Posts about: "NTSB" [Posts: 232 Page: 10 of 12]¶

Bit of confusion here . TCAS is not a separation tool , it is a last minute anti collision system . You are not obliged to monitor the screen, definitively not at 300ft on finals Not sure the CRJ crew noticed it . . Fact is the CRJ crew was not passed the traffic info . the reason why has been covered in the NTSB docket ( interview of the controller)
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "

It's not the controller's discretion, it's the pilot's discretion. If the pilot calls "traffic in sight" then the pilot is taking on the responsibility of ensuring separation. If the pilot hadn't done that in this case, then I'm sure the controller would've directed them to hold.

One of the Army pilots at the NTSB hearing said he'd always been instructed to hold when there was traffic on approach to 33. I'd be willing to bet that he never called "traffic in sight" in those instances. That's the crucial difference.

This incident was discussed in posts #1506-1527 of this thread.

NTSB Aviation Investigation Preliminary Report - N879RW (RPA), UH-60 (PAT23)

From a Forbes Breaking News YouTube clip in which the Chicago-based aviation attorney, Robert Clifford, answers some questions about the status and expected progress of the lawsuits.

The headline refers to Mr. Clifford attributing to legal counsel for American telling him that the collision is "not our problem", the "helicopter ran into our aircraft" and words to the effect there was no reason for counsel for one of the eventual plaintiffs would want to talk to the airline. There was context also - some questions related to how many lawsuits would be filed and litigated, and in reply, Mr. Clifford related that in the Ethiopian accident litigation, some families settled with the airline prior to litigation commencing in earnest. Not so with American at this juncture, he noted.

Mr. Clifford went on to say that the plaintiffs will "show their [American's] responsibility" although there was no elaboration as to the causal sequence of the accident (not that any lawyer would lurch far ahead of what the NTSB has publicly disclosed to date). He also stated that publicly available information indicates that American Airlines (or perhaps its holding company - this was not clarified) had "drawn down massive reserves" in "London", not difficult to infer that this was in reference to insurance coverage. Unsurprisingly, Counsel drew the further inference that American Airlines would not have done so unless it had liability concerns (in so many words) - as to which reasonable minds certainly can and should differ.

One perhaps interesting bit from the video clip is that Mr. Clifford anticipates that a Plaintiffs' Steering Committee or Executive Committee will be formed and approved by the Court, so that discovery practice will not need to be conducted multiple times (one deposition of a given witness rather than one by each plaintiff, and so on).

Edit: and the first federal court lawsuit has been filed.

H 'n' H.
Ordinarily I have no objection to lawyer bashing (and I've been known (in non-anonymous mode) to tell one or more good lawyer jokes).

Before stating why I object to the aspersion you've cast on legal types in the context of the DCA mid-air collision and the litigation arising from it, I'll suggest that probably most all forum posters (and readers), if not literally all, have heard either an ex-husband or ex-wife relate their unrequited frustration and anger at how the other spouse "got everything", "ripped me off", "took me to the cleaners" and so on. And then someone else will say, "yeah, and the lawyers are the only ones who profit in a divorce." The contradiction is rarely called out, but it is no less a contradiction.

But as to this case. The passenger manifest of the PSA flight isn't necessary to make this point, but I'm sure the estimable Mr. Clifford would consume hours of argument and pages of supporting documents making it clear that 64 lives were cut short, and many were people in the prime of their adult lives - not that one life should be worth more than any other life in compensation in court proceedings, but taking for example the relatively early career attorneys who perished in the accident, their earnings potential over the course of their careers is less speculative than, say, projections about one of the youthful skaters (although I'm pretty sure there are standards which have been worked out in the mine run of personal injury and wrongful death cases). My point is, this case will yield quite significant damage awards in the end. Yes, I realize that issues of immunity of federal agencies will have to be surmounted; having posted a lot about theses issues I realize they exist. Yet the citations of FAA orders, procedures, and rules in the Complaint does suggest that plaintiffs are ready to overcome the immunity argument. And I'm leaving for another day and place the consideration, how do you think it would affect the FAA in the long run to argue that "na na you can't get me" because of "legal technicalities" when it is pretty predictable at this point that NTSB in its final report will be, shall we say, either unkind or unsparing to FAA, or both, in assessing causes and effects.

