Posts about: "ICAO" [Posts: 41 Page: 2 of 3]¶

I'm sure it does, but UK helimeds use the suffix to indicate they are actually on a shout, rather than training or positioning.

That's not called for. PEI 3721 has a respectful and thoughtful response to your post.

I personally don't think there's anything to be gained from going down the ICAO route. The NTSB has it's own charter and that's what dictates what happens in the USA.

I can see several ways the NTSB could take this, first the obvious one. The helicopter assumed responsibility for separation when it was not able to do so, and then found itself on track for collision. That's what I would define as true proximate cause. Then there's a step back from there which says nobody should be allowed to request and receive visual separation responsibilities in Class B airspace. That would be a good result as far as I'm concerned.

And the final step, which I think is more contentious and really hard for the US to accept, is that the culture at the FAA and within the industry is to balance safety and boosterism for the industry, and I think that is a recipe for irreconcilable conflicts. I'm not holding my breath on that one.

I'm surprised that this is your conclusion. I think what I take away from the conversations on the night was that ATC was divesting himself of responsibility, and the helicopter was trying to expedite his sortie, and nothing in the 'system' prevented them from doing that. Removal of visual separation as an option IMHO deals with that hole in the cheese. It seems like you're suggesting that the helicopter might ignore instructions to hold before the tidal basin ?

WMF # 1207,
"… don't think there's anything to be gained from going down the ICAO route. The NTSB has it's own charter and that's what dictates what happens in the USA."

If so then the NTSB (FAA, USA) attitude raises safety concerns.

From systems theory, all systems (i.e. aviation) will change with time, tending towards greater disorder (increasing entropy), often referred to as complexity.
To date, the industry has managed this change and simultaneously improved the level of safety, and with economic benefit.
A contribution to this is the use of world standards (ICAO, UN charter) enabling, aiding, inter-country operations, and refection on one's own, home standards and assumptions

Independent, fixed attitudes may encounter more safety issues as the overall system changes.
Safety minds, thinking, has to change just to keep up with the changes in aviation - what has been done safely before may not apply today or in the future.

WMF,
… well having searched the usual places and the NTSB, you will have to help with directions and text for reference.

There is a NTSB Charter for data, but nothing which explains the link between ICAO and the USA, and thence to the NTSB and investigation, or the required statement of any USA deviation from the ICAO guidance (Annex 13).
Notwithstanding https://www.ntsb.gov/about/organizat...office_as.aspx
" fulfill U.S. obligations under International Civil Aviation Organization agreements"
"to examine specific aviation safety problems from a broader perspective. "

But back to the thread. Are there any reasons why NTSB might not comment on the wider organisational aspects as indicated in the discussion. Also noting that the NTSB have no powers of enforcement, relying on the FAA; thus if the FAA process were to be identified as deficient, who mandates change.
,,

From what I understand the delegation of separation used in the US is based on the "see and avoid ", It is basically delegating the positive control (ATC separation instructions ) from the controller to the pilot , who has to acquire the traffic visually and maintain visual contact and maneuvers to avoid it . = traffic info from ATC + See and avoid. . I do not think the ICAO forefathers designing the airspace classifications had this in mind when defining class B.
Listening to the NTSB , the only ATC instruction given : to " pass behind " was not received , and therefore not acknowledged by the crew , so we are here 100% in the good old "see and avoid" scenario I would say

There you go. A bit of work with google is never time wasted. I offered an opinion about the extent to which the NTSB might be incentivised to explore issues of the mission of the FAA, and like all opinions, it resides in the domain of politics. That's a possible reason why the NTSB might not choose to go there. However an ex-Inspector General of the Dept of Transportation had strong views on the subject, and I give a lot of weight to her opinion, supported as it is by her personal experiences of dealing with the FAA.

"Visual separation" is different from "see and avoid" in that the controller must confirm that the pilot has the factor traffic in sight before approving visual separation. The controller is only delegating the "avoid" part of the task, not the "see", which must be confirmed before the separation minima are removed. That, at least in my understanding, is how the FAA argues it to be compliant with Class B requirements. It's obviously vulnerable to misidentification of the factor traffic; don't think I'm defending it!

