Posts about: "IFR" [Posts: 98 Page: 5 of 5]¶

When operating in the USA (20+ years ago) I was told, "if ATC ask if you can see XXX traffic, say negative."
If everybody denied visual contact with the other traffic in IFR conditions then ATC will be really pissed, but will have to provide you separation. Isn't that still the case? You can never be completely sure that what you can actually see is the traffic ATC want you to see.

Lufthansa tried that at SFO in November 2023... didn't go well for them

Lufty at SFO

ATC will still have to provide you with separation, yes. But some US airports have too much traffic to operate without pilots accepting visual separation, so you may have to land elsewhere. Hence the discussion upthread about the inseparability of regulation from policy, economics and (ultimately) politics.

Post #10 on that thread...

And the last post on it, in April 2024...

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This sort of ties in with EasyStreet s comments on UK ATC in Class D ops which I used extensively. The key is being sure you really can see the actual aircraft ATC want you to see. In many cases, it is easy - it was SOPS for my time travelling about with my pax or when enjoying myself doing a bit of private flying. I'd say this happend (commercially) 80% of the time - otherwise I was IFR. The real difference between my experience and what happened here is 2-fold:-

- Traffic density.
- Routing configurations.

In my experience at UK regionals, there is usually just not the taffic density we see here (tho it can be busy at times at certain "rush hours"!) and, also, the ergonomics of the flightpaths were such that you weren't looking back up a busy approach path with many aircraft "in stream" thus making "picking the one" almost impossible. If I had to join a stream I was either changed to IFR for the ILS to "avoid an excessive delay" (which was ATC basically saying to me "we can't do this safely under VFR" which got my vote each time) or, if a smaller stream, I'd be extended downwind by App who effectively then handed Twr a workable solution which App had "engineered". At no time was I given anything more than a simple "pick 1 out of 1"-type or, very rarely, a "1 out of 2" scenario and never where the Twr were "trying to wallpaper a room, tile a bathroom and re-wire the main fuse box" at the same time. In the odd "1 out of 2" situations I was always asked "Do you see the 2 aircraft on Final?" and, unless I saw both, it was "Negative, only 1 in sight!".

The takeaway is that what's "legally allowed" is sometimes "not practically wise" and that seems to have been the undoing here.

I have noticed this and it really hosed me one night. Coming home to KMTN from KVKX (right next to DCA actually) I was VFR in the Class B at 2000 feet. The ceilings were dropping going north, but traffic at KBWI was all going along with calling the field in sight at 2500 feet. BWI wanted me above their landing traffic, so I was told to climb to 2500, which put me in IMC. There was NO WAY anyone was visual at 2500, but they didn't want to deal with a pop-up IFR flight in the middle of a busy push, so I got "You will be in the clear at 2500, everyone is reporting airport in sight". The message was very clear, don't screw the whole thing up! At least they didn't ask me if I could see any specific airplane, I guess they knew what the answer would be.

I refer to the case of Lufthansa identifying night visual separation as a safety issue and deciding not to allow it, then one of their aircraft having to divert from SFO because of this decision. AA banning DCA 33 might have had the same kind of result.

Anyway, after 72 pages it seems fairly clear that separating IFR from VFR at night by visual means inside the circuit pattern of a major airport is not a great plan. This could happen anywhere in the US and it would be an interesting exercise for the NTSB/FAA to see how many separation losses there were at other airports, as they have the software to do that. It is easy to fixate on this accident and the immediate environment when similar setups exist all over the place. It\x92s not just about helicopters and the military - civil and fixed wing on that kind of clearance could be just as risk-bearing.

It was a visual maneuver to 33 on an IFR clearance. Instrument Meteorological Conditions (IMC) weren’t a factor.

It's simple; the altitude restriction was never intended to be the sole method of separation. At most, it was an additional layer of protection. The controller wouldn't have cleared the Blackhawk to continue if they hadn't said they had the traffic in sight. But they did say that, whether it was true or not. ATC is a service provided to pilots, not an authority. Pilot-applied visual separation essentially overrides any procedure used by ATC. When you say "Traffic in sight," you are saying "I don't need your help maintaining separation, I have it under control and I take full responsibility."

The IFR aircraft wouldn't be required to have the traffic in sight.

And yet as we saw, this approach failed. So something has to be wrong with it.

Yet was not the controller required to inform the CRJ of the helicopter, which (as the inquiry noted) he failed to do? Thus a possible cross-check was lost.

