Posts about: "NTSB" [Posts: 232 Page: 3 of 12]ΒΆ

adnoid
February 03, 2025, 22:03:00 GMT
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Post: 11820943
Drone footage of wreckage in the river

Posted today by NTSB:


Subjects NTSB

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51bravo
February 04, 2025, 15:02:00 GMT
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Post: 11821488
NTSB on CVR recordings as I understand - however read from a paper:

remarkable: begin of pitch up 1 sec before impact (CRJ).

Subjects CRJ  NTSB

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galaxy flyer
February 04, 2025, 15:21:00 GMT
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Post: 11821499
Originally Posted by 51bravo
NTSB on CVR recordings as I understand - however read from a paper:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bD-hK3MsiA

remarkable: begin of pitch up 1 sec before impact (CRJ).
Having been in a mid-air collision with similar geometry, I would bet it was only normal input to approach path. FDR\x92s are incredibly sensitive recorders. I have a vague memory of the other plane\x92s wing flashing by. It looks slow in the videos, but it\x92s incredibly fast.

Subjects CRJ  NTSB

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DIBO
February 04, 2025, 22:48:00 GMT
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Post: 11821767
matching the info from the NTSB transcript briefing to the ADS-B trajectory:

Originally Posted by Sailvi767
Regardless the TCAS almost certainly gave them a traffic alert while above 500 feet
exactly at 500ft it seems
Originally Posted by Sailvi767
and displayed the traffic all the way to impact for the RJ crew.
to put "all the way" into context, 18 seconds is what they had



Subjects ADSB (All)  NTSB  TCAS (All)

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airplanecrazy
February 05, 2025, 19:16:00 GMT
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Post: 11822469
Originally Posted by JohnDixson
Dibo/fdr: keep wondering why the Hawk crew made that last correction to the right.
I don't think it make a significant turn right, and I believe that what you are seeing is positional inaccuracy due to MLAT position limitations in the ADS-B Exchange data. According to Flightradar24, " MLAT position calculations have a general accuracy of 10-100 meters and 1000 meters in the worst cases." Given that, I believe this previous post from MikeSnow AA5342 Down DCA represents our best current understanding of the actual helicopter track and its relation to Route 4 (until we get more information from the NTSB). I generated my own zoomed overlay and got essentially the same results



The position of the collision shown in the radar data overlay is consistent with the position of the RJ as shown in ADS-B Exchange at the time of the collision (approximately 01:47:59Z according to the NTSB timeline). See this link from DIBO for the RJ Track with timing AA5342 Down DCA In my experience, times in ADS-B Exchange are generally accurate to within 2 seconds. Given all that, I believe that the Black Hawk was within the horizontal bounds of Route 4 at the time of the collision and that it did not make the right turn we see in the ADS-B Exchange map.

Edit: Corrected route number and helicopter








Last edited by airplanecrazy; 6th February 2025 at 01:24 .

Subjects AA5342  ADSB (All)  Blackhawk (H-60)  DCA  NTSB  Radar  Route 4

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RSJ245
February 05, 2025, 19:26:00 GMT
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Post: 11822473
The last hole in the Swiss cheese was a vertical separation of aprox. 125ft by design. But the worst-case altitude tolerance stack-up results in about 50ft of separation. H60 tub to top of TR disc = 16', H60 @ 200' +/- 25' = 225' as measured from tub (rad alt location) to the water (I am using the NTSB +/- 25 number). So, the highest point of the H60 is 241' unless the MR cone height exceeds the top/height of the TR disc. CRJ was at 325' +/- 25 so it goes to 300' for this worst-case analysis and it's got landing gear hanging off the bottom of the A/C by 5 or 6'. A bad design was compromised by a minor non-conformance. I am not a pilot, spent 45 years as a QA engineer in that beautiful H60 factory.