When genuine "see and avoid" applies (Class C VFR/VFR, Class D VFR/Any) the controller does not need to confirm that VFR pilots have visual contact before allowing separation to reduce, because there *are no* separation minima. At least, not according to ICAO.

As I mentioned earlier, European and especially UK ATC tends to apply more stringent separation than ICAO requires. The 'ATC duty of care' argument in the UK results in its Class D being operated in a similar way to US Class B, in my experience.

I'm fairly certain that, because Annex 13 and all else pursuant to the Chicago Convention of 1944 applies to international civil aviation, the statutory as well as practical jurisdiction and responsibility of NTSB are matters dealt with by federal statute and regulations. This is not to say that the Board will or should ignore Annex 13 or declare it irrelevant - but it is to say -
first, the NTSB's authorization and processes are set by federal law and not by Annex 13 (although as the excerpt you quoted also says, Ann. 13 does apply where the case is international civil av.); and
second, the DCA midair is not within international civil aviation (sorry to find it necessary to state the obvious).

I cannot cite anything specific to support it but I'm strongly inclined to think Chair Homendy, at this point in her public service career, will insist on a report and supporting analysis that leaves, if you will, political niceties on the bottom of the Potomac shy of the Rny 3-3 threshold -- where they belong. We will see, time will tell.

No you can't , not in ICAO land anyway . Definition of " visual" for us is via eyeballs not an electronic display .,We always correct (mostly US)pilots which when passing traffic info reply to us " we have it on TCAS" . This is not a positive visual acquisition .

I don't recall seeing this specific Blancolirio segment previously - and thank you AirScotia for putting it up here.

SLF/attorney as I am, I've looked up some information about ASIAS. Not to bury the lede, the legal issues about whether or not the entities within the federal government which are likely to become defendants in the inevitable litigation will be able to defend successfully on the basis of sovereign immunity will draw, and perhaps draw heavily, on information about ASIAS. This just is my view as (for lack of a better label) an observer, and I'm not part of any legal group or practice currently involved with the matters arising from the accident.

1) Juan overstated one point which could become significant in what I think is the impending legal wrangle over sovereign immunity. The Executive Board of the ASIAS isn't comprised of all the stakeholders shown in one of the slides in the video. The Exec. Board "has representation" from all or substantially all of the stakeholder groups. (Source: portal.asias.aero) Didn't find (or invest more time in looking for) the actual roster of members of that board.

2) skybrary.aero has an interesting page about ASIAS. It notes the involvement of Eurocontrol, ICAO, and Flight Safety Foundation and includes further information about the ASIAS purpose and functions.

3) Most of the slides Juan included in the video appear to have been taken from (or at least those slides appear identical to slides in) a 2007 deck on the Voluntary Information Sharing System Working Group. I won't include the individual's name (just being cautious) but the deck is attributed to the Director, FAA Aviation Safety Analytical Services Division AVP-200. (The slides are marked (in fine print - no irony intended) as "ASIAS Proprietary". Yes, and 67 people were killed in a midair collision in the airspace of our Nation's Capital, so, I'll keep my "fair use" arguments ready if necessary.)

The slides in this deck include a chronological look-back at the genesis and iterations of efforts leading up to ASIAS, from 1995-96 through 2007.

The slide displayed in the video which grabbed my attention was the one indicating that ASIAS is governed by formal principles. Why this is so interesting (imho) is that the legal issue of whether sovereign immunity does or does not apply to FAA and (though it is more complicated) to the Army depends on whether the "discretionary function exception" applies. (That is, a federal statute removes sovereign immunity for negligence in general, but it also includes exceptions where sovereign immunity remains in place as a defense . . . or an affirmative defense, but this isn't law school or actual representation). I'm not drilling into the potential arguments and counters at this time. That being said, I'm quite inclined to think that it will be difficult to prevail on an argument defending the way FAA continued to run DCA because that way was based on policy choices or judgments instead of defined rules - in other words, that FAA exercised discretion in a matter of judgment about policy issues. To reduce this to some absurdity, "show me the policy decision memo that was written about a choice between tolerating the risk, now revealed as obvious - and didn't Board Chair Homendy say it was "intolerable" - of midair collisions, instead of applying all the safety principles embedded in the very existence of ASIAS itself." I'm not waiting for such a memo to surface, but if it exists, surely it will be found in discovery.

