Posts about: "Night Vision Goggles (NVG)" [Posts: 101 Page: 4 of 6]¶

fdr, bdcooper et al. The L model ( and original A models), come standard with dual SAS and airspeed hold/attitude hold and heading hold. No separate buttons for airspeed hold etc-its built into the AFCS.
Now the M model is equipped with additional features so you can if wanted have a hands off approach to a hover ( any hover height ) at any preselected destination of your choice etc. M model came after I retired so I\x92m not expert on that operation.
The L model in this accident has the 3400shp gearbox and bigger engines, thus with say full tanks and three crew, and as I recall we increased the tail rotor authority. In any case, coming to a hover OGE or any other maneuver you had in mind doesn\x92t present any problems. HOGE/backwards 45 kts-whatever-have at it. Only other thing that may deserve a note is that I do believe ( subject to correction from current Hawk pilots) that they would be using NVGs which flip up so they may have them on, but can choose whether to use them.

Had there been a fourth crew member in the Blackhawk, which routinely would have been seated on the port side with a view in the direction the CRJ was approaching the helicopter....you reckon there might have been a possibility that might have allowed for the sighting of the CRJ and thus prevent the collision?

Owing to the vision limitations caused by use of NVG's it is not out of the realm of consideration Army policy would require for two crew members in the rear of the aircraft to enhance conflict resolution.

We routinely flew Chinooks with three crew in the rear with two designated to watch for traffic on either side of the aircraft. The third crew member was the Flight Engineer who controlled activities in the rear and performed safety checks. That simple concept saved my Bacon more than a few times.

Torque, the 60L does not have Bar alt AFCS mode. It does have attitude, airspeed ( merged ) and heading hold ( with coord turn. ). M model has everything.
Brigadier, the newer NVGs are flip up, so you can have them on your helmet but flip them up if not wanting to use them.

The busy airplane controller was relieved of a significant workload when the helicopter assumed responsibility for themselves. A helicopter-only controller could have stayed on top of the situation and had them slow up, turn around, go orbit something, or 101 other ideas that didn't involve squeezing between an airplane on short final and the river.

* re the NVGs, I found an old video I shot of trying to drive with mine and coming around a corner to a bright street light at first the light bloomed across a good portion of the display and then the thing ramped down gain until the light was a pinpoint surrounded by black. Good thing I had it on one eye! I assume that if you have them on and look at a landing plane with lights on you get the same, either blooming or black with pinpoints.

As someone mentioned above, ADS-B isn't used by/for TCAS. TCAS doesn't work below 500' for various reasons.

The recertification flight might specifically need to be at night. It might even specifically require NVG. I also wonder if both pilots would be on NVG or just one of the two.

We don\x92t know if they were looking at the wrong traffic or not, yet. We do know they hit the traffic they said they would pass behind. Might just be a military Blackhawk thing. A thousand lowtime Robbie pilots flying single-pilot are told to pass behind landing traffic routinely and somehow manage to do it. On this thread you\x92ve read that Blackhawks need two crew chiefs in the back to help look out for traffic, and that the pilots are obliged to wear NVG on this route even though they can\x92t see **** with them on in the urban cultural lighting.

Done this myself for 50 years, night, single-pilot, high-density airports, single and multiengine, never had an issue identifying the aircraft tower pointed out to me.

Keep looking.

They stated the crew was likely wearing NVG, this would explain that

and I expect a lot of attention will go to the NVG aspect, as per NTSB brief, the qualification flight was both 'annual' and 'NVG'....

absolutely . the altimeter talk is just a distraction or at best contributing factor, Not the cause .. which brings us back to the safety assessment of the procedure , which the NTSB did not mention at all,, but I am sure , or at least I hope they will go into in their final report.
In any case the procedure us currently withdrawn until end of March and I sincerely doubt they will re-install it before the final report is out. ..

