Posts about: "PAT25" [Posts: 116 Page: 6 of 6]¶

This raises the question of what fraction of helicopter crews in that situation asked for visual separation. And how often did ATC grant it? According to posts above sometimes helicopters were held at Hains Point so apparently visual separation wasn't universal.

Apart from the IMC non-issue, the cause-and-effect chain of events and omissions in this accident is still under investigation. But I'll try to give some answer to your post - although I doubt my mind will latch onto anything new compared to the volume of this thread to date.

There are unknowns at this point about what information the Army PAT25 crew had in front of them about the altitude at which they were operating. There also are unknowns about the Army crew's visual scan (which, as a non-aviator, sounds to me like a complex subset of facts; I do work on maintaining strong visual scan plying limited access highways and even local streets and roads in my car but the instrument panel of my vehicle is, shall we say, somewhat limited in comparison). Add in the relatively fixed attributes of the physical environment, the background lights of the city and surrounding areas, the river, and so forth. Plus, NVGs, plus experience using same by the particular crew.

Then with all those factual matters still subject to fairly significant unknowns (at least as I am able to follow the developments), your question(s) turn to the acts or omissions of ATC. I am fairly strongly inclined to "stay in my lane" - meaning, there is a lot more about how ATC functions are performed that I don't know, compared to what I might actually have picked up from forum threads and other sources. It stands to reason that the visual separation set-up is subject to formal written rules and procedures, but I don't know to what extent these presumed rules and procedures reach down to very specific operational details. Beyond that, the signal-to-noise ratio of what more I might say would not be too especially good.

I'm reminded of the old saw that some one or another fairly well-versed individual has already forgotten more about a given subject than some smart-aleck will ever be able to master about such subject. I don't want to trip over that . . . altitude restriction.

One other perhaps non-trivial item I can add is that the attorney whose office has filed the preliminary claim (as required pursuant to the federal statute) is very accomplished in this field. I've met him at professional (Aviation Law) conferences. I have enough respect for other members of the bar who have amassed vastly larger public records of accomplishment - even those records which prompt lawyer-bashers to decry the profession and all who practice in it - not to try to pass off forum talk as the equivalent, or even merely reflective of, the serious legal thinking going on in that attorney's conference room. And many other law firm conference rooms. The issues in this matter aren't going to be simple, neat, or pleasant. Perhaps the air has been deflated out of the emotional shock-balloon the midair collision visited upon many folks; it is still my view that this was a catastrophe, wrenching in many respects the NAS all the way back to the skies over New York City in 1960 and the midair which ultimately gave rise to the formation of PATCO. And the strike, which led to, with respect to controller staffing . . . . .

Up to 205 documents now in the docket, including composite CVR transcript. Couple of things jumped out:

1. PAT25 PF started to turn right at Cabin John (American Legion Bridge), which would have taken them toward Great Falls; i.e., up the Potomac. IP had to tell PF to turn left, which would start track down Potomac River (helo route 1). Odd. Not the best SA by PF.

2. No discussion in the PAT25 cockpit about the called CRJ traffic.

3. PSA Captain/PF expressed to PM a preference for continuing to runway 1 but accepted runway 33. Media will make a big deal out of this. I don\x92t think it is.

My recollection from the CW3 Roth (former 12th AB pilot) interview was he said the opposite; i.e., due to the frequent bridges/islands in the river, PAT25 would have been flying referenced to baro for route 1 and 4 altitude limits.

And I forget who, but there was mention of RADALT varying with the depth of the water.

I\x92ve been listening to the NTSB hearings while doing other things last couple of days. All I can say is the FAA testimony is wild .

Normalisation of deviance doesn\x92t even come close.

- Airspace design. The heli route stepping down to 200ft max lead some army pilots to believe it gave clearance from DCA traffic. Spoiler. It did not.
- Controller workload \x93Just make it work\x94 was a common attitude at DCA
- FAA not actively tracking TCAS RA \x93incidents\x94 as it could skew data.. maybe it was correctly applied visual separation etc. Need to look at the background etc. Yeah. But it generated an RA 🤬
- FAA refusing requests for traffic \x93hot spots\x94 on low level VFR charts as \x93hot spots\x94 are on ground charts only.
- PAT25 wanted visual separation from the CRJ. ATC was required to inform the CRJ crew another aircraft was applying visual separation to them. They didn\x92t.

