Posts about: "NTSB" [Posts: 232 Page: 11 of 12]¶

Indeed but Visual Flight rules (VFR) and visual separations are two very different things . Visual separation can be ( and are) locally restricted , and even Airlines restricted ( think Lufthansa and the SFO incident) . My point is , with hindsight of course, that here, in this route in DCA it should have been restricted , even more so at night..

That is why you have a controller and procedures in place If the procedure says no simultaneous use, no traffic needs to be passed and no request for visual made , unless you allow the normalization of deviance
When you say FAA you mean the regulator right ? because here we have the service provider ( making the local procedures) and the Regulator certifying them being the same entity The "regulator " part should make a safety assessment of the procedures and approve them . In this case they were not safe , and, as I said earlier , especially after the numerous incidents a local restriction should have been in place : no visual separation allowed on those portions of the airspace , or no simultaneous use of that portion of the route when 15/33 is in use.

I strongly suspect this is what will come up anyway in the NTSB report .

NTSB Chairwoman speaks out about legislation to again allow uncontrolled military helicopter flights through Washington D.C. From the New York Times https://archive.ph/7YCHK

((Long pause.....))
1. Facts. The NYT does report the House passed its version of the NDAA. The NYT further reports that the provision at issue does "not appear in the Senate version" of the NDAA which the upper chamber previously passed. Though I have not worked on any Capitol Hill staff, it still is safe to say that there will be a conference between the two bodies to iron out a final version acceptable to majorities in both chambers.
NOTE: the NYT also reports the strong objections of the aviation sector leadership in the Senate, on an actually bipartisan basis. This includes the Chair and Ranking Member of the Senate Commerce Committee (Sen. Ted Cruz (R-Texas) and Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-Wash.), respectively, and the Chair and Ranking Member of the Committee's Aviation Subcommittee (Sen. Jerry Moran (R-Kansas) and Sen. Tammy Duckworth (D.-Illinois)). Doubtless few need to be reminded that Senator Duckworth, currently the Land of Lincoln's junior United States Senator, flew helicopters in the United States Army in armed conflict and actual combat during which she was severely wounded. I don't want to get bumped into blasting jets but I don't see the provision at issue as a wise legislative manuever or that it is wise to make Sen. Duckworth really angry about an aspect of helicopter operations in Washington, D.C. airspace.

Further, NTSB Chair Homendy, per the NYT: "Nobody actually knows what a commercial aviation compatibility risk assessment is". She also reportedly noted that the legislative measure does not task this assessment, whatever it might be intended to cover or what process it might be intended to utilize, to the FAA. Designation of a service secretary and the Secretary of Transportation as authority for issuing the pertinent waiver is not the same thing as tasking the process to FAA, first, as a strictly legal and legislative matter, and second, as a fact of life in the interagency.

2. Interpretation. Cynically, one could assert that this provision is another instance of the drive toward almost unlimited or, as a practical matter, effectively unlimited executive power.

Presumptuously, one could instead assert that somewhere deep inside the national security or intelligence bureaucracy, there is some as yet undisclosed risk or development which requires the Army or any other service to operate helicopter flights in a manner the same or very similar to the procedures allowed prior to the accident.

It may be poor form to transfer the phrase from its original context, but I think the provision at issue produces shock and awe, except that the awe is in the nature of disgust.

https://www.ntsb.gov/news/Documents/...tion%20Act.pdf

Letter to Congressional leaders re: NDAA from NTSB Chair Homendy.
The letter is addressed to the Chair and Ranking Members of the Armed Services Committees in both the House and Senate.

I'm coming to like Jennifer Homendy. It certainly looked like one of the contributory factors to the DCA crash was the military considering themselves to be outside the normal best practises. They now seem to be seeking to make that explicit.

This clip does not include the Q&A part of the briefing.

Good language and a strong statement. Too bad she spelled "Department of Defense" incorrectly.

I don't see anything in the above which states or implies that the provision in question is a good idea, or even just a neutral idea -- but then, the post perhaps (or likely) wasn't intended to state point of view on the provision's wisdom or absence of wisdom.