A couple of new info points the NTSB clarified : Both aircraft were on VHF , so we can drop this UHF discussion , the Blackhawk had ADS-B equipped but was not transmitting , it was check ride with NVG, and they most probably all had them on .and there was a last second evasive action attempt by the CRJ crew, which go a TA previously . On the TWR, the CAs are displayed in the BRITE even with audio on ..
For the rest we have to wait until the next NTSB briefing

I hadn't intended to go all the way along the causal chain in my post. But since you ask, I think your answer only goes one step further. There are more steps to take.

Helicopters in busy airspace are not a problem if a safe system exists for separating them from airline traffic.

There is no evidence yet of the controller having made a mistake. He was undoubtedly busy, but that was not his fault. What could be done about it? The answers to that question take us another step along the causal chain:

1. The FAA could have provided more controllers. We know the helicopter controller position was unoccupied, and it's likely that closer monitoring and earlier intervention could have changed the outcome (notwithstanding point 3).
2. Controller workload could have been reduced by implementing effective procedural separation . If the DCA ATC rulebook allowed this segment of Route 4 to be in simultaneous use with Runway 33 landings, then procedural separation did not exist , however much anyone thought it did. At least 1.5nm or 500ft between flight paths would be needed to meet the least restrictive FAA separation standards, and this would have forced constraints to be applied to Route 4 or Runway 33 utilisation.
3. Regulations allowed the helo pilots to assume responsibility for separation. This is what happened, with the consequences which flow from the inherent difficulty of identifying and separating visually at night (especially while wearing NVG).

The authorities (by which I mean FAA and DoD) have questions to answer on all three points. Why was the helicopter controller position vacant? Did the ATC rulebook or staffing requirements rely on a false assumption that procedural separation existed? How did any such assumption remain in place after previous near misses? Is visual separation between helicopters and airline traffic a reasonable thing for regulations to permit, at night and using NVG? Ultimately it seems to have routinely been used as a release valve for the pressure building in the system due to the failure to address points 1 and 2.

Hopefully the investigation will be bold enough to ask these questions, which expand the potential scope of responsibility well beyond the individual controller and pilots.

It's an interesting comparison, but I am not sure it's fair to say that a controller would know that visual separation at night is unsafe or appreciate the counterintuitive point that NVG make it less safe. Of course, they *should* know, but since they don't need to have night flying (or any flying) experience of their own, they are reliant on being educated on that point. That would be a matter for the regulator (specifically, pilots and human factors specialists within the regulator) to ensure. The same goes for the more robust option of prohibiting night visual separation entirely.
Returning to your doctor analogy: if front line medics prescribed a drug which years later turned out to be harmful to patients, despite following all professional best practice and having no reason at the time to suspect that the drug had been wrongly certified, it would be grossly unfair to hold the medics responsible. Instead we would turn to the drug regulator and those who carried out the trials.

So this just cracks me up. He's in the middle of the river where the route says it's up the East bank, and that's OK because the routes are not defined with no procedural separation from landing traffic. He's instructed to pass behind the CRJ, but that would involve him either holding short or deviating over the city at 200ft at night, but instead he chooses to plow right on. The helicopter is out of his standard altitude, and the jet is way above the glideslope, and ATC encourages them to sort it out themselves. And the helicopter crew are wearing NVGs. What could possibly go wrong.

Understandable, given that he mistakenly thinks he can see the CRJ ahead of him. It hasn't yet started moving to his left to line up with runway 33, so he thinks it is still south of the Wilson bridge (it being difficult to judge distance from points of light at night, and impossible through NVG). He therefore thinks he is OK to plow right on and is not too worried about being 78 feet high given the distance between the aircraft.

He doesn't know his mental model is dead wrong because he latched onto the wrong aircraft in the cluster of 4 visible when the traffic was called to him a couple of minutes ago.

Here you go. I feel rage too. And I'm willing to bet that those responsible are not held to account. You can hear the, "we've looked at this and there are definitely changes we can make to increase the safety in this airspace" being warmed up. I looked at the other heliroutes charts for the US around NY & Boston, and I can't see any minimum or maximum altitudes at all. I'm sure someone who knows these areas can point out what I'm missing. But if I'm not missing anything, then it's a sign that the bare minimum is put out there for guidance, and the people who are trying to make the best of it will be hung out to dry.