Honestly from a European perspective. It\x92s quite bone chilling.

I feel this was a systemic failure. Airspace design and Risk Normalisation.

And my heartfelt condolences for the pilots, of both aircraft, and everyone else involved including the ATCOs. Not that there weren\x92t issues\x85 but in the Swiss cheese model, the FAA bought the cheese, drilled holes in it, and invited everyone to take a look inside.

Slightly surprised by some NTSB comments as well\x85 they were presented that the heli was straight ahead on the CRJ TCAS simulation presentation. But in actual fact the CRJ was circling in a left turn for runway 33. It was stable at 500ft but in a left turn to line up with the runway\x85 wings level at 300ft. It was challenged by the airline/ALPA but I would hope the NTSB would have picked up on that.

Low point of the whole hearing was Jennifer Homendy halting proceedings and moving witnesses to different seats, as one of the FAA managers elbowed a colleague while she was giving testimony - at which point she went quiet. Infernce being she was being reminded to stop talking.

Thanks, BFSGrad-missed that\x85.Guess I was expecting resultant \x93 PAT25 you have traffic at\x85distance and altitude\x94.

How would the helicopter pilot know they had the CORRECT traffic in sight? It almost seems like the were looking at another aircraft. Can visual separation be successfully applied in such a busy night sky?

Docket info cites MilSpecs controlling altimeter accuracy for PAT25 aircraft; e.g., \xb130 ft at sea level. Part 43 lists altimeter accuracy of \xb120 ft at sea level. I don’t think these differences are going to adversely impact the safety of military aircraft operating in civilian airspace. The cause of CAs/RAs lies elsewhere.

For most of its flight, PAT25 was operating outside Class B but in contact with PCT. At Cabin John with PAT25 operating right at the Class B floor of 1500 ft, the DCA LC approved PAT25’s request to proceed Route 1, Route 4, to DAA. That was PAT25’s clearance into Class B.

Two interesting events noted on the recordings:

At about 20:00L, PCT calls helicopter traffic to PAT25. I count at least 12 statements between the two pilots regarding the called traffic in addition to radio transmissions to PCT regarding the traffic. Contrast this to the CRJ called traffic which generates zero discussion between the PAT25 flight crew.

At about 20:37L, there’s a traffic interaction between MUSL13 and BLJK1 (two helicopters) that generates a conflict alert. The DCA LC provides multiple traffic alerts to both aircraft, including direction, range, and altitude of the conflicting aircraft, even after visual separation is approved for BLJK1. Contrast this with the accident sequence where PAT25 is provided with a single traffic alert and the CRJ gets bupkis.

Trying to understand how the individuals and organizations responsible for the operation of the DCA airspace and associated helicopter routes expected it all to operate safely. Also not exactly trying to anticipate lines of inquiry to be conducted by the Dep't of Transportation Inspector General, although I think Sailvi767's comment points to a key area that will be examined.

My understanding is that TCAS RA's are inhibited below some specified altitude, in order to reduce or minimize nuisance alerts. Is it a correct statement to say that when the CRJ received the TCAS TA's referenced by Sailvi767's comment, it already was below the altitude at which RA's were inhibited?

If that is correct, then doesn't it follow that the CRJ crew - intently focused on the approach to and landing on 33 - were following procedure that has long been acknowledged for DCA Rnwy 33 - the LC will keep helicopter traffic from becoming conflicting traffic? It is (I think, but only as a non-pilot and non-ATCO) obviously true that in this instance, there were a number of inputs (and lackof inputs) by ATC, and likewise several acts and omissions by PAT25 which led to the procedure failing badly, with the tragic result. In other words, the clearest root cause is the fact that the acknowledged procedure over a period of years was that the LC (and sometimes a helicopter position in the tower) would keep the helicopters from becoming conflicting traffic - and through normalizationi of deviance, when this procedure eventually failed, it failed all the way.

