February 15, 2025, 02:20:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828339
Vertical and routing wise, the description is pretty detailed.
Personally I think these discussions on the lateral width, or the exact position of the route isn't really relevant. Abeam KDCA for example, I expect not exactly hugging the river bank, but remaining well within the eastern half of the river, wouldn't cause any 'pilot deviation'.
Subjects
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 16, 2025, 01:54:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828951
As someone with an insight into the complexities of retrofitting certified avionics hardware and the associated wiring, controllers and antennae to fighter jets and other military aircraft, I would be completely unsurprised if, as seems to be evident from the video imbedded at #1112, the USA\x92s elite, pre-eminent military aerobatics team uses a portable ADS-B unit velcro\x92ed to the aircraft\x92s glare shield. And if it\x92s OK for them, I can\x92t see why it wouldn\x92t be OK for the PAT helicopters and I wouldn\x92t be surprised if that\x92s the ADS-B to which various references having been made.
I suppose the operational question is whether the aircraft on which these portable units are used are permitted to fly without them on board and working. My guess is that there will be no prohibition. They are just \x91nice to haves\x92 but not essential for the ops in which they engage.
And there\x92s a causal question anyway: Would a functioning ADS-B system \x96 portable or otherwise - on the PAT helo have made any difference? The answer depends on the variables around the alert suppression parameters in each aircraft\x92s systems and the effectiveness of the format of alerts \x96 if any \x96 given in each cockpit.
I suppose the operational question is whether the aircraft on which these portable units are used are permitted to fly without them on board and working. My guess is that there will be no prohibition. They are just \x91nice to haves\x92 but not essential for the ops in which they engage.
And there\x92s a causal question anyway: Would a functioning ADS-B system \x96 portable or otherwise - on the PAT helo have made any difference? The answer depends on the variables around the alert suppression parameters in each aircraft\x92s systems and the effectiveness of the format of alerts \x96 if any \x96 given in each cockpit.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 16, 2025, 03:52:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11828969
For us lowly civilians a Velcro ADS-B receiver isn't getting you within 30 miles of KDCA, you need it to transmit too. The helicopter having even receive ADS-B would have helped hugely if they looked at it, the fact they weren't looking at the plane they thought they were would have been pretty apparent.
What they could have seen and heard in the PAT helo depends on a lot on the matters to which I referred, among others, in my earlier post.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 17, 2025, 01:56:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11829588
You should feel rage. Managing control of airspace is not a matter of political interest any more than the rules of the road for driving cars is. And in my previous tirade I forgot the earliest parts of this ****show which was an aircraft on a stabilised approach asked to circle to a lesser equipped runway in order to expedite traffic. The next time I hear someone in authority say that safety is our number one concern, I think I'll probably choke on my own vomit.
I’m very much opposed to the helicopter routes, both in planning and execution. The routes shouldn’t exist, if DCA is to remain open. But, to say safety trumps (excuse me) everything is unrealistic. As soon as the wheels leave the runway, there’s risks. This case someone is government accepted too much risk; crews accepted too much risk and normalized that risk. Maneuvering to a different is generally very acceptable, putting a helicopter on final is way too much risk. The system failed to see it for what it was.
Subjects
DCA
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 17, 2025, 02:19:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11829594
KDCA 01 visual to 33 (note: not circle, 121 carriers are not circling authorized in the US) has been a standard procedure for, at least 45, that I flew there. Expediting, moving more planes is always one of the goals. Sure, we can make it safer, only one plane flies on each side of the Mississippi. After that, it\x92s a negotiation.
I\x92m very much opposed to the helicopter routes, both in planning and execution. The routes shouldn\x92t exist, if DCA is to remain open. But, to say safety trumps (excuse me) everything is unrealistic. As soon as the wheels leave the runway, there\x92s risks. This case someone is government accepted too much risk; crews accepted too much risk and normalized that risk. Maneuvering to a different is generally very acceptable, putting a helicopter on final is way too much risk. The system failed to see it for what it was.
I\x92m very much opposed to the helicopter routes, both in planning and execution. The routes shouldn\x92t exist, if DCA is to remain open. But, to say safety trumps (excuse me) everything is unrealistic. As soon as the wheels leave the runway, there\x92s risks. This case someone is government accepted too much risk; crews accepted too much risk and normalized that risk. Maneuvering to a different is generally very acceptable, putting a helicopter on final is way too much risk. The system failed to see it for what it was.