Subjects CRJ  NTSB  Separation (ALL)  Vertical Separation

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galaxy flyer
February 06, 2025, 01:54:00 GMT
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Post: 11822687
Originally Posted by dbcooper8
Condolences to all impacted.
Questions:

Why was PAT 25 search light in the stowed position and not motored to a more forward position?
Why are PAT helicopters not M models with FD's so PAT 25 could have been coupled on route 4 while at 200' giving the PF more time to look for traffic?
Was there pressure to use NVG along route 4 to meet the hourly requirements for currency?
Why did PAT 25 not slow down or hold at Hains in order to pass behind the CRJ as per their clearance?
Why was it ops normal after a near miss the previous day and then only one crew chief instead of two for PAT 25?
Why was the controller task saturated?
Why over the years, as the airport got busier, someone didn't suggest, for night operations, only one aircraft on route 4 or only one aircraft on the approach to 33 at a time and prohibit simultaneous operations?

IMO while the CRJ was turning final to rwy 33 PAT 25 may have experienced the CRJ landing lights in the cockpit and may have chosen up and right rather than left and down. Note worthy, PAT 25 RAD ALT gauge scale changes dramatically at 200'.

Maybe an upgrade to Dulles with a high speed train connection...
By the time the lights were shining in PAT 25\x92s cockpit, it was way too late\x97collision was inevitable and unavoidable.

Not the latest model? Guess what, combat units get the latest models. These missions are transport, not combat roles. Budgets and priorities rule. There are VH-60s in the battalion, they\x92re probably not scheduled for check rides or training flights.

One RA does not rewrite the schedule, likely not even unusual in DCA. The previous crew may not have passed the event on. I\x92ve had numerous RAs, never a report. The NTSB has stopped asking for reports for events involving VFR traffic.

While nice to have, there\x92s no place for a second crew chief to have a forward view. And the CC may or may not be \x93in the loop\x94. They\x92re crew chiefs, not pilots. We had them on C-5 and they mostly slept in flight as they too much to do on the ground.

Subjects ATC  CRJ  Close Calls  DCA  NTSB  Night Vision Goggles (NVG)  Pass Behind  Pass Behind (All)  Route 4  TCAS RA  VFR

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Locked door
February 06, 2025, 03:31:00 GMT
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Post: 11822714
Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
.

One RA does not rewrite the schedule, likely not even unusual in DCA. The previous crew may not have passed the event on. I\x92ve had numerous RAs, never a report. The NTSB has stopped asking for reports for events involving VFR traffic.
This goes back to my comment about USA aviation safety being broken but the people in it don\x92t realise it as it\x92s all they\x92ve ever known.

How can you make that statement without realising how many red flags are in it?

LD

Subjects DCA  NTSB  TCAS RA  VFR

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remi
February 06, 2025, 21:27:00 GMT
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Post: 11823226
Originally Posted by T28B
A quick note for dbcooper:
The accident investigators will probably be asking questions similar to yours, and a great many more.

As to Dulles and rail: I am happy to inform you that the metro now goes out that far .
I had heard some years ago that the Metro was eventually going to get out that far into Northern Virginia, and it seems that "eventually" has arrived.
It does. I've been visiting a friend in Reston for 30 years and one day, quite recently, Metro was just "there."
Originally Posted by Torquetalk
Now, if the article made that point clearly, and did not concern itself with:
[stuff]
But as it was a blatantly political article that did not focus at all on the key things that are pretty much obvious as causal from this discussion, then it is surely just a distraction to serious discussion in this thread.

The controller does not appear to have done anything wrong, so what have DEI policies to do with the ATC side of this accident?
The passenger aircraft followed a procedure and got hit, so what bit of the federal bloat caused that?
The 2-crew helicopter apparently never properly identified the aircraft they were supposed to avoid visually. You going to really argue that the DEI or the government caused that?

Unsafe procedures caused this. SASess, please take the ridiculous politics to Jet Blast.
Avoiding the partisan finger-pointing, I'm going to generally agree here.

