Posts about: "NTSB" [Posts: 256 Page: 13 of 13]ΒΆ

ATC Watcher
February 06, 2026, 20:38:00 GMT
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Post: 12033480
Whow! Legislation to force the FAA and the US military to fully implement NTSB recommendations ? That will be a first since the grand Canyon collision in 1956 if it really materialize.

Subjects FAA  NTSB

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DaveReidUK
February 06, 2026, 22:36:00 GMT
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Post: 12033518
Originally Posted by ATC Watcher
Whow! Legislation to force the FAA and the US military to fully implement NTSB recommendations ?
I think not.

Subjects ATC  FAA  NTSB

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Musician
February 07, 2026, 07:49:00 GMT
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Post: 12033661
Originally Posted by WillowRun 6-3
Joint statement from House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA),
These are the guys responsible for stalling the ROTOR act that the Senate passed with bipartisan support last year.

https://www.politico.com/live-update...-bill-00764270
But Transportation Chair Sam Graves (R-Mo.) has objected to the bill, saying he wants big changes to it.
In a series of recent interviews, Graves has cited concerns over impacts to general aviation, the small-scale flights that range from recreational trips on single-engine planes to crop dusting.
On Tuesday, the top Democrat on the House transportation panel, Rep. Rick Larsen of Washington, said in an interview he was mulling two options: either adjusting the ROTOR Act or crafting new legislation after the National Transportation Safety Board last week issued 50 recommendations related to the catastrophe, which killed 67 people.
.
The journalists asked Homendy about it on the day of the board meeting, and she diplomatically said she'd been busy with the DCA midair documents since the board meeting and final report were coming up, but she also reiterated she wants ADS-B IN on every aircraft, so...

The NTSB has the enviable role of being able to champion safety absent any other consideration. The FAA and politics in general need to balance that with economic, business and other interests, so the outcomes are pretty much guaranteed to be compromises falling short of what we would want.

Subjects ADSB (All)  DCA  FAA  Final Report  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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DaveReidUK
February 07, 2026, 08:22:00 GMT
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Post: 12033680
Originally Posted by Musician
The NTSB has the enviable role of being able to champion safety absent any other consideration. The FAA and politics in general need to balance that with economic, business and other interests, so the outcomes are pretty much guaranteed to be compromises falling short of what we would want.
Yes, it's hard to see how it could work any other way - but it does of course mean that a proportion of NTSB Safety Recommendations will ultimately not be adopted on cost or other grounds.

For example, the FAA are now going to make 25-hour CVRs mandatory on all new-build airliners, as recommended (a while back) by the NTSB, but an accompanying SR that they should also be retrofitted to all airliners currently flying was rejected, not unreasonably, by the FAA.

Subjects FAA  NTSB  Safety Recommendations

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WillowRun 6-3
February 14, 2026, 02:53:00 GMT
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Post: 12036958
Wall Street Journal article re: advocacy of parents of 5342 FO

The Wall Street Journal has published an intensely relevant piece reporting on the advocacy efforts - and the grief, and the resilience - of Tim and Sheri Lilley, the parents of Sam Lilley, the F/O of Bluestreak 5342.

Here is the headline and subheading:
"A Pilot\x92s Parents Work to Clear His Name After the Deadliest Crash in Decades
An American Airlines regional jet and an Army helicopter collided a year ago over the Potomac, creating unlikely friendships and advocates."
by-line, Christoper Kuo (Feb. 13, 2026 8:00 p.m. ET)

In several of the perhaps too-many posts (including a recent rant) I have written onto this thread, I have repeatedly made the point, or asked the question, who speaks for the pilots of Bluestreak 5342? Despite the WSJ reporting focusing on just the RHS pilot on the fateful night of 29 January 2025, I believe we now know that indeed, those blameless aviators indeed have a voice. In the safety ecosystem aftermath on Capitol Hill and before the eminences of the NTSB. And in the courtroom, I hope. Because although I have met a goodly number of very fine "aircraft crash litigation attorneys" on both sides of the adversarial barrier, I'm not recalling any whose advocacy resonates with such resolve as shown by these two grieving but determined parents. (No offense to the Gucci loafers or Clarence Darrow vests.)