Subjects
DCA
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 17, 2025, 06:24:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11829650
So this just cracks me up. He's in the middle of the river where the route says it's up the East bank, and that's OK because the routes are not defined with no procedural separation from landing traffic. He's instructed to pass behind the CRJ, but that would involve him either holding short or deviating over the city at 200ft at night, but instead he chooses to plow right on. The helicopter is out of his standard altitude, and the jet is way above the glideslope, and ATC encourages them to sort it out themselves. And the helicopter crew are wearing NVGs. What could possibly go wrong.
You could reasonably define the bank as the water's edge, and therefore expect crews to fly along an infinitesimally narrow path. Or as the space between the water's edge and the [edge of the flood plain | first flat area | something else], which would imply that the western boundary changes with the water level. Both imply the route is substantially above land.
Neither are useful for precise navigation, but the map and the description are probably 'close enough' if they are only needed for general route guidance and knowing that structures on the east bank need to be NOTAMed for helicopters, but probably not the west bank.
A good reminder that measurements/specifications without tolerance are often worse than useless.
If it quacks like a duck... this kind of "It can't be an X because we can't do it, so we'll call it a Y" leads to a culture that gets used to massaging the truth for convenience. Did we hear more on the Alaska door plug that was an 'opening' not a 'removal'?
Subjects
ATC
CRJ
DCA
FAA
KDCA
NTSB
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Pass Behind
Pass Behind (All)
Separation (ALL)
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 17, 2025, 09:45:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11829754
Facts of life: at one time or another pilots will set incorrect QNH values, altimeters will fail, flights will end up above or below a glideslope, lateral boundaries will be breached, pilots will fail checkrides, radio transmissions will be blocked, visual illusions will occur, air traffic controllers will get distracted. So any procedure that depends on all those things never happening is flawed. We are not living in some utopic la-la-land.
So I wouldn\x92t call the altimeter discussion a distraction per se - not yet, anyway. It\x92s just one tiny fact in a complex picture, but still an important fact nevertheless. It is a concrete example of one (or more) of those, by itself insignificant, real-life deviations from perfection occurring. I expect (hope) that the NTSB will use this issue just to illustrate the point that relevant traffic procedures at KDCA were largely based on wishful thinking.
So I wouldn\x92t call the altimeter discussion a distraction per se - not yet, anyway. It\x92s just one tiny fact in a complex picture, but still an important fact nevertheless. It is a concrete example of one (or more) of those, by itself insignificant, real-life deviations from perfection occurring. I expect (hope) that the NTSB will use this issue just to illustrate the point that relevant traffic procedures at KDCA were largely based on wishful thinking.
Subjects
KDCA
NTSB
QNH
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 20, 2025, 00:01:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11831866
I used ADS-B reported GEO Altitude as my source and added the EGM96 correction for the lat/long of KDCA. Given that, nothing in the chart is derived from pressure altitude. As an aside, I did take a look at QNH adjusted pressure altitude (to get calibrated altitude) and it was largely in agreement with Geo Altitude. The exceptions were two helicopters N11PP and N22PP, and I don't know if it is something I am doing wrong in my calculations or something wrong with their ADS-B equipment.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
KDCA
QNH
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
February 20, 2025, 07:51:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11831998
I used ADS-B reported GEO Altitude as my source and added the EGM96 correction for the lat/long of KDCA. Given that, nothing in the chart is derived from pressure altitude. As an aside, I did take a look at QNH adjusted pressure altitude (to get calibrated altitude) and it was largely in agreement with Geo Altitude. The exceptions were two helicopters N11PP and N22PP, and I don't know if it is something I am doing wrong in my calculations or something wrong with their ADS-B equipment.
Subjects
ADSB (All)
KDCA
QNH
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
March 11, 2025, 20:08:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11845606
AIR-25-01 Deconflict Airplane and Helicopter Traffic in the Vicinity of KDCA
Findings
Existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision.
When Route 4 operations are prohibited as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-25-1, it is critical for public safety helicopter operations to have an alternate route for operating in and around Washington, DC, without increasing controller workload.