So the case is likely, if not certain, to pay out big. The lawyers will get - unless legal counsel are using very different formulas than are typical in cases of this type - about one-third.

How is it then that only the lawyers do well? The argument is not about whether big-ticket damage awards can replace a lost loved one. The argument is about whether only the lawyers do well. "Grief" begins with the same four letters as "Grievance" and the crash victims' families certainly are individuals aggrieved by the negligence of some or all of the defendants. Maybe we can split semantic fibers over whether having their grievance abated by significant financial compensation is within the meaning of "doing well" - but under the facts of this case and their tragic losses, I think they will be at least "doing better". And so not only the lawyers.

This all having been said, apologies accepted, naturally.
WR 6-3

I may have a dig round on the stats when I get time (currently sorting out heating in the house so quite busy with pipework everywhere!). But I'm sure many in the FAA etc have done exactly that and it's why the NTSB came down on the setup at DCA like a ton of bricks. IIR, they suggested that the FAA look to see if there were other similar risks at other airfields as well.

Also, there were some comments a while back in this Thread that there had been a number of "incidents" (ie TAs) at DCA. Also, it's not how many compared to X, Y or Z. It's not just down to simple numbers - risk assesment is way more than that. It's down to the SME's involved.

Just a few incidents should prompt a much more detailed analysis which then reveals the true risk. If there are more happening elsewhere, all that should do is make you look across the board and ask "Where else is this risk present?" despite no evidence to date - in other words they should have indirectly flagged up DCA.

The danger is an accident can happen the very first time a risk comes home to roost - if you are fortunate, you may get some "near-misses" first as a warning ..... but you may not! But, from what I've read, I'm not sure the NTSB saw this as an "out the blue" event - rather an "accident waiting to happen". Finally, safety is not purely numbers - it's appropriate/intelligent interpretation of those numbers. One event can be more significant than a history of 1000 of similar, but slightly different, events

Anyway, I've had my say and much of this has been said before anyway so I'll return to lurk mode! And my plumbing..... Deep joy!!!!!

I seriously doubt that this case would be split into two trials. You are (of course) correct that the FTCA does not provide for jury trials, but there are many examples of advisory juries being used by federal district court judges (as you also suggest) in FTCA matters. My inclination is to think that district court judges have little apparent reluctance to empanel advisory juries in FTCA matters because negligence claims would - other things being equal - be precisely among the archetypes of claims for which juries serve as the finders of fact.

The practice of using an advisory jury in FTCA matters is, nonetheless, not without its critics. (See, e.g., "Advisory Juries and Their Use and Misuse in FTCA Cases", 2003 BYU L. Rev. 185) (2003)). Perhaps interestingly, the cited law journal article opens with reference to the use of an advisory jury in a trial arising from the incident in Waco, Texas involving federal law enforcement.

But in the current matter, let it be recalled that there are non-federal defendants. So there will be a jury serving as fact-finder already, and it would seem an even less difficult or concerning step for the U.S. District Court judge to assign the jury for the "ordinary civil case" the additional advisory role for the FTCA claims. WIthout claiming any knowledge at the level of aviator or related aviation or engineering role, the overall factual development needed to present the claims against the federal defendants on one hand, and the civil defendants on the other, are so closely related that the advisory role also makes sense from that perspective.

But are there federal defendants, plural? The Complaint names as defendant the United States of America (and includes the nice touch of giving the country a defined term identifier, i.e., "USA" - Complaint, para. 8). So on two levels, I would not anticipate* divergent let alone clashing attorneys representing, on one side FAA, the other the Army. A litigant in federal district court, to the best of my knowledge, has one lead counsel, and I'm unfamiliar with any practice of splitting the defendant. It might have a nice ring to it; I can almost phrase a law journal article built upon it..... "Splitting the Defendant: the Perils of Beat-Generation Hipster Slang in Federal Practice"...... but I digress.

Secondly, I have serious doubts that the "federal powers that be" will fail to coalesce around the essential facts and defense arguments. (There is a sub-sub-agency within the Department of [formerly Defense] War known as the Policy Board for Federal Aviation. I have no experience working with the Board but I have worked information about it - or tried to do so - into academic work. My understanding, provisional (or provincial) as it may be, is that a conflict between U.S. Army PAT helicopter training requirements, and associated practices and habits of the units involved on one hand, and proper structure and operation of the DCA airspace on the other, would be precisely the kind of matter to be brought before the worthies of the PBFA - but I don't "know that for a fact".) In any event, the FAA and the Army, with the NTSB about to levy some pretty heavy criticisms against them, are very unlikely I think to confront each other. In court, anyway.

