Posts about: "NDAA" [Posts: 12 Page: 1 of 1]¶

From Senate Commerce Committee website, following is a summary of the ROTOR Act - Rotorcraft Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform Act. Commerce Committee vote may take place next week.
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Rotor Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform (ROTOR) Act
Upgrading In-Flight Safety Technology and Fixing Helicopter Operations to Eliminate Risk
[Sponsors] Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Todd Young (R-IN)

The Problem : The midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29th was preventable. For decades, the airspace around the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) operated without an accident, but with thousands of close calls that should have resulted in preventive action. The Black Hawk was likely operating in congested airspace without transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out\x97a satellite beacon technology that can transmit location, altitude, and velocity to air traffic control and other nearby aircraft faster than radar or other transponders. The airspace is only as safe as its least equipped aircraft, which is why military aircraft must not play by different rules.

The Solution: The ROTOR Act
The ROTOR Act improves aviation safety, addresses FAA knowledge and oversight of ADS-B, and directs the Army Inspector General (OIG) to reevaluate its aviation safety practices. The bill requires:
1. All aircraft operators to equip with ADS-B In technology and transmit such information. ADS-B In is a technology for aircraft to receive location signals from other nearby aircraft and ground technology, improving safety in the sky and on runways.
2. Closes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) loophole that permitted the Army Black Hawk to fly without broadcasting ADS-B Out. The ROTOR Act allows the FAA to only grant exceptions for \x93sensitive government missions,\x94 not training flights.
3. Requires the FAA to review helicopter routes near airports. The FAA would comprehensively evaluate the airspace at congested airports\x97where helicopters and airplanes are flying near each other\x97nationwide.
4. Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army\x92s aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety.
5. Initiates FAA study on dynamic restricted area for helicopters near airports. The FAA would review whether audio and visual signals could be deployed to reduce airspace confusion and avoid traffic conflicts.
6. Repeals a Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA provision that exempted the Department of Defense from enacted ADS-B transmission requirements.

Why This Matters: The tragic midair collision earlier this year exposed serious and systemic weaknesses in how civilian and military aircraft share and operate in congested airspace. While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation continues, initial findings show glaring failures in oversight and coordination that must be addressed now, not later. The ROTOR Act was drafted in direct response to the operational shortcomings that led to the midair collision. Deconflicting congested airspace and establishing better communication standards between civilian and military aircraftis not optional\x97it is essential. The ROTOR Act does exactly that, ensuring American skies remain the safest in the world.

((Long pause.....))
1. Facts. The NYT does report the House passed its version of the NDAA. The NYT further reports that the provision at issue does "not appear in the Senate version" of the NDAA which the upper chamber previously passed. Though I have not worked on any Capitol Hill staff, it still is safe to say that there will be a conference between the two bodies to iron out a final version acceptable to majorities in both chambers.
NOTE: the NYT also reports the strong objections of the aviation sector leadership in the Senate, on an actually bipartisan basis. This includes the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Commerce Committee (Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), respectively, and the Chair and Ranking Member of the Committee's Aviation Subcommittee (Sen. Jerry Moran (R-Kansas) and Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D.-Illinois)). Doubtless few need to be reminded that Senator Duckworth, currently the Land of Lincoln's junior United States Senator, flew helicopters in the United States Army in armed conflict and actual combat during which she was severely wounded. I don't want to get bumped into blasting jets but I don't see the provision at issue as a wise legislative manuever or that it is wise to make Sen. Duckworth really angry about an aspect of helicopter operations in Washington, D.C. airspace.

Further, NTSB Chair Homendy, per the NYT: "Nobody actually knows what a commercial aviation compatibility risk assessment is". She also reportedly noted that the legislative measure does not task this assessment, whatever it might be intended to cover or what process it might be intended to utilize, to the FAA. Designation of a service secretary and the Secretary of Transportation as authority for issuing the pertinent waiver is not the same thing as tasking the process to FAA, first, as a strictly legal and legislative matter, and second, as a fact of life in the interagency.

2. Interpretation. Cynically, one could assert that this provision is another instance of the drive toward almost unlimited or, as a practical matter, effectively unlimited executive power.