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. (A-25-1) (Urgent)
Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)
Existing separation distances between helicopter traffic operating on Route 4 and aircraft landing on runway 33 are insufficient and pose an intolerable risk to aviation safety by increasing the chances of a midair collision.
When Route 4 operations are prohibited as recommended in Safety Recommendation A-25-1, it is critical for public safety helicopter operations to have an alternate route for operating in and around Washington, DC, without increasing controller workload.
To the Federal Aviation Administration:
Prohibit operations on helicopter Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when runways 15 and 33 are being used for departures and arrivals, respectively, at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport. (A-25-1) (Urgent)
Designate an alternative helicopter route that can be used to facilitate travel between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge when that segment of Route 4 is closed. (A-25-2) (Urgent)
Subjects
ATC
Findings
KDCA
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
March 14, 2025, 03:12:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11847144
One example, after the KBED G IV accident, the NTSB went to the NBAA asking for help in better use of FOQA data increase compliance with flight control checks. Remember, this the G IV crew who tried to take-off with locked controls. ASIAS has tens of thousands of flight control checks and compliance data. Focused on that, measure it, problem mostly solved.
GE Digital’s FOQA programs also have a tremendous data bank. For example, KTEB has an easily the highest rate of TCAS encounters for corporate operators. How it compares to KDCA, I again cannot say. The airlines have the KDCA data for their operations. They know how many and where TCAS events occur. More evidence of normalization, I suppose.
Subjects
Close Calls
FAA
KDCA
NTSB
TCAS (All)
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
April 22, 2025, 03:15:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11871332
I\x92d add, the FAA and the airlines that operate at KDCA had the data on near-misses, RA\x92s. If the various safety managers pressed crews for reports on TAs, near-misses, ATC failures major or minor; and the FAA brought the stakeholder in a room, the problems would have been identified. Whether action would have been taken OR the risks were deemed acceptable due to no accidents, I cannot say. I suspect inertia would have overcome the group and nothing changed. It\x92s now blindingly obvious the risks that were accepted as either reasonable or just resigned to luck being a strategy.
Subjects
ATC
FAA
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
May 03, 2025, 19:28:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11877898
CAUTION - TFC PAT - KJPN EAST/WEST OPS. SPECIAL PRO TFC PAT. WHEN LDG W ALL ARR ACFT MAKE LEFT TFC CIRCLING THE PENTAGON AT OR BLW 200 FT. WHEN DEP E ALL ACFT MAKE RIGHT TFC CIRCLING THE PENTAGON AT OR BLW 200 FT.
SPECIAL PRO; TFC PAT AND OPR RULES EXIST DUE TO WASHINGTON TCA; PRK; NOISE; FLT PLAN CDN AND VISUAL RTE RSTRNS.
HELIPAD PHYSLY LCTD ON W SIDE OF PENTAGON BLDG.
Owned by the Army
U.S.ARMY ATCA-ASO
CAMERON STA
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
U.S.ARMY ATCA-ASO
CAMERON STA
ALEXANDRIA, VA 22314
Subjects
KDCA
PAT23
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 01, 2025, 03:53:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11931630
Once the recording/transcript is available I'll try to find it. I remember it struck me as odd.
Was it her that later said she'd use baro since the route was MSL not AGL?
Again need to recheck against the transcript. my memory may be fuzzy. I was doing 3 different things at the time.
I have several things I want to revisit from the 2 days so far.
Was it her that later said she'd use baro since the route was MSL not AGL?
Again need to recheck against the transcript. my memory may be fuzzy. I was doing 3 different things at the time.
I have several things I want to revisit from the 2 days so far.
Subjects
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
August 15, 2025, 06:37:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11938789
In my ( European) world Procedures are written down and yes they can be altered with a pilot request and controller approval. but it is adherence first .
Taking a road procedure similarity : . at a crossroad you can have a stop sign or a triangle giving priority , or nothing
The written procedures are : at a stop sign you must stop even if there is no traffic.
:Transposing this to DCA route 4 map l the procedure should have been in Europe at least ;
1) hold ay golf balls until you get a clearance to proceed . (so that in case of loss of comms , blocked freq, etc.. you can't proceed ).
2) pilot or controller can request visual separation if all t he following conditions re met : typically VMC, and in daylight and traffic is in sight and maintained in sight and both aircrfat pilots are informed. of each other position
3) lateral deviations by the helicopters to fly over built up areas of the city at 200ft will; not be permitted.
