You\x92re assuming facts not in evidence. It\x92s possible the LC wanted to create more separation between the CRJ and traffic departing on 01, but I was responding to another explanation, apparently one given by someone who regularly flies RJs into DCA.

That\x92s the kind of information that the NTSB will discover from interviews.

Absolutely, and it will be very interesting to see what the NTSB has to say about the "rules" and if the FAA does anything to change those rules. Pilot-applied visual separation is common at airports all over the US, day and night. Frankly, it was only a matter of time before a tragedy occurred, for the reasons you mentioned.

and from island air photo :
Spot on, but there is no EU or EASA IFR there are IFR rules and agreed global aviation standards ,Period What is ( or should I say was ) done in DC , or in SFO or with LAHSO, etc are all deviations to allow more traffic outside of the rules. Expedition taking over our good old "safety first" mantra .

Now , is delegating visual separation to an Helicopter ,at night ,( with pilots wearing NGV ) on an aircraft cleared off the ILS doing a circle visual NPA at 500 ft with 4 eyes most probably locked on the PAPI something safe ? with a 150- Ft margin of error designed on the chart ? But it is how the system was built and local controllers trained on doing this , since years. Normalization of Deviance.

I wish good luck to the NTSB and the FAA is trying to reverse this .

And thus the perpetually (usually unspoken) questions arise: Are the lives lost in this tragedy merely the price inevitably to be paid in return for airspace arrangements and an ATC system that would cost more than those lost lives were 'worth', if the system and arrangements had been more effective at preventing this kind of collision? Or is it mere luck that many other circumstances created by these airspace arrangements and the ATC system have ended with near misses rather than tragedy, thus justifying more expenditure on the airspace arrangements and the ATC system so as to prevent those near misses becoming collisions? (And let's not forget that the amount of concrete available on the ground at airports drives traffic capacity.)

Despite what's said almost universally by politicians and aviation authorities worldwide, the answers are driven and determined by politics, not the laws of physics and probabilities. "Safety is always our highest priority" is a meaningless but comforting sop for the public.

Ponder this question: If the POB the CRJ were senior politicians and important bureaucrats instead of the actual POB killed in this tragedy, would the investigation be carried out any differently, and its outcomes be any different, than if the POB were us nobodies?

I earnestly (perhaps naively) hope that the NTSB has and continues to have the corporate competence and the corporate integrity to investigate the circumstances of this tragedy, comprehensively, and to make frank and fearless findings and recommendations based on the objective facts and objective risks.

In its report into the Austin near-miss, the NTSB failed to mention, still less question why the FAA deviates from international mainstream practice by allowing landing clearances to be issued onto occupied runways. Such a fundamental omission in the investigation can only have arisen because the subject was considered "off limits" for some reason.

Regrettably, I suspect we will see the NTSB take the same approach to the question of visual separation at night. It can't so much as mention the resulting risks without putting the FAA (and as you rightly infer, politicians) in the position of having to admit that safety is not always king. On the evidence of Austin, they won't do that.

This is conflating two issues:
1.The bat-s### crazy way they run helicopters around DCA.
2. The usual practice of visual approaches and spacing in good weather. It has been that way for as long as I have been flying and I am having a hard time even visualizing all IFR spacing to the pavement on a clear day. Maybe asking an American about this is like asking a fish if water is wet?

The OTHER unrelated (?) issue of sorting out ground traffic. I was one on the same trip cleared to take off with an aircraft on short final and then cleared to land with an airplane just pulling out onto the active. To make that one better, I knew the person flying that plane and couldn't resist being snarky: "Ah XYZ tower, we'll be going around, Bob says not to wreck his airplane by landing on it".

I'm struggling to make sense of the numbers being bandied about here. Apparently the NTSB has said that the CRJ was at 375 feet,

But from the beginning, various plots have shown the collision occurring in mid-river. A little work with Google Earth will show that the extended 33 centre line reaches mid-river about 3,300 feet from the aimpoint of runway 33. A 3 degree glideslope and some trig will put it at 175 feet at that range, with obvious implications. 375 feet would be a big error with not much more than half a mile left to run.

What am I doing wrong?

Also, helicopter route 4 hugs the eastern bank of the Potomac until Goose Island and doesn't cross to the western bank until Wilson Bridge. So why did the Black Hawk perform a 45 degree right turn while still abeam DCA? (See, e.g., post #25) Was it intending to route direct to Fort Belvoir, ignoring the heli routes? (I think I've seen it was operating out of Joint Base Anacostia en route to Fort Belvoir, so the fact it was still abeam DCA must have been more than obvious.)