Bit of confusion here . TCAS is not a separation tool , it is a last minute anti collision system . You are not obliged to monitor the screen, definitively not at 300ft on finals Not sure the CRJ crew noticed it . . Fact is the CRJ crew was not passed the traffic info . the reason why has been covered in the NTSB docket ( interview of the controller)
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "

PIC retains final authority as to the disposition of the aircraft, and collision avoidance definitely falls into the "don't particularly care what the book says" territory.

The only metric seems to be how much traffic gets moved. I hope this accident highlights how visual separation at night isn't appropriate at major airports (particuarly when airline IFR traffic is involved), but personally I don't think anything will change.

For a while I was flying schedules which were often conducted SVFR as they were very short legs . I'd often get from Twr on joining the circuit at my various destinations, and having confirmed I'd got traffic XYZ in sight, a clearance "Roger, C/S, keeping that traffic in sight, report Final XX. You are No 2 to the XYZ.". From that point on, my positioning was determined by me based on visual separation with the other traffic - so not totally identical to the DCA accident but the principle was the same - I was responsible for remaining clear of XYZ and positioning appropriately behind them (including accounting for wake/runway occupancy effects etc). Occasionally I'd then get "C/S, new clearance - report ready for L/R base." usually with a reason if there was time - often it was App not leaving TWR a big enough gap to sneak me in between 2 IFR arrivals.

In other words, Twr would delegate separation to me with the initial clearance but, if for whatever reason, they became unhappy - I got issued with a revised, more restrictive, clearance. Similarly, if I lost sight of the traffic at any point after the initial "Report Final" clearance, it was my responsibility to advise ATC that I was no longer visual with XYZ (ie I could no longer comply with the clearance ATC had given me) and ATC would then update my clearance on that basis - "..... report ready for base" or similar until they could visually assure themselves of separation. Indeed, on those occasions, it was not unknown for ATC to say "C/S, I have you both in sight - that traffic is well ahead of you, report Final XX, No 2". I was thus relieved of my responsibility to self-position.

What ATC giveth away in their airspace ATC can taketh back again in their airspace!

Now, "normalised deviation" may skew such a way of working such as PAT routinely expecting to get what they ask for and ATC routinely giving them what they want......... Not saying that happened at DCA but............ Also, I've lost track in the Thread if PAT were visual but with another a/c or the intended one but simply "lost it" at some point........... And whether visual separation at night in such busy airspace was wise ............

Re ATC assigning own separation, that happens here in Oz. IIRC, it went like this: "Report sighting the 737 on final"..."Traffic sighted"..."Follow as number two". Although critically, Our Oz AIP states:
Re TCAS, my Boeing manual states
Change 7 came in some years ago. I wonder if the CRJ's TCAS was the same and the TA was inhibited a few seconds before the collision, which was below 500ft?

Re "normalised deviation", I'm not sure this applies here. Normalised deviation means deviating from published (perportedly safe) procedures, with no adverse consequences, so the deviations continue. In this case, it's pretty obvious that the "published procedures" were flawed in the first place.

Fitting and enabling ADSB has to have some positives, so I don\x92t think it\x92s a waste of time. The elephant in the room is mixing IFR and VFR at night on routes that have no (or totally inadequate) separation; this is inside controlled airspace - it should be controlled! The whole point of separating traffic by level, speed, direction and/or SID/airway/STAR is that if ATC goes down (or is distracted) or has to revert to procedural separation, aircraft are not immediately going to start hitting each other.

I am pretty sure enabling ADS-B will make that near impossible, even though it is in a slightly asinine way.

What has that got to do with this event? They were not on an IFR flight plan.
Also, as an aside the term "altitude" is typically used in aviation. (Yes, I know that DH for a precision approach is "decision height"...and HAT is shown on approach plates (Height Above Touchdown).

Thank you, I am a professional pilot so I do understand the difference in meaning. 'Height' is the correct term here as the route was defined with reference to the surface and the pilots were using the (badly named...) radalt as their height reference.

Why do I think the IFR ACS might be relevant? Because it specifies the accuracy the FAA requires of skilled pilots when separation is to be achieved by procedural means. The fact that the "designed" separation between the 33 approach slope and the top of Route 4 was less than the allowable error for skilled pilots could be used to rebut an allegation of negligent flying as the cause of the accident. The Army no doubt has its own standards document, but I'd be surprised if it was radically different. Building the argument off the FAA's own document forces the focus onto its route design and visual separation procedures.

As to why this might be relevant to VFR flying - is it your opinion that parameters should be flown more accurately in VFR than in IFR? In any case, I have now dug further into the ACS and the same tolerance is prescribed for commercial VFR helicopter operations (see CH.VII.A.S8).

Probably at Hains Point.
Thank you for your reply. I will offer the view that you are overthinking this.

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.