In a previous post I mentioned that one of the attorneys representing the families of accident vicitims has said that claims against the airline would be investigated and possibly included in the forthcoming lawsuits. I suppose it is not talking like a stark raving lunatic to point to the many reports filed about overly close encounters in the airspace, especially in light of information found and then released by NTSB soon after January 29 which detailed many close encounters (as a non-frivolous basis to assert claims against the airline). But wait. They are going to argue that, during the last few hundred feet on final approach to Runway 33 at night, after having been more or less directed by ATC to switch from Runway 1, running through all the steps outlined (by Capn Bloggs) to look for the possibly conflicting traffic took priority over flying the approach - especially in light of the long-acknowledged procedure at DCA? I'm admittedly shouting from down in the cheap seats but this attack by plaintiffs on the CRJ pilots, as an means to advance claims against the airline, strikes me as a legal obscenity.

Absolutely, it was a non-standard discourse. But however you look at what was said, PAT 25 requested the change to visual separation. Meaning PAT25 correctly believed he was under standard 1.5nm/500ft separation at the time and that he needed LC approval for Visual separation to be applied. The change in the separation standard being applied did not happen until the LC accepted PAT 25\x92s traffic visual report and authorised the change. It\x92s not an automatic change made just on the pilot\x92s say so, ie by reporting visual, which I think is what you may be implying (happy if you correct me). Both pilot and LC are necessary (and both made errors here).

I may be mistaken, but my understanding is that the controller doesn't really have the option to deny visual separation. The regulations don't mention any response except 'approved.' The word 'approved' does seem to imply that it could also be denied, but there's no mention of how, when, or why that would be done. Even if they do have the option to deny, as far as I can tell there's no guidance on how to make that decision. Obviously there's no way for a controller to know whether a pilot truly has the correct aircraft in sight.

Ward Carroll posted some thoughts about the crash following the evidence a couple of weeks ago. He gives a quick summary of the faacts, and looks at the blame game.

He's quite clear that he thinks that ATC alerting the CRJ about the presence of the helo (using visual flight separation) probably wouldn't have changed the outcome.

But he does pick up on the cockpit dynamics on PAT25. He says

"Now, the most important facts to emerge from the hearings this week center on the cockpit exchange between Warrant Officer Eves and Captain Robach that happened just about a minute before the midair. He says to her, " All right, kind of come left for me, ma'am. I think that's why he's asking ." And she replies, " Sure ." He says, " We're kinda.. ." And she cuts him off by saying, " Oh-kay, fine ." And he finishes his statement “… out toward the middle ”, meaning the middle of the river and west of helicopter route 4. So PAT 25 is above and west of where they should have been as the CRJ is properly on final approach for runway 33. Using maritime rules of the road terms, the CRJ was the burden vessel and the Blackhawk was the giveway vessel." He quotes someone (David Cherbonnier) posting:

"In military protocol, referring to a fellow officer as sir or ma'am is the role of a subordinate. It’s use in the cockpit indicated ‘privilege of rank’ as opposed to the typical instructor student relationship. The instructor was a Chief Warrant Officer with over 10 years service as an enlisted person prior to selection as a Chief Warrant Officer and as well as met all criteria to be a check pilot and as such was the person in charge during the entire training/examination exercise. In any other capacity, a Captain represents a person who has been recognized by Congress to have the qualifications to become an officer. In my experience, an examinee’s response in a drawn out “ oh-kay fine ” would have signaled check ride over. In this instance, deference was given to rank. Was that a contributing factor?"

Hopefully he knows more about aircraft rules than maritime rules. In maritime parlance (to adopt his analogy), the CRJ would be the "stand-on" vessel (expected to maintain course and speed); the Blackhawk would be the "burdened vessel", responsible for taking avoiding action (giving way).

Some reactions and at least attempts at valid observations.