If you've posted on this thread, or if you have just read it from time to time (or entirely) - go read about the parents of Bluestreak 5342's F/O, Tim and Sheri Lilley, please.
WillowRun 6-3

Subjects Grief  NTSB  Wall Street Journal

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Landing light
February 17, 2026, 19:53:00 GMT
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Post: 12038804

I found a Video from the NTSB, think you know it. What worries me is how many conversations didn't reach the PAT.
The video also shows that it wasn't easy to see each other.
Does the PAT not have TCAS?
They had to look at the IPad attached to their knees to detect a hazard.
This wasn't possible with goggles on.Therefore, my opinion is that the PAT didn't receive any warnings,
only from the tower, and not even all the words from Tower, because crucial parts didn't come through over the radio.

Regards

Subjects NTSB  TCAS (All)

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Senior Controller
February 17, 2026, 21:16:00 GMT
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Post: 12038825
419 pages ! , initially just read the first 30 which contains the resume of what happened ( nothing really new ) and their recommendations ( 50 of them) , the interesting part : They are hitting some nails right on the head , lots of very good points , but most of them not really feasible. Looks like a painting of paradise , but who is going to perform the actions required and who has the power to force the FAA to go in that direction ? , and at which costs ? Reducing traffic to a safe level ? That alone , while it of course makes lot of sense, will requires a stronger regulator that will be backed up by the government that will choose the NTSB recommendations against the usual lobbies .. .
Curious to see the political reactions .
As to forcing DOW to change things as recommended , I have my doubts too.

On the positive side , from the recommendations listed , it looks like a very good report overturning the right stones and telling it like it is , looking forward to read the rest of the report later.

Subjects FAA  NTSB

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MechEngr
February 18, 2026, 00:07:00 GMT
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Post: 12038894
Originally Posted by Musician
The NTSB has the enviable role of being able to champion safety absent any other consideration. The FAA and politics in general need to balance that with economic, business and other interests, so the outcomes are pretty much guaranteed to be compromises falling short of what we would want.
The NTSB is aware of the costs and the "balance" is that people die vs. an extra 0.1% for the corporate bonuses.

The caption says it is from a hearing last week:



Subjects FAA  NTSB

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WillowRun 6-3
February 18, 2026, 00:44:00 GMT
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Post: 12038903
Originally Posted by MechEngr
The NTSB is aware of the costs and the "balance" is that people die vs. an extra 0.1% for the corporate bonuses.

The caption says it is from a hearing last week:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I8PUtx-6_HY
Excellent colloquy - the Senator was, uncharacteristically perhaps, quite restrained in tone and content.

But as to the "extra 0.1%" of corporate bonus earnings impliedly referenced as the fundamental issue, I'll venture a wild [insert] guess - that's hyperbole, yes? Or do you have some corporate SEC filings or other documents about actual bonus plans which directly link to cost and expense of ADSB-In retrofit and/or original equipagge? Or better yet, documents from American Airlines which, according to Sen. Cruz as well as Board Chair Homendy, has installed ADSB-In - again, according to their respective statements - with what sounded like barely more than trivial cost or expense impact?

Subjects ADSB In  NTSB  NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy

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Musician
February 18, 2026, 01:30:00 GMT
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Post: 12038924
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
.
Altimeter testing showed that the 100-ft pressure altitude discrepancy seen in the FDR data for the accident flight was observed on three other UH-60L helicopters operated by the 12th Aviation Battalion. These altimeter testing results also showed that the pressure altitude data recorded by the helicopters\x92 FDRs, when corrected for local conditions, was representative of what was indicated on the right side altimeter. Therefore, the FDR pressure altitude data for the accident helicopter, when corrected for local conditions, was likely representative of what was indicated on the IP\x92s barometric altimeter during the accident flight.

[...]. The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.

For the northern segment of Route 4, which included the area of the collision, of the 523 flights analyzed, 260 flights (49%) were identified as exceeding route altitude limitations at some point during the flight. Had the error tolerances of barometric altimeters been considered during design of the helicopter route maximum altitudes, the incompatibility of a 200-ft ceiling and barometric altimeter errors may have been identified.


Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Final Report  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Route Altitude

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WillowRun 6-3
February 18, 2026, 03:12:00 GMT
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Post: 12038951
Originally Posted by MechEngr
I did not mention American Airlines.

What value would you have accepted without question or do you believe that cost cutting doesn't affect bonuses?
I'm not on this forum to manifest cynicism. Without reviewing an actual executive bonus plan of an actually affected aircraft operator, I'm unwilling to assume any of the following: the inclusion of the relevant retrofit in the aggregation of costs for any given plan which places material reliance on cost factors; the presence or absence of insurance premium adjustments based upon completion of retrofit of key safety avionics; or any terms which allow or require different calculations of the determining factors where NTSB recommendations and/or legislative mandates are implemented.

But no kidding, total costs incurred typically are relevant as a component of financial results which in turn are determinants for executive bonus plans, I'll grant you that.

And the hearing did mention American, obviously. As a specific test case, are you asserting that American's retrofit to the extent incomplete on some of its fleet has been left incomplete because of the "0.1%" quantification you assert? I'll wait for your post with excerpts from American's SEC filings or similar corporate reporting filings.

Subjects NTSB

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ATC Watcher
February 18, 2026, 16:22:00 GMT
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Post: 12039242
The 100ft in the altimeter is within IFR tolerance , not really the point here , yes you should check against elevation airfield before start , but we learn there is a small discrepancy when on the ground and when the rotor blows over the static holes, and ATC will check again in flight the alt against mode C, it is mandatory on first contact with ATC , but mode C is calibrated on 1013 not QNH , anyway not the major cause here, just another hole on the cheese that night .

As to the lack of experience of the PF , I think 56 h of flying visual and manual an helicopter is significantly more important experience wise that the same number on say, a 747 .I also do not think this was factor.
The reasons and direct causes of this accident are within the 50 NTSB recommendations , not in the altimeter or experience of the PF , unless she had a couple of close calls herself doing visual separation at night before and did not learn from that.

Last edited by ATC Watcher; 18th February 2026 at 16:35 .

Subjects ATC  Altimeter (All)  Close Calls  IFR  NTSB  QNH  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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Ver5pen
February 19, 2026, 14:18:00 GMT
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Post: 12039724
Originally Posted by Musician
Page 242 ff. in the final report pretty much exonorates the PF in the helicopter, in my opinion.
.
Altimeter testing showed that the 100-ft pressure altitude discrepancy seen in the FDR data for the accident flight was observed on three other UH-60L helicopters operated by the 12th Aviation Battalion. These altimeter testing results also showed that the pressure altitude data recorded by the helicopters\x92 FDRs, when corrected for local conditions, was representative of what was indicated on the right side altimeter. Therefore, the FDR pressure altitude data for the accident helicopter, when corrected for local conditions, was likely representative of what was indicated on the IP\x92s barometric altimeter during the accident flight.

[...]. The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4.

For the northern segment of Route 4, which included the area of the collision, of the 523 flights analyzed, 260 flights (49%) were identified as exceeding route altitude limitations at some point during the flight. Had the error tolerances of barometric altimeters been considered during design of the helicopter route maximum altitudes, the incompatibility of a 200-ft ceiling and barometric altimeter errors may have been identified.

repeatedly in the CVR transcript of the Blackhawk the instructor tells the PF they are straying from their clearance

the PF had also shown their handling skills were not to standard earlier in the check ride (I\x92ve seen it mentioned their abandoning a manoeuvre earlier would\x92ve been a fail normally) hence monitoring their trainees parameters would\x92ve been even more taxing for the instructor

I don\x92t know how anyone can pretend these things didn\x92t at least play a part in the Swiss cheese.

if the PF had been as equally capable as the instructor and performing their scan (the CGI reenactment shows that much of the CRJ\x92s flatboats occurred within the PF\x92s side of the scan) would the outcome have been different? Possibly.

the conduct of that flight was the final hole in the Swiss cheese arguably

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  Blackhawk (H-60)  CVR  Final Report  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Route Altitude

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punkalouver
February 19, 2026, 17:02:00 GMT
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Post: 12039783
Originally Posted by Musician
Yes, but the visual separation was the responsibility of the PIC instructor, not the PF.