We all know there are issues with American ATC. But primarily, they are ordinary problems that don't need radical solutions. The solutions are generally more resources and more rigorous enforcement.

* One of my go-to complaints: Pilots not disciplined for erasing or overwriting CVRs following runway incursions and near misses. No blowback for aircrews refusing to meet with NTSB following incursions/near misses. I mentioned this earlier; hopefully 25 hr recorders will fix the overwrite part of this. Ideally the "erase" button would be removed in all cockpits where it still remains. I understand aircrews wanting to erase their CVRs and avoid meetings with investigators after doing something careless (or straight up idiotic) with a plane full of people, but, folks, how can coming to Jesus *not* be part of the job? We are blessed to live in a country where fatal transportation accidents are not presumed to be criminal (unlike most every other non-Commonwealth nation), and aircrews hardly ever have personal liability for damages. Yes a career might take a hit. That's careers for ya.
* Runway incursions in general: Over 1k per year for many years ... we have systems to manage this but they need to be continually funded, resourced, and improved ... HNL, MDW, LAX need to be sorted out aggressively (LAX is no longer the poster child for incursions, good work there, it's HNL now)
* See-and-avoid: It works as well as it does because of the very high standard of air"person"ship prevalent in the US, but it is absolutely guaranteed that see-and-avoid is insufficient to avoid midair collisions, as it is impossible to see all potential collision aircraft even in broad daylight
* Manufacturer quality: Until MCAS I'd have never thought that US manufacturing processes would (once again) become a significant safety risk, but, here we are, with no indication that the trend has been reversed (it's fair to say that there is some promise that there has been a reversal at the top of Boeing management, but effects haven't appeared at this early date)
* ATC hiring: Pay more, hire more, create alternative career structures that allow qualified "old" people in their 30s to start jobs at ATC while giving them a fair framework for retirement

None of this needs "AI" or "satellites" or "complete rework" or "woodchipper" to fix. It just needs money and constant re-commitment to safety, and commitment to compromising in favor of safety when a decision of "revenue vs safety" arises. Honestly I think it's mostly about money. Perhaps 99% about money. Perhaps 100%.

Last edited by remi; 6th February 2025 at 22:31 .

Subjects ATC  Accountability/Liability  Close Calls  DEI  NTSB

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PPRuNeUser548247
February 07, 2025, 10:20:00 GMT
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Post: 11823511
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees

Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.


Subjects AA5342  ADSB (All)  NTSB  PAT25  Situational Awareness  TCAS (All)

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hoistop
February 07, 2025, 11:01:00 GMT
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Post: 11823555
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees

Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.

Yes, but their ATC transponder was obviously operating normally in C mode. That should be enough to show PAT25 on CRJ screen as traffic, even if no RA was given (bearing in mind, they were cca 300ft AGL) It is of course completelly unreasonable to expect that CRJ crew should see or even avoid the Blackhawk incoming from (slightly) right, as they were merely 20-ish seconds from touchdown and manually aligning with the runway. Also, I believe that operating ATC transponder on Blackhawk allowed for clear view on ATC screen and I wonder if there was no alarm triggered on ATC computers - they probably do have such guard software in operation on DCA?
In another midair collision report, that happened in July 2022 at NorthLas Vegas airport, NTSB put out this:
Interviews with personnel at the air traffic control tower indicated that staffing was deficient, and most staff were required to work mandatory overtime shifts, reaching an annual average of 400 to 500 hours of overtime per controller. According to the air traffic manager (ATM), the inadequate staffing had resulted in reduced training discissions, and the management team was unable to appropriately monitor employee performance. The ATM stated that everyone on the team was exhausted, and that work/life balance was non-existent. It is likely that the cumulative effects of continued deficient staffing, excessive overtime, reduced training, and inadequate recovery time between shifts took a considerable toll on the control tower workforce.
I wonder, how this situation is with DCA ATC service.
I am not trying to blame ATC either. He issued clearance to PAT25 to cross behind and asked (and got) confirmation for CRJ in sight twice. It seems quite clear that helicopter crew did not look at the same airplane that ATC was asking about.
What baffles me here is, that it was obvious a routine procedure to let helicopters cross active runway heading less than 2 miles from runway treshold, leaving practically zero margin for error. Backups, designed to catch pilots or ATC errors (TCAS and ATC alarms) cannot catch up in short time left if someone makes a mistake, so this arrangement as based on "see and avoid" concept, in the night, with many lights in the background and a fact, that other aircraft on collision course does not move relatively on the screen, but just grows bigger. Unfortunatelly, that dot on the screen that will kill you starts growing bigger only in the last few seconds.
If I would ask ATC to cross runway heading DAY VFR so close to runway treshold at my airport with incoming commercial traffic, I would be denied 100 times out of 100 attempts. (and probably called nuts).
My guess on this tragedy is, that thru the years, the system was trying to pack more and more aircraft in the same space and same infrastructure, by gradually squeezing margins and safegueards, until one day, Jenga tower collapsed.