* How exactly the USA will deal with representation of the FAA on one hand, and its statutory parent Department of Transportation, and also of the U.S. Army, is of course a matter to be considered, evaluated, and decided upon by the Justice Department. There have been sufficient divergences from what conventional wisdom would say DoJ would do (or not do) in particular situations in recent weeks such that I think it wisest not to venture any comment about the overtly political nature of the decisions which will have to be made. Besides, in my career I have not had the occasion to represent the United States in any legal matter, so.

I did not use the words "maintain situational awareness". I'd be hard pressed to pin down when SA is "maintained" and when it is not. To my understanding, SA is something you can have more or less of, and having more is safer, and has prevented some accidents in the past.

I also don't advocate for that issue taking center stage, but to taboo it and to say we can't talk about it ever doesn't seem right, either. The central issue in this accident is ATC's decision to routinely leave separation in the hands of a heli crew with night vision goggles and less than 75 feet of procedural separation. But we all know this by now if we've watched the NTSB presentation, so please excuse me for not repeating this with every post.

The central issue of the lawsuit is whether the level of safety provided by FAA rules, FAA/ATC procedures, Airline decisions and SOPs, Army decisions and SOPs, and pilot performance on the day are sufficient to legal standards. It's a complex interplay of factors, and even though it's clearly far from the deciding factor, I'm not going to say that a late approach briefing did not matter at all.

Anticipating what may be a scathing NTSB report, and certainly will be a highly critical report, the FAA and - through some interagency process or similar path through the bureaucracy - the Army as well will already be experiencing significant leverage for reform. Perhaps it will be unprecedented leverage given the almost incomprehensible series of errors which occurred in this accident (not actually incomprehensible, because they happened in fact). And although it makes sense that the airline defendants will have their own reasons for trying to leverage significant reform, one has to wonder to what extent the airline industry as a whole already is taking as strong a position as possible on the many issues in the looming massive spending on new ATC technology and facilities, and (hopefully) new ATM architecture overall.

As for the Army's public presence about this accident, no, you have missed nothing. The Army's witnesses at the NTSB hearing were (imo) well prepared for testimony, but if any other public statements by Army officials have been made, I've missed them too. I would note that one of the purposes of the PAT flights is continuity of government missions. Obviously this would not be a subject on which the Army (or anyone else with official knowledge of and responsibility for same) will be saying much of anything.

From Senate Commerce Committee website, following is a summary of the ROTOR Act - Rotorcraft Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform Act. Commerce Committee vote may take place next week.
___________
Rotor Operations Transparency and Oversight Reform (ROTOR) Act
Upgrading In-Flight Safety Technology and Fixing Helicopter Operations to Eliminate Risk
[Sponsors] Senators Ted Cruz (R-TX), Jerry Moran (R-KS), Marsha Blackburn (R-TN), Ted Budd (R-NC), Shelley Moore Capito (R-WV), Roger Marshall (R-KS), Eric Schmitt (R-MO), Tim Sheehy (R-MT), Todd Young (R-IN)

The Problem : The midair collision between American Airlines Flight 5342 and an Army Black Hawk helicopter on January 29th was preventable. For decades, the airspace around the Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport (DCA) operated without an accident, but with thousands of close calls that should have resulted in preventive action. The Black Hawk was likely operating in congested airspace without transmitting Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B) Out\x97a satellite beacon technology that can transmit location, altitude, and velocity to air traffic control and other nearby aircraft faster than radar or other transponders. The airspace is only as safe as its least equipped aircraft, which is why military aircraft must not play by different rules.