But regardless, I'm just trying to "noodle" (as a higher-seniority level lawyer in the same firm once used the term) how such a provision was inserted into the NDAA. I might have been taken in too much by press releases and watching hearings, but the current leadership of the House T&I (Transportation and Infrastructure) Committee has not given - to at least this one observer - any reason to think they would move in a direction contrary to the urgent safety recommendations made by NTSB soon after the accident (which were in fact implemented by DOT soon thereafter). So where is this coming from, this provision?

I won't try to argue leverage against any of the links in the reasoning in the quoted post. For one thing, the cynicism - not saying it isn't valid or warranted - on which the reasoning is based is sharper and more basic than the cynicism I usually experience. But this avoidance still doesn't address the question, where did the provision originate, and why?

Perhaps it is coming from the Executive branch and the Congress people involved feel pressure, for all sorts of Jet-Blasty reasons. The Pentagon might not want the adverse publicity of a trial which casts very unfavorable light. And with the recently announced systems integrator contract for the new ATC system, likewise, trial developments showing governmental incompetence would be seen as impeding the rest of the required appropriations. Not least, the public hype for the new ATC system has frequently referred to the work being completed in three or four years. Reliable sources (including a long time senior ATCO in a major European country with current involvement in a major ATCOs organization) scoff at the idea that all the necessary steps could possibly be completed in less than 8 to 10 years (including but not limited to site acquisition, construction, training on new equipment, not to mention sufficient rosters of ATCOs and then doing the relocations necessary if main facilities are actually consolidated). A really negative trial in Washington would not be helpful with regard to continuing to tout the expected so-very-rapid arrival of the new ATC system which will - it is said - make up for many years of lost time in the NAS.

I'm not arguing that this is what happened - just, what is the root of the provision? I mean, unless one believes it's a good idea, then I guess the "what if" is answered by saying, "good idea". Or even....
"That's good thinking there, Cool Breeze." (Couldn't resist the Boomer aside.)

From the Committee website; Rep. Nehls also has issued a statement opposing the NDAA provision which has elicited vehement objections from NTSB.

Washington, D.C. \x96 Aviation Subcommittee Chairman Troy E. Nehls (R-TX) announced that the Subcommittee will receive testimony from Bryan Bedford, marking his first appearance in front of Congress as Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Subcommittee Members will have the opportunity to discuss recent regulatory actions taken by the FAA and current issues in aviation, and seek updates on the continued implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. The hearing, entitled, \x93The State of American Aviation,\x94 will be held at 10:00 a.m. ET on Tuesday, December 16, 2025, in 2167 Rayburn House Office Building.
Witness List:

The Honorable Bryan Bedford, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, United States Department of Transportation

The NTSB has not said, and Chairwoman Homendy's letter does not say, that lack of ADS-B Out was the central cause of the accident. Without going through the whole thread again, as far as I recall no one has even argued, let alone persuasively asserted, that lack of ADS-B Out caused the accident. Any even mostly attentive reading of the thread would lead one to conclude that there were several big problems with the "situation" on the night of the accident. Just picking the one easiest for a non-aircrew to comprehend, the difficulty of discerning different objects, in the air and on the ground, at night and at low altitudes, particularly against the background of city lights, was a factor. No one has claimed lack of ADS-B Out made it a factor nor has anyone claimed that having ADS-B Out would remove it as a factor in given situations.

The argument that the NTSB Chair and the Congressional people who are opposed have heard some imperative to "don't just sit there, do something" is a straw man, imo.

But taking it with more credence than it seems to deserve, how do you explain the absence of much, or really any, opposition to the NTSB's recommendation issued shortly after the accident? Too much heat in the aftermath of the tragedy to state the opposition at that time, instead wait until things died down?

NTSB:
It is true that if the -only- change was using ADS-B Out on the helicopter, this accident would still have happened.

The CRJ was equipped with TCAS, which may or may not have been applicable at this low altitude as it is suppressed at 400 ft. The preliminary report does not indicate the helicopter having a TCAS or having an operating one. It did have the ability to produce ADS-B Out. Neither aircraft is reported to have had ADS-B In.