FAA and ATCOs. Did the Department of Justice's Answer to the Complaint throw the controller(s) "under the bus?" Yes, and no. In brief, the Answer does not state that the controllers' acts or omissions were a cause-in-fact and proximate cause of the accident.

The Complaint alleges a long list of allegedly negligent acts by the controller(s) in Paragraph 250, which starts on page 158 and runs on to 164 (in the Answer). Without having studied the pleadings for hours upon hours (as one might do in actual practice) perhaps I've missed something -- but I think the only admission made by DOJ with regard to the controllers is that a very specifically cited FAA rule or procedure of some sort was not followed: "the DCA local controller did not comply with \xb6 7-2-1(a)(2)(d) of FAA Order JO 7110.65AA, chg. 3, Air Traffic Control (Sept. 5, 2024)." This specific admission is made recurrently in the Answer, amidst many other denials of (again, unless I missed something) everything else in the massive and detailed Paragraph 250 of the Complaint.

Edit [forgot to include]: the Complaint alleges generally the following about FAA and the ATCOs.
"the Federal Aviation Administration\x92s air traffic controllers failed in their two most important priorities, namely to separate aircraft in airspace and issue Safety Alerts when aircraft are in an unsafe proximity to one another; that the air traffic controllers on duty failed to abide by numerous other policies and procedures, including that air traffic control failed to provide traffic advisories to both aircraft and air traffic control failed to resolve an aural and visual Conflict Alert that advised air traffic control that the two aircraft were on an unsafe and converging collision course; and that the air traffic controllers failed in their duties concerning the \x93tower team concept\x94 within an air traffic control facility so that all controllers assist each other to prevent, amongst other things, a mid-air collision. The Defendants\x92 [meaning, both the U.S. and the airlines] collective failures (for which they are jointly and severally liable) caused, and/or contributed to this senseless and entirely avoidable tragedy."

So, "no", because the DOJ does not admit ATC was a cause-in-fact and proximate cause (both needed for liability, if I recall 1-L) but yes, first, specifically with regard to the FAA Order, and second, for all of the reasons ATC Watcher invokes. Whether those several factors would ever be considered for inclusion in an Answer to a big tort case such as this is doubtful . . .BUT especially after the fireworks over Section 373, watch for the NTSB report to lay it all out. (And incidentally, the Complaint now includes several excerpts from NTSB hearing and docket - not sure if these were part of the original Complaint. The Answer is the first pleading in response to the Complaint and it has become the Master Complaint, as I understand it, because it is the pleading on behalf of all the plaintiffs, regardless of whether they are represented by the attorneys who filed the very first Complaint in the case. Further, according to press reports (WSJ print edition today) both the airline companies filed motions to dismiss. Thankfully, or maybe not, my Pacer account is acting up, so, no comment....)

2. The airline and its parent company. The Complaint paints a very negative picture about the acts and omissions of the airline companies and the two pilots of 5342. The Answer was filed only on behalf of the United States (FAA and Army) and so the DOJ does not address the specific allegations forming the claims against the airline - this is standard practice. Still, I found this in the Answer (re: Para. 174): "The United States admits that the AE5342 pilots failied to maintain vigilance and to see and avoid PAT25".

I am refraining from trying to summarize or comment on the many aspects of the story about the airline pilots and airline companies alleged in the Complaint. It is a very detailed story. It probably if not certainly will outrage people in the industry writ large. I've not practiced tort law, either suing or defending, but that won't stop me from saying that it seems pretty clear that the trial lawyers are gunning for the airline company deep pockets, the availability of punitive damages when those are not awardable against the Federal Government, the availability of a jury trial, and insurance policies. To state the obvious.

As for the Army, Para. 253 starts on page 168 and runs to 176; the DOJ admits some but not all of the many specifically alleged negligent acts and omissions by the Army and those pilots.

One other little item caught my attention. In paragraph 106, reference is made to "risk assessment" stuff the Army aviation unit conducted or did not conduct. "Risk Assessment", that wouldn't be the same thing as showed up in Section 373, by chance?

(For information, the case number in federal district court in D.C. is 1:25-cv-03382-ACR.)