The Solution: The ROTOR Act
The ROTOR Act improves aviation safety, addresses FAA knowledge and oversight of ADS-B, and directs the Army Inspector General (OIG) to reevaluate its aviation safety practices. The bill requires:
1. All aircraft operators to equip with ADS-B In technology and transmit such information. ADS-B In is a technology for aircraft to receive location signals from other nearby aircraft and ground technology, improving safety in the sky and on runways.
2. Closes Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) loophole that permitted the Army Black Hawk to fly without broadcasting ADS-B Out. The ROTOR Act allows the FAA to only grant exceptions for \x93sensitive government missions,\x94 not training flights.
3. Requires the FAA to review helicopter routes near airports. The FAA would comprehensively evaluate the airspace at congested airports\x97where helicopters and airplanes are flying near each other\x97nationwide.
4. Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army\x92s aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety.
5. Initiates FAA study on dynamic restricted area for helicopters near airports. The FAA would review whether audio and visual signals could be deployed to reduce airspace confusion and avoid traffic conflicts.
6. Repeals a Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA provision that exempted the Department of Defense from enacted ADS-B transmission requirements.

Why This Matters: The tragic midair collision earlier this year exposed serious and systemic weaknesses in how civilian and military aircraft share and operate in congested airspace. While the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation continues, initial findings show glaring failures in oversight and coordination that must be addressed now, not later. The ROTOR Act was drafted in direct response to the operational shortcomings that led to the midair collision. Deconflicting congested airspace and establishing better communication standards between civilian and military aircraftis not optional\x97it is essential. The ROTOR Act does exactly that, ensuring American skies remain the safest in the world.

As a non-technical poster on this forum I sure as shucks won't comment on the ADS-B content of the proposed legislation. But point 4 of the summary:
"Directs the Army OIG to initiate a safety coordination audit. The Army Inspector General has declined to voluntarily review the Army's aviation safety practices. The Inspector General would conduct an independent review of the Army's approach to safety."

Why does this not make real sense?

The NTSB will very likely (undoubtedly, I think) include, in its report, quite extensive findings about the Army's operations. It was at least very unusual, if not unprecedented, for the NTSB to issue urgent recommendations to FAA in the immediate aftermath of January 29 with regard to use of the helicopter routes. On these facts, why is it not sensible to require the Army to undergo an IG review?

Although without a service record, I do generally understand the idea that the Army's task and purpose is lethality, at least in the meaning of that term before the assemblage at Quantico earlier this fall. Surely operating in domestic airspace doesn't make safety irrelevant "becasue lethality", does it?

One other aspect of this tragic and from many perspectives senseless midair collision is that very dedicated professional people in the aviation field are going to have their respective actions and failures to act in the events of January 29 scrutinized in the most harshly critical light in a courtroom. Bluntly, their performance will be trashed - the Army pilots, one or more controllers, and as discussed recently on this thread, the airline aviators too. On these facts, and hoping that reasonable minds may differ, I think the IG review isn't just a sensible idea, it's a necessity. It is something owed to those people, who are not going to speak up in their defense, or in their eternal regrets, from the great beyond. The least the United States can do is to find out what to do better. I'll work for the IG project, gratis, .... if they'd take me.

I would have thought that the IG office that is part of any particular organization within the federal government, and especially the senior level people in such offices, develop a deep understanding of their "client's" activities. Perhaps not.

I also seem to recall that somewhere in this thread ..... maybe it was a different thread ..... a handful of posts described the Army's own investigation process for accidents such as this, and the admittedly vague recollection includes reference having been made to the rank of the officers who typically run those processes or something else about the process. (Maybe about different levels of inquiry and hearing boards?) It would be logical for an IG not blessed with aviation expertise to nonetheless avail themselves of people with experience conducting official investigations, which would close much or even most of the gap.

Also, the NTSB hearing included testimony by Army witnesses who may not have had aviation expertise in the sense of flying but who according to the information from the hearing and Board docket were members of the Army's cadre of aviation experts. They could possibly be assigned to work with the IG (.....though I don't know how it actually works, obviously).

In reverse sequence;
Without an assessment of potential liability and damages, no defense counsel I have ever known would recommend settlement negotiations to start. What you say about some plaintiffs and their counsel potentially wanting to buy certainty of recovery in exchange for waiving possibly larger recovery later on certainly can happen in litigation. However in this case, the attorneys who filed the Complaint are, to state it (or to try to state it) neutrally, about the biggest guns in the business of litigating claims on behalf of air crash victimns' families. Sure, they might take the earlier, lower dollar route, and/or recommend such a choice to clients, but their reputations - and track records - suggest this will be the least likely course, and only much futher down the timeline. On the other hand, I have no role in the case and do not know whether the two firms (one in NYC the other Chicago) actually represent all the passengers on the American Eagle flight. (And do the estates and survivors of the deceased airline pilots have representation? Or the estates and survivors of the decesased soldiers? I don't know - and not getting into why they might have representation in this case or in general. Or whether an organization on behalf of ATCOs, in the U.S., or more globally, might seek to intervene in light of the facts being asserted against one or more controllers.)