Since many operators seem to loath spending money on ADS-B In, the recommendation from the NTSB was to (1) stop simultaneous flight path use and (2) go elsewhere when the approaches were in use. The FAA agreed.

Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-001 the FAA did what was recommended about simultaneous use.
Per https://data.ntsb.gov/carol-main-pub...tails/A-25-002 the FAA made a satisfactory response concerning planning the alternate route(s)

This legislation is the exact opposite of that recommendation.

No doubt the anger isn't just that the NTSB has yet again been ignored, it's that the FAA agreements to safety measures are targeted for destruction in a way that recreates the circumstance of the tragic event.

I said at first, on seeing this collision a few hours after the event, that I felt rage that so many safety measures are available and yet none of them was actually used.

This section, 373, is what I consider an intentional sabotage of the safe operations around DCA.

The FAA literally had advertising videos showing the use of ADS-B In on helicopters for this exact purpose, to give situational awareness to the pilots long before there would be a need to deconflict with other traffic (see end) . No sudden swerves as TCAS attempts to make a last moment save of a terrible situation. TCAS alone cannot be the solution as TCAS gets shut off to avoid nuisance complaints about the terrain the plane is intentionally going to run into or other proximate planes waiting for takeoff.

ADS-B In is for noting where everyone else is in the neighborhood of the aircraft. Had the helicopter been equipped with ADS-B In they would have known the speed and direction of the CRJ and seen it was on a collision course.

As usual it appears there is no name attached nor meeting notes about who submitted what became Section 373. There is certainly no justification paper that will see the light of day.

If those exist, please, someone, prove me wrong.


duplicate:

I cannot find it on YouTube.

An actual user who avoided a mid-air using ADS-B In (Trent Palmer, if anyone wants to avoid him; not everyone is liked):

Thank you MechEngr for stating in detail, and explaining, the recommendations made by NTSB and their relation to ADS-B systems, both Out and In.

It appears I had mistakenly thought NTSB had made a recommendation after the accident about ADS-B. That was incorrect.

It would be interesting to try to unearth the document trail with respect to the agreement reached by FAA and the DoD with regard to ADS-B Out usage, which agreement was reached (per the NTSB Chair letter) after the accident. Of course unearthing documents which relate to controversial subjects could well be a fool's errand. .... ..... ...... oh wait, there's such a thing as pre-trial discovery, and the lawsuits are in federal district court.

Senator Cantwell gave two speeches in recent days on the Senate floor about Section 373. I'm not posting links to them, because "politics". Still, something worth noting from them is that the Senator, previously Chair of the Commerce Committe - the Committee with jurisdiction for civil aviation - and currently Ranking Member, stated she does not know who inserted the highly questionable Section 373 into the NDAA. And whether as prevention or preemption, yes, the families of Flight 5342, including the family of the First Officer, are raising a loud objection to Section 373 - but the concerns over the legislative provision are not based on any effort to serve or to please the trial lawyers suing on the families' behalf. Chairwoman Homendy of the NTSB does indeed operate in a political environment, no kidding, but she is conducting her public advocacy as a safety professional and not a politician. (I'm not lauding any Senator's bona fides as aviation safety advocates because, again "politics.")

As a non-lawyer and non-American, can I just clarify my understanding of this situation:

• Following the accident, the NTSB recommended that military helo flights not fly that route while 15/33 was in use;
• The FAA concurred, and this was implemented on a temporary basis;
• Section 373 of a bill that has already passed the House would allow military helo flights to resume, as prior to the accident, with 'waivers' to let them fly there as they like;
• The waivers could be granted by many military personnel at different levels of seniority, meaning the waivers would be effectively permanent;
• The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed.
• Section 373 takes away the requirement for ADS-B Out, reducing safety.
• Section 373 gets round the ADS-B Out requirement by specifying that military aircraft should only be required to be able to trigger to TCAS alerts.
• TCAS does not activate at low altitudes, such as when landing, so is useless on the route the helos use to pass DCA.
• Therefore the only reasonable safety measure is not to let military flights onto that route while 15/33 is in use. Section 373 reverses that safety measure.
• 'Someone' sneaked Section 373 into the bill, and nobody knows who or when.
• The bill passed without anybody noticing Section 373.
• So unless the Senate challenges, this legislation will go through
• The legislation would make it harder for families to blame the military/government for the DCA accident, by confirming the correctness of protocols at the time
• Chair Homendy is furious.