4) Not least, Juan walks through some specific reports of previous aircraft-helicopter encounters at DCA. At about 8:50, no. 1458911, he relates an incident with chilling parallels to the fateful night of January 29. I mean, if our court and legal system in the United States still has any meaningful relationship to "the interests of justice" . . . this will be (imho) powerful and effective evidence. And it's not from a distant past - just 2015. If my notes are accurate, the incidents just after this one (a Captain who calls DCA the most dangerous airport he's familiar with or words to that effect), and the previous incident also (a TCAS RA, complied with, but then a GPWS from the tower was triggered, incident 1558721 at about 8:15) - when was a specific policy judgment made to shrug off incidents such as these, and what were the alternatives then considered? Or was it "system drift, this is the way we've always done things, National is close to the Hill you know" .... these explanations do not constitute policy, in my view, but rather negligence that can and should be held to adjudicated responsibility and accountability in the United States District Court.

One last point is that Juan's calling attention to the swift and unequivocal actions taken by the Secretary of Transportation is something everyone involved with aviation safety and operations ought to concur with. Not even a month in the role yet - and this tragic calamity occurs. Salute!, Mr. Secretary!

"That's good thinking there, Hot 'n' High." (with apologies to the late Tom Wolfe for my copying the opening line of his 1968 New Journalism book, The Electric Kool-Aid Acid Test)

1) The starting point for any of my thought process about the midair collision is that this accident should never have happened and would not have happened without some parts of "the system" failing to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. Midair collisions in U.S. airspace are an aberation, aren't they? I sense that many aviators and other aviation professionals don't want to say it out loud - their sense of disbelief that this actually occurred.

A few years ago, in response to a question after a guest lecture he had delivered at an ICAO event in Montreal, then-Chair of the NTSB Robert Zumwalt said, "we've already had that accident" . . . the question was about whether an accident caused by certain factors which were, in fact, present in the Colgan Air accident needed to happen, in order for certain rules to be changed. (I don't want to misstate the q&a, although my best recollection was that the question was about fatigue and rest, and commuting time before line service.) In other words, the DCA midair is not an accident the primary causes of which were factors the overall aviation system had not quite learned to do correctly. In comparison, at the time I first began "reading aviation", wind shear accidents were occuring not infrequently (that beginning was December 1974).

I have not represented anyone or anything in air crash litigation and my posting here is not intended as what most lawyers call "client development and prospecting." Despite that, I think the opening statement on behalf of the families of the victims of this accident will be quite a courtroom moment. It's against this backdrop that I've been trying to think through the federal entities' most likely defense. There is some sense, maybe only vague, that how the anticipated lawsuits play out will have some impact or bearing on how the overall aviation system responds to this tragic occurrence.

2) Not for the first time my choice of phrasing was too emphatic and also imprecise. I didn't mean to point to ASIAS as a foundational or ultimate component of decisions about safety of DCA airspace management and usage. Instead, the content of some of the incident reports pointed out by Juan Browne struck me as glaring. They struck me as strong evidence of two things; one - as noted above, this accident was the kind of occurrence caused by some part of the system not fulfilling its responsibilities, and the other, that there were pretty clear statements by "bottom-up" reporters about such responsibilities appearing to be unfulfilled at particular times and in particular situations.

So, from these two foundations, I'm trying to figure out whether the discretionary function exception applies or does not apply. If it applies, the federal court will not have jurisdiction over the claims and the federal defendants will enjoy immunity (irony intended). I apologize in advance for what follows next (it is quoted in full from Congressional Research Service Report (R45732.8, April 17, 2023) "The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA): A Legal Overview". I would not clutter up this respected forum with legal material were it not arguably necessary for meaningful discussion of what is likely to happen next in the aftermath of the night of January 29.

CRS:
"[T]to determine whether the discretionary function exception bars a particular plaintiff's suit under the FTCA, courts examine whether the federal employee was engaged in conduct that was (1) discretionary and (2) policy-driven. "If the challenged conduct is both discretionary and policy-driven," then the FTCA does not waive the government's sovereign immunity with respect to that conduct, and the plaintiff's FTCA claim must therefore fail. If, by contrast, an official's action either (1) "does not involve any discretion" or (2) "involves discretion," but "does not involve the kind of discretion\x97consideration of public policy\x97that the exception was designed to protect," then the discretionary function exception does not bar the plaintiff's claim.