So the message for everyone is to politely and firmly refuse to do things that are not in your own interest, to make copious reports through safety management systems of events that you see that breach the normal, and to stop trying to work around a broken system where you ultimately will be the scapegoat.

Not quite funny once the body bags fill up.
Your litany of how the holes in the cheese lined up might be missing a detail or two, but any of those holes not lining up might have avoided this tragedy.
I think I agree with you.
The rad alt is right there.
At night over water at low level, the pilots I flew with did not ignore their rad alt.
It was a part of one's scan.
If I know that field elevation is 14', and my rad alt isn't at 200' or less on a route where max altitude is 200', a correction is needed now, before the error gets larger. (The separate issue of going behind, and that tower guidance apparently being stepped on, is another pair of holes in the cheese).
I am at a loss to understand the apparent magnitude of the altitude error (they were still too close laterally, yes), but as I've been out of the cockpit for a few years I am not aware of what's being taught these days.
On most airlines, they do have a barf bag, still, in the seat pocket in front of you. Suggest you vomit into that and avoid the choke hazard.

I agree the altimeters are not as an important an issue as the flawed policies and procedures were. Were the helicopter routes originally approved for day VMC only while, years ago, the airport was much less busy and over time due to pressures layers of added operations were added such as night and NVG operations?



While the PAT 25 pilots, prior to take off, would set the barometric pressure each gauge must have no more than a +/- 75 foot error (FAA). One gauge may have read + 50 feet high while the other one read - 50 feet low which would account for the 100 foot difference in flight between the two barometric altimeters. Many mechanical and pilot input errors would be potential factors. Not common but sometimes a pilot will read back the correct setting while at the same time setting a different value by mistake. IF the 100 foot discrepancy was discussed initially on the ground it may account for the lack of discussion , later in the flight, while at 400 feet PM and 300 feet PF. It begs the question was radar altimeter planned to be used and if so when?

Even though there are some transmissions stepped on for various reasons, the words runway thirty three were mentioned a number of times. As crossing the threshold to runway 33 posed a significant risk to PAT 25 I would have thought the PAT 25 crew, to know from experience, that in 3 to 4 minutes from the time ATC reported the CRJ crossing the bridge the CRJ would pass directly in front of them at or near the same altitude. It's not clear to me why PAT 25 would not have reduced airspeed and or held at HAINS point.

I belive the simultaneous helicopter and runway 33 operations should never have been permitted. Clearance limits and expected further clearance times mirroring the ETA for rwy 33 given to helicopters to arrive at or hold at HAINS point would have be helpful in preventing conflicts.

The diagram shows the route up the east ~half of the river, solidly over water. The inset seems to show it within perhaps the east quarter, but still 100% over water. Asking crews to follow the riverbank therefore seems to be a direct contradiction.

You could reasonably define the bank as the water's edge, and therefore expect crews to fly along an infinitesimally narrow path. Or as the space between the water's edge and the [edge of the flood plain | first flat area | something else], which would imply that the western boundary changes with the water level. Both imply the route is substantially above land.

Neither are useful for precise navigation, but the map and the description are probably 'close enough' if they are only needed for general route guidance and knowing that structures on the east bank need to be NOTAMed for helicopters, but probably not the west bank.

A good reminder that measurements/specifications without tolerance are often worse than useless.

If it quacks like a duck... this kind of "It can't be an X because we can't do it, so we'll call it a Y" leads to a culture that gets used to massaging the truth for convenience. Did we hear more on the Alaska door plug that was an 'opening' not a 'removal'?

This just a catchy phrase to make passengers comfortable, just like the : " Staff are the most important asset of our company " on can see in the reception hall of many companies nowadays . The shareholders must be smiling a bit when passing thought those banners...