Puzzled.

I know I'm fighting a losing battle but here goes.....

What you are doing wrong is making guesses based on incomplete/inaccurate data that is in the public domain.

Assuming the NTSB figure of 375ft is correct, you still need more info for it to mean anything. Was that the AGL, AMSL or SPS height/altitude?
How accurate are the 'various plots' that indicate the collision occurred mid-river? They may be right; they may not be.
Was the CRJ on final or was it still positioning to final? If it wasn't on final then the trigonometric calculations of what height it should be at might not be correct.
What official evidence is there that the Blackhawk made a 45 degree turn, or could that be a data error in the publicly available information?

In summary what I am saying is that, despite all of the internet sleuths plotting tracking data, none of it is official and it is all subject to various errors. Whilst interesting to form an understanding of the circumstances, it can't be assumed to be accurate to within a few feet (vertically or laterally).

That 1-2 feet error would be a theoretical accuracy. The readout in the cockpit would be subject to significant errors during turns/pitch changes etc; without knowing the exact installation on a Blackhawk, it might also unlock based on the surface conditions. More importantly, the ATC instructions would probably be based on an altimeter setting and not Rad Alt.

How would that have worked in this scenario? Who do you think should have been directed by TCAS to do what? Does the Blackhawk even have TCAS?

It could have instructed the CRJ to climb (meaning initiate go-around immediately) and the heli to \x91not climb\x92 (meaning descend if practicable). Or it could have instructed heli to climb and CRJ to not climb (meaning continue descent or level and look out). I am saying that tech is there in principle and the 500ft RA floor was decided on 20-30y ago, probably to limit complexity and risk of dangerous RAs, but that this limitation could be revisited in future, especially with lots more data and modelling capability to assess.

I understand what you're saying, but given that DCA airport elevation is 14 feet, there's not a whole heap of difference between AGL and AMSL. And why would anyone be flying on standard pressure at a couple of hundred feet?

Similarly, given that both aircraft did sadly end up in the river, there's limited margin for error in the position of the impact as well. The Potomac is narrow near DCA as a glance at a chart will show.

Anyway, I have no expectation of solving anything. Just trying to understand the information that's out there.

According to the NTSB chief yesterday, the CRJ was at 325 ft plus or minus 25 feet, so not sure where the 375ft comes from?

To follow Henra’s on point question: where was the call from the ATC radar monitoring, saying, for example: Army XXX you have traffic, 12 o’clock 1.5 miles coming at you, make immediate left turn to YYY, climb to WWW??
The reporting made public to date leaves the impression that ATC in this instance is the tower controller and only the tower controller.
Is it possible that radar guidance ( to either party ) has not surfaced because the single tower controller was not ( possibly could not? ) monitoring the tower radar display ( assuming that there was such ).
And, if there was such a display, was there software in place that incorporated a triggered warning when two aircraft tracks predicted an intersection?
NTSB will certainly be looking into these aspects.
( An aside re the barometric altitude accuracy fed to the radar system in the case of the non ADSB helicopter-assume this will be part of the after accident homework? )

Regarding the collision of American Eagle JIA342 and Army Blackhawk PAT25, I lay the blame squarely on the shoulders of both the FAA and the United States Army Aviation Branch. If the NTSB in any way blame the pilots in the incident, they are not doing their job. Let’s look at all of the holes in this swiss cheese:

1. In an effort to maximize commercial air traffic in and out of DCA, the FAA has created the “deviate to RWY 33 procedure” for air traffic in-bound to RWY 01. This requires a right-hand turn from the RWY 01 approach followed by an immediate hard left-hand turn to line up on RWY 33. FAA criteria for a stabilized approach states that you have to be stable at 500 feet AGL on final in VMC or perform an immediate go-around. But on this particular approach, you will be at or below 400 feet AGL as you come out of the left turn to final. So the FAA has granted an exception to the “stabilized requirements” at DCA to allow for this maneuver. This allows ATC to shorten the distance between arriving and departing aircraft that are utilizing conflicting RWYs. The FAA in essence violates its own safety standards on stabilized approaches for the sake of expediency.