Whether the Challenged Conduct Is Discretionary

When first evaluating whether "the conduct that is alleged to have caused the harm" to the plaintiff "can fairly be described as discretionary," a court must assess "whether the conduct at issue involves 'an element of judgment or choice' by the employee." "The conduct of federal employees is generally held to be discretionary unless 'a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow.'" If "the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive" established by a federal statute, regulation, or policy, "then there is no discretion in the conduct for the discretionary function exception to protect." Put another way, the discretionary function exception does not insulate the United States from liability when its employees "act in violation of a statute or policy that specifically directs them to act otherwise."

Even where a federal statute, regulation, or policy pertaining to the challenged action exists, the action may nonetheless qualify as discretionary if the law in question "predominately uses permissive rather than mandatory language." In other words, where "a government agent's performance of an obligation requires that agent to make judgment calls, the discretionary function exception" may bar the plaintiff's claim under the FTCA. Notably, "[t]he presence of a few, isolated provisions cast in mandatory language" in a federal statute, regulation, or policy "does not transform an otherwise suggestive set of guidelines into binding" law that will defeat the discretionary function exception. "Even when some provisions of a policy are mandatory, governmental action remains discretionary if all of the challenged decisions involved 'an element of judgment or choice'".
[End CRS, all quotations in the excerpt as in original, and all footnotes omitted]

3) Which leads to this essential inquiry: which one - and the answer cannot be "both are involved" - is closer to what happened: the federal entity individuals involved at all levels acted in violation of a statute or policy that specifically directs them to act otherwise", or, the federal entity individuals' "performance of an obligation require[d] that agent to make judgment calls", and "all of the challenged decisions involved an 'element of judgment or choice.'"

On one hand, the imperative of separation of aircraft in controlled airspace is pretty absolute, as far as I have been given to understand. There isn't any discretion or choice to risk a collision at an "intolerable" level of likelihood in order to keep traffic moving, both airline and the military and other helicopter operations in question. And that was the query I was attempted to point out: the midair collision at DCA on Janaury 29 looks like the proverbial death of a thousand small cuts, such that there never was any "judgment" or "choice" as those (admittedly ambigous) terms are employed in the statute and its interpretation. I should have been clearer about only imagining that one of many hypothetical situations where - arguing for the defense - someone was looking at ASIAS and proceeded with the calculating or reasoning which presumably would qualify as "judgment" or "choice." The larger point is that taking account of all the safety information in all the system elements which have been noted and others which might not have been noted here, mark me down as quite skeptical that there ever occurred a time, at a particular place, where anyone acting on behalf of the federal government exercised judgment or discretion that - contrary to the assessment of the NTSB Chair - the risk at DCA was tolerable.

Two caveats to wrap: I don't envy the advocates for the victims' families, as it will be terribly challenging to argue the facts of this case without appearing to cast aspersions on some or all of the pilots and controllers. Nobody wants that, and I certainly don't.

The other is that I do not think that the discretionary function issue will play out in the context of the actions by the pilots of either aircraft or the controllers. Rather it will be litigated with regard to the way FAA (and its parent Cabinet department, DoT) structured, managed, and operated DCA airspace. And this could include staffing policies and procedures (but again, not individuals' actions or inactions on the night of the accident). There may be some involvemenmt of civil-military coordination also at the agency level.

On a somewhat personal note, just a few years ago I traveled by air to a major European capital where a quite substantial and important aviation industry organization has its headquarters; the purpose was to attend a conference hosted by that organization. When the flight ended, because I had not previously traveled on a 787 aircraft, I asked the cabin crew if I could please get an invitation to visit the flight deck to see it, if doing so would not unduly delay the pilots from deplaning. When I got admitted to the flight deck, the captain invited me to sit in the LHS, and then gave me his hat and offered to take my photograph (yes, really). In the snapshots this SLF/attorney looks pretty ridiculous, and I wonder, "what am I, ten years old?" I hope neither this post nor any others look like they were written by that kid.