If I've got this wrong, can you correct me?

I'm absolutely staggered that something this important could have been 'slipped' into a major piece of legislation, without a final read-through of changes since the last version. Surely there's an audit trail of changes and who submitted or entered them?

The general principle of overruling the NTSB and FAA by legislation doesn't sound like it's going to do much for aviation safety, not neither. There was a reason the legislator gave them independence to begin with.

Re: AirScotia and the summary in the recent post:

"The NTSB had recommended that military flights in DCA airspace should use ADS-B Out, so that military flights could be detected above 900ft in a busy airspace. The FAA and DoD agreed."

I'm not certain the first sentence above is correct. The letter from the NTSB Chair regarding Section 373 states: "The NTSB has, for decades, advocated for ADS-B In and Out and its substantial contribution to safety, especially near airports."

The NTSB on March 7 issued a pre-preliminary report of sorts, specifically urging immediate action to shut down helicopter route 4 when Runway 33/15 is in use (for landings and departures, respectively). There is no reference to ADS-B in the March 7 urgent recommendation document.

I cannot say how it was that FAA and DoD agreed to start ADS-B Out use by military aircraft in the relevant airspace. But it did not result from the same urgent recommendations, at least insofar as those recommendations were stated in writing on March 7, which led to the closure of helicopter route 4. (I would note that the Preliminary Report by the Board was issued a few days later, on March 11.)

Regarding Section 373's legistative history, to use a term it perhaps does not deserve, there is less mystery than your summation suggests. There certainly are staff of one or both Armed Services Committees, and/or staff of Members serving on one or both of the those Committees, and/or the Representatives and/or Senators who run those Committees, who originated the language, and agreed upon the version that ended up in the legislation (it obviously would have gone through a series of revisions).

So the question is why was their action done without consulting the same people (Committee staff, House/Senate members' staff, and the legislators themselves) whose routine committee work has jurisdiction for civil aviation.

And there's another level also. Where within the defense bureaucracy or some other place in the interagency or executive branch did the impetus for the provision originate? I can see that the post pointing out that the provision, if enacted, would not help the Army in court, is probably correct. What other reason the Army may have had to sponsor the provision (and to do so quietly) I can't say. Which leaves, can it really be that difficult to devise a system for how and when military aircraft with significant emergency or classified operations (as compared to essentially routine operations) need different handling in the airspace?

Administrator Bedford testified today before the Aviation Subcommittee of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee. The ostensible calling of the hearing as noted above was for an update on implementation of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 as well as general oversight. As was widely anticipated, several Members questioned the Administrator, at times pointedly, about the presence and effect of Section 373 in the FY2026 NDAA (National Defense Authorization Act), i.e., the controversial provision undoing safety-related changes made in the aftermath of the DCA midair collision on 29 Janaury of this year.

The video link I am including in this post is from the Forbes magazine website (and I apologize that it includes adverts). I don't know if the video link presumably available on the Subcommittee webpage (or it could be on the Committee webpage) has the same time-stamps as the Forbes video and since it's the one I watched, I'm using it here.

The families of at least some of the families of people who lost their lives in the DCA midair were present for the hearing.

Rep. Nehls (R.-TX), Chair of the Subcomm., and the other three leaders each gave opening statements (Comm. Chair Sam Graves (R.-MO.), Comm. Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D.-WA.), and Subcomm. Ranking Member Andre Carson (D.-IN)). Representative Nehls's opening statement hinted that ADS-B Out and Sec. 373 were going to see some emphasis (unsurprising, as Rep. Nehls had already issued a statement decrying Sec. 373).