Presumptuously, one could instead assert that somewhere deep inside the national security or intelligence bureaucracy, there is some as yet undisclosed risk or development which requires the Army or any other service to operate helicopter flights in a manner the same or very similar to the procedures allowed prior to the accident.

It may be poor form to transfer the phrase from its original context, but I think the provision at issue produces shock and awe, except that the awe is in the nature of disgust.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/Documents/...tion%20Act.pdf

Letter to Congressional leaders re: NDAA from NTSB Chair Homendy.
The letter is addressed to the Chair and Ranking Members of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate.

I'm coming to like Jennifer Homendy. It certainly looked like one of the contributory factors to the DCA crash was the military considering themselves to be outside the normal best practises. They now seem to be seeking to make that explicit.

Good language and a strong statement. Too bad she spelled "Department of Defense" incorrectly.

I don't see anything in the above which states or implies that the provision in question is a good idea, or even just a neutral idea -- but then, the post perhaps (or likely) wasn't intended to state point of view on the provision's wisdom or absence of wisdom.

But regardless, I'm just trying to "noodle" (as a higher-seniority level lawyer in the same firm once used the term) how such a provision was inserted into the NDAA. I might have been taken in too much by press releases and watching hearings, but the current leadership of the House T&I (Transportation and Infrastructure) Committee has not given - to at least this one observer - any reason to think they would move in a direction contrary to the urgent safety recommendations made by NTSB soon after the accident (which were in fact implemented by DOT soon thereafter). So where is this coming from, this provision?

I won't try to argue leverage against any of the links in the reasoning in the quoted post. For one thing, the cynicism - not saying it isn't valid or warranted - on which the reasoning is based is sharper and more basic than the cynicism I usually experience. But this avoidance still doesn't address the question, where did the provision originate, and why?

Perhaps it is coming from the Executive branch and the Congress people involved feel pressure, for all sorts of Jet-Blasty reasons. The Pentagon might not want the adverse publicity of a trial which casts very unfavorable light. And with the recently announced systems integrator contract for the new ATC system, likewise, trial developments showing governmental incompetence would be seen as impeding the rest of the required appropriations. Not least, the public hype for the new ATC system has frequently referred to the work being completed in three or four years. Reliable sources (including a long time senior ATCO in a major European country with current involvement in a major ATCOs organization) scoff at the idea that all the necessary steps could possibly be completed in less than 8 to 10 years (including but not limited to site acquisition, construction, training on new equipment, not to mention sufficient rosters of ATCOs and then doing the relocations necessary if main facilities are actually consolidated). A really negative trial in Washington would not be helpful with regard to continuing to tout the expected so-very-rapid arrival of the new ATC system which will - it is said - make up for many years of lost time in the NAS.

I'm not arguing that this is what happened - just, what is the root of the provision? I mean, unless one believes it's a good idea, then I guess the "what if" is answered by saying, "good idea". Or even....
"That's good thinking there, Cool Breeze." (Couldn't resist the Boomer aside.)

From the Committee website; Rep. Nehls also has issued a statement opposing the NDAA provision which has elicited vehement objections from NTSB.

Washington, D.C. \x96 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Troy E. Nehls (R-TX) announced that the Subcommittee will receive testimony from Bryan Bedford, marking his first appearance in front of Congress as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Subcommittee Members will have the opportunity to discuss recent regulatory actions taken by the FAA and current issues in aviation, and seek updates on the continued implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The hearing, entitled, \x93The State of American Aviation,\x94 will be held at 10:00 a.m. ET on Tuesday, December 16, 2025, in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building.
Witness List:

The Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, United States Department of Transportation

His opposition by voting "YES" on it is curious. It seems like the wrong order to proceed. Would it not be better to object to the provision before the vote when there could be some influence in the House rather than hoping the Senate won't agree and just pass it as-is.

Thank you MechEngr for stating in detail, and explaining, the recommendations made by NTSB and their relation to ADS-B systems, both Out and In.

It appears I had mistakenly thought NTSB had made a recommendation after the accident about ADS-B. That was incorrect.