After having completed three days of its formal proceedings - which I'll predict will long be remembered for the Board Chair ordering witnesses from FAA to turn off their cellular devices and to relocate because one had been seen elbowing another during the latter's testimony - the Board may be about to enter a new kind of Washington ball game.

Twelve billion dollars here, eighteen billion dollars additional there, pretty soon you're talking real money (with apologies to anyone who recalls the originator, Illinois Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen). With all that federal largesse provided by the American taxpayer destined to be spent on the so-called "new ATC system", I have a question. Isn't it necessary to know what conclusions the Board reaches in this investigatory process before committing to - and I'm going to use my own phrase - the "new National Airspace Architecture"?

The United States needs a new FAA organization, on two fronts at least. One, separate the ANSP from the regulator (as probably hundreds of real-life aviation industry worthies have long advocated). Second, a new organizational structure, ethos, culture, set of career pathways, and everything else that is not fit for purpose for the immient and dramatic changes dead-ahead (such as automation, Advanced Air Mobility, environmental pressures, and oh yeah, increased traffic correlated with increased demands from the traveling public for the precise kind of bag of peanuts to which they believe they're entitled). Is it not the case that FAA has failed in its fundamental mission, because under no ConOps should it have been possible for this accident to take place? (Of course, there will never be a guarantee against one or more persons conducting relevant activities with gross negligence - but if that harsh judgment is levied against the Black Hawk, nonetheless the system should have provided stronger procedural separation.)

And all this is before decisions are made about what technologies to build into the new Nat'l Airspace Arch., what vendors, what geographic arrangement, and what connectivity the entire system will have with ATM in Europe and globally (and European ATM especially is moving rapidly into the future).

But the Board final report is what, 12 months away? 18 months perhaps?

And as the new National Airspace Architecture is supposed to be undergoing definition and development, what assurance is there that the upcoming 42nd Triennial Assembly of ICAO in Montreal will not take action which will seriously impact the U.S. process? Or set ICAO on further intitiatives which would constrain U.S. plans, and not necessarily for the better? Recall that the United States has not had a designated Permanent Representative to ICAO since Capt. Sully abruptly resigned (July 2022), and while the career Foreign Service officials heading up the U.S. Mission undoubtedly are fine and excellent public servants, they are not ( afaik ) aviation industry professionals.

None of this is to say that the NTSB should speed up its process and deliberations. But at the same time, if during this Assembly the Secretary of Transportation shows up - as happened during the previous Assembly - to speak on behalf of the United States, I hope the Secretary has very, very good speechwriters because it will be hard to say anything meaningful when the state of affairs is in such disarray.

Edit:
On July 17 the White House nominated former Delta Airlines Capt. and U.S. Navy aviator Jeffrey Anderson to the position of Permanent Representative to ICAO with the rank of Ambassador. Timing of Senate confirmation hearing is presently unknown.

No , of course not, they can start the work right now.if they got the political will and budget .BUT :

And that is they key , that must come first in my view, first the new structure then the road map to your "new" airspace infrastructure and governance , with new guys and fresh ideas, and yes, some can be copied on what Europe is trying to do .

Good news that the chair will not be empty but I am not sure an airline guy is the best choice for the job , I do not know the guy but as an airline Capt he might be OPS orientated so he will, just like Sully did , become extremely frustrated on discovering how ICAO works. It is by consensus , the best ideas can be rejected by a few States and then discussions and negotiations must start again , even obvious solutions will; take years to be implemented , not weeks. In ICAO the USA has the same voice as a small State with no airline.
​​​​​​​A diplomat with civilian airline background fits better the post. A Military's background is of absolute zero use in ICAO.

On the relationship between the in-progress NTSB investigation and the "new ATC system" (or, new National Airspace Architecture), my previous assertion of "necessity" was over-stated, and work not only can be started (as you noted) but it has started, i.e., the funds authorized and appropriated in the recent U.S. federal government budget legislation. Although I haven't read the line items in detail, my understanding is that the funds are assigned for specific projects and activities.