As many and I said before, discussion about Altimeters or width of VFR routes are just distractions to deflect from the real cause , which for me can be resumed into the lack of a safety assessment and safety case of existing procedures. We all had to do this when SMS was widely introduced in the late 90s It was not that easy , but we discovered a few holes that were closed.
Here in DCA we see a couple of procedures that would not have passed a safety case : e.g Route 4, Circling to RWY 33 with that route active, visual separation at night , use of NVG on that route ..etc,,

Flying in itself always bares a risk,, our job is to minimize the risk , not to eliminate it , but here the Regulatory ( i.e FAA) failed to minimize the risks.
As in the US the FAA is both the service provider and the Regulator , and is in addition dependent of political will and pressure for its funding , the willingness to implement unpopular measures, may be limited. A Judge might look into this differently but for those part of the discussion I hand over the floor to .Willow run 6-3 .

Why is route 4 set at 200ft? What is above it that prevents it being at a sensible height where it crosses approach paths?

Re the height deviation. When flying a helo at 200ft at night over a black hole (the river) you are very conscious indeed of your extremely low height. If told of conflicting traffic that you have to search for over/amongst city lights your attention is considerably diverted from pure flying and the natural tendency would be to squeeze back a little on the cyclic. I imagine that would be even more the case if NVGs were in use, tho I've no experience with them. That is a likely cause of the otherwise surprising altitude deviation tho we'll never know.

The more posts I've read on this thread, the more I'm anticipating that court actions seeking compensation for the families of the people killed in this accident will encounter very tough barriers.

This is an excerpt from a website of an actually well-known, very accomplished, and respected group of lawyers who specialize in (among other things) aviation matters. I'm not using their name and I don't have any approval, express or implied, to use information from their website - but if justice is to be sought for the victims' families, public discussion is - or should be - encouraged.

"A discretionary function is an action of a governmental nature exercised by a federal employee, but in order for that action to be considered a discretionary function, it must pass a two-part test:

There must be an element of judgment or choice. That is, if a federal statute or regulation prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, there is no discretion.
That judgment or choice must be susceptible to policy analysis.
The Federal Tort Claims Act contains a discretionary function exception that says the U.S. cannot be held liable for any employee\x92s failure to exercise or perform a discretionary duty.

Within the legal field of aviation accidents, discretionary duties for which the U.S. is not liable include the following:

Aircraft \x93spot check\x94 certifications
Weather forecasting
Failure to install equipment
The FAA\x92s design of flight procedures
The types of actions that are considered not discretionary, and therefore, open the U.S. government to litigation are:

The failure to issue air traffic control manual warnings
If air traffic control fails to warn of weather dangers
The failure to maintain equipment
Relaying incorrect instructions to pilots."
END OF EXCERPT [not intended as legal advice here or on its original internet page]

So to return to ATC Watcher's point...... the more posts I read about this midair collision (plus other information such as NTSB briefings) the more I am anticipating that it will require an act of Congress to provide for compensation for the families of the victims. Isn't it the obvious fact that convenience for people who work in Washington and travel "back home" generally speaking on weekends and when Congress isn't convened, is a prime and central reason for the way DCA airspace has been constructed and managed? Is it really going to be the case that because the lawsuits will - in all likelihood - fail to overcome the "discretionary function" exception, that the 67 families will be without a remedy? Is that how it works, then?

In case anyone thinks my sense of being horrified at this accident is clouding reason or logic, consider this - the book Collision Course discusses the PATCO union's genesis, the strike, and so on. PATCO's earliest stirrings resulted in large part from the 1960 midair over New York. Is the United States aviation sector willing to accept an outcome of this accident that in effect travels back over six decades? The point is, given the long-term shortage of ATCOs in this country . . . I don't think a court is capable of ruling that the situation, allowed and in fact enabled by Congress and successive White House presidential administrations, is subject to "negligence" analysis in the currently applicable legal sense. All this being said, this is how I arrive at thinking that in the interests of justice, some other means of providing for the loved ones of 67 souls who were on board needs to be determined and implemented.