. He got the message!
What they want to do is dump their own responsibility and pass it on to the pilot using his/her own eyes. And they speak far too fast etc etc etc.
I feel sad for the airliner pilots of today\x92s crash. At that stage, at just over 200feet from touchdown (20-25seconds) their attention was on the runway, not looking 90degrees either side \x85..(They would not have been looking around in case another plane might be targeting them!!!)
May they all be resting in peace. Such an unnecessary accident.
i look forward to the accident report which will be done in accordance with ICAO Annex 15.
In particular, I will be looking forward to their recommendations for avoidance of a repeat of this kind of collision..
POTUS\x92s comments today are totally in conflict with Annex 15\x92s words: \x85..accident investigation is \x85\x94not to apportion blame or responsibility\x94.

I have been watching this thread for a while now and felt compelled to respond, mainly due to some of the comments on here, a proportion of which, come from professionals within our industry which in itself is troubling.

Lets break it down based on what we know so far:

See and Avoid We have years and years and years of evidence about the limitations of see and avoid. It is not and never will be effective mitigation to a collision risk on its own. It needs to be backed up with other barriers such as ACAS etc. The human eye is particularly bad at spotting stationary objects, which would have been the case in this instance with another aircraft on a steady bearing. Those who criticise the aircrew for not keeping a good lookout are being disingenuous. The ability to judge distance at night, is difficult. Those who suggest the helicopter was looking up at the night sky, omit to recognise that the cameras on which you are basing that opinion, were at ground level. The crew of the Helo would have been at a similar altitude, looking at a background of many lights, with other aircraft barely above the horizon. The reports state that the aircrew may have been on NVG. This exacerbates the issue as they narrow your field of view, make depth perception even worse and of course, those I know of, do not display different colours, such as navigation lights. So see and avoid needs to be backed up by other measures and one can also see how VFR at night is fraught with danger.

Procedures - There is nothing inherently wrong with helicopter lanes close to aerodromes as long as the procedures that control such traffic are robust. I do not know what the local procedures state for routes 1 and 4 but I would expect them to include a limitation to ensure that you cannot use route 4/1 if an approach is being made to Rwy 33 or vice versa, an approach cannot be made to Rwy 33 if there is traffic on route 1/4. If such a procedure does no t exist then we could argue negligence. Lets assume one does exist. In that case, I would expect some process to block the route or the approach, using an aide memoire such as a flight strip or other electronic means. The recent crash at Haneda, highlights the need for such a safety barrier.

The Controller - Reports suggest that controller numbers were down to 19, which is woefully inadequate for an operation such as this and I hope the NTSB looks at what actions were taken by the airport to close in the face of staff limitations. We assume from reports, that the controller concerned was working in a combined position, with band-boxed frequencies. Looking at FR24 replays, it was quite busy at the time and we also do not know what level of fatigue the individuals were under. If the procedures above were in force, was a blocking strip forgotten? Was the controller overloaded or distracted? I hope they were not combining Radar and tower!

Phraseology - Others on here have mentioned about phraseology used. First of all, I cannot understand this machismo, that US controllers have to speak fast. Stop it! It is dangerous and you only end up having to repeat yourself. Others have mentioned about using the clock code. The Tower controller may not have the endorsement to use radar procedures and may have been forced to use geographical points. From what I have heard and yes lets wait for the report, it seems that the phraseology used was sub optimal.

Duty of Care - Some of here have spoken about the transfer of responsibility onto the helicopter operator. This is a pet hate of mine, of people hiding behind the rules to abrogate responsibility. Everyone in the system has a duty of care and Air Traffic Controllers, regardless of type of service, have an accountability to do what they can to prevent collisions. That is written into the highest levels of ICAO Annex 11

My condolences to all involved and my thoughts are also with those under investigation, who I feel may have been let down by the system.

Well said and reasoned.

The losses so far in this case are almost defined, except that the unfortunate ATC officer is a victim of nothing more than being human and working within the constraints of a system that he did not design or have responsibility of. He has the most powerful pumpkin in the world defaming him from the normalised position of gross ignorance to such an extent that even Fox news and CNN push back. I would suggest that a suicide watch be placed on this poor individual to protect him from the hurtful comments that exude from the incumbent of the WH. This guy is going through hell, as much or more so than any other person suffering the loss in this mishap.


PS:

Humans may be the frail part of the system but they are also the most resilient parts. We will have moments in the following months to doubt that, history highlights failures not successes.




Agreed and their ability to use the radio with clarity and stick to ICAO language is worth underlining.Speed of delivery in ATC communication adds nothing to safety.

( My bolding )

HEAR, HEAR.