The Administrator's testimony started at around 19:00. When he concluded, the Subcommittee Chair, Rep. Nehls, opened the questioning (at about 23:00). He asked, in a fairly pointed manner, about the controversial Section of the NDAA, Sec. 373. What did the Administrator answer, readers of the thread (who presumably have far better things to do than watch Congressional hearings) may wonder??

Mr. Bedford responded that FAA policy is not to comment on pending legislation. But he added that the section had shown up in the NDAA without any advice having been sought from or given by the FAA. And that both he and Secretary Duffy have "no intention" of going back to the airspace situation as it was on January 29.

At about 29:15 the Administrator referred to "someone in the Senate" having placed Section 373 into the NDAA. At about 29:45, he noted that after the accident the gaps in the safety situation were closed "and will remain closed." He also seemed to refer to "renegotiation" of the FAA Memorandum of Agreement with the Department of Defense (and at least twice during the hearing noted that the DoD had been good partners with FAA with regard to DCA (and Capital Region, I believe) airspace usage).

Congresswoman Norton also questioned the Administrator about Section 373 (1:47:__) although without much follow-up.

At about 2:15:__ (oops, I didn't note who was questioning) Mr. Bedford again used the phrase, "not going back" to the airspace situation as it existed, and that mixed traffic situations (military and civil) were, "not gonna happen". He noted the Memorandum of Agreement between FAA and the DoD - in this instance not referring to any renegotiation process (whether presently or planned) - and added that he is "not aware of any desire to change it" (close to verbatim, but I'm not a court reporter).

The Administrator's testimony was noteworthy for several other reasons (not counting the evidence the hearing provided that not every single Member of the House of Representatives deserves categorization in MechEngr's "critter" status), and here are two I thought most significant - most significant to a pro pilot audience, that is.

The current Administrator is a very smooth operator and this should surprise no one (and this is meant as a compliment to professionalism). Dealing with sometimes ill-founded questions (to be polite) and a few outright stupid questions takes patience. Beyond that, there were no instances, at least to the extent of my knowledge, when the Administrator ran away from the truth of the situation across the FAA. And he still managed to be a good soldier (so to speak) as a member of the current Executive administration. Without getting into politics but strictly in the realm of operating as a professional, not everyone in high places at the moment has the ability as well as willingness to talk detailed "X's and O's" about complicated federal enterprises while still staying within the lanes drawn somewhere on Pennsylvania Avenue (see? - not politics).

Second, the Administrator provided several answers in his testimony about the status of the modernization program. As a possibly interesting even if small point, I don't think I heard "brand new ATC system" or even just "new ATC system" even once; it consistently was Air Traffic Control Modernization. Substantively, he outlined four layers: copper wire to fiber; analog to digital systems (and TDMA to VOIP); analog architecture in general to digital architecture; and a fourth layer of "compute" meaning that now, each facility has its own computing resources and the program intends to move this into one cloud-based layer. He also emphasized work that has already been done and gave a slam-dunk defense of selection of Peraton, and sorry for this disrespect, to an outright stupid question about FAA selecting Peraton as systems integrator.

(I realize the ATC Modernization program isn't exactly about DCA but in two senses it is; the accident greatly motivated the program to be drawn up and to receive the first tranche of appropriations, and the families of the accident victims were present for the hearing today. And a third factor: the facts about the modernization program are important as a counterpoint to Section 373's troubling content, not to mention its illegitimate sourcing. I have not heard one single voice of a legitimate aviation wise-person, not a single legitimate worthy, say it is a good provision. How modern can the NAS become if something like Section 373 -- no wait, if Section 373 itself actually -- becomes law?)

Link: https://youtu.be/UJM4YsV_hmw?si=116yx6W1AnJaIELY

Some reactions and at least attempts at valid observations.

FAA and ATCOs. Did the Department of Justice's Answer to the Complaint throw the controller(s) "under the bus?" Yes, and no. In brief, the Answer does not state that the controllers' acts or omissions were a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident.