2. The FAA creates the Route 1/4 helicopter route through the DCA airspace as a VFR route with constantly changing altitude requirements. The lowest limit is at 200 ft MSL through the area east of DCA. Any pilot will tell you that flying that low over water at night is a best a tense experience. Try not to break that limit flying at night while also trying to communicate with ATC and simultaneously searching for possible conflicting aircraft.

3. The United States Army Aviation Branch deems it acceptable to allow training missions for Army Reserve pilots with limited flying experience to fly these helicopter routes through this complex and extremely active airspace. Compounding this, training flights at night using night-vision goggles are deemed “safe” in spite of the fact that using said goggles severely limits peripheral vision and makes it difficult if not impossible to perceive any color other than green and white. Picking out particular lights against the background of urban lighting is challenging, as is depth perception. Scanning key cockpit instruments is also made more difficult, making it challenging to accurately maintain altitude. Add to that workload the need to be in constant communication with ATC as well as monitoring all other comms traffic not directed to you but necessary in order to maintain good situational awareness. Given the density of commercial air traffic on this route, common sense would dictate that this route be flown by only the most experienced pilots and only when absolutely necessary. Reasonable logic would understand that conducting training missions should not be using final approach areas with heavy commercial traffic.

4. The Army crew on PAT25 are flying a mission they have been ordered to fly, at night and using night vision goggles. Although they may feel it is difficult and may be anxious about it, their command structure has determined that it is an appropriate training procedure and as such must meet minimum safety requirements. They do not have the authority to question the mission or the orders to fly it.

5. JIA342 is on approach for RWY 01, but is asked at the last minute by ATC to deviate to RWY 33, requiring the “circle to land” maneuver. Therefore, they are now on approach different from what they briefed for.

6. Any aircraft following the “circle to land” approach to RWY 33 will most likely have both pilots focused on RWY 33 as they come out of the left turn to final, especially if it was a last-minute request by ATC. In this case they will be looking to make sure that AA1630, which has just been given clearance to depart from RWY 01, is clear of the intersection with RWY 33 as they complete their final approach, and be ready for a go-around if it is not. In addition, this left bank makes it extremely difficult for the first officer to see any conflicting traffic coming towards them from the 1 to 2 o’clock position, as that traffic will probably be below the right window level. For the pilot, who is on the left side of the cockpit, visibility of such conflicting traffic will be nearly impossible.

7. For whatever reason, ATC is working with “split frequencies while controlling this airspace, so that although the controller hears both the aircraft on approach and the helo traffic south-bound on “Route 1”, the pilots of those respective aircraft only hear information directed at them. Thus they are not aware of all that is going on around them, and as such their situational awareness is limited by factors outside of their control.

8. ATC informs PAT25 of the conflicting aircraft on approach for RWY 33 at 1200 feet MSL, but at the time, PAT25 is heading almost due east towards the Jefferson Memorial on Helo Route 4 while JIA342 (the CRJ) is executing its right turn departing from the RWY 01 approach and is now heading in a northeast direction as it prepares to make a hard left onto the RWY 33 short final approach. From their respective positions, PAT25 in all likelihood sees the landing lights of AA3130 which is trailing JIA342 and whose landing lights are pointed almost directly in his direction, and mistakenly identifies it as the aircraft approaching RWY 33. At no time does it appear that ATC notifies JIA342 of the conflicting helo traffic. They are most likely focused on their approach to RWY 33, which was just handed to them.

9. As JIA342 rolls out of its left hand turn to final on RWY 33, completing the deviation they were just handed and had not briefed for, it is now approaching the 9-11 o’clock position of PAT25. Since the pilot of PAT25 is on the right-hand side of the Blackhawk, visibility of the CRJ may be limited. Both pilots of PAT25 are now most likely visibly fixated on passing to the rear of AA3130, which is in their 1-3 O’clock position, and which is the conflicting aircraft they perceive as the one ATC initially warned them about.

10. ATC, now receiving a conflicting aircraft warning, asks PAT25 if they have JIA342 in sight. In the absence of any obvious difference from the first mid-identification of the conflicting traffic, confirmation bias raises its ugly head. The voice response from the training pilot is calm and confident in stating that they do have it in sight and claim visual separation, probably proving once again that he mistakenly has AA3130 in sight slightly to his right directly in front of him and more than a mile away. Both pilots are totally unaware of JIA342 which is now arriving in front of them from their left.