In the hands of bureaucrats, SMS has drifted far from its purpose, and become another unwieldy, overly complex, set of box-ticking processes. There are some civil aviation service providers -- i.e. airports, airlines, and ANSPs -- that have functional, effective SMS's. Somewhat ironically, those are usually the smaller, more efficient organizations. The larger and more bureaucratic the entity (the FAA for example) the more likely that any collected data is not adequately assessed for risk, and acted upon.

It's SO damned sad and frustrating that, as you said, this accident was as predictable as a sunrise.

Look at SMS in private jet aviation. We have IS-BAO, Wyvern, ARG/US all doing audits, issuing pretty certificates, gold labels and then the operators have hideously stupid and predictable accidents. My rumor mill told me years ago, much of the FAA views SMS has some ICAO idea they don’t need. Is it any wonder their SMS is dead?

Canadian ATC is even more of a "whoa this really is a different country" than a flashing green light.

YES/NO

Musings:

"The system" includes all of us that are involved in aviation at all levels, everyday. Thee are a lot of flights that go into DCA every day, each crew observing the same conditions, and conducting briefings of the arrivals, approaches and departures. Same out of LAX etc. How many of us, as stakeholders in the system have raised our concerns to the system by the means available, the ASRS, company safety reporting systems, the squadron SMS systems. How many safety managers have bothered to go and do an operational route survey/audit? Without our active participation, then we are relying on some person long retired who designed a procedure that survives to this point in time, and due to our collective indifference to the common users safety we remain broadly mute, until something falls off the perch. At this point we feign surprise, shock and some horror, yet, search inside, how many of us are surprised by this event, or Jeju Air in Muan, or the Russians shooting down yet another civil aircraft, Instead, we pontificate, (myself possibly more than most) and point the bone at all others in the system,

SMS systems only work if they have data that is meaningful. Each airline may seem to be swamped in data, that however is not the case for dealing with extremely low incidence, but high consequence events. There is not enough data generally to do a damned thing with, for just UAL, DAL, AAL etc or other operators. To be able to understand fully a system behavior there has to be adequate data, At present the only aggregated data of any note is that with NASA under the ASRS, and with ICAO at the reportable event level. Each ICAO state safety plan is supposed to provide data to the extent it can to its own community and to ICAO, and that is generally the last that is seen of the data. The airlines and operators dont get feedback, ICAO may or may not apply that data towards rule making, but that is years hence, and does not meet the needs of the user or the public today. Without the data being available to all, it is diminished in its utility. SMS systems have limited effectiveness that is IMHO glossed over universally, as actually getting data that is useful takes effort, and then evaluating that data takes critical analysis. By squandering the opportunity to have the data to evaluate, it should be no surprise that occasionally, we have SA-1, SA-2 and SA-3 type situational awareness failures of biblical proportions.

Aerospace suffers from frequent events that are normal in most respects. Functional resonance is a reasonable paradigm to assess how the system is really working, to give the system the understanding of how large the slip between assumptions and real system behavior is. The means of doing that is available from the flight data, and from operational audit aimed at understanding how expectations of process match with the real world.

Alternatively, we can sit back and blame the victims of the most recent mishaps, chasing those that should take responsibility for this, which to an extent falls on all of us that use the system and don't bother to raise concerns to the system.

Complacency works well though, until it doesn't.

Not 100% sure about the US FAA situation where everything seems to be possible , at least in DC, but in ICAO land Tower controllers cannot give headings, while they might have a copy of the Approach radar picture on a TV monitor somewhere , it is to verify actual positions not to issue vectors.. In addition some TWR controllers are just TWR rated, not Approach radar rated.
25 ft is the accuracy of mode S, transmit data so let's take 300 ft , Heli was apparently 100 ft higher than its altitude restriction , doing a separation maneuver ? (*) question to my US friends , : when delegating separation VFR to an aircraft does that automatically cancels its previous altitude restrictions ?
(*) I mean control input to maintain visual separation . not last second collision avoidance maneuver.

I used to many moons ago as a controller when working local in both class B and C airspace.

A Class B tower is a different animal than a Class D that might not even have a radar repeater of any kind.

Radar can absolutely fly two planes directly into each other. You have to put a number on how far apart they should be. If you call it "controller's judgement" then all you've done is change who's responsible, given that aircraft are never going to stick exactly to their assigned altitude and heading, and neither radar nor ADS-B gives exactly accurate positions, speeds, or headings.

This page, section "Separation minima based on ATS surveillance systems" quotes ICAO as saying that even in terminal space with good radar, separation should not go below 1,000ft vertically or 3Nm (2.5Nm if established on the same final approach in sequence within 10Nm of the runway). We're already blithely discussing half those standards as being impossible to meet.

Trying to understand the point you\x92re pushing. Are you of the belief that in terminal airspace (Class B in this case) that some minimum lateral or vertical separation standard must be applied? Apologies if I\x92m off base.