But, that having been said, the Board's investigation appears primed to result in recommendations, supported by factual findings and analysis, for arguably significant changes in certain basic aspects of the ATM architecture. I'm relying here on the fact that the Board issued, very soon after January 29, an emergency directive to FAA with regard to the design of the DCA airspace and specifically the use of the helicopter routes. While I would not wish to assert familiarity with the actual world of ATC, the tenor and content of the Board's actions to date as well as of the three days of hearings strongly suggest that the Board will make recommendations for significant change in at least certain areas. Among these are the structure of airspace in which helicopters (civil, law enforcement, and military) interact with commerical traffic - it should be noted that a review of these airspace structures was ordered after the accident. Also, the way in which military aviation is conducted in Class B airspace especially adjacent to airports (of a certain size, presumably) appears likely to be covered by recommendations. None of this is to say that the new ATC system cannot be undertaken unless and until the Board report is issued (again, "necessary" was imprecise) but to the degree that recommendations for particular substantial reconfigurations of the NAS design are coming, the architects of the new ATC system certainly will not want to have to backtrack and redo their work.

On the drive to bring "FAA 2.0" into being, I would not associate myself with any claim that the United States ATM should "copy" European activities. I think the Memorandum of Cooperation between the SESAR authorities on one hand, and the FAA on the other, is the correct framework. And under that framework, "harmonization" appears to be the principal objective. It happens to be the case that although three formal joint reports on the status of harmonization have been completed and published over the past couple of decades, the most recent one was published several years ago. It is not as if nothing much has changed or advanced in the intervening years, but no further report is anywhere to be found.

When one takes into account the many and varied data-gathering and reporting functions of EUROCONTROL, the activities of the FABs, the ATM Master Plan, and informed expert groups such as the Wise Persons Group, at least from the cheap seats from which I see these it appears clear that European ATM is advancing quickly into the future. Whereas, in the United States, despite good people in certain technical roles in agencies and supporting organizations, the sorry state of the overall system speaks for itself. So to learn from our European allies and partners (and I do continue to view those States as allies and partners despite the view being out of vague in certain ignoramus precincts here) is not just wise, but necessary. But not to copy, rather to learn and adapt what will work best on this side of the transatlantic air-bridge.

On ICAO and the nomination of Mr. Anderson - and I do not know the gent either. Perhaps frustration with ICAO's immutable process of seeking consensus is what drove Sullenberger from Montreal, but I have my doubts. An experienced and by-then famous airline captain would be expected to have enough sophistication to realize, in advance, the unsurprising fact that ICAO is part of the UN. It should not have been any surprise, and that is without wondering whether the lucrative guest-speaker circuit was also a major factor.

I don't agree (respectfully) that each and every Member State, even small States lacking an airline, have equal voice. In Assembly votes, yes, they do. But not in the Council, given its three levels of membership and the process by which States gain membership on Council. And, though I am not an ATC professional (as you know), my understanding is that in the Air Navigation Commission, there are States with the experience and credibility to understand evolving state-of-the-art, even though they may disagree on how to proceed with it. And not every Member State has that level of experience and credibility. It's impolitic perhaps to say this out loud but that does not negate its validity or truth.

As for Mr. Anderson, the profile he has up on LinkedIn indicates that he has had quite significant labor relations experience. And governement relations responsibilities for the pilots' labor organization as well. His military career was, it appears, where he learned to aviate, and is not the approach the White House expects him to apply at ICAO. (In my view, sovereignty of every Member State's airspace is so fundamental, not only as reality of international flying but also under the Chicago Convention that a military career actually is fabulously relevant background for ICAO Permenent Rep, but reasonable minds can differ.) The labor relations experience could well turn out to be just what the doctor ordered for dealing with - as you say - the sometimes infintesimal pace of ICAO efforts to actually do something.

Of course, with ALPA having promptly denounced the nomination, because Mr. Anderson split from the labor organization over raising the age limit, perhaps the Senate confirmation process will not be accelerated before the Assembly convenes in third week of September. Whether the U.S. will be represented by a proper Permanent Representative, even one without Senate confirmation as Ambassador, is just not clear on the scope yet.
[...apologies for thread drift, but right now the NTSB DCA midair investigation is "the only game in town" in U.S. aviation policy - town as in Washington that is, not Montreal, QC, CA. ]

.....@Winemaker - thanks for posting the archived article. Which prompts some further comments and "general overviews on the investigation" as Annex 13 continues to provoke concerns in other ICAO Member States.