11. The collision occurs.



In my humble opinion, the crews of both aircraft involved were set up by both the FAA and the Army Department of Aviation through a series of poorly based decisions which focused on expediency and departed from any appropriate utilization of a rational use of risk assessment. Consider the following:

1. Approval of the circling to RWY 33 maneuver which violates normal stabilized approach standards.

2. The establishment of a series of complex VFR helicopter track complex and heavily restricted air space as well as through final approach paths.

3. A 200 foot maximum altitude requirement over water and required even at night, which may result in a less than 200 foot vertical separation between aircraft on approach to RWY 33 and those traveling on Helo Route 1/4.

4. The decision to conduct military training missions in this complex and busy airspace with an abundance of commercial passenger traffic either arriving to or departing from DCA.

5. The use of split frequencies by the FAA which negatively impacts the situational awareness of all of the pilots in the airspace.

6. The use of night vision goggles to place even more limitations on the pilots.

Granted, all pilots involved may not have had the thousands of hours senior commercial and military pilot possess. But even the most senior individuals when placed in the task saturated environments these two crews faced would have at the very least felt their “pucker factor” increase through this. And there is probably an equal chance that the lack of common sense and appropriate safety design exhibited by the controlling entities would have resulted in a similar outcome. The odds were significantly stacked against these two flight crews, and unfortunately, against the passengers and flight attendants as well. If ever there were an example of an accident waiting to happen, this is it.

Fair enough. I inferred his experience in military helos from his many discussions of his experience training flight crews. I'm not sure what other of his statements you consider "inaccurate" though, and you don't bother to back that statement up with any specifics. Would you care to expand on what inaccurate advice he gave?

What I can say about Mike is: he puts his name and his face and his reputation out there in public to have open discussions about flight safety, and in the context of this totally preventable collision, it would be beneficial to all if every expert here and elsewhere on the interwebs participated in a similarly open and public debate in relation to this incident. If you disagree with him, message him and invite a public debate.

I've lurked and read this forum for a long time. Decades? I can't even remember how long. Much as I enjoy reading it when a major incident occurs, it frustrates me to no end how it is filled with so many examples of institutional inertia, acquiescence to mind-numbingly antiquated regulations, ridiculous politics, and endless excuses, all of which inhibit the progress of technology and safety...not to segue into a rant but the most obvious example being, and which 99% of the non-flying public would agree with, that there is almost zero reason at this point to not have cameras in the cockpit and perhaps even live transmission of video and/or audio feeds on every commercial aircraft at this point \x96 the power and data/bandwidth requirements being miniscule relative to the benefits, at this point it is simply absurd that such features do not exist; the Jeju incident's loss of CVR data being the best recent example of what a hindrance to technological progress aviation regulations have become, when for a few dollars a consumer can own a tiny little dashcam that records stunning 4K video and broadcast quality audio in near total darkness with 100mph wind noise running on a small and safe lithium batteries trickle charged from a 5 watt power supply for days on end, which can be broadcast via wifi link to Starlink-satellite based internet across the entire planet. We live in the Space Age, but the data storage and recovery procedures for commercial aircraft still hearkens back to WW2...

That rant aside, as the videos posted above by others demonstrate:

- A Blackhawk can in fact stop on a dime (so whatever you're suggesting Mike Blackstone was wrong about, it certainly wasn't that).

- Obviously that shouldn't be the plan , but it still a legitimate question to ask, in the context of an emergency, and when every other safety precaution has already failed, why couldn't it be done? Other poster's rationalize: at the low altitude, there's nowhere to go. The videos demonstrate otherwise. You can stop a Blackhawk 50 feet above the ground in seconds. If deviating in any direction is a risk, why didn't ATC just say " PAT25 slow to stop and hover!" \x96 as a Very. Last. Resort?

- I don't understand how we can have a system of "Air Traffic Control" that defers its control to aircraft at night around a busy airport with intersecting approaches. It's nonsensical. I honestly didn't know it was a thing. I thought all major airports had flight paths that kept inbound and outbound aircraft in separate non-conflicting lanes at all times. Obviously, I'm extremely naive. From my perspective, it seems as though the professionals involved are allowed no intuition to deviate when the procedures clearly compromise safety? Apparently they're all reduced to being bots who can only read checklists? If that's the case, then why not run the whole system on "AI"? I know I'm being spicy by saying that, given all the pilots on this forum who harp on about how stupid AI is (true for the moment, but not for much longer, rest assured), yet many consider it perfectly reasonable for ATC procedures being to read out the type of aircraft to a pilot who is flying in total darkness in order to fulfill delegation of its responsibility to control air traffic, as if that procedure actually helps? Are we through the looking glass? It doesn't take a three year NTSB investigation to infer how stupid that is. Yet some defend it. Why?