It would be interesting to try to unearth the document trail with respect to the agreement reached by FAA and the DoD with regard to ADS-B Out usage, which agreement was reached (per the NTSB Chair letter) after the accident. Of course unearthing documents which relate to controversial subjects could well be a fool's errand. .... ..... ...... oh wait, there's such a thing as pre-trial discovery, and the lawsuits are in federal district court.

Senator Cantwell gave two speeches in recent days on the Senate floor about Section 373. I'm not posting links to them, because "politics". Still, something worth noting from them is that the Senator, previously Chair of the Commerce Committe - the Committee with jurisdiction for civil aviation - and currently Ranking Member, stated she does not know who inserted the highly questionable Section 373 into the NDAA. And whether as prevention or preemption, yes, the families of Flight 5342, including the family of the First Officer, are raising a loud objection to Section 373 - but the concerns over the legislative provision are not based on any effort to serve or to please the trial lawyers suing on the families' behalf. Chairwoman Homendy of the NTSB does indeed operate in a political environment, no kidding, but she is conducting her public advocacy as a safety professional and not a politician. (I'm not lauding any Senator's bona fides as aviation safety advocates because, again "politics.")

Administrator Bedford testified today before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. The ostensible calling of the hearing as noted above was for an update on implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 as well as general oversight. As was widely anticipated, several Members questioned the Administrator, at times pointedly, about the presence and effect of Section 373 in the FY2026 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), i.e., the controversial provision undoing safety-related changes made in the aftermath of the DCA midair collision on 29 Janaury of this year.

The video link I am including in this post is from the Forbes magazine website (and I apologize that it includes adverts). I don't know if the video link presumably available on the Subcommittee webpage (or it could be on the Committee webpage) has the same time-stamps as the Forbes video and since it's the one I watched, I'm using it here.

The families of at least some of the families of people who lost their lives in the DCA midair were present for the hearing.

Rep. Nehls (R.-TX), Chair of the Subcomm., and the other three leaders each gave opening statements (Comm. Chair Sam Graves (R.-MO.), Comm. Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D.-WA.), and Subcomm. Ranking Member Andre Carson (D.-IN)). Representative Nehls's opening statement hinted that ADS-B Out and Sec. 373 were going to see some emphasis (unsurprising, as Rep. Nehls had already issued a statement decrying Sec. 373).

The Administrator's testimony started at around 19:00. When he concluded, the Subcommittee Chair, Rep. Nehls, opened the questioning (at about 23:00). He asked, in a fairly pointed manner, about the controversial Section of the NDAA, Sec. 373. What did the Administrator answer, readers of the thread (who presumably have far better things to do than watch Congressional hearings) may wonder??

Mr. Bedford responded that FAA policy is not to comment on pending legislation. But he added that the section had shown up in the NDAA without any advice having been sought from or given by the FAA. And that both he and Secretary Duffy have "no intention" of going back to the airspace situation as it was on January 29.

At about 29:15 the Administrator referred to "someone in the Senate" having placed Section 373 into the NDAA. At about 29:45, he noted that after the accident the gaps in the safety situation were closed "and will remain closed." He also seemed to refer to "renegotiation" of the FAA Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Defense (and at least twice during the hearing noted that the DoD had been good partners with FAA with regard to DCA (and Capital Region, I believe) airspace usage).

Congresswoman Norton also questioned the Administrator about Section 373 (1:47:__) although without much follow-up.

At about 2:15:__ (oops, I didn't note who was questioning) Mr. Bedford again used the phrase, "not going back" to the airspace situation as it existed, and that mixed traffic situations (military and civil) were, "not gonna happen". He noted the Memorandum of Agreement between FAA and the DoD - in this instance not referring to any renegotiation process (whether presently or planned) - and added that he is "not aware of any desire to change it" (close to verbatim, but I'm not a court reporter).

The Administrator's testimony was noteworthy for several other reasons (not counting the evidence the hearing provided that not every single Member of the House of Representatives deserves categorization in MechEngr's "critter" status), and here are two I thought most significant - most significant to a pro pilot audience, that is.