Subjects AA5342  ADSB (All)  ATC  Blackhawk (H-60)  CRJ  DCA  NTSB  PAT25  See and Avoid  Situational Awareness  TCAS (All)  VFR

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Capn Bloggs
February 07, 2025, 11:52:00 GMT
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Post: 11823587
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342.
TCAS does not require, nor use, ADS-B information (yet). If the PAT had it's Mode C ON, the TCAS on the CRJ would give full warnings... if it was high enough, which it wasn't. However, the TCAS issued a Traffic Advisory "Traffic Traffic" as the CRJ passed through 500ft (as per the NTSB briefing).

Subjects AA5342  ADSB (All)  CRJ  NTSB  PAT25  TCAS (All)

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YRP
February 07, 2025, 22:36:00 GMT
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Post: 11823982
Originally Posted by The Brigadier
The deactivation of the PAT25's ADS-B system meant that it was not broadcasting its position, making it invisible to systems that rely on ADS-B data for situational awareness, including those on AA534. There would be no signal from PAT25 to trigger TCAS alerts to pilots of AA5342. NTSB also said it was 'likely' PAT25 crew were wearing night-vision goggles, which have greatly reduced field of view, as little as 40 degrees

Quite extraordinary for a supposed 'recertification' flight.
As someone mentioned above, ADS-B isn't used by/for TCAS. TCAS doesn't work below 500' for various reasons.

The recertification flight might specifically need to be at night. It might even specifically require NVG. I also wonder if both pilots would be on NVG or just one of the two.

Last edited by YRP; 7th February 2025 at 22:49 . Reason: Edited to sound 10% less grumpy

Subjects AA5342  ADSB (All)  NTSB  Night Vision Goggles (NVG)  PAT25  Situational Awareness  TCAS (All)

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Chock Puller
February 10, 2025, 13:38:00 GMT
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Post: 11825508
From the NTSB.

Update yourself on what the NTSB is reporting.

https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/...CA25MA108.aspx

Subjects NTSB

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RatherBeFlying
February 10, 2025, 20:17:00 GMT
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Post: 11825695
I suspect the NYTimes simulation did not adjust the helicopter heading for crosswind drift correction + the wind aloft could easily be double the DCA reported wind.

The CRJ FDR should allow the NTSB to determine the wind aloft at time of collision.


Subjects CRJ  DCA  NTSB

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DIBO
February 11, 2025, 00:58:00 GMT
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Post: 11825797
Originally Posted by BFSGrad
The situation was actually more visually complicated.
And I think you can drop the "visually".
For the ATCO, there wasn't only the flow of arrivals, but a good number of (no delay) departures, all this on intersecting runways and, not shown on the screenshot, in the seconds (a few dozens of...) prior to the accident, the ATCO was handling at least 3 helicopters (Mussel7 / Medevac / PAT25), even not counting the police helicopter working in the SW corner as depicted in the screenshot.