Lomon , asking questions is fine , but have you listened to the R/T in any busy airport in the US like DCA is ? the traffic levels and the phraseology , or slang I would say used, ?This not ICAO land with little traffic . The guy here was trained to work like this , single position , 2 runways and VFRs crossings on 2 different frequencies. Your suggestion of what he should have said like " if not sighted do that ,etc," does not fit in here . No time for long sentences,,. The procedures were completely wrong , not the controller...
Absolutely , but you were not asking a question , you were making suggestions on what the controller could have done ,.

Well, not duplex, but the existing simplex with 'stepping over' protection, was something I read about in Flight Int'l some 40 odd years ago, which at that time was being discussed in some ICAO (??) workgroup, but nothing ever came out of this.
In the following decades, I've been more than once frustrated with hundreds of 'stupid' stepping-over's, causing so much confusion (luckily nothing more serious that I witnessed), which all could have been prevented if that mechanism would have been standardized.

\x85and yet that is precisely how ICAO stipulates that accident investigation should work. The consequent focus on such things as \x91proximate cause\x92 and the SIA-world\x92s inherent unwillingness to deal with underlying aetiology work against holistic approaches and generate exactly the outcomes you warn against.

# 1194 Caley,
"… and yet that is precisely how ICAO stipulates that accident investigation should work. The consequent focus on such things as ‘proximate cause’ and the inherent unwillingness to deal with underlying aetiology work against holistic approaches and generate exactly the outcomes you warn against. "

In part yes, I agree.
However, as you might know, ICAO does not 'stipulate', it provides recommendations and standards of practice (SARPS), e.g. Annex 13, on which nations can base their investigation and reporting.
As such it is the interpretation of by individual nations and their investigators which direct investigation, findings, and recommendations.

Some nations interpret SARPS better than others.

There is an interesting example (amongst many others) of wider investigation and reporting in the Fukushima accident report: Pprune Safety Forum Fukushima Nuclear Accident Investigation

Reforming the regulators
The Commission has concluded that the safety … cannot be assured unless the regulators go through an essential transformation process. The entire organization needs to be transformed, not as a formality but in a substantial way. … regulators need to shed the insular attitude of ignoring international safety standards and transform themselves into a globally trusted entity .

P.S. Re the investigation above, also noting 'Cosmetic Solutions'; if the findings from this DCA investigation warrant it, would the NTSB conclude 'This was a manmade accident, made in the USA'
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My apologies, I tend to regard the conversation here as being reflective of the lounge bar rather than the witness box. You're right, 'recommends' is a better word and I will try to be more pedantic.

Regarding Fukushima, the problem lies not with regulators, but with regulation and its evil twin, compliance. And on your last line, I might add, 'by politics'. The process of sharing draft reports with interested parties is harmful enough to the investigative process, as we have seen with crystal clarity over the Clutha case for example, but is even more damaging in its influence to the jobbing investigator sitting at a word processor, thinking not only of that process, but all the petty politics which are exercised by managers in SIAs. Sometimes the investigator feels charged with writing a benign account of a series of improbable, unfortunate, and unforeseeable coincidences, which aligned with previously unknown holes in otherwise-solid cheese, despite being fully aware that there is much more to it than that.

Indeed , as reminder this is the official ICAO definition of class B airspace :
My bold. so in essence not by one of the pilots. But this is ICAO, not FAA .

I agree that is a solution, indeed the obvious one from my European point of view. What I was trying and failing to think of was a route design which guaranteed separation without ATC intervention, which is what I thought meleagertoo was asking for.

However, from a US point of view, this is arguably the solution which was in place on the night. It's just that the means of actively keeping the traffic apart, ie visual separation, failed. I am prepared to accept that FAA-style "visual separation" is slightly more robust than "see and avoid" in that it requires ATC to confirm that the pilot has the specific traffic in sight before relaxing separation minima, but the question for the FAA is whether "slightly more robust" is good enough when airliners are involved, particularly at night given the increased potential for misidentification.

I am not sure the subsequent line of discussion over how Class B requires ATC (not pilots) to separate all traffic is a very productive one. Any separation instruction given by ATC relies upon the pilot executing it, for instance by maintaining the cleared altitude. Here, it relied on the pilot not colliding with the specific traffic he had confirmed visual contact with. So far as the FAA is concerned, that's a sufficient degree of control and differs from the "see and avoid" principle applicable to VFR/VFR in Class C, and VFR/Any in Class D. Again, the question is whether that's appropriate.

That last point gives me an opportunity to make an observation I've been pondering for a while. Many European airport control zones are Class D, where on a strict reading of ICAO, VFR traffic is not required to be separated from IFR. But how many of us know a Class D zone where the controller gives traffic information and lets VFR traffic merge with IFR under see and avoid? In practice, European and especially UK ATC exercise a greater degree of control than is strictly required by the ICAO classification. At least in my experience, US airspace is operated closer to ICAO specifications ("visual separation" nothwithstanding).