The current Administrator is a very smooth operator and this should surprise no one (and this is meant as a compliment to professionalism). Dealing with sometimes ill-founded questions (to be polite) and a few outright stupid questions takes patience. Beyond that, there were no instances, at least to the extent of my knowledge, when the Administrator ran away from the truth of the situation across the FAA. And he still managed to be a good soldier (so to speak) as a member of the current Executive administration. Without getting into politics but strictly in the realm of operating as a professional, not everyone in high places at the moment has the ability as well as willingness to talk detailed "X's and O's" about complicated federal enterprises while still staying within the lanes drawn somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue (see? - not politics).

Second, the Administrator provided several answers in his testimony about the status of the modernization program. As a possibly interesting even if small point, I don't think I heard "brand new ATC system" or even just "new ATC system" even once; it consistently was Air Traffic Control Modernization. Substantively, he outlined four layers: copper wire to fiber; analog to digital systems (and TDMA to VOIP); analog architecture in general to digital architecture; and a fourth layer of "compute" meaning that now, each facility has its own computing resources and the program intends to move this into one cloud-based layer. He also emphasized work that has already been done and gave a slam-dunk defense of selection of Peraton, and sorry for this disrespect, to an outright stupid question about FAA selecting Peraton as systems integrator.

(I realize the ATC Modernization program isn't exactly about DCA but in two senses it is; the accident greatly motivated the program to be drawn up and to receive the first tranche of appropriations, and the families of the accident victims were present for the hearing today. And a third factor: the facts about the modernization program are important as a counterpoint to Section 373's troubling content, not to mention its illegitimate sourcing. I have not heard one single voice of a legitimate aviation wise-person, not a single legitimate worthy, say it is a good provision. How modern can the NAS become if something like Section 373 -- no wait, if Section 373 itself actually -- becomes law?)

Link: https://youtu.be/UJM4YsV_hmw?si=116yx6W1AnJaIELY

The Senate has passed the legislation with the controversial Section 373 still included. According to The Wall Street Journal, the bill now goes to the President for signature into law. (Also, I should have checked my knowledge of legislative process more thoroughly - my previous post stating a House-Senate conference would follow Senate passage was incorrect.)

But there is other action regarding Section 373. Excerpt from the WSJ article:
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"The bill passed despite concern from federal officials and senators over an airport-related measure in the 3,086-page package. Lawmakers said it was unclear how the provision ended up in the final version, and senators quickly approved a bill that would overrule it. That measure still needs to be passed by the House.
......... [ paragraphs with background re: accident omitted ]......

"Anger at Section 373
Sens. Ted Cruz (R., Texas) and Maria Cantwell (D., Wash.) led a bipartisan effort to remove Section 373 and replace it with the ROTOR Act, which would require aircraft in controlled airspace to be equipped with ADS-B and would impose stricter oversight of military flights in the area. At a press conference Monday, Cruz, Cantwell and families of victims from the collision denounced the section.

\x93There\x92s no reason to have this language in the National Defense Authorization Act unless you\x92re somebody who wants to continue to see letting the military do whatever they want to do in a congested airspace,\x94 Cantwell said.

Trump administration officials have also criticized the measure. \x93It\x92s a safety whitewash,\x94 said Jennifer Homendy, chairwoman of the National Transportation Safety Board, last week. Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy said that regardless of any legislation passed by Congress, he will ensure that there is no cross traffic between planes and helicopters.

After the vote Wednesday on the NDAA, Cruz took to the floor and passed the ROTOR Act by unanimous consent, a shortcut to quickly approve legislation when no senator objects. A spokesman for the Defense Department said the Pentagon supports the bill."
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According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27. The meeting will include revealing and voting on the probable cause determination produced by its investigation into the DCA midair collision 29 January 2025.

The reporting indicates that the Board's final report is expected within two weeks.

Various safety recommendations also are anticipated to be on the agenda for the NTSB's January 27 meeting.

Of particular interest, among many other factors involved in this horrifically senseless accident (my characterization, not found in TAC reporting as such), is whether the NTSB's meeting which will mark the end of its official investigatory process will touch upon the controversial section of the NDAA, Section 373 (subject of previous posts at the time of passage, upthread).