And all this on three* separate frequencies, not fully cross coupled, so TWR was receiving on several occasions, simultaneous/parallel incoming R/T calls (* based on info from other posters in both threads here on pprune & NTSB info - but I still have doubts PAT25 was on UHF, although 3 or 2 freq's, doesn't really matter in this accident's context)

And simulations by VASAviation and the likes, are heavily edited (as they correctly indicate in their comments), so they easily give the impression that traffic and R/T comm's were relatively light...

Subjects ATCO  NTSB  PAT25

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airplanecrazy
February 11, 2025, 06:13:00 GMT
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Post: 11825867
Originally Posted by henra
First of all: I can largely follow your Maths. In a straight line the PAPI is a bit less than1550m from the Eastern bank of the Potomac on a straight 328\xb0 course. At 3\xb0 this would be 270ft altitude when crossing the -east bank. Both aircraft ended up in the Potomac. When looking at the point of impact of the Blackhawk in the Potomac in these videos I end up with a spot ~1450m from the PAPI.
On the other hand the collision will have somewhat altered trajectory of both aircraft, so maybe the collision had still occured over land and due to the lateral energy transfer the Helicopter was thrown off its original course towards the West and into the river. We will get this information finally.
And in the end it doesn't really make that much of a difference wrt the level of lunacy of this whole setup.
I think the collision was closer to 1250m (4100') from the PAPI. I base that upon the NTSB statement " At 8:47:58, the crew had a verbal reaction, and FDR (flight data recorder) data showed the airplane beginning to increase its pitch. Sounds of impact were audible about one second later," That puts the collision at about 8:47:59 (01:47:59Z). ADS-B Exchange data at that time puts the ground distance to the PAPI between 1200-1280m (3900-4200'). My assumptions are that the NTSB statement is correct and that the ADS-B Exchange data is accurate (which in my experience, the times are generally less than 0.2 seconds later than the timestamps on data collected by the FAA, and the reported NACp (position accuracy) was estimated at < 10m). Here is the graphical representation I generated of my estimated collision position vs. PAPI.


Collision Altitude vs PAPI

Originally Posted by galaxy flyer
Having been in a mid-air collision with similar geometry, I would bet it was only normal input to approach path. FDR’s are incredibly sensitive recorders. I have a vague memory of the other plane’s wing flashing by. It looks slow in the videos, but it’s incredibly fast.
If my depiction is accurate, it's hard to see why they would pitch up as normal input to approach path. I think their inputs would have been focused on getting down.

Last edited by airplanecrazy; 11th February 2025 at 06:30 . Reason: Problem with picture. Awkward phrasing

Subjects ADSB (All)  Blackhawk (H-60)  FAA  NTSB

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RetiredF4
February 11, 2025, 07:54:00 GMT
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Post: 11825889
Originally Posted by DIBO

And all this on three* separate frequencies, not fully cross coupled, so TWR was receiving on several occasions, simultaneous/parallel incoming R/T calls (* based on info from other posters in both threads here on pprune & NTSB info - but I still have doubts PAT25 was on UHF, although 3 or 2 freq's, doesn't really matter in this accident's context)

And simulations by VASAviation and the likes, are heavily edited (as they correctly indicate in their comments), so they easily give the impression that traffic and R/T comm's were relatively light...
In the linked article after the first paragraph is a link to the ATC radio communication. I think it is unedited, the crash happens after17 minutes.