The Complaint alleges a long list of allegedly negligent acts by the controller(s) in Paragraph 250, which starts on page 158 and runs on to 164 (in the Answer). Without having studied the pleadings for hours upon hours (as one might do in actual practice) perhaps I've missed something -- but I think the only admission made by DOJ with regard to the controllers is that a very specifically cited FAA rule or procedure of some sort was not followed: "the DCA local controller did not comply with \xb6 7-2-1(a)(2)(d) of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, chg. 3, Air Traffic Control (Sept. 5, 2024)." This specific admission is made recurrently in the Answer, amidst many other denials of (again, unless I missed something) everything else in the massive and detailed Paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

Edit [forgot to include]: the Complaint alleges generally the following about FAA and the ATCOs.
"the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s air traffic controllers failed in their two most important priorities, namely to separate aircraft in airspace and issue Safety Alerts when aircraft are in an unsafe proximity to one another; that the air traffic controllers on duty failed to abide by numerous other policies and procedures, including that air traffic control failed to provide traffic advisories to both aircraft and air traffic control failed to resolve an aural and visual Conflict Alert that advised air traffic control that the two aircraft were on an unsafe and converging collision course; and that the air traffic controllers failed in their duties concerning the \x93tower team concept\x94 within an air traffic control facility so that all controllers assist each other to prevent, amongst other things, a mid-air collision. The Defendants\x92 [meaning, both the U.S. and the airlines] collective failures (for which they are jointly and severally liable) caused, and/or contributed to this senseless and entirely avoidable tragedy."

So, "no", because the DOJ does not admit ATC was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause (both needed for liability, if I recall 1-L) but yes, first, specifically with regard to the FAA Order, and second, for all of the reasons ATC Watcher invokes. Whether those several factors would ever be considered for inclusion in an Answer to a big tort case such as this is doubtful . . .BUT especially after the fireworks over Section 373, watch for the NTSB report to lay it all out. (And incidentally, the Complaint now includes several excerpts from NTSB hearing and docket - not sure if these were part of the original Complaint. The Answer is the first pleading in response to the Complaint and it has become the Master Complaint, as I understand it, because it is the pleading on behalf of all the plaintiffs, regardless of whether they are represented by the attorneys who filed the very first Complaint in the case. Further, according to press reports (WSJ print edition today) both the airline companies filed motions to dismiss. Thankfully, or maybe not, my Pacer account is acting up, so, no comment....)

2. The airline and its parent company. The Complaint paints a very negative picture about the acts and omissions of the airline companies and the two pilots of 5342. The Answer was filed only on behalf of the United States (FAA and Army) and so the DOJ does not address the specific allegations forming the claims against the airline - this is standard practice. Still, I found this in the Answer (re: Para. 174): "The United States admits that the AE5342 pilots failied to maintain vigilance and to see and avoid PAT25".

I am refraining from trying to summarize or comment on the many aspects of the story about the airline pilots and airline companies alleged in the Complaint. It is a very detailed story. It probably if not certainly will outrage people in the industry writ large. I've not practiced tort law, either suing or defending, but that won't stop me from saying that it seems pretty clear that the trial lawyers are gunning for the airline company deep pockets, the availability of punitive damages when those are not awardable against the Federal Government, the availability of a jury trial, and insurance policies. To state the obvious.

As for the Army, Para. 253 starts on page 168 and runs to 176; the DOJ admits some but not all of the many specifically alleged negligent acts and omissions by the Army and those pilots.

One other little item caught my attention. In paragraph 106, reference is made to "risk assessment" stuff the Army aviation unit conducted or did not conduct. "Risk Assessment", that wouldn't be the same thing as showed up in Section 373, by chance?

(For information, the case number in federal district court in D.C. is 1:25-cv-03382-ACR.)

The legal approaches are like sweeping up after the 'Lord Mayors Show' (a parade with horses).

The core issue remains that of air safety;

An independent US view focussed on safety:- "The night everything at DCA finally went wrong"

https://theaircurrent.com/aviation-s...pecial-report/

Lessons that aviation can learn now, without waiting for a trial or raking though the embers of investigation.