Big differences .
Now a pilot can request visual separation at any time but Controller can refuse at any time to .. To my knowledge requesting visual a night using NVG is not covered in the definition of " visual acquisition " in ICAO, so legally it could be challenged I guess . Same as when a pilot reports "visual" on his TCAS display . It is not valid , and for good reasons .
But KDCA is not in Europe, and ICAO SARPs do not apply to military aircrfat , so the outcome of all this is quite uncertain .In fact i would not be surprised if nothing dramatic changes as far as procedures are concerned, Route 4 will be permanently removed I guess, but other than that ? business a usual with visual separations at night ? .
Taking a road procedure similarity : . at a crossroad you can have a stop sign or a triangle giving priority , or nothing
The written procedures are : at a stop sign you must stop even if there is no traffic.
:Transposing this to DCA route 4 map l the procedure should have been in Europe at least ;
1) hold ay golf balls until you get a clearance to proceed . (so that in case of loss of comms , blocked freq, etc.. you can't proceed ).
2) pilot or controller can request visual separation if all t he following conditions re met : typically VMC, and in daylight and traffic is in sight and maintained in sight and both aircrfat pilots are informed. of each other position
3) lateral deviations by the helicopters to fly over built up areas of the city at 200ft will; not be permitted.
Big differences .
Now a pilot can request visual separation at any time but Controller can refuse at any time to .. To my knowledge requesting visual a night using NVG is not covered in the definition of " visual acquisition " in ICAO, so legally it could be challenged I guess . Same as when a pilot reports "visual" on his TCAS display . It is not valid , and for good reasons .
But KDCA is not in Europe, and ICAO SARPs do not apply to military aircrfat , so the outcome of all this is quite uncertain .In fact i would not be surprised if nothing dramatic changes as far as procedures are concerned, Route 4 will be permanently removed I guess, but other than that ? business a usual with visual separations at night ? .
Subjects
ATC
DCA
ICAO
KDCA
Night Vision Goggles (NVG)
Route 4
Separation (ALL)
TCAS (All)
Traffic in Sight
Visual Separation
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.
September 30, 2025, 17:13:00 GMT
permalink Post: 11962127
Thanks a lot for your detailed explanations WR 6-3 . One is nearly always feeling more educated after reading your lengthy posts .
To answer your 2 questions , the fist one is easy , over my nearly 50 years of aviation experience , except recently where we start to discuss seriously Human factors, Fatigue , Mental well being , it was always to blame the Pilots or the controllers first when you can , and protect management and manufacturers was the priority
Al Wiener had even a law for that in the 1980s : .
To the second question , concrete examples, yes there are . For instance ,nearly all the Japanese accidents and serious incidents resulted in pilots or controllers" being thrown under the bus" as you say , ,some sent to jail, and fired , because in their legal system someone has to be blamed . Watch the upcoming Haneda one .
It you want one , the one I know pretty well is . the Nantes ( France) collision , 2 civil aircrfat under military ATC ) Iberia and Spantax) back in 1973 , at the first trial the Spantax pilot was blamed to protect the military ATC institution , (but overturned in appeal a few years later )
In the US I do not immediately recall any particular involving military ops but there must be some similar to KDCA,, maybe someone has time to run through a proper judicial database .
To answer your 2 questions , the fist one is easy , over my nearly 50 years of aviation experience , except recently where we start to discuss seriously Human factors, Fatigue , Mental well being , it was always to blame the Pilots or the controllers first when you can , and protect management and manufacturers was the priority
Al Wiener had even a law for that in the 1980s : .
Law #
21. :In aviation, there is no problem so great or so complex that it cannot be blamed on the pilot.
It you want one , the one I know pretty well is . the Nantes ( France) collision , 2 civil aircrfat under military ATC ) Iberia and Spantax) back in 1973 , at the first trial the Spantax pilot was blamed to protect the military ATC institution , (but overturned in appeal a few years later )
In the US I do not immediately recall any particular involving military ops but there must be some similar to KDCA,, maybe someone has time to run through a proper judicial database .
Subjects
ATC
KDCA
Links are to this post in the relevant subject page so that this post can be seen in context.
Reply to this quoting this original post. You need to be logged in. Not available on closed threads.