1. Producing documents just a short time before a scheduled deposition or, in this instance, a scheduled session before an investigatory board at which witnesses from the producing party or entity will testify under oath, is a classic sign of intentional failure to cooperate. Perhaps there were valid reasons for the last-minute production of documents the Board had requested; there is no way I could know whether valid reasons existed or not. But absent an articulable basis in fact, the late disclosure of requested documents means that the FAA officials responsible intended to delay, deflect, or otherwise interfere with the Board's processes. It is not obstruction of justice as such - but having had a litigation practice which involved many instances of needing to produce, or conversely wanting to receive, significant document disclosures with enough time to evaluate them prior to taking (or defending) depositions, if there were legit reasons for FAA's timing....well, they would need to be pretty good ones, given the appearance of intent to delay and so on.

2. As to retaliation, it is understandable that FAA would have moved people from DCA in the aftermath of the accident, and not necessarily for retaliatory motives. Or, not necessarily only for retaliatory motives. That particular set of personnel changes in the immediate aftermath of the accident, however, does not actually address the larger issue of the existence of a retaliatory mindset within the agency, or at least the perception of such a mindset, which also would inhibit or discourage speaking up about changes needed for safety's sake.

3. Is there an investigation process by the Army which will be (or already is) publicly available, in whole or in part?

4. The perhaps unusual or even surprising extent to which the hearings appeared to approach an adversarial context suggested it was time to check on the status of the preliminary litigation activities. (Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which is pertinent to claims against the FAA and the U.S. Army, a preliminary type of claim must first be filed with the federal entities, who have some defined time period in which to respond, or not. This was filed in mid-February.) One of the prominent attorneys specializing in representing families of accident victims, in a video segment on the firm's website, described the status of the matter. What I had not (perhaps inexcusably) anticipated was a description of likely, or at least possible, claims against the airline, and Sikorsky. About the airline, the attorney asserted that it appears the airline knew that flight operations into DCA were especially risky, that there had been several instances of cause for heightened alarm or concern, and that in the past what he called special training had been required for flying into DCA but which had been discontinued - all in the context of proximity of helicopter flight operations.

I get it. Under the FTCA, claims against the federal entities may well be challenged on the basis of the exception to waiver of sovereign immunity for (so-called) discretionary functions (a case involving Varig Airlines is a well-known example). And even if the claims go forward, there are no punitive damages allowed by the FTCA. And FTCA claims are tried to the court (judge) only, not to a jury. But claims against the airline and manufacturer, as implausible as they may appear, would allow recovery of punitive damages, and would be tried to a jury. So it isn't just a case of deeper pockets and insurers, it's also leverage given the different avenues of legal redress.

It will get . . . intense. And if the Board report ultimately follows suit to the main take-aways from the hearings, well.

@WillowRun6-3 : First a couple of replies to your earlier comments :
No the FAA cannot copy Europe, in fact the initial Single sky (SES) plan was the other way around, copying what the US had, based on a biased report that the US system was better and more productive than Europe . a single airspace structure under a single authority, When they realized it would not be possible, they then invented the FABs ( airspace blocks) that did not work either , so they went for technical harmonization , that is how SESAR grew . . Yes the current US-Europe discussions are about harmonization between NextGen ( what is left of it ) and SESAR . No-one wants to "copy" the other today but I suspect that the FAA 2.0 will most probably "copy" the technological path of Europe , with an ambitious master plan etc...Do not rock the boat just believe technology/ automation, now AI, will eventually solve all the problems.
on the NTSB powers :
As Lonewolf 50 correctly said and reminded us, the FAA does not have to follow NTSB recommendations . In fact they mostly don't , I have been told or read some time ago that over the last decades there were a few hundreds NTSB recommendations that remained open unactioned., But that is not a US alone issue, same in many other countries. An Investigation Board is not a Regulator, which is what is missing in the US.
as to how ICAO works :
I have been attending ICAO meetings . part of Panels and various working group ( still do it today ) The ANC is where the decisions are voted but not when the work is done and proposals are made. . There is not like in the UN , no State has a priority seat there, all equals , big and small.. And that causes difficulties My example was correct , for instance in Europe there are 2 large non-EU States both with very large international airlines and a dozen smaller ones , also both aircrfat manufacturers which are constantly blocked by very small countries with no airline but members of the EU. ( PM me if you want the names)
Military background, no use for me because we do not discuss Military matters in ICAO ( the "C" in ICAO is sacred ) and over-playing the sovereignty card is creating opposition , not consensus . Some States think it is is a nice retirement present to send a former Air Force General to ICAO : big mistake . You lose influence, not gain any, in my experience at least , but I will give Mr Anderson my full attention and will judge him on his actions , not his past .He might prove to be excellent in that role , who knows,
now about retaliation :
Not sure if this is the case., In Europe we do not do this .We suspend people involved in accidents, this is standard , some need retraining ,some come back to work ( almost always in the same facility) and some want to change jobs, but they are generally seen more as victims than culprits.
Here from what we know so far, the controllers and their supervisors were trained to work on local procedures made long before they came to the facility . Those procedures were or became unsafe but if this is how they were trained to work , you can't blame the operators for faulty procedures . OK but what about supervision ? 10 managers in 10 years, 5 in the last 5 years , show that some possibly felt vey uncomfortable with what they were seeing. But for me they also were kind of victims of the system