"I wish you good fortune in the wars to come"

The \x93single point of failure\x94 thing has been around forever. Reminds me of when ATC decided it was OK to start using land and hold short procedures at major air carrier airports. My airline immediately put out ALL CAPS memo that we were not to accept LAHSO clearance under any circumstances. It wasn\x92t long after that I was operating into BOS landing 27, when controller says \x93______ 123 you are cleared to land 27, ________ XYZ will be landing 22L and holding short of your runway.\x94 I politely said we can\x92t accept that clearance. Controller got PO\x92ed a bit and wanted to debate it, but in the end he removed the LAHSO clearance from the other aircraft/cancelled our landing clearance/told us to continue then subsequently cleared us to land after the other aircraft landed. The gist of all that is that ATC was miffed because everybody else was going along with their questionable tactics until I came along. In my mind it was clear: technically we would not have been accepting a land and hold short clearance, but we would all be cemetery dead if the other guy screwed up. We would be \x93dead right.\x94

Over the course of the next few weeks/months I queried every check airman/chief pilot I came across and got differing opinions from nearly every one. The majority of them leaned towards the \x93 it\x92s ok you are not landing/holding short,\x94 idea. When I would point out the \x93dead right\x94 concept they would just look at me like I was speaking Mandarin Chinese.

It seems like most pilots (myself included) have a can do attitude and are willing to help ATC out whenever they can so long as it\x92s \x93legal.\x94

There was an old captain I flew with years ago that said \x93We get paid the big bucks to say no.\x94

I have personally flown the the approach scenario that PSA was flying.

I think I first flew that procedure in the mid 1980's. It has been in use for decades.

I expect most pilots operating into DCA, and possibly this PSA crew have done this.

Based on the NTSB briefing yesterday, the PSA was at 325 feet +/-25 feet.

Had PAT25 been on the east coast of the Potomac, and at or below 200 feet, this accident would not have happened.

Just an opinion.....

https://www.washingtonpost.com/dc-md...ues-point-dei/

Then the NTSB can get a closer look. I read it will be moved to a hangar at DCA.

I am surprised with the NTSB statement that the CRJ was at 325 ft altitude: the collision appeared to have taken place over the water (the helicopter had a track parallel to the bank and its hull splashed in the water) and, even if computed overhead the river bank, 325 ft gives a glide slope with an angle of 3\xb0 and 28 minutes. This is between 3 and 4 whites on the PAPI (the angle separating 3 and 4 whites is 3\xb0 and 30 minutes). And the videos show that the CRJ was lined up at least 9 seconds prior to impact.

Edit: after correcting the calculation with the fact that the PAPI is 350 ft before the TDZ, the angle for 325 ft altitude is rather 3\xb0 48 minutes, well into the 4 whites range.

So you are saying the plane would have been even LOWER had it been right on glideslope, making the whole plan even WORSE?
* Not to say anything against the CRJ pilots, when getting night runway changes at DCA myself I would line up first and deal with the PAPI second. Flying over black water in the dark that seems a normal thing to do.

I do not know , what kind and how it is used. Some US controllers said in another forum they now have one , but what is it , where it is located and what the procedures are I do not know. Normally at large airports you have a radar picture repeater for situation awareness not for providing radar control unless you are in a TWR-APP combined facility of course , but DC is not.
and
if you mean in emergency , to prevent a collision ? , yes absolutely because in legal terms you always have the duty of care That is what the judge will come back to in the end. Now that said, where was the display located ? remember the guy was working 2 positions at same time . If there was a radar repeater display somewhere , was it located at the position he was working from ? The NTSB investigation will tell us that
.
If you are a controller you know how we work , Problem identified , = Conflict with PT detected , solution found = delegate separation , delegation accepted = problem solved. Next ... The guy was quite busy with departing and arrival traffic in runway one . Now of course with hindsight ,, what he should, and could perhaps have done is very easy for us to say . Feel very sorry for the guy . I hope he is not made the scapegoat for this mess.