Further, the government attorneys as well as the airline attorneys on the defense would be (imo) pretty far outside practice norms to recommend settlement negotiations without joining issue on anything yet. Perhaps one or more defendants will not file their (respective) Answer to the Complaint before broaching settlement, but doubtful this will happen (insurers' counsel lurking off-stage probably would insist upon an Answer being filed). And, the defense applying sovereign immunity through the discretionary function exception to the FTCA waiver is most likely an "affirmative defense" which, under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, probably must be included in a defendant's Answer to the Complaint. Even if your continued doubts about its applicability prove correct, it strikes me as quite inconsistent with the current Department of Justice approach to things to skip the pleading stage and jump to settlement. Especially when the opposing attorneys are among the biggest guns in this part of the trial bar, and especially with the political overtones of the litigation looming (as in, funding by Congress of the new ATC system, and legislation which may be lurching ahead of NTSB findings, as in recent posts about 'the ROTOR Act').

As to the discretionary function exception on the merits:
On the current state of the public record, it is pretty straightforward to say that the helicopter crew deviated from the applicable duty of care (i.e., negligence) - as noted, though, I can't imagine the Army component of the Defendant-USA just declining to contest liability at this stage. It must be noted that plenty of acts and/or failures to act by the FAA component of the Defendant-USA also appear to have departed substantially from the applicable duty of care. Maybe it's too cyncial to have this view, but I think FAA is more deeply entrenched in trying to prevent a litigated result that it had mismanaged the DCA airspace - more deeply entrenched than the Army because, as the airline company attorney reportedly said, the helicopter flew into the airliner, pretty simple. I cannot quite verbalize how the FAA would try to shift major responsibility to the Army and off itself, but the discretionary judgments FAA might argue drove its methods and processes for operating the DCA airspace could be the way FAA tries to do so. Of course, ultimately that still leaves Defendant-USA fully liable - just a politically different outcome.

But recall that the defense of sovereign immunity through the discretiionary function exception to the FTCA waiver is an Affirmative Defense. The defendant can rasie it even when the plaintiff has not sought to plead anything which would, by itself, invoke the issue. And in federal court (unless things have drastically changed since I last stepped up to the lectern in a courtroom with the Big Eagle on the wall behind the bench) the standard for pleading is "notice pleading" not "fact pleading". The Complaint just has to give sufficient notice of what the claims are about and what they're based on, and not all the facts necessary to state a particular claim under the specific substantive law. (Certain State courts still follow "fact pleading" though....been a minute.)

I think the point you were making is that nothing the Complaint has alleged factually, and nothing else about the accident that is in the public record at this time, suggests that a defense based on the discretionary function exception would work, or in fact would be worth trying. My view is that the government will take a very close look at trying to assert it. For example, the way the Army operated the proficiency flights in general and in DCA airspace in partiucular, including but not limited to use of NVGs, draws upon (it would be argued) policy judgments about the critical importance of "continuity of government" operations, and even the more routine VIP transport. Will that be enough to overcome the assertedly "clear negiigence" of the helicopter crew in their visual scan for visual separation, and altitude adherence (and possibly other related operational factors)? Maybe not, but I have no clear idea what process the Army went through to devise the rules by which those proficiency flights are conducted, evaluated, and so on. (And which a proper Army Inspector General inquiry and review would delineate, and with clarity.)

And for the FAA, how many times on this forum have posters pointed out that FAA's operating principle has been to move traffic in volume, and not to focus on what FAA eviderntly considers minor details of proper ATC methods and procedures? Sloppy discretion, maybe, but Congress recently expanded the slots at DCA (iirc) and so in a sense the United States did indeed exercise discretion.

I have posted several times that I do not believe the defense should be successful here. But what some non-pilot SLF and attorney writes (hoping not to overstay my guest-on-the-forum status) here might be many levels of altitude below what will actually happen in the litigation and in the courtroom.

