Posts about: "Phraseology (ATC)" [Posts: 14 Page: 1 of 1]¶

sequence is not important . What is is the difference between passing traffic information and delegating separation . . in the US limits are being "pushed" to use a politically correct term in order to allow more traffic than the rules would allow . That is the issue here . Not the phraseology .
Same as using "side step " , a procedure made for parallel runways , here they do with with runways 30 degrees apart . etc..etc..

yes. if you look at the longer transcripts his initial call of the traffic was exactly that format and the helicopter acknowledges the traffic in sight and is approved visual separation. they some time later 30-60 seconds at least (maybe more) there are the more common published transcripts where the controller uses non standard phraseology in quick succession to attempt to point out and ask he helicopter to pass behind the traffic. the non-standard phraseology and voice is clearly stressed because its the moment in time the ATC controller becomes first concerned by the proximity of the helicopter and airplane and clearly he is making a quick call to try to see if the helicopter still "has him in sight" or if he needs to take action (like sending the CRJ around). unfortunately after the second quick non standard call the helicopter again responds they have the traffic in sight and will maintain visual separation. perhaps 10-15 seconds later the midair occurs. detailed audio long before and after the incident is here:

Once again simple rule played significant role.

One runway, one ATCO, one frequency , one language ( not issue here- but there are again number of phraseology deviations)

Yes I know, system is more sensitive to money than to safety.

N.B. what I find interesting, systems that are richer are more prone to safety savings.
You will never find in " small and poor " country one ATCO working on 3 rwys withIin busy CTR .

I have been watching this thread for a while now and felt compelled to respond, mainly due to some of the comments on here, a proportion of which, come from professionals within our industry which in itself is troubling.

Lets break it down based on what we know so far:

See and Avoid We have years and years and years of evidence about the limitations of see and avoid. It is not and never will be effective mitigation to a collision risk on its own. It needs to be backed up with other barriers such as ACAS etc. The human eye is particularly bad at spotting stationary objects, which would have been the case in this instance with another aircraft on a steady bearing. Those who criticise the aircrew for not keeping a good lookout are being disingenuous. The ability to judge distance at night, is difficult. Those who suggest the helicopter was looking up at the night sky, omit to recognise that the cameras on which you are basing that opinion, were at ground level. The crew of the Helo would have been at a similar altitude, looking at a background of many lights, with other aircraft barely above the horizon. The reports state that the aircrew may have been on NVG. This exacerbates the issue as they narrow your field of view, make depth perception even worse and of course, those I know of, do not display different colours, such as navigation lights. So see and avoid needs to be backed up by other measures and one can also see how VFR at night is fraught with danger.

Procedures - There is nothing inherently wrong with helicopter lanes close to aerodromes as long as the procedures that control such traffic are robust. I do not know what the local procedures state for routes 1 and 4 but I would expect them to include a limitation to ensure that you cannot use route 4/1 if an approach is being made to Rwy 33 or vice versa, an approach cannot be made to Rwy 33 if there is traffic on route 1/4. If such a procedure does no t exist then we could argue negligence. Lets assume one does exist. In that case, I would expect some process to block the route or the approach, using an aide memoire such as a flight strip or other electronic means. The recent crash at Haneda, highlights the need for such a safety barrier.

The Controller - Reports suggest that controller numbers were down to 19, which is woefully inadequate for an operation such as this and I hope the NTSB looks at what actions were taken by the airport to close in the face of staff limitations. We assume from reports, that the controller concerned was working in a combined position, with band-boxed frequencies. Looking at FR24 replays, it was quite busy at the time and we also do not know what level of fatigue the individuals were under. If the procedures above were in force, was a blocking strip forgotten? Was the controller overloaded or distracted? I hope they were not combining Radar and tower!

Phraseology - Others on here have mentioned about phraseology used. First of all, I cannot understand this machismo, that US controllers have to speak fast. Stop it! It is dangerous and you only end up having to repeat yourself. Others have mentioned about using the clock code. The Tower controller may not have the endorsement to use radar procedures and may have been forced to use geographical points. From what I have heard and yes lets wait for the report, it seems that the phraseology used was sub optimal.

Duty of Care - Some of here have spoken about the transfer of responsibility onto the helicopter operator. This is a pet hate of mine, of people hiding behind the rules to abrogate responsibility. Everyone in the system has a duty of care and Air Traffic Controllers, regardless of type of service, have an accountability to do what they can to prevent collisions. That is written into the highest levels of ICAO Annex 11

My condolences to all involved and my thoughts are also with those under investigation, who I feel may have been let down by the system.