Note the heat map of reported incidents - the data existed, but not acted on.

"\x85 only one pilot out of four interviewed by the NTSB had an accurate and complete understanding of the structure of the D.C. helicopter routes \x97 an individual who happened to have seven years of prior experience as a military pilot in the area. Two pilots had no awareness that published routes for helicopters even existed." And other telling quotes.

Knowledge, information sharing, published approach charts, normalisation of deviance (Dekker); a systemic accident (Reason).
'Safety' is easy with hindsight, but there are many people who's job is to have foresight - to review and act on reports, at least ask 'what if', to think about, and seek an understanding of every day work (Hollnagel).

From FAA website (verbatim):
Trump\x92s Transportation Secretary Formalizes Permanent Restrictions for Aircraft in Reagan National Airport Airspace

Thursday, January 22, 2026
WASHINGTON, D.C. \x97 U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy today announced that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is formalizing permanent restrictions for helicopters and powered-lift from operating in certain areas near Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA), unless these aircraft are conducting essential operations. These restrictions were put in place immediately following the American Airlines 5342 crash and supported by the NTSB\x92s preliminary recommendations.

\x93After that horrific night in January, this Administration made a promise to do whatever it takes to secure the skies over our nation\x92s capital and ensure such a tragedy would never happen again. Today\x92s announcement reaffirms that commitment,\x94 said U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy. \x93The safety of the American people will always be our top priority. I look forward to continuing to collaborate with the NTSB on any additional actions.\x94

The FAA published an Interim Final Rule (IFR) that will significantly reduce midair-collision risks and implement a National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) safety recommendation to prohibit certain helicopter operations when Runways 15 and 33 at DCA are in use.

\x93We took decisive action immediately following the January 2025 midair collision to reduce risk in the airspace,\x94 said FAA Administrator Bryan Bedford. \x93This is a key step toward ensuring these improvements remain permanent and we\x92re continuing to work with the NTSB to ensure an accident like this never happens again.\x94

While the interim final rule goes into effect tomorrow, the public is invited to submit written comments, which the FAA will consider before issuing a final rule.

Additional Information:

The FAA took immediate action to restrict mixed traffic around DCA and made permanent helicopter route changes after the NTSB recommendations. U.S. Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy and the FAA didn\x92t stop there \x96 taking additional actions for DCA to address operations, procedures, and personnel, including:

Established procedures to eliminate helicopter and fixed-wing mixed traffic near the airport
Closed Route 4 between Hains Point and the Wilson Bridge
Revised agreements with the military to require ADS-B Out broadcasting
Discontinued take offs from the Pentagon until the FAA and Department of War updated procedures and fixed technical issues at the Pentagon Heliport
Eliminated the use of visual separation within 5 nautical miles of DCA
Published modifications to helicopter zones and routes moving them farther away from DCA flight paths
Increased support, oversight and staffing at DCA
In October 2025, the FAA updated Helicopter routes and zones at DCA, Washington Dulles International Airport (IAD) and Baltimore/ Washington International Airport (BWI).

The FAA previously implemented temporary flight restrictions (TFR) around DCA. To make the restrictions contained in the TFRs permanent, the FAA issued an IFR which is set to publish on January 23, 2026, and will take effect immediately. The public is invited to submit comments on the IFR and the FAA will later publish a Final Rule in response to those comments.

According to reporting published today by The Air Current - one of its periodic articles reporting on air safety which are not paywalled - the NTSB will meet on January 27. The meeting will include revealing and voting on the probable cause determination produced by its investigation into the DCA midair collision 29 January 2025.

The reporting indicates that the Board's final report is expected within two weeks.

Various safety recommendations also are anticipated to be on the agenda for the NTSB's January 27 meeting.

Of particular interest, among many other factors involved in this horrifically senseless accident (my characterization, not found in TAC reporting as such), is whether the NTSB's meeting which will mark the end of its official investigatory process will touch upon the controversial section of the NDAA, Section 373 (subject of previous posts at the time of passage, upthread).