https://www.npr.org/2025/01/30/nx-s1...ntroller-radio

Subjects ATC  NTSB  PAT25

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airplanecrazy
February 11, 2025, 19:28:00 GMT
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Post: 11826281
Originally Posted by SLFstu
I’m not sure your quoting FAA helicopter routes as having no defined centreline or width would strictly apply in DC versus what they wrote about the North Shore of Long Island route in NYC where they are required to be 1 mile off the shoreline. As shown on the published helo chart (DIBO’s post #863, and your little chart insert) and in writing (BuzzBox’s post #998) Route 4 directs traffic to track “via the east bank of the Potomac” from the Wilson Bridge to Anacostia River. If the impact point was 1000 feet or so (give or take some trig) from the east bank of a 3000 feet wide river at that point wouldn’t this mean that PAT25 was not only too high but off track too? Otherwise according to your graphic even at 200 feet max elevation, being that distance from the east bank any helicopter not maintaining visual separation could collide if an AC was still positioning itself from being low on the glideslope.
My understanding is that the FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig...2-complete.pdf . It specifies that on a fully printed chart the route should be 0.1 inches wide regardless of chart scale. The chart I pulled from was 1:125,000 scale (full chart size is 51x33 inch poster), which would mean the routes "appear" to be 125,000 * 0.1 / 12 = 1,042 ft wide. In the same FAA chart package https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/12-26...-Wash_Heli.pdf , the third page is a "Washington Inset" with a scale of 1:62,500. In that inset the routes "appear" to be 62,500 * 0.1 /12 = 521 ft wide. Also, if you look at the centerlines of the routes depicted on those two pages (which I "drew in" below), they do not exactly match. For example, look at how the full chart shows the route going east of Hains Point while the inset shows it very close to Hains Point.


DCA Helicopter Routes

Given these chart differences, I wonder how far a helicopter can stray from the various depictions of a route before it is considered a pilot deviation? Perhaps the NTSB will give us some insight with their accident report.

Last edited by airplanecrazy; 14th February 2025 at 23:53 . Reason: Emphasize the route "appear"

Subjects DCA  FAA  NTSB  PAT25  Route 4  Separation (ALL)  Visual Separation

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airman1900
February 11, 2025, 22:31:00 GMT
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Post: 11826358
Originally Posted by airplanecrazy
My understanding is that the FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flig...2-complete.pdf . It specifies that on a fully printed chart the route should be 0.1 inches wide regardless of chart scale. The chart I pulled from was 1:125,000 scale (full chart size is 51x33 inch poster), which would mean the routes appear to be 125,000 * 0.1 / 12 = 1,042 ft wide. In the same FAA chart package https://aeronav.faa.gov/visual/12-26...-Wash_Heli.pdf , the third page is a "Washington Inset" with a scale of 1:62,500. In that inset the routes appear to be 62,500 * 0.1 /12 = 521 ft wide. Also, if you look at the centerlines of the routes depicted on those two pages (which I "drew in" below), they do not exactly match. For example, look at how the full chart shows the route going east of Hains Point while the inset shows it very close to Hains Point.


DCA Helicopter Routes


Given these chart differences, I wonder how far a helicopter can stray from the various depictions of a route before it is considered a pilot deviation? Perhaps the NTSB will give us some insight with their accident report.

"...FAA depicted width of a helicopter route is governed by the following doc: https://www.faa.gov/air_traffic/flight_info/aeronav/iac/media/IAC15/IAC-15-22AUG2022-complete.pdf "

I think that the "width" that you are referring is for the chart maker but not the actual width of a helicopter route.

I can't find in any FAA document a definition of the lateral extent of a helicopter route. Is there one?

There are inconsistencies between the "DESCRIPTION OF ROUTES AND ALTITUDES" and the charts themselves. The Merriam-Webster's 11th Collegiate Dictionary definition of "BANK 2 : the rising ground bordering a lake, river, or sea or forming the edge of a cut or hollow."
for example "RT. 4: ... VIA EAST BANK OF POTOMAC RIVER..." while the chart depicts RT. 4 over the POTOMAC RIVER not over the ground bordering the river.
while "RT. 15: ... ALONG THE WESTERN SHORE OF THE CHESAPEAKE BAY AND PATAPSCO RIVER..." and the chart depicts RT. 15 over water.

Last edited by airman1900; 11th February 2025 at 22:33 . Reason: punctuation and quote

Subjects DCA  FAA  NTSB

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