Well said and reasoned.

The losses so far in this case are almost defined, except that the unfortunate ATC officer is a victim of nothing more than being human and working within the constraints of a system that he did not design or have responsibility of. He has the most powerful pumpkin in the world defaming him from the normalised position of gross ignorance to such an extent that even Fox news and CNN push back. I would suggest that a suicide watch be placed on this poor individual to protect him from the hurtful comments that exude from the incumbent of the WH. This guy is going through hell, as much or more so than any other person suffering the loss in this mishap.


PS:

Humans may be the frail part of the system but they are also the most resilient parts. We will have moments in the following months to doubt that, history highlights failures not successes.




No, they just not following phraseology rules.

Every single transmision has " a few" words more than needed

These youtube videos are perfect "devices" to learn youngsters why phraseology has no alternative.

Question: In the last seconds:

Controller instructed very firmly: "PAT25, pass behind the CRJ"

There was no such readback, instead:
PAT25: "PAT25 has CRJ in sight, request visual separation"
Controller: "vis sep approved"

Does the "request visual separation" undo the "pass behind"?
(just trying to refresh my phraseology understanding, its long time passed, my PPL is not current a long time since)

Here you go: Read All About It.
https://www.avweb.com/flight-safety/tower-brites/
This explains the different phraseology between a tower using a BRITE to help out vs. the phraseology of tower certified and equipped for full radar separation. It also explains LOAs for airspace. Where I learned to fly at KMLB the tower only owned up to about 1800 feet IIRC and approach had above that. In those pre-BRITE days it helped a lot for handling IFR traffic.
( I sometimes flew a Bell 47 helicopter there and the tower managed to organize it such that I never came close to any airplanes)

FIT I assume?

Lomon , asking questions is fine , but have you listened to the R/T in any busy airport in the US like DCA is ? the traffic levels and the phraseology , or slang I would say used, ?This not ICAO land with little traffic . The guy here was trained to work like this , single position , 2 runways and VFRs crossings on 2 different frequencies. Your suggestion of what he should have said like " if not sighted do that ,etc," does not fit in here . No time for long sentences,,. The procedures were completely wrong , not the controller...
Absolutely , but you were not asking a question , you were making suggestions on what the controller could have done ,.

Apologies on not using accurate terminology wrt being stepped up solutions but;
the technology is available to stop dual transmissions, even a warning light in the cockpit (ATC station).when simultaneous transmissions are being made would help safety.

On the collision avoidance technology the CAA gave a grant of \xa3250 towards the cost of approved FLARM devices one of which I have - XC TRACER MAXX - which also has FANET.

The swiss invented FLARM nearly 30 years ago and marketed it at cost; it has been obligatory in France for glider operations for the last decade. According to the CAA website it is better than the ADS-B out.

The telecommunication industry has come a long way from the necessity of climbing into the electrical bay and re racking or thumping a radio module but basic cockpit radio procedures haven’t.

What appears to be also relevant is the language and associated phraseology; there was a narrow airmiss in Dublin between an executive jet on take off and a private helicopter pilot caused by ambiguous crossing clearance issued - cross behind the rolling aircraft IIRC which the helicopter pilot took to mean the aircraft rolling down the runway after landing whereas the controller meant the executive jet about to roll; the copilot stuffed the stick forward after take off and passed underneath helicopter.

In this accident I presume that all were Americans; flying around a southern French airfield the controller standard can be diabolical.

Really do not physically have the time to listen to all the tapes .and watch all the videos, In case someone did , was there anything of relevance , ( e.g. new) from the ATC staff interviews ?. Was the missing traffic info discussed , the phraseology used , why previous incidents were not followed by changes in procedures ? That sort of things. Thanks in advance,

The transcript of NTSB interview with the local controller is available as one of the articles. Part way through it but was it most obvious, perhaps with the benefit of hindsight, is how poorly constructed some of the questions are - ambiguous and at times, leading.

Bit of confusion here . TCAS is not a separation tool , it is a last minute anti collision system . You are not obliged to monitor the screen, definitively not at 300ft on finals Not sure the CRJ crew noticed it . . Fact is the CRJ crew was not passed the traffic info . the reason why has been covered in the NTSB docket ( interview of the controller)
In class B , controllers will provide separation between IFR and VFR however they can delegate separation to an aircrfat visually following a strict procedure and phraseology .and issuing an ATC Instruction : " maintain visual separation "