Can\x92t say about the Army, but the USAF standard for altimeters is exactly the same as the FAA. Additionally, the USAF is very specific that in civil airspace we will comply with ICAO SARPs, FAA regulations or any bilatera agreements in place.

Thanks for raising a smile on an otherwise dull day!

In my ( European) world Procedures are written down and yes they can be altered with a pilot request and controller approval. but it is adherence first .
Taking a road procedure similarity : . at a crossroad you can have a stop sign or a triangle giving priority , or nothing
The written procedures are : at a stop sign you must stop even if there is no traffic.

:Transposing this to DCA route 4 map l the procedure should have been in Europe at least ;
1) hold ay golf balls until you get a clearance to proceed . (so that in case of loss of comms , blocked freq, etc.. you can't proceed ).
2) pilot or controller can request visual separation if all t he following conditions re met : typically VMC, and in daylight and traffic is in sight and maintained in sight and both aircrfat pilots are informed. of each other position
3) lateral deviations by the helicopters to fly over built up areas of the city at 200ft will; not be permitted.

Big differences .

Now a pilot can request visual separation at any time but Controller can refuse at any time to .. To my knowledge requesting visual a night using NVG is not covered in the definition of " visual acquisition " in ICAO, so legally it could be challenged I guess . Same as when a pilot reports "visual" on his TCAS display . It is not valid , and for good reasons .
But KDCA is not in Europe, and ICAO SARPs do not apply to military aircrfat , so the outcome of all this is quite uncertain .In fact i would not be surprised if nothing dramatic changes as far as procedures are concerned, Route 4 will be permanently removed I guess, but other than that ? business a usual with visual separations at night ? .

The 78 feet deviation by the Mil Heli is not the cause of this accident . I hope the lawyers during the trial do not focus on that and minimize the rest .

Bit of historical background : when designing this route decades ago they must have followed basic ICAO/ FAA principles . separation IFR-VFR is 500 feet . allowed deviation then was 100 ft either way , so even if one a/c is 100ft above and the other 100ft too low , there would still be 300 ft separation preventing a collision ,
When that was introduced decades ago I bet you a bottle of (real) Champagne that the procedure was use of that route 4 was restricted during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures. It was one or the other but not both simultaneously .
How , when and why , over time , did it degraded to the point that this restriction could be disregarded would be interested to investigate and unveil . The why I think we know, i.e. enabling to move more and more traffic, but when and by who we don't. How and on who's pressure did the numerous previous incidents got disregarded is another question worth asking . Not why the Heli pilot was flying 78 ft too high .

Throwing the Heli pilot (and perhaps also the controller on duty) "under the bus" as you say in your country, would be so wrong as it would prevent getting to the truth and learn the real lessons of this accident .

Agreed.

If the helicopter hadn't called "traffic in sight," they would've been instructed to hold until the CRJ was clear. In general, a VFR aircraft saying "traffic in sight" is effectively exempt from such procedures.