The crew in the helicopter could not focus on an ADS-B In display as they didn't have one. However, if they had one, they could have glanced at the ADS-B In display to see which aircraft the ATC was referring to and to compare that position to the outside. They would know the airliner was very close and crossing just ahead of them. There was no need to check altitude as they knew the other plane was on final and they were not trying to scoot under it.

The following video is from NTSB, about 8 years ago concerning the midair collision between Cessna 150M, N3601V and Lockheed Martin F-16CM, 96-0085

From the description:

Thank you, I'd missed that. And on re-reading the preliminary report, I see that the NTSB described the routes using amsl. So I stand corrected on the route definition. That brings altimetry errors into play for erosion of the "designed" separation margin, which makes the design even more unsafe. But the point remains that PAT25's 78 foot deviation above the route maximum altitude is within the FAA's tolerance for commercial and instrument flying accuracy by helicopter pilots.

Nothing I'm saying in this post is meant to exonerate FAA or deflect responsibility away from it.

That being said, even though the FAA published a certain tolerance, and the helicopter's 78 foot deviation was within that tolerance, I think it is quite likely (if not certain) that on this particular subpart of the overall factual record, the plaintiffs will argue that the Army knew or should have known that despite the deviation being within the tolerance, such a deviation nonetheless was significantly unsafe and therefore negligent on the Army's part. It would be argued that the Army had a legal duty independent of what FAA published to operate its helicopters safely. The acts and omissions of more than one actor in a given situation can be oustide the established duties of care and therefore negligent. (I'm imagining that military aviators may disagree insofar as it may be an article of faith as well as military regulation that the FAA is absolutely the one responsible party for civil controlled airspace, but as a legal point I think plaintiffs will attack it.)

The process "to investigate and unveil" the key facts about simultaneous use of Route 4 during RWY 33 arrivals and RWY 15 departures will more likely be the NTSB investigation and not the pre-trial discovery activities, pre-trial motions, and trial in the lawsuit. The object of the lawsuit, despite what my esteemed colleagues in the legal profession may insist, is not "getting to the truth" or "learn[ing] the real lessons of this accident." (In the first season of the t.v. series N.Y.P.D. Blue (circa late 1993 early '94), one of New York City's Finest was charged with homicide. In a talk with her big-time defense attorney, he reminded her that a "trial" and "the truth" have about as much to do with one another as a "hot dog" and a "warm puppy.")

Unless all the possible plaintiffs intend to proceed with the same lawyers who already have filed a Complaint in federal court, other complaints with perhaps different approaches to the facts and the law are to be expected. But at this time, I think there's pretty strong reason to understand the Complaint which was filed as pitching the ATCO and one or more of the helicopter pilots directly toward a large Greyhound. If, after finding time (and attitude) sufficient to read every single word on every single page of the Complaint very closely, I realize that plaintiffs' counsel have not done so in the current Complaint, I'll frame some correcting post.

As a somewhat related point, and without intending to be a flame-thrower, what about the airline pilots in this matter? Imagine being one of their immediate family. The passengers and cabin crew will be part of the overall group of plaintiffs. With the allegations in the current Complaint, the pilots are being alleged to have operated the flight negligently - is this not a fair and accurate reading of the Complaint? But if this accident was caused - in the sense of the actual realities of flight operations and airspace and all the other actual aviating facts - by the airspace design and operation, and the wrong time and place flight of the helicopter - why aren't the families of the pilots entitled to their day in court as well? And I don't mean day in court just to defend their actions against allegations as in the Complaint, I mean in claims against the FAA and possibly the Army....... oh sure, sue the United States? I'm guessing the airline corporate entities which are defendants probably would not think that would be a good idea. And neither would airline industry trade groups - but maybe this is something for former New Hampshire Governor Chris Sununu to tackle in his new role as CEO of Airlines4America. Something that seems to be part of this is that the airline corporate entities are well-insured. But what good does that do for the families of the two pilots? - answer, it doesn't do any good for them, other than a probable off-ramp for the entire case at some point down the litigation timeline. And still without the families of the two pilots having their day in court to claim rights and remedies against the real causal agents of the accident. End of rant. For now anyway. (See perhaps Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, re: permissive intervention)

I entirely agree that getting the facts, at the granular level (that is, with as much completeness and detail as the facts themselves warrant), about how the airspace got configured and how its operation was established as those facts existed on the night of January 29 should be a strong focus - I would say exteme focus - of a real effort to understand how this accident could have happened. Including the names, and roles and responsibilities, of all significant decision-makers and others with non-trivial input into any decisions. As prior posts have made clear, the way in which the helicopter routes were used during particular approach and departure usage of DCA runways did not just spring into existence deus ex machina.