You are of the opinion they should've checked that the altimeter was working correctly? Is that a normal item on a pre-flight checklist?
When the altimeter setting is placed in the aircraft on the ground, the pilot should take note of how much difference there is from actual field elevation and then consider what should be done for compensation for any error. On most VFR flights, a 100' error does not have much relevance. On the other hand, if you were to know that you are going to pass extremely close to something that you do not want to be close to, then it can become significant. An example might be for the people who like to fly 100 feet vertically from airspace that they are not allowed to enter. This situation might be another example where good airmanship can make a difference(specifically to compensating for an altimeter error).

I have not read this report, as I am deep into many other ones these days but I did take a quick glance on page 242 that was referenced and it talks about altimeter additive errors. The report states: "The allowable tolerances are additive, with the total error having the potential of exceeding 100 ft.". The report also states: "The NTSB concludes that, due to additive allowable tolerances of the helicopter\x92s pitot-static/altimeter system, it is likely that the crew of PAT25 observed a barometric altimeter altitude about 100 ft lower than the helicopter\x92s true altitude, resulting in the crew erroneously believing that they were under the published maximum altitude for Route 4".

My question to other people on this thread is: Did the NTSB do some sort of evaluation of this particular helicopter in order to come to a reasonable conclusion that all errors were in such a way that they were all in the direction of resulting in the helicopter being higher than indicated as opposed to errors potentially cancelling each other out(or partially so)?

Subjects Altimeter (All)  Barometric Altimeter  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  VFR  Visual Separation

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DaveReidUK
February 19, 2026, 17:20:00 GMT
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Post: 12039791
Originally Posted by punkalouver
My question to other people on this thread is: Did the NTSB do some sort of evaluation of this particular helicopter in order to come to a reasonable conclusion that all errors were in such a way that they were all in the direction of resulting in the helicopter being higher than indicated as opposed to errors potentially cancelling each other out(or partially so)?
Yes, they did. I haven't read the report in full yet, but the issue was discussed at the hearing.

Subjects NTSB

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WillowRun 6-3
February 19, 2026, 23:09:00 GMT
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Post: 12039941
Legislation

From House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee website 19 February 2026

Washington, DC \x96 The comprehensive legislative response to the various aviation safety issues raised by the tragic 2025 midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and a UH-60 Army Black Hawk helicopter at Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) was released today by the bipartisan leaders of the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Armed Services Committee.
The Airspace Location and Enhanced Risk Transparency (ALERT) Act of 2026 addresses all 50 safety related recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), which concluded its thorough investigation and issued its final report on February 17, 2026.

The ALERT Act considers all of the NTSB\x92s findings of probable cause that contributed to the accident and responds to each of the NTSB\x92s 50 safety recommendations to provide a thorough and holistic legislative solution to improve U.S. aviation safety. Critical safety issues the bill addresses include:

Establishing requirements for equipping collision mitigation, avoidance, and alerting technologies and systems for civil fixed-wing and rotorcraft;
Improving helicopter route design, guidance, and separation;
Preventing loss of separation (near-miss) incidents;
Addressing deficiencies in the FAA\x92s safety culture;
Enhancing air traffic control training and procedures, particularly during high traffic;
Strengthening the safety of the DCA airspace \x96 one of the nation\x92s busiest and most congested airspaces;
Repealing section 373(a) of the last National Defense Authorization Act; and more.
The ALERT Act is led by Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman Sam Graves (R-MO), Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Ranking Member Rick Larsen (D-WA), Armed Services Committee Chairman Mike Rogers (R-AL), and Armed Services Committee Ranking Member Adam Smith (D-WA).

[Quotes from Congressmen omitted]

Link to the text of the ALERT Act: https://transportation.house.gov/components/redirect/r.aspx?ID=486957-71714618

Link to a section by section summary of the ALERT Act:
https://transportation.house.gov/news/email/show.aspx?ID=RFS3V7AWS4PPNV2MA2XZXHULM4


Subjects ALERT Act of 2026  Blackhawk (H-60)  DCA  Final Report  Findings  NTSB  Probable Cause  Safety Recommendations  Separation (ALL)

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