It is tempting to say that a proper discovery plan in the federal district court litigation - which let's recall has only just started - would indeed drill down into those granular facts. The case might actually see that sort of intense and relentless discovery. In the current era of electronic discovery and perhaps utilizing AI tools to continue to refine content of interrogatories and requests to produce documents (and, down the road a bit, requests to admit specifically articulated facts), more massively intrusive discovery efforts would seem possible. And I say "intrusive" because good and effective discovery really is like taking a sewing needle to one's finger to extract a wood splinter which has embedded itself deeply even if also visibly. You've got to keep digging at it.

If such discovery actually eventuates in the litigation, it could produce results approaching revelation of "the truth" about what happened. Still, seeking compensation for the families of the accident victims, and I'm not unaware for the attorneys for their work (if not also for validation and fulfillment in the type of legal careers they've chosen) will be the main lodestar for all that happenes, imo. (Whether this case ultimately turns out to be an example of the need for "civil justice reform" in the United States .... I can't predict. That would be like saying Congress should enact special legislation to compensate the families of the crash victims, after a proper investigation beyond what the NTSB will provide .... yeah, when Hades sets new wind-chill records.)

Same comments about the myriad previous incidents and follow-up or absence of follow-up. It could be the focus of highly intrusive discovery, which to be effective would need to be conducted in waves, taking information extracted first and then using it to dig out more. I should add, probably need to add, that whether the case management plan which ultimately will be approved by the federal district court judge will or will not contemplate such wide-ranging, time-consuming, expensive, and - to the defendants, "objectionable as unduly burdensome" - discovery is yet to be seen. Of course, the attorneys and law firms already in action (per the Complaint filed recently) aren't rookies, far from it.

One other comment which current Congressional action seems to make relevant. Already 12.5 billion bucks have been appropriated with another 18 billion supposedly somewhere in the Congressional authorizations-appropriations process. No one in the aviation community needs reminding of the litany of emerging and/or intensifying issues confronting the NAS. I happen to hold the view that the European and global ATM communities have advanced very significantly on defining these issues and working - albeit incrementally, and even though not without political issues - on solutions. New entrants, not least UAM. The introduction of AI into ATC functions. Cybersecurity (remote towers being a valid example of the locus of the issue). Of course the drive toward reduced emissions, whether called net-zero or anything else. Include calls for equity and inclusion. HAO; Class E airspace. Service Delivery Model of the ATM Master Plan (Service-Oriented Architecture). My point, which is only partially a rhetorical question, is: how could it be even remotely possible for the United States to design and implement a new ATC system worth 30 billion dollars - and which accounts for the issues I've noted to the extent they apply here as well as in Europe and globally - if the actual hard and distressing facts about the causes of the January 29 2025 DCA midair collision are not uneartherd and properly taken into account?

Visual Flight Rules aren't a local procedure.

I agree. The prudent thing to do would be to not call traffic in sight and let the controller give you a hold. But first you'd have to know the plane is there.

If that was/is happening, that's a huge problem. But I don't understand how the FAA would be responsible. Visual separation is initiated by the pilot, when they say "traffic in sight." Controllers sometimes prompt it (e.g. "Do you have that traffic in sight?"), but that didn't happen in this case. A pilot should never call traffic in sight unless they truly have it in sight and are completely confident that they can maintain safe separation. I do get the impression that the Blackhawk pilots may not have fully understood that. Both from the NTSB hearings and the ATC recordings (the way they don't even wait for the controller to finish speaking before shouting "traffic in sight request visual separation!")

"The 78 feet deviation by the Mil Heli is not the cause of this accident . I hope the lawyers during the trial do not focus on that and minimize the rest ."

It wasn't the sole cause but it was one of the holes in the cheese. If the helicopter had been where it was supposed to be (further east and lower) the accident would not have occurred.

The purpose of the trial is to determine legal liability. It is the purpose of the NTSB investigation to recommend ways to improve safety.